Book Review: Defeat and Division: France at War, 1939–1942

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by Douglas Porch

Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. xviii, 725. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $39.00. ISBN: 1107047463

An Insightful Look at France’s War from 1939 Through 1942.

Douglas Porch’s Defeat and Division: France at War, 1939-1942, is a book with few peers. It delves headlong into the French military experience in one of their worst recent periods, providing key insights into their experience from war’s beginning to Operation TORCH in November 1942.

Porch sets out to reconsider a period in French history full of confusion, bitterness, ego, and betrayal that makes it simultaneously exhausting and maddening. As such, the book is at times very dense reading with an expectation of more than basic World War II knowledge, a penchant for abbreviations strung together at times cryptically, and a grasp of French that some readers may find off-putting, if not jarring. It forges on, however, not as a combat narrative but rather as a well-knit journey that considers not only leaders and places of power but also the lesser characters that go about their duty in far-flung colonies with no hope of a mention in a history book. Important to note is that Defeat and Division is the first of two volumes; the second volume Resistance and Liberation: France at War, 1942-1945 came out in 2024.

Ostensibly the prewar period up to the German invasion, the so-called “Phony War,” the 1940 campaign and subsequent defeat of France, the rise of competing French surrogates claiming to be the new France (Vichy and Free French) and the Allied initiative which eventually led to the invasion of Vichy North Africa are the main areas of focus. Ultimately this book is encyclopedic in nature with many details and heavy referencing of what other historians postulated, which gives it a powerful gravitas other works lack.

While the book covers many different aspects of the early war French experience, a few examples will suffice: the May 1940 disaster, the lingering POW controversy, and placing Vichy [more] accurately in the historical record. From May-June 1940 a French military that on paper had more mobilized troops, tanks, artillery, significant defense works, and other theoretical advantages, yet performed poorly against the Wehrmacht which overwhelmed them in six weeks and irrevocably damaged the French psyche. Since then, the question of who or what was to blame has seen considerable debate. Some argue the Third Republic essentially betrayed France with the interwar period’s reduced budgets, wasteful priorities, political instability and so forth, while others argue the French military let the empire down, although these are just oversimplifications of a very complicated topic. Porch ignores both, providing details that suggest it was a thorny collection of factors that exceed either approach, which is just one reason the book excels.

Another key factor is the POW issue, whereby the French defeat produced about 1.8 million POWs who in theory should be returned home. They were instead used to fill some labor roles inside the Third Reich’s patchwork wartime economy. (p. 557) This hurt France not only as a “crise du masculine” or masculinity crisis but by providing unwilling laborers for the Nazi war effort’s work details or Kommandos which created a numbing hostage situation by which Vichy could be leveraged. (pp. 231, 248) Contrastingly, in 1941 Vichy allowed the raising of a modest far-right unit for the Ostfront known grandly as the “Legion of French Volunteers against Bolshevism” or LVF. (p. 287) While not a Vichy initiative, it was condoned by Vichy to show support for Berlin using minority French fascists willing to fight. For all that is said about the French Resistance in the war, little is ever said about the LVF, nor did it achieve much militarily, yet remains worth mention. (pp. 327-337)

Finally, the case of Vichy as political and military entity begs brief mention as it is widely misunderstood or at least glossed over in typical historical circles. Porch shows how the Vichyites were not truly neutral. They fought the Allies at times with considerable zeal, cleverly fielded more military and related forces than the Armistice allowed, wielded their own “dreaded and thuggish” internal security force, the Milice, engaged in sometimes bitter fratricidal combat with the Gaullist Free French, provided economic assistance to Berlin as important vassal, sacrificed over 100,000 Alsatians and Mosellans to German conscription demands, and were manipulated by Berlin more thoroughly than generally understood. (pp. 287, 308-309, & 324)

Vichy rose as a direct contrast to the Third Republic, even down to its conservative slogan “Work, Family, Fatherland” which was a far cry from “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.” Vichy leadership struggled to walk the line as a supposed non-ally to Berlin, yet thoroughly collaborationist (“Vichy’s energies were directed into collaboration.”(p. 287) Vichy attempted to argue legitimacy while still acquiescing to whatever demands were placed on them in a nightmarish scenario that lasted from 1940-1944. The book closes with Operation TORCH, which heralded the collapse of the main military might that Vichy controlled through the colonial troops of the XIX Military Region (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and led to “le sabordage,” the Toulon scuttle of the Vichy-controlled fleet to deny German control in a “determined act of neutrality.” (pp. 548-9)

Porch’s landmark Defeat and Division: France at War, 1939-1942 excels at informing the reader about not merely the French military experience in a turbulent time but also offers fresh insights into politics, leadership, and other realms which collectively build a nuanced look at a once proud country faced with an unwanted identity crisis amidst a catastrophic war. While it may daunt some potential readers, Porch provides a compelling narrative that can be richly rewarding.

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Our Reviewer: Professor Schultz (Luzerne CC) has taught history and political science to community college undergraduates for over 20 years. Specializing in military history, particularly World War II and the Cold War-era, he has presented papers at the McMullen Naval History Symposium, the Society for Military History Annual Meetings, the Midwestern History Conference, and other venues. He contributed Chapter 12, “The Reich Strikes Back: German Victory in the Dodecanese, October-November 1943”, to On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare, edited by Timothy Heck and B.A. Friedman (2020). His previous reviews for us include Warrior Spirit: The Story of Native American Patriotism and Heroism, Home Run: Allied Escape and Evasion in World War II, The Spanish Blue Division on the Eastern Front, 1941-1945, The ‘Blue Squadrons’: The Spanish in the Luftwaffe, Malta’s Savior: Operation Pedestal, Flawed Commanders and Strategy in the Battles for Italy, Lawrence of Arabia on War, and Dogwood: A National Guard Unit's War in Iraq.

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Note: Defeat and Division is also available in e-editions.

StrategyPage reviews are published in cooperation with The New York Military Affairs Symposium

www.nymas.org

Reviewer: Jeffrey Schultz    


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