August 14,
2008: U.S. military commanders and
diplomats quickly learn that Iraqis possess a unique culture, as is customary
wherever you go in the world. For example, the Iraqis are more comfortable with
the "winner take all" form of politics and government. They are still
getting used to this democracy business. It's not that the Iraqis are
unfamiliar with democracy. Until fifty years ago, Iraq had a parliament for two
decades. It was a constitutional monarchy, but the parliament had power. The inability
of that parliament to use its power effectively was one of the things that led
to the military coup, which eventually got Saddam Hussein into power, and
brought Iraq a quarter century of war and despotism.
Few Iraqis
remember the old parliament, which is too bad, as the current legislators are
making the same mistakes. The corruption is so pervasive that spending
legislation is deadlocked. That's because of the disputes over who will steal
what. There are also anti-corruption factions, but they are not the most
powerful players. The stalemate over spending (and who controls what chunk of
the $50 billion or so of unspent oil money) is also holding up resolution over
more mundane matters, like voting rules for upcoming elections and autonomy for
the Kurds. Then there is the SOFA (status-of-forces agreement), for what
foreign troops can, and cannot, do. The Iraqi politicians would like the American
troops out, but not until it's very certain that Iraqi security forces can
handle any unruly portions of the population.
Many Iraqis
are eager to ditch the old traditions, and adopt more effective ones. The push
for clean government is what got al Qaeda going in the first place. Many Iraqis
were willing to go along with a religious dictatorship if that meant an end to
all the stealing and double-dealing. But the Islamic radicals also justified
the slaughter of Moslem civilians and the imposition of severe lifestyle rules,
and this has destroyed most al Qaedas support. Now Iraqis yearn for the kind of
government they have heard about (especially from friends or kin who have
migrated) in Europe and North America. But getting from here to there is
proving exceedingly difficult. There is all that oil money, and all those guys
who want to go old school on it.
Down south,
in the land of Shia holy places and a population that is nearly all Shia,
popular religious leader Moktada al Sadr is getting out of the militia
business. Not that he had much choice, since the Iraqi army marched in earlier
this year and demonstrated that their American training and tactics were far
superior to the bravado and enthusiasm of Sadr's gunmen. Most of these guys
have either hidden their weapons, been forcibly disarmed, fled the country or been
killed. So Sadr has ordered the rest to put away their Mahdi Army uniforms and
get rid of their AK-47s and RPGs. Only a few of them will be selected for an
elite fighting force (that knows how to avoid getting disarmed by the army or
police). Everyone else will devote themselves to social welfare programs. There
is one problem with this plan, there is now no way to meet the payroll. When
the Sadr militiamen strolled freely through Shia towns and neighborhoods, they
collected a special tax from merchants and anyone who seemed to have a lot of
money. This cash went to provide weekly pay for the militiamen. These guys have
now lost their guns, their power and their money. Sadr wants them to run soup
kitchens and clinics. This is not going to work well.
While the
Iraqi Army is now competent enough to defeat militias and al Qaeda in combat,
Iraqi commanders don't have one weapon their U.S. counterparts do; cash. Early
on, American unit commanders, and their superiors, realized that if there was
cash available for battalion or brigade commanders to give out for local
reconstruction projects, it was much easier to gain the trust and cooperation
of locals. Iraqi commanders who have received this kind of cash, have too often
stolen most of it. Same thing often happens with military supplies. Even some
of the food and clothing for their troops will often find itself diverted to
the black market, so the commander can get himself a little cash bonus (for
being the boss). There are other opportunities for Iraqi battalion or brigade
commanders. There's always loot, although their U.S. trainers have warned about
how this angers civilians and makes life more dangerous for the looters. But it's
a tradition that has proved difficult, although not impossible, to change. It's
really come down to a battle between Old Iraq and New Iraq. It's a battle that
is little reported on, but it's the one that will decide the future of the
country.
The Iranian
terrorist network inside Iraq has been cracked open, since the capture of so
many members and documents has led to the rolling up of most of the cells that
were making attacks on Iraqi and American troops. The Iranians have not given
up this secret war in Iraq, but it has become much more difficult for them to
carry on. This year has been a disaster for the Iranians, with hundreds of
their agents killed or captured.
Up north, al
Qaeda and Iraqi Sunni Arab terrorists are making their last stand in Diyala
province. The terrorists are cornered on the well guarded border between Arab and
Kurdish Iraq. Kurdish troops have been active in this campaign, because the
Kurds want to extend their borders south to incorporate the city of Kirkuk (and
nearby oil fields). This is a contentious issue in the parliament, but the
Kurds are content to crush the Sunni Arab radicals first, and sort out the real
estate claims later. The remaining Sunni Arab terrorists are a nasty bunch,
although many of the smarter ones have fled the country, and some are showing
up in Afghanistan.
