Last Chance For The EFV

 

 The options could be something like the EFV without the IFV requirements or perhaps a combat hovercraft with light armor protections armed with a 20mm and AGL in a remote turret and carry about 15 to 20 Marines. Remember priority one is ship to shore movement, not General Patton type operations  further inland.

 

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Ambush touches on a point central to this debate; this isn?t about a commitment to the squad, whatever THAT means?  (What evidence do you advance that the US Army is NOT committed to the squad, and what commitment look like, and why OUGHT a service focus on the squad, as opposed to the platoon or company, in short this supposed lack of focus deserves its own thread with some specifics.) 

 

Instead, like many programs, the EFV represents a compromise.  The Marines can?t afford hundreds of M-2?s to transport the assault force in, so 6-12 person vehicles are out.  But neither does the USMC want one hit to destroy a company, so 60-100 person assault vehicles are out?plus the such a large vehicle could not carry the troops inland, thru defenses and into the enemy?s rear, even in a beach assault or onto the objective(s) further inland.  So the M2/3 is out (too small), a LCAC is out (too big a target, not mobile enough).  So it needs to be something ?in-between?.  In this case it was the EFV, carrying 18 troops, a squad and the weapons unit, or a command unit, or an engineer unit, or a medical team, or the ALO/FSO?a squad and something.  The EFV?s size has little to do with a focus on the squad, and more to do with economics, is it ?right-sized? enough that we can afford a goodly number of them, but small enough that when one takes a hit, that the Company/Battalion is not incapable of completing its assigned mission?

 

As to its IFV-ness?the Marines began the AAV-7, or LVTP-7 began life with the .50 Cal. HMG.  The Marines, thru the years, have sought to upgrade its fire power.  In its 30-plus year career, the USMC has found it needs a better turret!  That would seem to be user-driven upgrade, not just a focus on becoming a ?second Army? or as one General put it, ?A bitched up Army that speaks Navy lingo.?  Instead, the Marines felt that the landing craft/assault vehicle was under-armed and armoured.  I might point out that the LVTP?s preceding the AAV-7 carried three machine guns, or a 37 mm gun turret, or 75mm howitzer turret, and this was in the ?Old Amphibious Corps?, c. 1945-65.  So, it would seem that the USMC has found the need for serious firepower on its assault craft, even, when the Marine focus was on Amphibious as opposed to Expeditionary Warfare. 

 

A 20mm weapon is a very limited weapon and a poor choice, I?d argue for an alternative.  It will NOT damage AFV?s or APC?s, by-and-large, and its explosive content is too low to make it an effective suppressive weapon.  You will note that most nations that adopted the 20mm for their APC/IFV have upgraded their turret weapon, to 25-40mm caliber.  The EFV?s main gun allows it to engage APC?s and, I?d imagine, T-54/62?s (side, top, or rear-possibly frontally IF an APFSDS round is developed), field fortifications, AND infantry in emplacements, thru an air burst ability.  Overall, the Marines may have chosen well with the weapons fit of the EFV.

 

Finally, you?ll discover that the USMC?s mission is, whatever the SeccDef SAYS it is?and if the USMC wants to be the ?kick-in the door? force, let?s disband the divisions and air wings?because as a kick in the door force all we need are battalions and brigades.  The USMC, itself, realizes the dangers of ?kick in the door? and amphibious warfare missions, simply that if the USMC is going to tie itself to 50 kilometres of the sea and not fighting in the ?big wars? too, the USMC will be cut, drastically.  Approximately 50% or more of the DoD budget is going to the ground forces, when historically they?ve had 30-40%  Why, because the ground forces, Army and Marines) are FIGHTING the GWoT.  The USMC reverts back to being an ?afloat? presence, expect to see the Army absorb more of the Marine budget.  In this the Marines are being very sagacious, and have some history on their side.  Desert Storm and OIF all involved Marine DIVISIONS, operating well inland?so did Vietnam, and Korea.  USMC understands something Ambush doesn?t, that a Corps that does only one thing, floating on boats, in a battalion-sized element, makes for a very expensive battalion and an over-specialized Corps, which is subject to drastic cuts and revisions.

 

Bottom-Line: the vehicle may be overly ambitious, from the propulsion side, but its size issue has nothing to do with any focus or not on the squad and its weapons fit is a good choice and one well within the realm of Marine weapons fits for previous Landing Vehicles.

 

 

 The Marines main justification for being is the entry from the sea. Granted it also has other duties that the "President may direct" but there is no conceivable way to organize and equip for every possible mission. If you are going to organize and equip the Corps like the Army why have the Corps? The Corps has done alright for itself concentrating on the amphibious mission and adapting to the others.   As it turns out the organization is great for not only amphibious missions but also places like Afghanistan and other places you need a lot of rifleman on the ground. It is less well situated for charging across the desert but has demonstrated it can do it.   There is a lot of merit to the idea of making Afghanistan a Marine mission and Iraq the Army one. 

A better question would be why we found ourselves the position of having to use the Corps in this manner?  It is not as if the Corps stormed the beaches in GWI & II and then fought their way to Baghdad. Why did the Army not have sufficient forces or the ability to move them fast enough into the region to do the job? Of course this

brings about issues to only with Army but air and sea lift.

LB wrote:

So what if anything are they going to replace this turkey with when it is canceled, or will they just rebuild and modernize the current AAVs?

 

The current AAVs are too slow for rapid over the horizon  ship to shore movement.  The additional armor and other upgrades also have put a strain on the suspension system so movement ashore is a problem.

 

 Looking at just a ship to shore requirement and forgetting the IFV part which would mean reduced armor protection etc, perhaps a lighter EFV would be more do-able.  If not I like the idea of a small armed, lightly armored hovercraft capable of carrying 15 to 20 men.

 

 Ideally you would want the MEU to be able to have enough of whatever you use (EFV, hovercraft etc) to carry a re-enforced rifle company in a single lift. A problem is that when the LHA (R) comes on line well deck space will be at an even greater premium so the size of whatever we use will be even more important. Hovercraft that could perform the dual role of assault landing and follow logistical lifts (perhaps able to carry small vehicles) would perhaps be of more value than an EFV.

-mechanically complex, unreliable and suicidally vulnerable to mines, machine gun  and auto-cannon fire.

Size matters as in SAFETY. There is a GOOD engineering reason why we use small speed boats for raiders and LCACs  for  ship to shore air cushion vehicle movement.

We'll just have to learn to embrace the helo for speed and the SLOW swimming long endurance amphibian tractor.

Herald

I would note that the 'Over the Horizon' (OTH) requirement that spawned the EFV, and several other items, was based on the assumption of a enemy that would be our equal or near equal in high tech weapons and general fire power.  That is we could not count on USN & USAF support properly suppresing threats to the amphib ships & the assualt force.  Hence the OTH  was to keep the amphib transports safer and add some range & flexiblity to the surface assualt force.

Since that assumption was made some twentyfive years have passed and the threat has changed.  We contemplate very different enemys now and for the near future.  The nature of reconissance/target accquzition and fire power have changed.  It is quite possible the ultra high speed EFV is a obsolecent system, no longer usefull for the current battlefield and probablly obsolete on the next generation of battlefields.  

Development needs to start very soon on a less costly and generally capable assuallt amphibian.

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...the U.S. Marine Corps (especially the MEUs deployed aboard amphibious task groups) serve a critical role as "State Department Troops," intervening in low-intensity conflict environments where American citizens and other friendly foreign nationals require protection and evacuation from failed states and other environments turned suddenly and catastrophically hostile.

 

This would tend to argue for small and medium amphibious craft - capable of large cargo/personnel lift - independent of the ability to function as IFVs, capable of handling shallow-water as well as steep-to-beach landings in both coastal and riverine operations, with armored combat vehicles and wheeled MRAP personnel carriers deliverable over-the-beach to provide the means for deeper, more sustained operations as required.

 

Doubtless, the ability of the EFV to come in from over-the-horizon at high speed is important to maintain the credibility of the Marine Corps' capabilities (which is in large part what makes the Navy's amphibious task groups such strategically and operationally valuable "intimidation factor" elements).  However, the reliance upon a technologically complex vehicle to serve in a sustained inland combat function strikes one as wasteful and perhaps intrinsically impossible.  The sight of columns of AAV7s driving up graded and paved highways to Baghdad with the 1st MEF in 2003 ran that conclusion home with great force.

 

Not to beat the simile to death, the phrase "Ducks out of water" is inescapable.

 

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