December 28,
2008: U.S. plans to increase its Afghan troop strength are in flux. The most
recent plans are to basically double U.S. strength there (from 32,000 to 60-65,000.) This would mean five or six combat
brigades, an aviation brigade and lots more intelligence and Special Forces troops.
This would mean about a dozen more battalions of U.S. infantry, as the new
brigade structure has reduced the number of battalions from three to two. But
each battalion now has four combat companies, instead of three. The aviation
brigade has about a hundred helicopters (half transport, half combat). The new
brigades also have more support troops (all trained to fight) attached. It would take about 18 months to get all the
new forces to Afghanistan. That would then result in a Western force of about 100,000
troops (62,000 U.S. and 40,000 NATO). In that time, the Afghans are expected to
expand their own security forces (police and army), arm and train some tribal
militias, to produce a total force of nearly 300,000 local and foreign troops
and police.
Canada, and
some other NATO members, object to the U.S. plan to provide weapons and
training to form more reliable anti-Taliban militias. The U.S. and Britain
believe these militias are an acceptable risk. All the dozens of tribes (and
many more major clans) in Afghanistan have militias. These are usually very
much "come as you are" operations, with men armed with their personal
weapons, and leaders providing (if they are flush enough) vehicles,
communications (radios, walkie-talkies, satellite phones, whatever) and other
essentials (food, medical care.) Quality varies enormously. Those tribes or
clans that are into the drug business are much better equipped (including
protective vests, night vision devices and plenty of ammo.) The pro-Taliban tribes
are not quite as well off, obtaining additional money from drug lords (for
helping keep the police away from the drug operations) and Islamic charities
(whose money is supposed to go for non-combat improvements, but often doesn't.)
Many NATO
nations are appalled at the amount of corruption in Afghanistan, with tribal
leaders often keeping most of the aid provided to their tribe, for themselves. These
nations prefer to put more effort into cleaning up the government, police
(which are notoriously inept and corrupt) and improving the army (which is
pretty good, but small). But the Americans and British have worked with these
tricky tribal situations often in the past. As the Brits like to put it,
"who dares, wins." The Americans have decades of experience with the
tribes, having been there since the 1980s, during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.
Europeans don't always trust American combat experience, it being an article of
faith in Europe that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a mistake, and winning that
war was a fluke. Those lucky, but ignorant, Americans! The anti-militia crowd
will lose this argument, but you'll see a lot about it in the media. Allies
squabbling, whether real or imagined, makes for exciting news. But the basic American
strategy is to play the game the Afghan way. The tribes are in it for the long
haul, and will change sides if they sense they are losing. The Americans and
Brits want to use superior firepower, mobility and cash reserves to flip as
many tribes as possible, as quickly as possible, to hand the Taliban a very
obvious, and well publicized "defeat."
The tribal
militia strategy means getting involved with the many disputes between tribes.
The Americans recognize that you cannot avoid these disputes. If you are in the
area, the local tribes consider you a player. So the Americans want to play
with a plan, and a strong hand. Many Europeans are aghast at this approach, but
the Americans point out that this is what is. Wishing Afghanistan were less
chaotic and easier to deal with will not accomplish anything. It's a nasty and
unpredictable corner of the world, and if you want to win, you have to play by
local rules. It would take generations to "civilize" the rural
population to a European standard. A victory of sorts can be obtained much more
quickly. The U.S. is sending thousands
of additional intelligence and Special Forces troops, along with new equipment
that makes it easier to watch the ground below, and pick up enemy
transmissions. U.S. intel forces have become quite adept at sorting out tribal
politics. While the tribes of Iraq and Afghanistan are quite different, they
share many similarities, and numerous American intel officers, with lots of Iraq experience,
have already done tours in Afghanistan. The Americans believe they have the
knowledge, and experience, to play the Afghan tribes. In most cases, the enhanced
tribal militias will mainly be for gathering better intelligence. The Western
troops are still much better and (more importantly) reliable fighters. Afghan
tribal leaders are notorious for looking out for their own best interests, and
not digging in for suicidal last stands.
The U.S. sees
the Taliban as a tribal confederation dedicated to opposing the central
government. This has been a popular tribal activity for centuries. In the past,
it was often the goal of the tribal coalition to capture Kabul (long seen as
the national capital), and become the new central government. The Taliban have
a problem in that they did this in the mid-1990s, and the government they
established had, by the late 1990s, become very unpopular. Tribal leaders have
memories, and are willing to use the Taliban (to keep the government from
interfering with drug running, smuggling or whatever), but not be ruled by
them. The Taliban try to collect a "tax" (about ten percent) in areas
where they are strong enough to keep the police and army at bay. The Taliban
also elect loyal locals as government officials, but play down the return of
the Taliban controlling the central government. This is practical, because the
majority of Afghans are hostile to the Taliban, and have recent experience to
explain why. If ties to the Taliban become a liability, tribal leaders will cut
them. This has been happening regularly for the last six years, and the Afghan
government has a department dedicated to making and maintaining such
arrangements. The new U.S. forces will be put to work giving these bureaucrats
lots more work.
