by Austin Bay
March 28, 2003 gave this assessment March 27: "The enemy we�re fighting is a bit different than
the one we wargamed against, because of these (fedayeen) paramilitary
My translation: US war planners didn�t anticipate extensive death squad
Military staffs use "game" techniques, experience, and current intelligence
data to examine friendly and enemy combat options. They attempt to "see the
battle as our enemy sees it and fight the battle his way, not our way." Goals
include spurring creative thinking and exposing assumptions to critique.
Commanders try to use these insights to craft better plans. A recognized
weakness in U.S. wargaming is the "fake bad guys" rarely prove to be as ruthless
as the genuine bad guys. Playing "dirty as Saddam" is tough. The real world�s
socio-paths and sadists one-up the imaginations of even the best crime writers.
A war plan provides a time frame. No war ever quite follows the plan, for
many reasons. The enemy isn�t stupid. The brass doesn�t boss the weather.
Despite the general�s admission, I�m convinced the fedayeen represent more of
a political problem than military problem.
The Pacific island campaigns in WWII provide a historical example. Once
organized Japanese resistance ceased and the allies had an island�s airfields
and ports operating, the brass would declare the place "secure." Infantry
regiments would withdraw to refit for the next amphibious assault. The "major
operation" was over� but tell that to the Navy SeaBees on the "secure island"
who would scrap with snipers for months after the front had officially moved
In Iraq the fedayeen�s low-level resistance could flicker for months. That�s
one reason US Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki says peacekeeping in post-Saddam
Iraq will require more ground troops.
Guerrillas need popular support, but the Iraqi people fear the fedayeen.
British troops report civilians are telling them where the paramilitaries hide.
The population isn�t protecting the fascists. That suggests pro-Saddam holdouts
may use guerrilla tactics but they�re death squads, not a guerrilla force.
Baghdad is the real "big game." Thus the more discerning question: "How long
will major military operations continue until the game is up in Baghdad?"
No outsider has CENTCOM�s war plan or current intel.
Outsiders have to crack a "best guess" with open sources.
In early February, using a wargame originally developed in 1990 for ABC News
Nightline, I looked at several Iraq attack options.
The allied forces actually in Kuwait on March 20 appeared in those games.
However, the games also included the US 4th Infantry Division and one
brigade of the US 1st Armored Division. Those units weren�t in the
line March 20th.
An option close to what appears to be the actual plan was dubbed "The Slow
Roll." "The Slow Roll" had two variants, one with two fronts (Turkey and Kuwait)
and one with a "Kuwait only" front. The game assumptions included US air
supremacy, abundant smart bombs, and stiff Republican Guard resistance.
Major combat operations �meaning the destruction of Repubican Guard units
around Baghdad-- took 15 days to 25 days to conclude. With a northern front and
no hitches, 15 days. The south-only attack took 25 days, but that was with the
presence of the 4th Infantry Division. One had parachute and
helicopter units seizing the big airfields in western Iraq. Apparently CENTCOM
took those with Green Berets.
"The Slow Roll" did get a few things right. It assumed the allies would try
to minimize civilian casualties and protect oil facilities. The gaming does
suggest that until the 4th Infantry arrives the allies risk a
shortage of combat troops� a worry voiced by several old soldiers. Add the
4th Infantry�s arrival time and the games indicate big operations
could last five to six weeks. I�ll trot out that guess, fully aware history
pummels guess work. However, it�s a fair bet that the destruction of the
Republican Guards will mean the political destruction of Saddam�s regime. The
February games missed the 3rd Infantry�s jaw-dropping dash to
Baghdad. CENTCOM may well have another surprise.