Murphy's Law: The Afghan Shuffle


September 26, 2011: In the last ten years, the GDP of Afghanistan has more than quadrupled (from $4 billion to $18 billion.) A lot of that has to do with new roads and an unprecedented security force of 300,000 soldiers and police (mostly soldiers.) The problem is that the vastly larger government is expensive, and costs $14 billion a year to run. With a GDP of only $18 billion, the Afghans obviously can't afford it. In fact, Afghanistan only pays for about ten percent of their government budget. Most (62 percent) comes from the United States, with other Western nations providing the rest. It gets worse, as some of the government benefits are anything but.

For example, most Afghans regard their police as a foreign institution. As implemented in Afghanistan, the national police are a threat to the people, not a force that "protects and serves." Too many of the current police see themselves as bandits with a badge. All this goes back to the fact that Afghanistan has never been a country in the modern sense, but rather a tribal confederation dominated by the Pushtuns. Before the 18th century, what is now Afghanistan was part of various empires (Indian, Iranian, Mongol, Greek). But in the 18th century, with the profitable trade routes from China made obsolete by Western ships, the Pushtuns got organized, and sought to establish an empire. After much effort, they failed. By the 19th century, the advancing Russian and British empires had reduced Afghanistan to its present borders. The Pushtuns were still in charge, although they were now a minority. The king was traditionally a Pushtun, and his main job was to deal with outsiders and arbitrate disputes among the tribes. Law and order, such as it was, depended on tribal customs and local militias or warlords. This did not stop tribal feuds, and wars. Even the king knew when to step back and let the tribes settle their own disputes violently. An "Afghan Army" was a feudal levy of tribal militias, which appeared whenever there was an outsider that threatened many of the tribes. There was usually no police at all. Before the 21st century, the only efforts to create police forces were local, usually in cities and major towns. But in the countryside, where most Afghans still live, the tribe provides whatever police functions they can, and it usually isn't much.

It has taken nearly a decade for Western nations to fully absorb the reality of the Afghan attitudes towards police. NATO and U.S. police trainers have bit the bullet in Afghanistan, and drastically upgraded recruitment standards. From now on, you can't be a cop, unless you are literate. This means the foreigners running the police training operation must establish a major literacy program. That's necessary because only about 25 percent of Afghans are literate. Moreover, it's become clear that illiterate and untrained police are worse than no police at all. Cops who can't read and don't know much about proper police procedure tend to be corrupt and a menace to the people they are supposed to be protecting.

Currently, two-thirds of police recruits fail to complete their training, and illiterate recruits have the worst time of it. Despite that, the national police force has been expanded to over 80,000. The illiteracy problem has always been recognized as a problem. Currently, only 40 percent of all policemen are literate. This can be ignored for many of the lower ranking personnel, but police supervisors need to read. Moreover, illiterate recruits take longer to train, and more effort to work with.

The U.S. has provided an intensive literacy course for soldiers, which gets most of them to basic ("functional") literacy within a year. A similar program was implemented for the police. They needed it, and it was noted that it made a big difference. In addition to learning how to read signs and maps, the newly semi-literate police were taught to sign their names, and write out the serial number of their weapon.

Illiterate police selected for promotion to sergeant were given more literacy training. That's because being able to read and write has long been a critical asset for any paramilitary force. The Roman Empire, at its height 1800 years ago, had an army over 100,000 troops, a third of which were literate. But with modern forces, an abundance of technology makes literacy even more necessary. The Afghans can get by without it, but can do a lot better with it.

The police had another problem. Until last year, many police recruits received no training at all. That had a lot to do with the high dropout rate. That has changed, but it will be several years before all police are trained to an acceptable level. But Western nations have never been able to provide a sufficient number of trainers. This makes it difficult to establish some essential procedures, like how to work with Afghan Army units or operate modern police technology (databases, biometric data, crime scene investigation and so on.)

In fact, there are some even more serious problems with the cops, mainly because of a lack of good leadership. Afghanistan has never had a real national police force, and building one isn't easy. The cultures of corruption, and tribalism, plus widespread illiteracy, are proving to be formidable obstacles. Those police units that are well led (and there are some of them) and have worked out good relationships with local tribal leaders (difficult, because of the many feuds, and short tempers), do a good job. Having to battle the Taliban and drug gangs puts additional strain on an already weak force, so improving the quality of new cops is a matter of survival for the force.

The army is kept away from the population unless they are out chasing Taliban or drug gangs (it's often different to tell the two apart). For that reason, the army is more liked and respected than the police. But that's largely because people have less contact with the troops, and because the soldiers are actually better trained and more disciplined than the police.

Finally, there is the corruption, which permeates everything that happens in Afghanistan. Corruption is a major reason why the country is so poor (the poorest in Eurasia) and chaotic. It's also the main reason why lots of foreign aid doesn't do as much good as the foreign donors expect. So welcome to Afghanistan, the land of unbelievable violence, and unrealized expectations.


Article Archive

Murphy's Law: Current 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 



Help Keep Us Soaring

We need your help! Our subscription base has slowly been dwindling. We need your help in reversing that trend. We would like to add 20 new subscribers this month.

Each month we count on your subscriptions or contributions. You can support us in the following ways:

  1. Make sure you spread the word about us. Two ways to do that are to like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter.
  2. Subscribe to our daily newsletter. We’ll send the news to your email box, and you don’t have to come to the site unless you want to read columns or see photos.
  3. You can contribute to the health of StrategyPage. A contribution is not a donation that you can deduct at tax time, but a form of crowdfunding. We store none of your information when you contribute..
Subscribe   Contribute   Close