Syria: Disintegration

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June 13, 2023: There continues to be less fighting in Syria despite the continued presence of numerous mutually antagonistic groups in many parts of the country. So far this year there have only been a few hundred killed each month. This is a trend that has been continuing since the peak violence in 2014. For example, nearly 6,000 died in October 2014, ten times the current monthly death toll. Most of the dead continue to be Islamic terrorists and other rebels. While ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) is believed to have suffered over 2,000 dead in October 2014, mainly because they were fighting everyone else simultaneously, there are far fewer ISIL fighters now. The highest annual death toll was in 2014, when at least 100,000 died. Annual deaths declined after that, reaching about 3,800 in 2021, about the same in 2022 but so far in 2023 there are a few hundred deaths a month, which indicates a decline from 2022.

Since the civil war began in 2011 the death toll is estimated to be between 400,000 and 500,000. Iran wanted the civil war to end so they could concentrate on Israel. The key role of Iran in Syria has been noted and no one, not even Iranian allies, are cooperating with the Iranian activities. The only ones who cannot walk away from this are the Assads, Turkey and Israel.

Syrians in general and particularly the Assads are aware of the damage done to Syria by a decade of war. The best evidence of the performance of the Syrian economy is the strength of the Syrian currency. The exchange rate was 50 pounds to the dollar before the violence began in 2011. In late 2022 it was 5,000 pounds to the dollar and currently it is 7,000 pounds to the dollar. The average monthly income is under $200 and much of that comes from expatriates sending remittances. The loss of oil shipments from Iran is a major factor in the collapse of the economy. The change in exchange rates also reflects the failure of the Assads to make much progress in the last few years. Aid from Russia and Iran had kept the Assad government and the Syrian Air Force going. The loss of Russian and Iranian support over the last few years was catastrophic because no one else stepped up to replace that aid.

The damage is worse than most outsiders realize when you take into account expected (normal) growth in the economy (GDP) and the population if the war had not happened. This assumes a decade of some post-war reconstruction for the real Syria. In contrast, Syria without the war would have a population of 32 million by 2030. Because so many (over six million) Syrians fled the country while fewer were born and more died, the most likely population of war-ravaged Syria by 2030 is 22 million. Most of the refugees (Sunni Arabs) do not want to return to a homeland dominated by a Shia government and occupied by Iranian (and Shia) forces. In these “war/no-war” comparisons, the economic projections show the country even worse off. Currently GDP is less than a third of what it was in 2011. But even with a decade of post-war reconstruction 2030 GDP would only be about 74 percent of what it was in 2011 and about 35 percent of what it would have been in 2030 without a war. Without the war GDP would have doubled by 2030. It is possible that Syria will grow, in terms of GDP and population, at a faster rate but that is unlikely since not a lot of nations are lining up to donate to or invest in reconstruction. In part that is due to the expected long-term presence of Iran or, even without that, the Assads would probably remain in power and still be accused of war crimes during the war. There is no statute of limitations on that sort of thing. Meanwhile the years of war have destroyed structures, infrastructure and businesses that would cost several hundred billion dollars to replace. That will be hard to do for a nation that had a 2011 GDP of about $60 billion and not a lot of natural resources other than its people and their many skills. It would have been much worse with the $50 billion worth of Iranian military and economic aid provided by Iran.

In the northwest (Idlib province), fighting between Syrian troops and Syrian Islamic terror group HTS continues. Efforts to get HTS (the dominant Islamic terrorist coalition in the province) to cooperate with the Turks have failed. Turkey proposed that HTS work with Turkey-backed Syrian militias to keep the peace so Turkey could move more Syrian refugees back to Syria. Turkey offered HTS sanctuary in Turkish controlled areas and a few HTS members would be allowed into Turkey. Reaching an agreement with HTS on the details proved difficult, so the fighting continues between HTS and Syrians working for the Turks. Meanwhile HTS is trying to remove non-Syrian Islamic terrorists from the organization by providing them with money to get them to Ukraine where they can attack Russian forces there. HTS has made arrangements with Turkey to facilitate movement of these Islamic terrorists to Ukraine.

Syrians blame outsiders for the length and severity of the 12- year-long civil war. Iran and Russia came to the aid of the Syrian government while Israel continued to attack Iranian forces in Syria, and Turkish forces crossed the border to deal with Islamic terrorists threatening Turkey and Syrian Kurds control most of the northern border with Turkey. In the northwest there is Idlib province, which remains under the control of Islamic terrorists who don’t belong to ISIL. For years the Assads made deals with Islamic terror groups that controlled areas throughout Syria for them to move to Idlib rather than fight to the death with the Assad troops. The Assads did this to maintain morale among their own troops, who had been fighting for years and were liable to desert rather than face a death-match with Islamic terrorists. For the last few years there has been fighting in Idlib involving the Islamic terrorists attacked by Assad, Turkish and Kurdish forces, with air support from Russia and Turkey. The fighting is slow, methodical and relentless in killing Islamic terrorists and shrinking the terrorist controlled area.

Although there are fewer than a thousand American military personnel in Syria, they are constantly attacked by Iran-backed militias and harassed by Russian warplanes. The Iranian violence has been going on for a long time but the harassment of American aircraft by Russian fighters is recent. Both countries long had an agreement to avoid such interference by each other’s aircraft. Both nations were using their warplanes mainly to seek out and attack ISIL forces. Apparently in response to Western economic sanctions on Russia because of the Ukraine War, the Russian fighters are now engaging in dangerous maneuvers around American aircraft.

June 12, 2023: In the south (Quneitra province) five members of the Syrian security forces were killed in three separate attacks. Today and yesterday, in the Kurdish northeast, fighting between the Kurds and the Turks left several Kurds and one Russian solider dead from Turkish artillery fire.

June 10, 2023: In the north (Aleppo province) there were two airstrikes by missile-armed UAVs. The attacks left three dead and five wounded. All belonged to the Kurdish SDF, which indicates the UAVs were probably Turkish.

June 9, 2023: So far this year the remaining ISIL factions in eastern Syria have carried out at least 72 attacks, which left 46 people dead, including ISIL members. This pattern of violence also reveals another side effect of the war; the lack of unity in Syria. The Assad government controls most of the south, including Damascus, the capital and Syria’s small Mediterranean coast. These areas are the most prosperous and pro-Assad. Russian and Iranian intervention made it possible for Assad to gain and maintain control over these areas. The sparsely populated east is controlled by ISIL and SDF and American forces. In the north, along the Turkish border, Turkish and SDF forces .

June 8, 2023: Iraq confirmed that 3,000 Iraqi terrorists had been returned from Syria and prosecuted for their crimes. There are still over 10,000 Iraqi in al Hol prison camp. The Iraqis terrorists had been held in eastern Syria (Raqqa province) by the Kurdish SDF forces who operated al Hol. Kurdish security forces regularly search the al Hol for active Islamic terrorists and criminal gangs operating in the camp. Several suspects are arrested during each search. SDF has been maintaining the prison camps for captured ISIL fighters and their families since 2018. The SDF must divert troops and other resources to maintain camps This includes persistent problems with criminal activity taking place among the prisoners. The SDF has to keep complaining to their allies that without some help in dealing with the huge number of ISIL captives in al Hol, the situation would get out of control. In 2019 the SDF had over 50,000 refugees (most of them under 18) in the al Hol complex and various governments were asked to verify who was a citizen of where. The UN has been asked to take custody of those found to be stateless. Iraq agreed to take about 30 percent of the refugees and prosecute those who are suspected of ISIL crimes. That process was slower than expected. The SDF decided to try the known ISIL members, turning those convicted over to the UN and releasing the rest, along with their families. Most of the people in the camps are women and children.

Al Hol has existed since the 1991 Gulf War when the UN established it to handle refugees from the fighting. Al Hol kept expanding since then because there was more fighting in Syria and Iraq and more refugees. There are still about 50,000 people at the al Hol camp, most of them women and children that no one wanted to take back. Many of the ISIL wives are obviously still active ISIL members and many were caught smuggling weapons into the camp when they were searched before entering. These ISIL women are terrorizing other camp residents and seeking to intimidate the camp guards. There is a separate high-security area for known Islamic terrorists and other criminals. The Kurds needed help paying for the camp and wanted the nations these people came from, including Syria, to claim and take custody of them. Nearly all camp residents claim to be non-Syrian but for many of them it is unclear exactly where they come from. Some active ISIL terrorists are in the camps and are the source of much violence. Nearly a hundred prisoners are killed in al Hol some years and ISIL leadership keeps calling for members inside and outside the camps to cooperate to create a major uprising in the camps. Food and other aid from the United States and other donors is distributed by the UN to NGOs (Non-Government-Organizations) that do the actual work in al Hol distributing food and other supplies as well as providing medical care. The Kurds need to maintain good relations with the United States, whish has been a major supplier of military and other assistance to the Kurds. Because of that the Kurds can’t just walk away from al Hol.

June 7, 2023: In the north (Aleppo province) Russia has withdrawn troops from positions near Turkish-backed Syrian forces. Russia only has a few thousand troops in Syria, most of them stationed at the Russian controlled Hmeimim airbase that was built by Russia in 2015 near the port city of Latakia, which is 85 kilometers north of Tartus and 50 kilometers from the Turkish border. Part of the Tartus port has become a long-term foreign base for Russia, along with Hmeimim. Currently Russia stations several warships plus some support vessels at Tartus. Russian warplanes and helicopters based at Hmeimim regularly carry out attacks on Islamic terrorists in Eastern Syria as well as nearby Idlib province. Russia sees its forces in Syria as peacekeepers. Russia has treaties with the Assad government legalizing Russian presence in Hmeimim and Tartus. Russian forces have also helped Syria revive smaller airbases in eastern Syria after recapture from ISIL. A year ago, some Russian forces in Syria returned to Russia to be used in Ukraine. The remaining Russian forces in Syria are close to the entrance to Black Sea and Russian ships and aircraft regularly monitor who uses the Turkish straits to enter or leave the Black Sea.

June 4, 2023: In the east (Homs province) ISIL gunmen attacked a group of farmers harvesting their crops. Four of the farmers, all from the same family, were killed. This sort of thing is often part of an effort to intimidate civilians and encourage cooperation with ISIL.

June 3, 2023: The continuing Israeli airstrikes in Syria are apparently concentrating on Iranian Unit 18340, which maintains several workshops for producing guided rockets using components smuggled in from Iran. Israeli airstrikes often destroy Iranian convoys bringing in these components. Because of this many of the components are flown in on cargo transports. Some of these have been damaged on the ground when Israel attacks Syrian air bases.

June 2, 2023: The United States revealed that American forces launched 17 attacks on ISIL groups in Syria during May. Some of these operations were carried out in cooperation with local forces (Syria or Kurdish). ISIL remnants in eastern Syria are the main source of Islamic terrorist violence there. The May attacks resulted in the arrest of 20 suspected ISIL members captured and another two killed.

June 1, 2023: In Syria Iran-backed militias continue firing rockets at American troops. Sometimes Iran-backed groups in Iraq attack American troops in Iraq. The Americans retaliate and Iran denies any responsibility for the violence.

May 31, 2023: Israeli media reported that recent Israeli airstrikes on targets near Damascus hit the Hezbollah “Golan Unit”. This unit organizes, arms and trains Hezbollah for attacks on Israel. This has not resulted in any successful Hezbollah attacks on Israel but has Hezbollah personnel seeking to carry out such attacks. The main obstacle is Israeli surveillance along their Syrian border, which detects attempted attack efforts and disrupts them with artillery and air strikes. Hezbollah is also using some men trained by the Golan Unit to attack American forces in Syria. The Americans, like their Israeli counterparts, are trained and equipped to defend themselves.

May 30, 2023: Syrian naval forces attacked a Turkish fishing boat that was in international waters. The two Syrian gunboats caused some damage to the fishing boat and wounded two of the crew. Apparently the attack was the result of uncertainty whether the fishing boat was in Syrian or international waters.

May 28, 2023: Outside Damascus and Israeli airstrike hit several targets. As usual for most Israeli airstrikes in Syria, the Israeli aircraft never entered Syrian air space, but launched missiles while still inside Israel.

May 26, 2023: In the north (Aleppo province) three Turkish backed militiamen were killed and four wounded during a dispute over delayed salaries

For the first time in nearly six months, Russian warplanes carried out five airstrikes against Islamic terrorists in northwest (Idlib province.) Idlib is near where the Russian Hmeimim airbase is. In the past Islamic terrorists from Idlib have tried to attack Hmeimim, without success.

May 25, 2023: In the east (Homs province) Oleg Pechevisty, a Russian colonel was killed during an ISIL ambush. Pechevisty was sent to Syria earlier in the year to carry out unspecified special tasks.

May 24, 2023: The annual misery index revealed that the five most miserable nations in the world are Zimbabwe (the worse), Venezuela, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan. Iran came in as the 19th most miserable while Ukraine was in 8th place. The five least miserable were Switzerland, Kuwait, Ireland, Japan and Malaysia in that order. Israel was the 15th lease miserable.

May 14, 2023: The U.S. has concluded that a March UAV attack on an American base in Syria, which killed a military contractor, was launched by an Iran-backed militia in nearby Iraq using small commercial quadcopters equipped with explosives and a contact fuze.

May 10, 2023: Lebanon is seeking to expel Sunni Arab refugees from Syria. Lebanon has started registering and attempting to deport these refugees. The nearly two million Sunni Arab Syrians that fled to Lebanon since 2012 radically changed the demography of Lebanon. Before 2011 the Lebanese population was only five million. Since nearly all those refugees are Sunni Moslems, it changed the religious mix of Lebanon from 27 percent Shia, 27 percent Sunni, and 46 percent Christian (and other religions) to a more volatile combination. With the refugee influx there were now seven million people in Lebanon and 47 percent were Sunni, 19 percent Shia and 34 percent Christian (and others). This put the Iran backed Hezbollah militia in a bad situation. Their better armed and trained fighters have been able to dominate the other minorities since the 1980s. That was possible because of Iranian cash, weapons and advisors. But the Iranian help and better organization is no longer enough when the Sunnis are nearly half the population and out for blood because of the slaughter the Iran backed Shia Syrian government inflicted on Syrian Sunnis. Lebanon does not want another civil war over this and it was becoming difficult to contain the anger. Hezbollah and Iran have had some success attracting non-Shia factions, especially Christians, to be part of the Shia coalition. This is traditional Lebanese politics, with the Christians surviving by forming a coalition with non-Christian groups. Now even these Christian factions are backing away from Hezbollah. By 2023 Lebanon felt itself capable of dealing with the refugee crisis, especially since large-scale violence in Syria has largely disappeared. During the Syrian war some 5.5 million Syrians fled to neighboring countries. Turkey has 3.6 million, Lebanon two million and 250,000 in Iraq. There are also several million Syrians in Saudi Arabia, who are considered part of the large (over six million foreigners) expatriate workforce. About a third of those workers are Syrians. While many fled to Saudi Arabia because of the war in Syria, they were not treated like refugees and have jobs and status in Saudi Arabia. Countries bordering Syria want their refugees to go home. That cannot happen without the cooperation of the Syrian Assad government. Syria needs a lot of those refugees to revive the economy and the Arab League is willing to allow Syria to rejoin if they reduce their cooperation with Iran. That has always been a dangerous option for the Assads because the Iranians have enough armed operatives inside Syria to threaten the lives of key Assad clan members. Currently, Iranian power is unusually weak inside Iran and inside Syria. Now is a good time for the Assads to make a break from Iran, especially if he has the support of the Arab League and assurances that the League will help, not hinder Assad use of force to maintain their rule in Syria. Turkey does not belong to the Arab League but is eager to send its Syrian refugee’s home. The Assad offer is acceptable if it will finally get those Syrians out of Turkey. The Assad’s appear to have decided in favor of the Arab League. That outcome of that decision will become known and put into effect sometime this year.

 

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