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Subject: Most Powerful Military of All Time in Terms of Global Percentage
Aeb4ever    1/13/2006 1:20:45 AM
What was the most powerful military of all time in terms of global share of military power? For example, the USA is currently ranked at having about 53% of total naval power. I am referring in terms of all branches vs the world. My votes would be either the Mongols at height, Romans at height, English at height, USA after WWII, or USA after Cold War. Can’t make a guess at each countries percentage though. Fell free to add your own list or make a guess at the percentages of mine.
 
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wjr1       2/7/2007 6:19:55 PM
Gee, Herald, are you reading an alternative history book?

Quote:

Japan in the Far East totally defeated everyone until June 1942. Afterwords they still cleaned the USN's clock routinely until the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and it could be argued that but for the fumbling Kurita they would have cleaned the USN's clock again at Leyte Gulf.

End Quote.

That's really remarkable. The Coral Sea Battle was a tactical draw and a strategic loss for Japan. Midway was both a strategic loss and a tactical loss for Japan and, BTW, was a disaster of the first magnitude. Guadalcanal and the destroyer / cruiser battles that took place there were mixed results tactically but a general strategic disaster for Japan. And from that point on the IJN had no hope.

Leyte, your example, was planned poorly and, basically, a death ride for the Japanese. The southern group (old battleships and cruisers) was essentially wiped out by our old battleships. The central group was heavily attrited by aircraft with one big battleship sunk with the others appearing to turn and run. The northern group of, essentially, empty carriers was completely destroyed in terms of large ships.

The only questionable tactical move by Halsey was "Bull's Run" which left the jeep carriers uncovered in the central region.

Let's assume that Kurita had not chickened out. What would have happened? Well, the jeeps would have taken some real losses but they would have, likely, severely damaged the rump Japanese battle group. Perhaps the IJN would have taken out some of the amphib shipping as well. However, they were low on ammunition (the reason for Kurita's bug out) and staying too long would have meant sure destruction at the hands of the fast carriers.

Not much would have changed -- still game, set and match for the USN.

Read Morrison's Two Ocean War to get the details.

Best,
wjr

 
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Herald1234       2/7/2007 7:16:39 PM

Gee, Herald, are you reading an alternative history book?

Quote:


Japan in the Far East totally defeated everyone until June 1942.
Afterwards they still cleaned the USN's clock routinely until the
Battle of the Philippine Sea, and it could be argued that but for the
fumbling Kurita they would have cleaned the USN's clock again at Leyte
Gulf.

End Quote.

That's really remarkable. The Coral Sea Battle was a tactical draw and a strategic loss for Japan. Midway was both a strategic loss and a tactical loss for Japan and, BTW, was a disaster of the first magnitude. Guadalcanal and the destroyer / cruiser battles that took place there were mixed results tactically but a general strategic disaster for Japan. And from that point on the IJN had no hope.

Unless the Australians won at Milne Bay, the Coral Sea would have been a defeat. Neither battle was fought in isolation. A defeat at Milne bay and your "tactical draw" would have been considered a defeat as it would be correctly seen as the forced retreat of allied seapower.

MIDWAY was decisive as it made it impossible for the IJN to operate independent of land-based aircover ever.

MOST of the USNs attempts to stop the Tokyo Express were disasters-not defeats DISASTERS.

First Guadalcanal, Second Guadalcanal, Empress Augusta Bay etc. Most of thosem battles were DEFEATS.

The  IJN was still in there swinging right into 1944. The Solomons campaign whittled the Combined Fleet down some, but it didn't stop them at Biak or keep them from showing up for the Turkey Shoot.
Leyte, your example, was planned poorly and, basically, a death ride for the Japanese. The southern group (old battleships and cruisers) was essentially wiped out by our old battleships. The central group was heavily attrited by aircraft with one big battleship sunk with the others appearing to turn and run. The northern group of, essentially, empty carriers was completely destroyed in terms of large ships.

What was the Japanese battle objective for SHO 1? To get their battleships in among the transports and offshore  Krueger's beachhead to give Sixth Army the naval gunfire works. Did Kurita succeed? No.  Did he come close?

http://www.battleship.org/images/leyte2a.gif"> 


The only battle that mattered in that total fiasco was the last man stand by Taffy III. Thank the providence that looks over fools drunks and the United States of America that Clifton Sprague was a much better Admiral on this his worst day, than that idiot, Halsey ever was on his best day.

Ozawa fooled Halsy cold. Nishimura did his part by pulling Jesse Oldendorf out of position. Of all the Japanese who fought in this battle, it was Kurita who Jellicoed out.       


The only questionable tactical move by Halsey was "Bull's Run" which left the jeep carriers uncovered in the central region.

It was the only American tactical error that mattered: it was the one that allowed the IJN to almost succeed.

Let's assume that Kurita had not chickened out. What would have happened? Well, the jeeps would have taken some real losses but they would have, likely, severely damaged the rump Japanese battle group. Perhaps the IJN would have taken out some of the amphib shipping as well. However, they were low on ammunition (the reason for Kurita's bug out) and staying too long would have meant sure destruction at the hands of the fast carriers.

The Taffys would have died, all of them, 12,000+ sailors.

And we'd have a smashed landing; 100,000 troops in desperate straits. They would have to hang on until we could reconstitute and come back for round two. Three months ..................could they fight for three months on Leyte with most of their equipment on the bottom of Leyte Gulf, until Spruance came to the rescue with reinforcements? Because we would have court martialled that son of a bitch Halsey, and shuffled our naval command up post-defeat[disaster].

Not much would have changed -- still game, set and match for the USN.
A disaster at Leyte w
 
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wjr1       2/7/2007 11:19:32 PM
Herald,

You are mixing tactics and strategic objective -- much to the ill.

The general historical consensus is that Coral Sea prevented further southward IJN movement -- win or lose at Milne. That can be debated but what cannot be debated is the fact that Coral Sea deprived Yamamoto of his newest two carriers at Midway. This tactical stalemate yielded enough of a, later, tactical advantage to allow a strategic victory at Midway. This single result lost the war for Japan as she could never recover.

In regards to the Solomons, yes, I suppose that you could say that really good tactics and the long lance torpedo made for a bunch of Japanese tactical victories. Yet, most of these really were strategic losses as the victories were by points not knockout. It is simply hysteric argumentation to claim that these were disasters. The losses could and were replaced (as cold as that sounds) on the U.S. side but were not replaced and could not be replaced on the Japanese side. Even Japanese analysis at the time considered the Solomons a disaster for the IJN. Keep in mind as well that as the fight in the Solomons went on the Japanese tactical advantage disappeared with the result that the USN won a series of decisive destroyer and cruiser battles in the later half of the campaign.

Remember, the Japanese lost the Solomons and never were able to mount much of an offensive after that.

Your right about them showing up for the Turkey Shoot. Of course, hardly any of their pilots could fly worth a shoot due to lack of training so we shot them all down. Made my dad an ace. This was yet another brilliant IJN command decision.

Finally, Leyte. No one will ever know what would or could have happened if Kurita had not bugged out. If you believe Kurita he was low on rounds and fuel and he thought he had encountered the bulk of the 3rd fleet. I really don't blame him much given the merciless pounding he had gotten the day before from the big carriers.

It is something to debate and there is merit on both sides -- e.g. the no significant effect to the totally catastrophic effect side. In the end it would have made no difference to the war -- Japan was finished.

One thing about Leyte is very clear, though. The battle illustrates the Japanese tendency for overly complicated battle plans and ballet like timing that simply did not fare well. In the end Leyte was a disaster for the IJN.

I am curious, where did you come across any evidence that the Japanese had a jet program that would have produced any aircraft prior to 1947? And then only if supply lines to southeast Asia had stayed open (metals for alloys).

BTW, I, also, have the complete set. And I actually read them.

Best,
wjr

 
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Herald1234    Finally somebody who debates with facts.   2/8/2007 12:55:39 AM
1. The IJN according to conventional wisdom could have won every battle at sea and still lost the war because we would always build replacements and keep coming back and bulldoze them through weight of  numbers.

2. This belies the actual facts of the build programs we had in place. Most of our naval expansion didn't actually start until 1938-1939. It took us an average of three years to build a carrier and about that long to build a battleship.  We had bottlenecks in rolled armor plate and in naval guns.n So we actually fought Japan  outnumbered as well as outtechnologied during the first entire two years of the war. We had to throw ships at them, the IJN, before we could train up and establish the basic competencies at the ship handling level much less the taskgroup level. This is why you get disasters like Savo Island or bungling like Empress Augusta Bay. Training.

3. Of course given enough time at war, the US numbers situation and the training would improve. Too bad about the dud ammunition wasn't it? It wasn't just US torpedoes that skunked. Bombs and shells had severe quality control issues. How long did that take to sort out? Two murderous years. Take a little example in the case of airpower. did you know that the Japanese started the war with working reliable 20 mm cannon armed fighters that could tear an American aircraft apart? of course you did. The USN wanted to step up from Browning  12.7 mm machine guns to Hispano Suiza 20 mm cannon that would have greater kinetic energy and greater effective range in a dogfight. Four HS 20mm cannon would be lighter and have greater throwmass than eight Browning fifties. Guess what happened? No 20mm for the US until well into the Korean War. That meant we had to make up  for that deficiency along with all the torpedoes, bombs, and cannon  shells.
Ever hear of the term "sawdust ammunition"?

4. Its getting a wee bit late so I guess I will summarize the complex naval staff work which served the Japanese so well at Pearl, during their southern advance, during the battles in the Java Sea, during the Battle of the Thai  Gulf, the Indian Ocean raids, and actually during the battles of the Santa Cruz Islands and Eastern Solomons. They showed mostly on time and where they needed to be AS SCHEDULED to do the appropriate harm. Coral Sea was a blindman's bluff game amidst mixed weather and Midway? Well nobody alive was going to defeat Spruance-ever. At the Turkey Shoot, the Japanese showed up as they scheduled and Spruance drubbed them as expected. Throwing away tyro pilots was just incidental.

4. You seem to forget that at Leyte Gulf, the Japanese once again moved their fleets[because of the fuel crisis among other things] exactly as scheduled to do as they were programmed to do in that battle. Saying that the japanese relied on overcomplicated plans, which is the conventional hindsight cited for their defeat, ignores the FACT that they carried out their plan RXACTLY as intended. Only one chickenshit admiral who was beached after he bungled his mission kept the Center Force off Krueger's neck.

5. Jet aircraft.
h*tp://www.nasm.si.edu/research/aero/aircraft/nakakikka.htm

http://www.nasm.si.edu/nasmicons/lockup.jpg" alt="NASM home page" border="0" height="45" width="235">

Nakajima Kikka

http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/aero/aircraft/images/nakajima_kikka.t.jpg" border="0" height="217" width="350">
Wingspan 10 m (32 ft. 9.75 in.)
Length 8.125 m (26 ft. 7 7/8 in.)
Height 2.95 m (9 ft. 8.25 in.)
Weight 2,300 kg
 
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wjr1       2/8/2007 8:47:01 AM
Herald,

You are mixing tactics and strategic objective -- much to the ill.

The general historical consensus is that Coral Sea prevented further southward IJN movement -- win or lose at Milne. That can be debated but what cannot be debated is the fact that Coral Sea deprived Yamamoto of his newest two carriers at Midway. This tactical stalemate yielded enough of a, later, tactical advantage to allow a strategic victory at Midway. This single result lost the war for Japan as she could never recover.

In regards to the Solomons, yes, I suppose that you could say that really good tactics and the long lance torpedo made for a bunch of Japanese tactical victories. Yet, most of these really were strategic losses as the victories were by points not knockout. It is simply hysteric argumentation to claim that these were disasters. The losses could and were replaced (as cold as that sounds) on the U.S. side but were not replaced and could not be replaced on the Japanese side. Even Japanese analysis at the time considered the Solomons a disaster for the IJN. Keep in mind as well that as the fight in the Solomons went on the Japanese tactical advantage disappeared with the result that the USN won a series of decisive destroyer and cruiser battles in the later half of the campaign.

Remember, the Japanese lost the Solomons and never were able to mount much of an offensive after that.

Your right about them showing up for the Turkey Shoot. Of course, hardly any of their pilots could fly worth a shoot due to lack of training so we shot them all down. Made my dad an ace. This was yet another brilliant IJN command decision.

Finally, Leyte. No one will ever know what would or could have happened if Kurita had not bugged out. If you believe Kurita he was low on rounds and fuel and he thought he had encountered the bulk of the 3rd fleet. I really don't blame him much given the merciless pounding he had gotten the day before from the big carriers.

It is something to debate and there is merit on both sides -- e.g. the no significant effect to the totally catastrophic effect side. In the end it would have made no difference to the war -- Japan was finished.

One thing about Leyte is very clear, though. The battle illustrates the Japanese tendency for overly complicated battle plans and ballet like timing that simply did not fare well. In the end Leyte was a disaster for the IJN.

I am curious, where did you come across any evidence that the Japanese had a jet program that would have produced any aircraft prior to 1947? And then only if supply lines to southeast Asia had stayed open (metals for alloys).

BTW, I, also, have the complete set. And I actually read them.

Best,
wjr

 
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kane       2/8/2007 9:39:47 AM
+Ottomans at height
The army they fielded beat crusader armies many times(sometimes beaten though)
They were politically controlling everything.Their armies were not just crowded but the most discplined and well equipped
Their navy was controllin whole medittreanean,black sea and aegean sea before Lepanto
And well the most important thing
they were the richest

 
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kane       2/8/2007 9:47:01 AM
lol I just saw my old posts and I realized I was telling the same things


 
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Vritra       2/8/2007 10:02:00 AM

+Ottomans at height
. . .

Their armies were not just crowded but the most discplined and well equipped


Here I was thinking Ottomans = Bashi-Bazouks >> West Asia's answer for the Berserker

Just kidding. Ottomans were the first people to really invest in developing artillery as a weapon of war. Western Turks were used as mercenary gunners as far away as Malaysia and Indonesia - definitely well equipped.
 
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kane       2/8/2007 10:05:32 AM
ok why Ottomans were global
i'm talking about before 1492.The Spanish and Portuguese didn't turned into big powers at the time they began colonizing.It took 100 years for them to get much more richer

Ottomans were a global power-They took over whole medittreanen trade and sea which is considered a very big thing back then.They took over both trade routes which made Europeans to find new ones
Ottomans founded the first large cannons which changed the world pretty much

During the Seljuks period the Crusades purpose was to
*take over holy lands
*gain riches of east
*and sack Turks from Anatolia
Were they succesfull...well no we're still here


Until the treaty of (forgot what it was but it's after Vienna) the Ottoman vizier was equal to Austro-Hungary emperor.After hat treaty this changed and things got equal

Ottoman took Egypt in 1517,thats when the Ottoman Emperor was also the Caliph.This mean they were the leader of all Muslims at the same time making them pretty global
They even sent 12 ships of Janissaris to Asia to help little kingdoms

Suleiman took a force of 120 000 men to sack German army from Hungarian lands he moved and moved but no one resisted him.No one brought any army to oppose him so he turned back.The Union of German-Austrian armies were 250 000 men but they were scared I guess

The thing that caused Ottomans to decline is their naval problems.Ottomans weren't beside any ocean so they never built big ships as the Spanish or others built
Thats why they couldn't get richer,after that they were a regional power(1700-...........)
It took 200 more years for them to fall completely though
 
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kane       2/8/2007 10:15:42 AM
I can find more stuff to prove Ottomans were a global power(actually the most powerfull) in 15th-17th century and very strong world power in 1300s

In 1300s Ottomans and Timurid were the greatest power in the world(well Europe wasn't a union back then)
Timur and Beyazdil thought they were the mightiest so Timur sent a letter to Beyazid saying that he is happy becasue of his success aganist Christians.But he warned him no to go far and know his place(he means he is teh mighty guy)
Beyazid was angry after this so he sent another letter telling him bad things.He put Timur's name UNDER his name in the letter(casus belli)
And Timur sent another letter that he is going to declare war
So the guys met in Ankara(1402)
Ottomans had like 80 000 and Timur had like 120 000
The Tatars and some other Turkic tribes joined Timur(well Timur was Turkic) and only loyal guys were left in the Ottoman side
After the battle Timur said"Allah left the whole world to a blind man like you and a lame man like me"
Ottomans were seperated after this and reunited after 11 years by 1. Mehmet


 
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