October 20,2008:
The Russian armed forces lost 80
percent of its strength in the last 17 years, but a disproportionate number of
officers remain. Now the government is planning a large scale purge of the
bloated officer corps. Currently, the Russian military has about a million
personnel (400,000 in the army itself, the rest in paramilitary units that are
largely uniformed and armed like soldiers). But there are 355,000 officers in
this force. That's more than one in
three, and includes 1,107 generals, 25,665 colonels, 99,550 majors, 90,000
captains, and only 50,000 lieutenants. With all that, some 40,000 officers
positions are still vacant. The proposed reorganization would eliminate 20
percent of the generals, 65 percent of the colonels, 75 percent of the majors,
and 55 percent of the captains. The number of lieutenants would increase 20
percent. The number of military organizations (about 2,500) would also be cut
(by 80 percent) over the next four years. Most of these are reserve units, Cold
War relics, containing only a cadre of officers. In the event of a major war,
reservists (who are no longer available) would be called up to use the
stockpiled equipment (also now missing.) The Stavka (general staff) will have
its personnel cut 61 percent (to 8,500).
The senior
officers (lieutenant colonel and above) will be retired, all others will be
offered retraining. The money saved would go to training and promoting more
NCOs, and enlisting more volunteer (or "contract") soldiers. The
Russians want an all-volunteer forces, but have lacked the money to replace all
conscripts with higher quality, and more highly paid, volunteers. Note that data
on how many troops there are of each rank in the Russian military is still
considered top secret stuff, and these numbers were recently released as a
Defense Ministry official discussed reforms with the media. This was apparently
done to reduce sympathy for the thousands of soon-to-be former officers who
might go around complaining that the military is falling apart.
After World
War II, Russia deliberately avoided developing a professional NCO corps. They
preferred to have officers take care of nearly all troop supervision. The NCOs
that did exist were treated as slightly more reliable enlisted men, but given
little real authority. Since officers did not live with the men, slack
discipline in the barracks gave rise to the vicious hazing and exploitation of
junior conscripts by the senior, or simply stronger and more ruthless, ones.
This led to very low morale, and a lot of suicides, theft, sabotage and
desertions. Long recognized as a problem, no solution ever worked.
During the
1990s, when military budgets were cut by over two-thirds, most of the best
officers got out, and went on to make their fortunes in the new market economy.
That left a lot of career officers who saw no other job prospects. Many turned
to corrupt practices to supplement their low military pay. Corruption got out
of hand.
The hazing
and corruption in the military is a complex issue. For one thing, Russia does
not have military police to deal with this sort of thing. During the Soviet
period (1921-91), the KGB kept an eye on criminal activity in the military, but
was more concerned with loyalty and espionage. The violence and hazing in the
ranks was not seen as a big problem. It is now, because Russians can vote, and
the parents of young men getting abused while doing their conscript service,
are making a lot of noise over this issue. Taxpayers are more interested in
what the military is doing with their money.
For any
meaningful change to occur in the military, there has to be a major upgrade in
leadership throughout the force. The first step is to get rid of the most
troublesome and least effective officers. Money for more NCOs and contract
soldiers will have to come out of the existing personnel budget. Sacking most
of the existing officers seems like the way to go for solving both of these
problems.