How and Why W.W. II at Sea Transformed the World

In his newest book Prof. Kennedy (Yale) author of the widely acclaimed The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), does not give us a grand, sweeping, detailed account of World War II on every ocean, sea, bay, and inlet, indeed he rather neglects some theatres. The reader will certainly learn much about the course of the greatest sea war in history, but Kennedy’s aim in Victory at Sea is to examine the whys and the hows that made sea power the key determinant of the outcome of the war and also led to a radical alteration in a world order that had prevailed for nearly two centuries, the era of European global preeminence.

The book’s eleven chapters are grouped into five sections.

Kennedy’s opening section surveys the role of sea power in history through the early twentieth century, examines the state of the principal navies during the 1930s (Britain, the U.S., Japan, France, Italy, and Germany), and looks at the geographic setting, and the economic resources of the various powers, most notably those of the U.S. He surveys how new technologies were conceived, developed, produced, and entered into service, and, of course, the trends in geopolitical thought and alignments on the eve of the war.

Kennedy follows with sections of varying numbers of chapters covering the events of 1939-1942, 1943 (“The Critical Year”), and 1944-1945, “Aftermath and Reflections”, plus an epilogue on “The Sweep of History,” and follows with a very interesting appendix on why he called 1943 “The Critical Year”.

Kennedy packs an enormous amount of information into Victory at Sea. We get an education in the industrial potential of the principal maritime powers, a look at emerging technologies, analyses of strategic and grand strategic decisions, and more.

Several important conclusions emerge from Victory at Sea. Firstly, that it was the industrial might of the United States that won the war at sea. By implication, this means that Allied victory in the war was essentially due to sea power, as all the Allies relied heavily on the sea to sustain their efforts, even the Soviet Union and China, sustained in great part by goods and equipment shipped by sea. In addition, the war ended the European dominated “world order” that had prevailed since the eighteenth century, replacing it with one dominated by the United States, which emerged from the war with a navy more powerful than all others combined. This is a condition which prevails to the present, albeit challenged briefly by the Soviets, and perhaps now by the Chinese.

Victory at Sea is marvelously illustrated with a series of paintings by the American marine artist Ian Marshall, and makes extensive use of tables and graphics to support Kennedy’s case.

Although some will rightly be critical about Kennedy’s use of sources (there are a number of Wikipedia references), Victory at Sea will likely prove interesting and possibly thought-provoking reading for anyone with an interest in sea power, World War II, or the emergence of the postwar world order.

Note: Victory at Sea is also available in e-editions.

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