Armor: Iran Has A Dream


December 16, 2020: In late 2020 Iran announced its army had begun receiving the first of 800 new Karrar tanks. The first Karrar was built in 2017, followed by several more pre-production prototypes. Karrar is another upgraded T-72, something which Iran admits. The 51-ton Karrar has all the features of other late-model T-72 tanks including a three-man crew, autoloaded 125mm gun, modern electronics and composite/ERA armor. Karrar is also the continuation of T-72 upgrades that began in the early 1990s.

Back in 1993 Iran produced six prototypes of its new Zulfiqar tank which was described as a hybrid using components or concepts from M48, M60 and T-72 tanks. At the time all three of these tanks were used by the Iranian Army. There were actually two different models of the Zulfiqar. The Zulfiqar 1 appeared in the 1990 and seemed to copy a lot from the 1950s American M48. Mass production of the 40-ton Zulfiqar 1 began in the late 1990s and by 2010 only about 150 had been produced. Meanwhile a rather different looking Zulfiqar 3 was in development and this 52-ton tank began production in 2012 and about 150 have been produced so far. Iran initially announced plans to produce 600 Zulfiqar tanks but seemed dissatisfied with both Zulfiqar models in contrast to the discarded Zulfiqar 2. A common comment about Zulfiqar 3 was that looked more like a T-72 trying to be an American M1.

Karrar looks like another late model T-72 variant. Zulfiqar 3 and Karrar are both armed with a 125 mm gun and autoloader. The two Zulfiqar models and Karrar were equipped with various versions of modern fire control systems. Iran announced it would not only produce 800 Karrar’s but also equip them with ERA (Explosive Reactive Armor) similar to the latest Russian designs as well the latest Russian APS (Active Protection System). That is pretty ambitious because even Russia has not got many tanks equipped with the latest ERA and an APS. There is also the question of production capacity and sufficient cash to support such an ambitious building program.

Russia continues to develop its own updated T-72 tanks. In mid-2020 T-90M, the latest evolution of the T-72, appeared. The T-90M was eagerly anticipated by T-90 users because the M model fixed problems recently encountered by T-90As in combat. The T90M is a major upgrade of the original T90A as it incorporates lessons learned from the extensive use of T-90As in Syria. The T90M also addresses new developments in anti-tank weapons as well as introducing a more effective 125mm main gun and improved APS. In terms of electronics, there is a new fire day/night control system plus digital communications that enable T90Ms to instantly exchange fire-control and other sensor data with each other in combat. There is also a new generation of ERA that is designed to better defeat high-speed metal penetrator shells as well as dual-warhead HEAT (shaped charge) missiles and tank shells. This new generation Relikt ERA also includes protection for the top of the turret and rear deck (engine space). The need for better protection against top-attack dual-warhead shaped charge warheads was discovered the hard way in Syria. Relikt ERA is believed to provide at least 50 percent more protection than the current Kontakt-5 ERA found on existing T90As and the latest T-72s. The new 2А82-1М 125mm gun is the same one used in the new T-14 tank. This version of the smoothbore 125mm gun is longer and stronger and uses a more capable and reliable auto-loader. More powerful high-speed armor piercing shells can be used and the barrel lasts longer.

The need for an updated T90 became urgent after what happened to T90s sent to Syria. While the T90A incorporated a lot of new technology, it was still a 1980s project meant to incorporate T-80 features into many upgrades of the T-72. The T-90 was actually another such upgrade but so extensive that in the early 1990s it was rebranded as the T-90.

There was a major reality check after Russia gave Syria 30 T-90As in early 2016. These were immediately put to work fighting various rebel factions. What the Russians failed to note was that some of these rebels had the American TOW wire-guided missile. While the T-90A had defenses against most ATGMS, especially the ones that are laser-guided, these defenses were less effective against the TOW. That was because the T-90A ATGM defenses consist of two systems. One is a “dazzler” that is connected to laser sensors on the tank. If the sensors detect a laser beam hitting the tank, the “dazzler” sends out a laser that disrupts the targeting laser and causes the ATGM, if it is headed for the front of the tank, to miss the target. The second ATGM defense offers some protection against TOW because it consists of plates of ERA which explode when hit by the HEAT warhead used by ATGMs. HEAT forms a superhot plasma when it strikes something and the plasma can melt through most armor. The ERA explosion disrupts the formation of the plasma and prevents much of the penetration of the tanks’ metal armor.

During the first incidents of ERA use against TOW, crews were seen abandoning the tank, even though the vehicle was shaken but not penetrated. Syrian crews came to fear even laser-guided missiles and would sometimes turn their tanks and try to get behind a building when the laser sensors alerted them that an ATGM was incoming. This was often a fatal mistake because it meant the dazzler was no longer aimed at the laser beam, which was now aimed at the side of the tank, which did not have ERA. The ATGM hit and the tank was destroyed. Worse, more recent models of the TOW have a “top attack” dual warhead to defeat the ERA by detonating as it goes over the tank and penetrating the thinner armor on top, which until the T90M, lacked ERA protection. Many missiles without top attack do have dual warheads which are designed to defeat ERA. This involves the first warhead detonating the ERA while the second warhead goes off and does a lot of damage. Even with the better ERA on the T-90M, some of these dual warhead ATGMs can penetrate side and rear armor.

Even though the rebels didn’t have many top attack TOW missiles, Syrian troops, or at least their Russian and Syrian advisors, adapted and proceeded more cautiously when it was suspected that they were facing ATGMs, especially TOWs. Despite these precautions, six of the Syrian T-90s were lost to ATGMs since 2016. Three T-90s were captured by rebels. Two of these were destroyed while being used by the rebels and the third one was recaptured. This highlights another problem the Syrian and Iraqi army shares; poorly trained and led troops. At this point, the Syrians avoid using their T-90s in close proximity to the enemy and the T-90s are less frequently seen in combat.

Iraq bought a large number of T90s and began receiving them in 2017. Against remaining ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) force in Iraq the T90s had bad experiences similar to what happened earlier in Syria. Russia attributed a lot of the T90 problems in Syria and Iraq to poorly trained and led crews. This is a valid complaint, which the Russians have been using since the 1970s. But some of those Arab crews were quite good, survived combat and reported some very real problems with their Russian tanks.

The T-90 is one of many upgraded T-72s available on the market. Until 2003 the Iraqi Army operated hundreds of older T-72s, which proved no competition for the American M1. The T-90 has been produced in large quantities since the 1990s but not for Russia. It is mostly an export item. The T-90 was a late 1980s project that simply incorporates new features that had worked on the T-80, a failed replacement for the T-72. There were a lot of other new techs available and so many of those were incorporated into this new T-72 that it got a name change. Originally it was designated the T-72BU, but when Russia finally began production in 1993, it was renamed the T-90 in order to help with export sales. That succeeded in making the tank an export success with most (nearly 90 percent initially) of those produced going to export customers.

India and Algeria each now have more T-90s in service than Russia. Worse, the Russian Army quietly put over a third of its 550 newly-built T-90s into reserve. While the T-90 was loudly proclaimed to be the next-big-thing the Russian army preferred refurbished T-72s in the form of the T-72B3. These proved to be cheaper and more reliable than the T-90s, something that got little publicity. While all the upgrades (new engine, gun, fire control and protection) made T-72B3s nearly as expensive as the T-90A, it was preferred by the troops and the older officers quietly agreed that it was a better tank than the new T-90/T-72BUs. This apparently has something to do with the design of the T-72BU and the decline in manufacturing quality in Russian the defense industry after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. Since the T-72B3 was introduced in 2013 it has been produced in far greater numbers than any other tank and that continues. Especially telling was how T-90As began to be taken out of service (and put in reserve) as soon as enough T-72B3s became available. At the same time, the most popular Russian tank for export customers is the T-72B (a B3 with fewer of the upgrades) which cost nearly two million dollars each but can be delivered in a few months after the contract is signed. The T-72B3 has been so popular with Russian troops that the government is giving it more publicity in the state-controlled mass media. The Iraqis don’t really care about the superiority of the T-72B3 because the T-90As are easier to obtain, do the job (usually fighting irregulars) and have large profits built in that allow for generous bribes to Iraqi officials who approve the purchase orders.

A potential problem with the T90M is that it incorporates even more very expensive equipment and is believed to cost nearly as much as the radical new T-14. The major reason the T-14 has not been produced in large numbers is the high-cost (over $5 million) per tank. It is unclear what, if anything, Iran has learned from Russian misadventures with upgraded T-72s.




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