January 26, 2026: Europeans continue to worry about how they will handle the Russian threat. It seems odd that 700 Europeans should be asking 327 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians. So far Russia has lost 1.2 million troops in Ukraine and is running out of Russians willing to fight the Ukrainians. Currently Russia is obtaining North Koreas and Cuban troops, plus thousands of foreign military-age men in Russia, to maintain a credible force in Ukraine. Russian forces are not attacking as much as they used to because those attacks are usually pointless against better trained and armed Ukrainians who use lots of drones and defensive tactics optimized to kill or wound as many Russian attackers as possible. Russia is having a hard time maintaining a force in Ukraine that can adequately man the thousand kilometer front line. Russia is no longer a ground threat in Ukraine, but an uninvited guest seeking a reasonable excuse to leave.

The current situation is nothing new. Twelve years ago, Russian threats to use military force against Ukraine were dismissed as bluffing. For over a decade Russia had been struggling to modernize its armed forces, most of which are still equipped with pre-1991 Cold War era weapons and equipment. Despite increasing defense spending by a third since 2008, less than half the troops had modern, post-Cold War. equipment. Moreover, the Russian Army was then smaller than the U.S. Army, a historical first. Worse, a third of the Russian army troops were conscripts, who were on active duty for one year. While the U.S. Army also has a half million reserve troops who are trained and equipped to quickly enter operations, Russia had less than 100,000 similar and less well equipped and trained reserves. Russia also had 200,000 armed men in the Interior Ministry. These were basically paramilitary forces equipped as light infantry. A few were highly trained commandos and riot police, but most were only good for security duties, not heavy combat. A third of the Interior Ministry troops are conscripts.

Russia hoped to buy and distribute sufficient new weapons and equipment so that by 2020 at least 70 percent of its combat troops could have modern equipment. A lot of Russian commanders were not confident that this deadline would be met. These officers noted that since 2008, when the five day Russian invasion of tiny Georgia exposed the equipment and training shortcomings of the army, not a lot of progress had been made to remedy those problems. Russia only had about 100,000 paratroopers, commandos and airborne troops it could really rely on, and these elite forces have to be ready to deal with emergencies across the vastness of Russia. Those hundred thousand troops would be quickly tied down if a similar move were made into Ukraine, which has ten times the population of Georgia and much more capable armed forces. Russia went into Georgia with 20,000 troops, about a third of them pro-Russian irregulars from nearby areas that had grudges with Georgia. That force suffered higher losses and a lot of other unexpected problems. Russian leaders noted the problems and vowed to fix everything. That didn’t happen.

Russia had held training exercises in the last few years before invading Ukraine. The Russian army quickly mobilized over a hundred thousand troops for unannounced maneuvers and inspections of readiness, it later was revealed that while the troops turned out, there were a lot of deficiencies. The Russians put a positive spin on this, and they were correct in assessing these snap exercises were a beginning. But Russia was nowhere near the finish line with this modernization process.

Russia was supposed to have a million troops on active duty but because of a shortage of volunteers and an abundance of draft dodgers it barely had 850,000. Lots of money was spent on developing new missiles, tanks, aircraft and ships but there was still not enough cash to replace the Cold War era vehicles that were still the norm. So, Russia relied on subterfuge and deception in Ukraine. The last thing Russia wanted was a situation where they would have to put a lot of their troops and equipment through their paces. The military wasn’t ready for that sort of thing yet, especially with all those cell phone cameras ready to record any flubs. Finally, there was the past experience with uncooperative Ukrainians. The Ukraine has always been an unwilling part of the Russian empire and rebelled many times before regaining their independence once more in 1991. There were still elderly Russians who remembered the campaign in the Ukraine from 1945 into the 1950s against Ukrainian rebels. The Ukrainians have not forgotten this and promised more of it if Russian troops returned. Even in Ukraine the Russian speaking portion of the population was largely in favor of remaining a part of Ukraine. Same deal in eastern Ukraine which the Soviets sought to Russify with lots of migrants from Russia. Those migrants may still speak Russian but most think of themselves as Ukrainian. Thus, Ukraine was no place for a paper tiger.