by Austin Bay
May 12, 2004
June 30, when the Coalition Provisional Authority officially returns responsibility for
governing Iraq to Iraqis, won't be a magic moment.
�No one with any fact-based
awareness of the human condition ever expected abracadabra democracy -- certainly not in Iraq.
The great American democratic political experiment remains a work in progress, and that
experiment's most terrible explosion, the Civil War, nearly destroyed the lab.
The Iraqi experiment is just beginning. America has created history's greatest opportunity for fundamental change in the
Middle East, change dramatically favoring the extension of basic human rights to people perpetually denied such rights.
The end of the dictator's graft and nepotism, as well as large doses of capital for rebuilding wrecked infrastructure,
sets the stage for a more productive and just economy.
However, the final formula for success is up to the people of Iraq.
There will be years of trial and error.
Is the American strategic goal of a self-policing, economically productive
and politically exemplary (meaning rule of law in some democratic shape, form or fashion) Iraq achievable?
Yes it is, if -- IF the approximately 250 community governments already functioning as democratic incubators are used as an
effective support network for the "federal" Iraq that is emerging with the encouragement of the United States and its
The basic federal model for Iraq is no mystery: a Kurd region, a Shia region, a Sunni region and
a "federal city region" of Baghdad. A functioning federal system, of course, presumes a high degree of local
control and authority.
The day-to-day experience of local governments fixing potholes bodes well for the long haul, but security -- protecting the lives of locals -- must become an Iraqi responsibility. Last week, Iraq's most influential Shia leaders and clerics demanded that rebel leader Moktada al-Sadr pull his militiamen out of the Shia holy cities of a Najaf and Karbala. It's another indication that responsible Iraqi leaders now have the confidence to act against their own local militants.
The Shia leaders condemned al-Sadr for using mosques as ammo dumps. The most telling demand, however, was that al-Sadr submit to�Iraqi police. Al-Sadr's "Al Mahdi" militia isn't finished, but its Iranian roots are being exposed. More on that in a moment.
In terms of preparation for self-rule, Iraqi Kurds have a decade's jump on Sunni and Shia Arab citizens. Recall, however, the Kurds' security situation under Saddam, even with the "Northern Watch" air umbrella provided by U.S. and allied aircraft, was never certain. Internal Kurd divisions sparked shooting. Saddam invaded Kurdistan in 1996, under the pretext of supporting a Kurdish faction. Ansar-al-Islam, Iraq's Al Qaeda affiliate, attacked Kurds, and probably still does, via car bombs.
The Kurds, however, have made an effort to police their region, and the effort has paid off.
The Sunni situation is far more tenuous, but encouraging Sunni leaders was one of the shadow games behind the U.S. Marine operations in Fallujah. Every Marine attack left more militants dead or arrested, creating a larger "political space" for Sunni moderates to emerge.
What will keep "federal New Iraq" cooperating instead of fragmenting?
A "fair shake for all" in the distribution of Iraq's oil revenue is absolutely essential.
International economic and infrastructure aid will only flow if Iraq remains unified.
U.S. security guarantees. New Iraq has enemies who are actively trying to destroy it, such as Iran. Al-Sadr and his militia serve as a covert Iranian army probing Iraq, and the Shias know it. An "independent Shia state" stands a high chance of being utterly dominated by Iran. Syria is also a threat. Turkey will not allow a separate Kurd state -- that's another factor. Saudi Arabia isn't quite sure about New Iraq, but then the Saudis are never quite sure about anything.��
The Saudis own internal war with Al Qaeda is boiling. Crown Prince Abdullah is now public criticizing Saudis sympathizing with Al Qaeda and anti-House of Saud militants. The Saudis also have no interest in a separate Shia state emerging on their border.
A new Iraqi national army. An integrated, federal force may be years away, but building it will be a politically unifying process.