April 29, 2007: The recent disbarment of Lynne
Stewart is one of the latest examples of what is wrong with using the law-enforcement approach to dealing
with terrorism. Not only is there the fact that all too often, treating
terrorism as a criminal matter to be dealt with by law enforcement agencies,
leads to terrorists going back onto the street, but there are problems with the
lawyers.
Stewart was convicted for providing material
support to terrorists while she was representing Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman
during his terrorism trial. One of the things she did was pass messages to
Rahman's supporters ? including exhortations to kill those who opposed his
brand of Islamic fundamentalism. Also, during Rahman's trial, evidence was
turned over to his attorneys. At least one of the documents handed over in
accordance with rules of discovery ultimately found its way to al Qaeda
headquarters in the Sudan. That document contained a list of people who were on
the government's radar screen ? and thus alerted al-Qaeda to the possibility of
surveillance. This was an intelligence disaster.
Once a person, group, or country find out that they
are of interest to an intelligence agency, two things happen. First, they tend
to become very careful with regards to communications ? they take steps to
throw off surveillance efforts, and they will even shift to means that cannot
be intercepted (like couriers or flying for face-to-face meetings). Second,
they begin to wonder how the information is acquired ? and try to cut off the
flow. If they find out enough of what an intelligence agency knows, they will
have an idea of who might be a source. The suspected source's ending will not
be a happy one. This not only deprives intelligence agencies of a source, but
also makes recruiting future sources more difficult.
The risks of compromised intelligence are serious,
and should be obvious. They primarily include the loss of sources of
information (due to death or non-cooperation) and decreased efficiency from
methods that have been compromised due to adaptations by terrorists (for
instance, if they know cell phones are being intercepted, they will shift to
messengers). These could potentially lead to successful attacks in the future.
This is why the Department of Defense is trying to clamp
down on the number of meetings lawyers have with detainees. In at least one
case, lawyers gave the detainees information about Amnesty International
conferences and terrorist attacks that boosted their morale, increased
resistance to interrogation and which encouraged attacks on guards. Over 600
attacks have occurred, many involving bodily fluids. This is not a small
concern. If terrorist morale is low, there is a better chance of getting them
to give up information that may help prevent future attacks.
The Guantanamo Bay setup is not the best situation,
but other alternatives do not seem any better. Terrorists need to be kept out
of circulation, and methods of gathering intelligence and sources of
information need to be protected. A number of human rights groups are
complaining about these clampdowns, claiming that the Administration is turning
Guantanamo Bay into a legal black hole. Since real black holes are not
presently accessible, dumping terrorists into a legal black hole will have to
do. ? Harold C. Hutchison (haroldc.hutchison@gmail.com)
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