December 18, 2007: During the 2006 war in Lebanon,
Israel learned again that speed and information are powerful weapons. Hizbollah
had studied Israeli operations, and believed they knew enough of how that
worked to pull off ambushes of helicopters and ground troops. Israel depended
on helicopters to avoid ambushes on the ground and to outmaneuver enemy ground
forces. Thus Hizbollah saw Israeli helicopters as prime targets. Israel found
that the counter to these Hizbollah tactics was information and speed. Israeli
aircraft, helicopters and ground forces were equipped with faster
communications systems, and procedures that got target and threat information
distributed more quickly. This made it possible for Hizbollah threats, or
targets, to be spotted, and dealt with, quickly enough to be effective. The
Israelis ran helicopter operations as quickly as possible, and were usually
able to land (and drop off troops, or supplies, or pick up casualties) and take
off so quickly that Hizbollah could not interfere.
Hizbollah had speeded up their operations, but the
Israelis speeded theirs up even more. Because Israel controlled the air, they
had an edge Hizbollah was never able to overcome. But if the Israelis had not
sped up their operations, they would have been in trouble. Hizbollah did the
correct thing in looking for predictable patterns in Israeli operations, and
preparing to take advantage of that. The Israelis were able to adapt quickly to
this, and crank things up a little more, to get out of harm's way.
The Israelis are taking this farther by installing
more Internet type capabilities, to include rapid exchange of digital photos
and videos. The idea being that, wherever the Israelis are, they are seeking
out the enemy, and ready to bring in whatever firepower they have (aircraft,
helicopters, artillery, tanks) to destroy the enemy quickly.
