August
7, 2008: China's effort to upgrade the lower end of their military
leadership is running into problems, most of them cultural. Efforts
to create a large number of professional NCOs (Non-Commissioned
Officers, or sergeants) has run afoul of ancient habits. Thus the NCO
schools tend to concentrate on the technical training of their
students, and leave the leadership chores to officers. About a third
of the Chinese military is officers, the proportion of officers in
the American military is closer to half that (16 percent). The
Chinese NCO corps is being trained mainly to fill technician jobs,
while still leaving leadership primarily to officers.
A
decade ago, China decided to develop a Western style NCO corps. This
was another result of the many studies performed to determine how the
Western, and particularly U.S., forces had so rapidly and
convincingly defeated Iraq in the 1991 battle for Kuwait. However,
while the Chinese appreciated the many technical skills of Western
NCOs, they misunderstood the role NCOs play in leading the troops.
You can blame this on the Russians.
Throughout
the Cold War, China had adhered to the military doctrines developed
by the Soviet Union. But by the end of the Cold War, suspicions that
the Soviet methods were not the most effective, began to evolve into
new ideas. A close study of the U.S. and British armed forces made it
clear that the Soviet custom of downplaying NCOs, in favor of more
officers, was a problem, not a solution.
For
the Soviet Union, the problems developed after World War II, when
Russia deliberately avoided developing a professional NCO corps. They
preferred to have officers take care of nearly all troop supervision.
The NCOs that did exist were treated as slightly more reliable
enlisted men, but given little real authority. Since officers did not
live with the troops, slack discipline in the barracks gave rise to
the vicious hazing and exploitation of junior conscripts by the
senior, or simply stronger and more ruthless, ones. This led to very
low morale, and a lot of suicides, theft, sabotage and desertions.
Long recognized as a problem, no solution ever worked. The Chinese
had similar problems.
The
basic problem is simply poor discipline. The Chinese have found that,
with professional NCOs, it's possible to exercise more control over
what goes on in the barracks. But this is not leadership, but simply
keeping order in the barracks. The Chinese still rely on political
officers (another concept borrowed from the Russians), but having
more numerous, and well trained, NCOs, would provide the officers
with a more reliable way to get the troops in shape, and of
monitoring their attitudes and capabilities. This is not leadership,
it's simply better control.
Since
the late 1990s, becoming an NCO in the Chinese military is almost as
difficult as getting into officers school, and is a big deal for
those who make it. The big difference is that you don't need a lot
of formal education (the basic nine years of school most Chinese get
is sufficient). If, after two years of military service, you
demonstrate you are smart and ambitious, you can apply for NCO
school. If you get accepted, and complete the two (or more) year
course, you are obliged to serve for at least twelve more years.
The
NCO school puts a lot of emphasis on technical training for whatever
branch you are in (truck or aircraft maintenance, electronics,
artillery, and so on). Think of it as a trade school, with some
leadership courses. You get paid a lot more as an NCO, particularly
one with technical skills. A recent jump in the Chinese defense
budget went largely for raising troop pay. The NCOs did very well by
this.
The
Chinese have been replacing some officers with NCOs, particularly in
technical jobs, now that they have more senior, and seasoned, NCOs as
well. The NCO schools currently turns out 50,000 graduates a year.
Most of these are junior sergeants (the first two, of six, NCO
ranks). For the first four grades, you have to serve 3-4 years in a
rank before getting promoted. For the highest two ranks, it's 5-9
years. Thus the Chinese have very few senior NCOs, and very few that
are allowed to exercise leadership skills.
In
peacetime, your most senior Chinese NCOs (Sergeant Major in Western
parlance) will be guys in their 40s or 50s, with over a quarter
century of military experience. In about 20 years, China will have
tens of thousands of these senior sergeants. These are the NCOs who
get things done, in peace or war. Without them, you just have lot of
poorly led men with guns. With those trained and experienced NCOs,
you have a force that can match anything in the West, but only if the
senior NCOs are leaders, not greying geeks. These senior NCOs will be
in a position to make a case for allowing NCOs to exercise more
leadership.
According
to studies by Chinese officers, the U.S. training and leadership
edge gives American troops a major advantage in combat. To counter
this, China is trying to develop tactics and techniques that will
catch the Americans by surprise and exploit American weaknesses. The
most obvious one is the Chinese Cyber War effort, which is extensive
and growing. But China is also equipping about a quarter of their
troops with modern gear, and training these troops hard, in the
American style.
For
the moment, the Chinese generals and admirals just want more older,
more professional enlisted troops, with better technical skills. Most
of these guys only understand the leadership role of Western NCOs as
an abstraction, and have never really seen it in action. They don't
really understand how critical NCO leadership is to success in
combat.