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Subject: ww2 Yamato vs Iowa class
capt soap    9/17/2005 12:55:11 PM
How would this fight turn out? the Iowa's 16 inch guns against the Yamato 18 guns? The iowa had radar,which one would sink the other 1 on 1.
 
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Leech       7/14/2009 6:42:42 AM
South Dakota closed on 4500 m from Japanese ships beacouse she had some problems with radar. She was hit with 42 heavy? projectiles, while Washington was undamaged. (Kirishima was destroyed by Washington.) However, this "heavy" might mean also any non-AA guns, in range from 406 to 155 mm, but better check that somewhere.
 
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benellim4       7/15/2009 10:55:43 PM
Halsey better than Fletcher? I don't think so. It was Fletcher who was busy stopping the Japanese advance at Coral Sea. It was Fletcher who was in command at Midway (yes, he had overall command of both task forces). It was Fletcher who started the first offensive campaign. It was Fletcher who was saddled with refining incomplete carrier tactics under fire. If you read his after action reports and recommendations many of them were adopted later in the war. Fletcher was good because he trusted his experts and his people grew to trust that a "shoe" would do what was right.
 
After Fletcher, the best carrier task force commander was Spruance. Spruance understood the what the real war-winning objectives were, and pursued them.

Halsey was a simpleton. He had his place because he provided good press, the more reserved Fletcher and Spurance did not, which got the home front inovled. But in reality, if I had to pick an admiral to fight a carrier battle he would be nearly last on my list.
 
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Herald12345    Spruance and Fletcher   7/15/2009 11:38:32 PM

Halsey better than Fletcher? I don't think so. It was Fletcher who was busy stopping the Japanese advance at Coral Sea. It was Fletcher who was in command at Midway (yes, he had overall command of both task forces). It was Fletcher who started the first offensive campaign. It was Fletcher who was saddled with refining incomplete carrier tactics under fire. If you read his after action reports and recommendations many of them were adopted later in the war. Fletcher was good because he trusted his experts and his people grew to trust that a "shoe" would do what was right.

I don't put Fletcher ahead of Spruance even after all the recent revisionism, mostly because of the overall performance records compared to each other, to me, still shows Spruance the better operational artist and admiral, but I've read the last year or so of flood of action reports that hit Hyperwar and Syracuse University. Fletcher comes off better and better compared to everyone except Spruance. He seems to have run a good naval staff setup of his own as you described.     

After Fletcher, the best carrier task force commander was Spruance. Spruance understood the what the real war-winning objectives were, and pursued them.

Strategic vision, which of course makes Spruance the better admiral, since he was at his worst, Fletcher's tactical equal.

Halsey was a simpleton. He had his place because he provided good press, the more reserved Fletcher and Spurance did not, which got the home front involved. But in reality, if I had to pick an admiral to fight a carrier battle he would be nearly last on my list.
 
Just ahead of Mutscher.


 
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Leech       7/17/2009 4:33:34 AM

Halsey better than Fletcher? I don't think so. It was Fletcher who was busy stopping the Japanese advance at Coral Sea. It was Fletcher who was in command at Midway (yes, he had overall command of both task forces). It was Fletcher who started the first offensive campaign. It was Fletcher who was saddled with refining incomplete carrier tactics under fire. If you read his after action reports and recommendations many of them were adopted later in the war. Fletcher was good because he trusted his experts and his people grew to trust that a "shoe" would do what was right.

 

After Fletcher, the best carrier task force commander was Spruance. Spruance understood the what the real war-winning objectives were, and pursued them.



Halsey was a simpleton. He had his place because he provided good press, the more reserved Fletcher and Spurance did not, which got the home front inovled. But in reality, if I had to pick an admiral to fight a carrier battle he would be nearly last on my list.


Fletcher, Spruance, Kimball... these are all responsible commanders. Halsey was popularity icon, not Fleet Commander. He was good when it come to hunt-and-kill missions, but nothing else.
 
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benellim4       7/19/2009 8:28:19 PM




Halsey better than Fletcher? I don't think so. It was Fletcher who was busy stopping the Japanese advance at Coral Sea. It was Fletcher who was in command at Midway (yes, he had overall command of both task forces). It was Fletcher who started the first offensive campaign. It was Fletcher who was saddled with refining incomplete carrier tactics under fire. If you read his after action reports and recommendations many of them were adopted later in the war. Fletcher was good because he trusted his experts and his people grew to trust that a "shoe" would do what was right.





I don't put Fletcher ahead of Spruance even after all the recent revisionism, mostly because of the overall performance records compared to each other, to me, still shows Spruance the better operational artist and admiral, but I've read the last year or so of flood of action reports that hit Hyperwar and Syracuse University. Fletcher comes off better and better compared to everyone except Spruance. He seems to have run a good naval staff setup of his own as you described.     




After Fletcher, the best carrier task force commander was Spruance. Spruance understood the what the real war-winning objectives were, and pursued them.



Strategic vision, which of course makes Spruance the better admiral, since he was at his worst, Fletcher's tactical equal.



Halsey was a simpleton. He had his place because he provided good press, the more reserved Fletcher and Spurance did not, which got the home front involved. But in reality, if I had to pick an admiral to fight a carrier battle he would be nearly last on my list.

 

Just ahead of Mutscher.








I meant after in a chronological sense.  I should have been more clear.

However,  I would argue that FJF understood the strategic consequences of his decisions all too well. As any commander who is outnumbered and entrusted with a key resource does.
 
Spruance may have understood the strategic situation better. We'll never know. Spruance didn't command when carriers were scarce, with the brief exception being at Midway when three Japanese carriers were already sunk or sinking, and FJF didn't command when he had resources enough to pursue a *robust* offensive.
 
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Herald12345       7/20/2009 2:04:06 AM










Halsey better than Fletcher? I don't think so. It was Fletcher who was busy stopping the Japanese advance at Coral Sea. It was Fletcher who was in command at Midway (yes, he had overall command of both task forces). It was Fletcher who started the first offensive campaign. It was Fletcher who was saddled with refining incomplete carrier tactics under fire. If you read his after action reports and recommendations many of them were adopted later in the war. Fletcher was good because he trusted his experts and his people grew to trust that a "shoe" would do what was right.













I don't put Fletcher ahead of Spruance even after all the recent revisionism, mostly because of the overall performance records compared to each other, to me, still shows Spruance the better operational artist and admiral, but I've read the last year or so of flood of action reports that hit Hyperwar and Syracuse University. Fletcher comes off better and better compared to everyone except Spruance. He seems to have run a good naval staff setup of his own as you described.     










After Fletcher, the best carrier task force commander was Spruance. Spruance understood the what the real war-winning objectives were, and pursued them.







Strategic vision, which of course makes Spruance the better admiral, since he was at his worst, Fletcher's tactical equal.







Halsey was a simpleton. He had his place because he provided good press, the more reserved Fletcher and Spurance did not, which got the home front involved. But in reality, if I had to pick an admiral to fight a carrier battle he would be nearly last on my list.



 



Just ahead of Mutscher.





















I meant after in a chronological sense.  I should have been more clear.

I misunderstood.

However,  I would argue that FJF understood the strategic consequences of his decisions all too well. As any commander who is outnumbered and entrusted with a key resource does.

When it counted and he had to commit Spruance committed everything to his strike (Midway). Fletcher held back half of his aircraft.as insurance (Coral Sea lesson). Fletcher had no luck at all as did Spruance. Remember what a miserable performance Hornet's air group turned in (Mitscher: dive bombers lost, dive bombers splashed out of fuel, dive bombers that dumped their bombs, when they bingoed without finding targets. torpedo planes only outfit that performed).
 
In short Fletcher fought not to lose, when losing was all to easy. I give him enormous  credit for this, and as I said (JFKY will enjoy this) the data compels me to rank him as a good admiral. His performance in Alaska, though, still has me question his offensive planning skills. Spruance has the Mariannas Turkey Shoot as an example of his command ability.         

Spruance may have understood the strategic situation better. We'll never know. Spruance didn't command when carriers were scarce, with the brief exception being at Midway when three Japanese carriers were already sunk or sinking, and FJF didn't command when he had resources enough to pursue a *robust* offensive.

Spruance ran an independent setup and actually had the bulk of the carriers. This was USN doctrine to scatter the targets but it was the true state of affairs.that Spruance and Fletcher planned their own movements and strikes.until Fletcher lost Yorktown. 


 
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benellim4       7/20/2009 10:04:33 PM


I meant after in a chronological sense.  I should have been more clear.



I misunderstood.


However,  I would argue that FJF understood the strategic consequences of his decisions all too well. As any commander who is outnumbered and entrusted with a key resource does.



When it counted and he had to commit Spruance committed everything to his strike (Midway). Fletcher held back half of his aircraft.as insurance (Coral Sea lesson). Fletcher had no luck at all as did Spruance. Remember what a miserable performance Hornet's air group turned in (Mitscher: dive bombers lost, dive bombers splashed out of fuel, dive bombers that dumped their bombs, when they bingoed without finding targets. torpedo planes only outfit that performed).

 

In short Fletcher fought not to lose, when losing was all to easy. I give him enormous  credit for this, and as I said (JFKY will enjoy this) the data compels me to rank him as a good admiral. His performance in Alaska, though, still has me question his offensive planning skills. Spruance has the Mariannas Turkey Shoot as an example of his command ability.         




Spruance may have understood the strategic situation better. We'll never know. Spruance didn't command when carriers were scarce, with the brief exception being at Midway when three Japanese carriers were already sunk or sinking, and FJF didn't command when he had resources enough to pursue a *robust* offensive.




Spruance ran an independent setup and actually had the bulk of the carriers. This was USN doctrine to scatter the targets but it was the true state of affairs.that Spruance and Fletcher planned their own movements and strikes.until Fletcher lost Yorktown. 






      
Some have a different take on Fletcher's not launching all of his aircraft, and that is his desire not to throw all of his aircraft at the spotted enemy carriers when one was still undiscovered. Not to mention Spruance already launched nearly all of his aircraft. Something had to be kept for a target of opportunity. Fletcher could not have known the Mistcher's group would fail so horribly. I have mixed feelings. Keeping the strike aircraft on deck is a sure way to lose them. However, if you do find a carrier that was previously undiscovered then what?
 
I think you're right. Fletcher played not to lose. But then again, that is exactly the position he was in at the beginning of the war. The USN could ill afford to lose carriers, early in the war. 
 
I'm not sure what you mean by "Fletcher had no luck at all?" IIRC VB-3 claimed Soryu, and I think it was VS-3 planes that finally sighted the Hiryu. The best coordinated attack from the USN was the Yorktown's air wing.
 
I disagree that Spruance ran his own show during Midway. Spruance's movements prior to the first strike were station-keeping. He didn't charge after the enemy and he did not launch until ordered. The actual execution of the strike was left up to Spruance, but that is to be expected. If FJF had ordered him to fly a specific number of aircraft, I think that would have been micromanagement.
 
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Leech       7/21/2009 3:56:08 AM

US forces did make several mistakes during battle for Midway (sacrificed 15 expirienced torpedo plane crews) but even these "mistakes" had worse impact on IJN forces than on USN. These 15 torpedo planes kept Japanese busy enough for dive bombers to finish the job.
 
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Herald12345       7/21/2009 4:27:23 AM
Some have a different take on Fletcher's not launching all of his aircraft, and that is his desire not to throw all of his aircraft at the spotted enemy carriers when one was still undiscovered. Not to mention Spruance already launched nearly all of his aircraft. Something had to be kept for a target of opportunity. Fletcher could not have known the Mistcher's group would fail so horribly. I have mixed feelings. Keeping the strike aircraft on deck is a sure way to lose them. However, if you do find a carrier that was previously undiscovered then what?
 
You eat an air strike. Seriously, though, what can you do, but go with what your own training, new combat experience, and exercises tell you? You have to clear your decks of everything except fighters and you have strike with everything you have as soon as you are in range at that stage of carrier warfare qwhen you have an identified target. The enemy aircraft carriers have to be disabled; or you will face inevitable enemy retaliation as he follows your strike back. That is what Coral Sea and US exercises, to that point, actually showed. 
 
I think you're right. Fletcher played not to lose. But then again, that is exactly the position he was in at the beginning of the war. The USN could ill afford to lose carriers, early in the war. 
 
And that was what JFKY argued strenuously. The problem I see, was that at Guadalcanal, Fletcher mistimed his innate caution, for once, just around the disaster of Savo Island; when we needed his air power and a little aggression to offset Mikawa, either before or after Mikawa's speed run, and that may be actually why Fletcher was moved to Alaska after he was wounded in the Eastern Solomons. In retrospect this was probably a huge command mistake as I think he, Fletcher, could have fought a better Santa Cruz than Kincaid did, and he, Fletcher, may have had enough counterweight and experience not to allow the Halsey mistake with Wasp, or to make that lunatic charge out of the CACTUS.air power circle at Santa Cruz..    
 
I'm not sure what you mean by "Fletcher had no luck at all?" IIRC VB-3 claimed Soryu, and I think it was VS-3 planes that finally sighted the Hiryu. The best coordinated attack from the USN was the Yorktown's air wing.
 
Agreed. What I meant was that if Yorktown's strike didn't have to divert to Soryu (because of Nautilus' dud torpedoes and Hornet's failed strike), or if Fletcher had committed everything he had in a huge gamble, then Hiryu, not Soryu would be the victim and then Fletcher could have clean swept the board.  That was the difference for me.. Spruance gambled and Fletcher didn't. Better admiral made a better call. Luck favors the intelligently bold. By the way, I do not fault Fletcher for his caution, I just note that that wasn't the time for it.    .
 
I disagree that Spruance ran his own show during Midway. Spruance's movements prior to the first strike were station-keeping. He didn't charge after the enemy and he did not launch until ordered. The actual execution of the strike was left up to Spruance, but that is to be expected. If FJF had ordered him to fly a specific number of aircraft, I think that would have been micromanagement.
 
Spruance launched after he had a positive contact report. He committed after he perfunctually cleared with Fletcher. Fletcher followed Spruance's vector, remember? Clearing permission was USN procedural with the OTC at the tume. I don't see where Fletcher had much say to Spruance after Spruance made up his mind.and after Spruance set down Browning after the Halsey staff botched up the first launch plan.
 
 
You can see that I have nothing good to say about Miles Browning.
 
 
 
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Herald12345    Might have helped.....   7/21/2009 4:33:28 AM
If after Yorktown had worked up speed after the first attack, then Fletcher had ordered her to run like hell, and clear the battle area?
 
 
 
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