The LCA developers saw this coming and a year ago ordered 99 American F414 jet engines for $8.1 million each. These were to be used for the first LCAs being mass produced. Eventually, most of the LCAs were to be powered by the Kaveri engine, which has been in development hell for over two decades. The F414s were to substitute only until the Kaveri was ready. The failure of this engine effort is just one of many examples of how the Indian defense procurement bureaucracy misfires. Efforts to fix the mess even led to calling in foreign experts (from the U.S., Israel, and other Western nations).
For example, three years ago India made arrangements with French engine manufacturer Snecma to provide technical assistance for the Kaveri design and manufacturing problems. Critics in the Indian air force asserted that help from Snecma would not save the ill-fated Kaveri program. But the government apparently believed that it was necessary for India to acquire the ability to design and build world class jet engines, whatever the cost. Only a few nations can do this and India wants to be one of them, soon, no matter what obstacles are encountered. Despite decades of effort, the Kaveri never quite made it to mass production. Now the government will continue funding development of jet engine design and manufacturing capability, but with some unspecified changes.
There is much to be learned from the Kaveri debacle. When work began on the Kaveri, in the mid-1980s, it was believed that the LCA would be ready for flight testing by 1990. A long list of technical delays put off that first flight until 2001. Corners had to be cut to make this happen, for the LCA was originally designed to use the Indian built Kaveri engine and the engine was never ready.
Fortunately, there was an American engine, the GE F404 that fit the LCA and could be used as a stop-gap. The F414 is a more recent model of the F404 and has 15 percent more thrust. So from the beginning the Kaveri engine was “temporarily” replaced by the American F414.
This enabled work on the LCA to proceed. For example, last year the carrier version of the LCA made its first flight. With that out of the way, the Indian Navy is negotiating a deal with their American counterparts to help get the LCA-NP (the naval version of the LCA) ready for regular carrier use. The U.S. Navy has provided this sort of consulting service to India in the past. Although the Indian Navy has been operating jet aircraft from carriers since the 1960s, most of their recent experience is with vertical take-off Harrier aircraft. The new Indian carriers will be more like their American counterparts and will operate carrier versions of land-based fighters. No navy has as much experience in this kind of carrier operations as the United States, and the Indians want to have their plans and preparations checked over by American carrier officers and technical experts. In this situation a little good advice can go a long way in avoiding expensive mistakes.
The LCA is only now beginning mass production and the first ones are to enter service later this year. Six prototypes and sixteen pre-production models already exist. For over two decades India has been trying to design, develop, and manufacture its own "lightweight fighter" but the project has been a major disaster. It has, however, been a valuable and very expensive learning experience.
Meanwhile, the 1970s, era American F-16 is probably the premier "lightweight fighter" in service and began joining squadrons about the time India came up with the LCA project. Both the F-16 (at least the earlier models) and the LCA weigh about 12-13 tons. But the F-16 is a high performance aircraft, with a proven combat record, while the LCA is sort of an improved Mirage/MiG-21 type design. Not too shabby and cheap (about half the cost of an F-16). Also, for all this time, money, and grief India has made its aviation industry a bit more capable and mature.
For all this, India only plans to buy 200-300 LCAs, mainly to replace its aging MiG-21s, plus more if the navy finds the LCA works on carriers. Export prospects are dim, given all the competition out there (especially for cheap, second-hand F-16s). The delays have led the air force to look around for a hundred or so new aircraft (or even used F-16s) to fill the gap between elderly MiG-21s falling apart and the arrival of the new LCAs. However, two decades down the road the replacement for the LCA will probably be a more competitive and timely aircraft.
Four years ago the Indian Navy announced it was buying six of the new LCA fighters to operate from the new carriers that are to enter service in the next five years. This is an experiment to see how the LCA will do as a carrier aircraft. The first LCA carrier trials are to take place this year. The navy has already bought navalized MiG-29s for these carriers. The navy LCAs will also be navalized (mainly stronger landing gear, a tail hook, and different cockpit electronics). The MiG-29K weighs 21 tons (16 percent weapons), while the navalized LCA weighs 13 tons (34 percent of that weapons). The MiG-29 is a better fighter but the LCA carries a little more (4 versus 3.5 tons) armament, making it a cheaper way to attack ships or land targets with missiles and bombs.