In designing the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, the decision was made to reverse the counter-rotation such that the "tops" of the propeller arcs move outwards, away from each other. Tests on the initial XP-38 prototype demonstrated greater accuracy in gunnery with the unusual configuration. The counter-rotating powerplants of the German World War II Henschel Hs 129 ground attack aircraft, Heinkel He 177 heavy bomber and Messerschmitt Me 323 transport used the same rotational "sense" as the production P-38 did.
Drawbacks of counter-rotating propellers come from the fact that, in order to reverse sense of rotation of one propeller, a gearbox needs to be used or the engine or engine installation must be different. This may increase weight (gearbox), or maintenance and spare parts costs for the engines and propellers, as different spare parts need to be produced in lower numbers, compared to a conventional installation.
Counter-rotating propellers should not be confused with contra-rotating propellers (propellers that share a common axis).
so what your saying is that only your opinion is valid and that someone has an alternative then its silly ?,
The best fighters were the ones statistically that an average pilot could easily master and use competitively against an enemy in air to air and air to ground combat combined.This idea is a non-starter as the Average pilot never shot down a single enemy aircraft! Not one! Statistics show that if you make a kill, you have to be in the top 50%!
The point is that you don't know who is the top 50% or 1% until they fly. But of course this escapes the perfect ideal Shooter. Also the assertion that the bottom 50% do not score kills is so like the LIES that this man writes. Statistically the effectiveness in combat is based on training hours, tactics, attitude, and opportunity. Graphed as a function it is a bell curve. In other words, you have never flown, Shooter. Besides, I do NOT restrict to mere dogfighting the criteria which is the least work an average pilot did. More often he bombed and strafed.
Spitfire (despite some rather complex flight controls [engines], and mainly air to air work still capable of ground attack)
Except for the late models with two or four 20s, the rest are WO Merrit!
You do know that for most of the war the Spitfires carried 20 mm cannon?
Note that planes that were difficult to fly and master such as the P-38 (twin engines), P-47 (turbo-charger), P-51 (flight stability-fuel management) and the BF-109 (landings, takeoffs, and engine controls) are not on this list.
But all of those planes were the ones that turned out to be the MOST effective!
Not so. The P-40 Tomahawk contributed far more overall to the war tactically than the P-38. But I did not list it as it was an inferior plane to the ones I listed as effective by MY criteria.
If a pilot lived long enough or received enough training hours the omitted planes were formidable, but my criterion for success is an average pilot under wartime conditions with not enough time to properly learn. The plane must be easy to learn the flight basics, be easy to maintain, be easy for an imbecile to use and fly, be competitive against contemporaries.
This is the single most silly argument ever posted! The "Average" Pilot has no place on the list at all! In all Air Forces, in every Nation, NO-ONE in the bottom 50%tile ever shot down a single Enemy Air Craft! Never Ever! Typical stats show the top 1% of all fighter pilots account for about 40% of all kills! The next 4% get about 25% of kills, while the next 10% get about 15% and the next 35% get the last 20% spread around thinly!
Again a LIE. Many mediocre pilots have one or two ACE kills to their credits from opportunity attacks. These same mediocre pilots did most of the air to ground work which most WW II fighter pilots DID most of the time.
So, I counter your "Average" pilots with; I would rather have the top 1% of shooter pilots than the entire bottom 50% of the average! In fact, I would rather have the top 5% than the MIDDLE 50%, who at least got to win some fights!
And that would prove you do not know how Human beings and actual war works.
You write as a child understands, not a an adult. Reality, where the rest of us live, tells us you must deal with consistent data results from what every air force has learned about Human beings and air combat.
Numbers MATTER. The more planes you have, the more training time you have, the better average pilots you have, the sooner you kill all the enemy aces and win control of the air and can bomb the ground under it, than a smaller force of elite pilots can defend.
By the beginning of 1942, the Germans had lost the equivalent of two entire air forces. The result was that the Germans had to curtail their training programs to meet the demands of the front for new pilots. By January 1942, of the pilots available for duty in the fighter force, only 60 percent were fully operational, while the number in the bomber force was down to 47 percent. For the remainder of the war, the percentage of fully operational fighter and bomber pilots available, with few exceptions, remained below, and at many times substantially below, the 70 percent level. Further exacerbating this situation was the fact that the Germans were forced to lower their standards for a fully operational pilot as the war continued. There was, one must note, no decisive moment in this decline in expertise. Rather as Winston Churchill has suggested in another context, the Luftwaffe had entered the descent from 1940 "incontinently, fecklessly . . . . It is a fine broad stairway at the beginning but after a bit the carpet ends. A little further on, there are only flagstones; and a little further on, these break beneath your feet."The graph for the number of training hours for new pilots clearly reflected such a course. In the period through the late summer of 1942, German pilots were receiving at least as many training hours as their opponents in the RAF. By 1943, that statistic had begun a gradual shift against the Germans until the last half of the year when Luftwaffe pilots were receiving barely one-half of the training hours given to enemy pilots. In terms of flying training in operational aircraft, the disparity had become even more pronounced: one-third of the RAF total and one-fifth of the American total. But those Luftwaffe pilots who had survived the attrition of the first air battles of the war had little difficulty defeating new Allied pilots no matter how many training hours the latter had flown. In fact, the ratio of kills-to-sorties climbed as those Luftwaffe pilots who survived built up experience. However, few German pilots survived the attrition of the first war years, and thus the Luftwaffe became, in fact, two distinct forces: the few great aces--the Hartmans, Galands, and Waldmans--and the great mass of pilots who faced great difficulty in landing their aircraft, much less surviving combat. Only 8 of Germany's 107 aces to score more than 100 victories joined their squadrons after mid-1942."
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