by Harry Yeide
Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2011. Pp. xiv, 514.
Illus., maps, append., notes, biblio, index. $30.00. ISBN: 0760341281
explores an aspect of Patton’s career that has been largely neglected, what the enemy thought about him.
Yeide, author of several works on the Second World War, examined German after-action-reports from both world wars, the transcripts of postwar interviews with German officers, and many memoirs. The result is interesting, thought-provoking, and iconoclastic. Yeide finds that the Germans believed Patton to be a good officer and sound tactician, certainly better than most of the Allied commanders. Overall, however, they ranked him as only equal to most of their own above average commanders, and believed him no match for their Guderians and Mansteins. Moreover, Yeide found the Germans believed that while Patton was a much better tactician than his rival Montgomery, they also believed Monty was the better strategist.
A book that is absolutely essential for anyone interested in the U.S. Army in World War II, the campaign in northwestern Europe, and George S. Patton,
will no doubt stimulate much controversy