The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, Commandos, and the Future of Us Warfare by James F. Dunnigan
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Dirty Little Secrets
Iraqi Sergeants and the Fate of the Nation
by James Dunnigan
November 10, 2005
Discussion Board on this DLS topic
One of the major problems in the Iraqi army,
and most Arab armies, is the low status of NCOs. In the West, sergeants were
originally, literally, “non-commissioned” officers. That is, they had
leadership and management responsibilities, but were not of the same status as
the aristocratic officers. Commissioned officers were, back in the day, from a
higher social class (often the nobility), literate, and used to giving orders.
Those nations with a more educated population, were able to build a more effective
NCO corps. But in areas with low literacy rates, and much class consciousness,
the sergeants were not given much responsibility, or authority.
As a result of this, the American and Iraqi armies are opposites in the way
they treat, and use, their NCOs. All American sergeants are well educated. Many
of them have college degrees. In the Iraqi army, centuries of low literacy
rates has led to sergeants who are given little respect, or authority. Officers
typically supervise the most mundane tasks the troops perform. Despite
relatively high literacy (over 70 percent for males) in Iraq, being an NCO is
not seen as a very respectable job. Long years of training by Russian
instructors did not improve the situation, because the Russians also had a bad
attitude towards NCOs.
However, now the Iraqis have seen, up close, how effective well trained and
respected sergeants can be. So American efforts to convince Iraqi officers and
troops to adopt the Western type of NCO is showing results. But it’s slow
going. For generations, Iraqis have gotten by with sergeants who got no
respect, or authority. And not much additional pay, either. As with the
officers, the young troops are more willing, and able, to accept these new
ideas than the older NCOs who served in Saddam’s army. Another advantage the
Iraqis have is the willingness of Jordan to help train NCOs. Jordan, which
enthusiastically adopted the British model of what an NCO should be, have the
best NCO corps in the Middle East. So the senior Jordanian NCOs can talk directly
to their Iraqi counterparts, and convince them that they can make the change
(from officer’s lackey to the guy-in-charge.)
But building an effective NCO corps will take at least a decade. The young
sergeants, especially the ones getting combat experience, are proving their
worth right now. But it will take years for them to acquire the experience and
wisdom to become platoon and company sergeants. The platoon sergeants will be
particularly valuable, because a major weakness in the Iraqi army was having
young lieutenants in charge of platoons, without the assistance of an older and
more experienced platoon sergeant.
The Iraqis need a strong NCO corps, because the Iraqi armed forces have long
been the most ineffective in the Arab world. That’s saying something, because
Arab armies in general have been pretty bad for a long time. Well trained
officers and NCOs will make a big difference in the combat capabilities of the
Iraqi forces. Unfortunately, that won’t solve the problem of the military
taking over the government. Saddam ruled as the result of a military takeover
in the 1960s, and put down dozens of subsequent attempts by the military to
overthrow him. Throughout the Arab world, power is maintained by dictators of
kings who know how to keep the troops loyal, or too afraid to attempt a coup.
This approach makes combat effectiveness less important than loyalty, and is
part of the reason for the dismal battlefield record of Arab troops.
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