Stealing For The Enemy

Another major problem is that there's no older system to build on. For one thing, all the former Iraqi army logistics officers were Sunni Arabs, whose loyalty is suspect. But it's not their political views you have to worry about the most. It's the corruption factor that is the biggest obstacle to establishing an effective logistics organization. Training Iraqis in the technical skills required is easy, compared to getting them to believe that honesty is the only policy that makes this work. If anyone involved in the long chain of handling supplies is crooked, the combat troops won't get what they need.

But it's not just corruption in the logistics units, but in the army as a whole. Senior commanders are too prone to just reassigning logistics troops to other duties, then complaining to their American advisors that they have no logistical support. Fortunately, not all Iraqi officers are corrupt, or logistically inept. But the more of them there are, the larger your logistical problems are going to be. 

Right now, the Iraqi army needs about 40,000 logistics troops. Only about half of those are on duty, and not all are trained, or trustworthy. Proficiency begins at the top, and in a democracy, the elected officials appoint the heads of the Defense Ministry (and other ministries that require logistic support, like Interior). Too often, these ministers, or their immediate subordinates, are stealing. And these thieves will appoint other officials and officers who are also thieves. But worse than the stealing, is the impact it has on operations. Troops who don't get paid, fed, supplied or equipped on time, do not perform very well, if at all. There's no magic solution to curing this problem, it just takes time and effort. This sort of thing has been cured before. Indeed, all the highly efficient Western nations went through this corrupt phase, and some were worse that present day Iraq. But the cure isn't going to appear overnight.