The Littoral Combat Ship program
has suffered a serious blow with the Navy terminating the construction of
LCS-3, which was being built by Lockheed Martin ("LockMart"). This
move could place the monohull configuration (Freedom-class) at a disadvantage
against the trimaran design (Independence-class) that General Dynamics is
using. Both LCS programs are suffering from serious cost overruns, and the Navy
will be monitoring the progress of LCS-2 and LCS-4 carefully.
The LCS is intended to be a low-end vessel with a
high top speed (over 90 kilometers per hour), and capable of carrying out a
number of missions, including minesweeping, anti-submarine warfare, special
operations support, intelligence/surveillance, and even logistics through a
modular design that would allow the ships to use various mission packages.
These ships were intended to replace the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and
other vessels. So far, the cost for the LCS has ballooned to roughly $200
million, and this is before any mission packages are added. The basic armament
of the LCS is a 57mm gun, point-defense systems like the Rolling Airframe
Missile and the Phalanx Close-in-Weapon System, and a variety of decoys and
electronic warfare gear.
The LCS, like the new DDG-1000 destroyer, is
several times more expensive than the previous vessel in its class. The Oliver
Hazard Perry-class frigates cost around $68 million each to build (some $200
million today). For that money, the Navy got a 3,600 ton warship with a top
speed of 55 kilometers per hour, a 76mm gun, the ability to carry two
helicopters, and (prior to the removal of the Mark 13 missile launchers) the
ability to use Standard surface-to-air missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
The Perry also proved to be a very tough design in the 1980s, with the Stark
and Samuel B. Roberts surviving anti-ship missile hits and a mine respectively.
The debate over ship costs and who is to blame for
them will rage for a while as the Navy will not only have to fight contractors
(and their congressional patrons), but also among themselves as they have to
decide whether to keep building older designs like the Burke-class destroyers
(about $1 billion each). The blame really goes all-around. The contractors
often submit bids that are on the low side, but at the same time, the Navy has
had a nasty habit of introducing essential, and non-essential, changes that
drive the costs up.
Environmental regulations have also gotten stricter
- often standards that are tightened just for the sake of tightening them. This
costs shipbuilders money - and the costs get passed on to the consumer (in this
case, the U.S. Navy). Finally, the peace dividend led to the consolidation of
many parts of the defense industry, including shipbuilding. As orders declined
(the Seawolf was cut from a planned production of 29 to three), some shipyards
re-tooled for civilian production while others went out of business. Many of
the workers and designers left as well, and have retired or otherwise moved on.
In a very real sense, the Navy is paying a delayed price for the peace dividend
of the 1990s in the form of higher shipbuilding costs and problems getting new
ship designs right. - Harold C. Hutchison (firstname.lastname@example.org)