February 17, 2015:
Despite a steadily shrinking American defense budget since 2010 special operations troops have been exempt from these cuts because they are still in big demand. That’s because SOCOM (Special Operations Command) is the most expert and effective force for counter-terror operations. This was realized from the beginning. Since 2001, SOCOM has gotten a lot more money. Annual SOCOM spending has gone from $2.6 billion in 2001 to over $10 billion. This is about 1.6 percent of the defense budget. That’s just the budget for SOCOM, you can nearly triple that if you include all the additional support (troops, spy satellites, aircraft support and air freight) SOCOM can (by law) and often (out of necessity) can call on. Still that’s less than five percent of the defense budget for a force of 70,000 troops (seven percent of military personnel). Thus since 2001 SOCOM spending has more than quadrupled, personnel strength has only doubled, to a current strength of 70,000. This includes many support specialists, as well as the 10,000 Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs, Marine Corps, and Air Force operators.
All this expansion and extra work has created some serious internal problems. The most serious problem is that after 14 years of intense counter-terror operations a lot of the most skilled and heavily used SOCOM personnel are leaving the military. In addition to all the time overseas, usually in a combat zone, there is the constant temptation to take a higher paying, safer and less travel intensive job in the commercial sector. Because the Special Forces troops are the product of an exacting screening and training process, they are in big demand by intelligence agencies as well.
It’s not just the damage to family life that is causing the exodus but also the differences in opinion between SOCOM experts on the ground and journalists, politicians and pundits back in the homeland. The operators, especially the U.S. Army Special Forces, know the local languages and culture in Arabia, Afghanistan and other Islamic countries. These experts long knew (and warned) that the Islamic world was undergoing an explosive and long-term reformation that was not going to be quieted down quickly enough for the leadership and “experts” back home. The Special Forces spent a lot of time “drinking tea” (meeting with local leaders) to learn all this and knew that this long war has been going on for a thousand years and heated up early in the 20th century, not on September 11, 2001. The Special Forces see the solution as more deal making and support for the Islamic reformers, not more spectacular raids that please the media and publicity hungry politicians (and senior generals who go along with this deadly theater).
Another problem is the growing of bureaucracy and bureaucratic obstacles within SOCOM. In 2001 you could get things done fast. Something that might take the regular army years (new equipment especially) would take SOCOM weeks. Not so much anymore and that has led to some morale problems, especially among the operators.
Thus while SOCOM has escaped the budget and personnel cuts (and is even continuing to gain a bit) the growing loss of key personnel is becoming a major problem. In response to queries about this SOCOM commanders now have to explain to the politicians that the real world doesn't quite work like it does in adventure novels and movies. While SOCOM is glad to hear that their budget (about $10.5 billion a year) won't be cut, they also remind everyone that you cannot mass produce more special operations personnel, especially the "operators" who seem capable of doing anything in the combat zone. Another problem is that over a decade of fighting has worn out the current generation of commandos. Additional recruits are harder to come by. The politicians may not listen and the results will not be pretty.
Nevertheless, while people are critical to the success of special operations (commandos and such), money helps a lot. Currently, 10,000 of these commando type troops are overseas, mainly in Afghanistan. Sounds good, doesn't it? Unfortunately there's a major downside: burnout. While most of the increased money has gone to buying better equipment, replacing worn out stuff, and providing better training, getting new people has been much more difficult.
Not surprisingly, 60 percent of SOCOM's current troops signed up after September 11, 2001. But an increasing number are leaving the military, despite reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000. The problems are many, including overwork and poor leadership from the top. While the number of SOCOM personnel has doubled, the number overseas at any time has quadrupled. Many SOCOM personnel are spending more than half their time overseas, usually in a combat zone. There, Special Forces troops take the lead in intelligence gathering and capturing or killing key terrorists. It's mentally and physically exhausting work. Unlike past wars, these troops can remain in touch with families back home, for better or worse. While it's been a long war most SOCOM operators realize that it could easily go on for another decade. Thus SOCOM has learned to say "no" more often, otherwise the expansion will go into reverse as many more exhausted operators leave the service.
Trying to recruit replacements is a solution that won't work. A U.S. Army effort to recruit another 2,300 operators (as members of the Special Forces are called) turned out to be a hard slog. Qualified candidates are out there, but it's hard to convince them to endure the additional effort, stress, and danger to become a Special Forces operator (or a SEAL, Ranger, Pararescue Jumper). Even with higher pay ($10,000 or more additional a year) and high reenlistment bonuses (adding about $10,000 more a year), it's hard to find the men who can meet the high standards and are willing to put up with the large amount of time spent overseas and other problems.
Recruiting and training more operators is a time consuming process, as it takes about three years to get a Special Forces recruit up to a basic level of competence. It takes another few years in the field before such men are ready for anything serious. At least half of those recruited are lost (quit, wash out) before they reach their full capability. Recruiting to expand the number of operators began right after September 11, 2001. That led to SOCOM being told to increase its strength by 43 percent, and then do it again. As expected it was easier to get new support people than more operators.
Casualties are less of an issue than you might think for such dangerous work. SOCOM casualties are actually lower than in infantry or marine units. While SOCOM operators comprise about ten percent of all combat troops, they have only suffered six percent of the combat deaths and four percent of the wounded. The big issue has always been overwork. Combat operations wear troops out. Elite men like SOCOM operators can handle more stress than your average infantryman, but they have their limits as well. Moreover, most Special Forces operators are married and have families. Being away from the wife and kids for extended periods often causes more stress. Keep the operators out there for too long at a time and you'll lose them to resignations, retirement or, rarely, combat fatigue. It's not just the equipment that is being worn out.
Most Americans tend to forget that the U.S. Special Forces are a unique organization in military, and intelligence, history. No other nation has anything like the Special Forces and never has. While other nations have some operators skilled in understanding foreign cultures, the idea of training thousands of troops to very high standards, then having them study foreign languages and cultures, is unique to the Special Forces. The war on terror is the kind of war Special Forces are perfectly suited to deal with. But now that this unique kind of war is under way, we find that those soldiers uniquely suited to fight it are in short supply. This is largely because Special Forces set high standards, and has resisted all attempts to lower those standards. One hard lesson the Special Forces has learned in the past sixty years is that lowering standards just increases the chances of failure, and getting your people killed.
After 2011, SOCOM shifted forces from Iraq (where it had 5,500 personnel in 2008) to Afghanistan (where it had 3,000 troops in 2008). By 2011 the ratio was reversed, with 7,000 in Afghanistan and under 3,000 in Iraq. By 2012 there were no SOCOM troops in Iraq and over 8,000 in Afghanistan. In 2013 SOCOM troops started to move from Afghanistan to other Islamic terrorist hot spots like Africa and Arabia. In 2014 SOCOM began sending troops back to Iraq.
SOCOM personnel are still in big demand overseas. But the longer the United States tries to fill this inexhaustible demand, the fewer operators there will be to meet the demand.