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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 9 Intelligence The planning effort and products that were tailored for the brigade S2 were the key strengths for the intelligence battlefield operating system (IBOS) in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Tools like TIMBUKTU and MIRC chat, as well as the G2 web page, gave analysts the ability to collaborate frequently and over great distances. Intelligence support to targeting was also a strength for the division, as the field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) and targeting officer used the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D 3 A) methodology for combat operations and stability and support operations (SASO). The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) targeting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and SASO threat assessment methodology were significant combat multipliers. Prior to combat operations, the division obtained, trained, and integrated several systems, such as the common ground station (CGS), PROPHET, and PPS-5D that improved its intelligence collection and processing capabilities. Finally, the G2 was able to acquire the Quick Reaction System (QRS) and the Global Broadcast System (GBS) that provided unparalleled access to current imagery for planning and targeting. A key challenge for the intelligence battlefield operating system (IBOS) was communications, especially as they affected continuous operations over extended distances and the use of the Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS). Commercial media, the Air Force, and the special operations community might offer good solutions for the IBOS�s need for secure, long haul digital and voice communications. Simple upgrades probably cannot fix the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) issue. The five basic systems that were originally designed to be interoperable have proven time and again to be very cumbersome with little overall value added below division. Moreover, Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) uses tactical websites (TACWEB), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), and Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB 2 ) with better results. For interaction with higher headquarters and with the Marines, the division IBOS should have been able to use command and control personal computers (C 2 PC). The Department of Defense needs a single, integrated joint system that allows all BOSs to manipulate relevant data and establish a true common operating picture (COP). Additionally, these systems need to be linked to an on the move, long haul communications network that will make them combat multipliers in any fighting configuration. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Division Capabilities for Full Spectrum Operations Issue: Divisions need organic collection and processing assets capable of responding to all aspects of the complex battlefield, to move seamlessly from combat operations to SASO, and to cover the vulnerable transition stage. Discussion: �The complexity of the operational environment requires sharing intelligence from the national level to the tactical level and among headquarters at each level.� (FM 3.0, Operations, p. 11-8) Our doctrine acknowledges the demands on our intelligence system in full spectrum operations and suggests some capabilities that should be available. A division must be able to collect against a commander�s PIR throughout full spectrum operations, including the intelligence dimension of SASO. As an example, it must be able to quickly integrate HUMINT assets, with corresponding demands for linguist support, operational direction, and analytical support. The division, lacking the range of collectors, processors, and supporting communications systems that would make the intelligence process seamless, is not yet ideally resourced for full spectrum operations. Moreover, reliance on EAD asset support does not provide the consistent dedicated focus that commanders expect. Prior to the beginning of the war, the 3ID (M) received four additional common ground stations (CGS), two PPS-5D, sixteen All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L), and six PROPHET systems with selected technical insertion packages, but it did not receive a dedicated UAV or some of the other capabilities requested to effectively conduct full spectrum operations. As of late October 2002, the G2 had requested six collection and jamming systems to improve organic or direct support collection for the division and nine additional processing or communications systems to improve the division�s ability to produce high quality all source intelligence products. In the chart below, italics represents those systems that were not received prior to OIF. Collection System Capability PPS-5D More capable ground surveillance radar Tactical HUMINT teams General support HUMINT collection, interrogation support at division level, analysis and guidance for collection teams G2X augmentation Coordination, planning, direction, and deconfliction of all HUMINT operations in division�s area of operations Long range surveillance teams Deep ISR, �eyes on� collection PROPHET w/ tech insertions Greater ability to acquire and locate specific and relevant enemy signals Jamming capability Ability to jam specific and relevant enemy signals Tactical UAV Near real time imagery and targeting Processing & Communications Systems Capability Linguists Arabic interpretation capability for commanders, tactical HUMINT teams (THT), civil affairs (CA), and PSYOP teams ASAS-L Automated database and intelligence analysis tools Quick Reaction System (QRS) Ability to rapidly access and exploit imagery Global Broadcast System (GBS) Ability to receive Predator and Hunter UAV, plus CNN National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) Rapid and reliable access to national agency databases Counterintelligence HUMINT Information Management System(CHIMS) Automated databases and reporting for HUMINT Common ground station (CGS) Proven system; division received its remaining systems in November for a total of 6 TROJAN SPIRIT � LITE Long range satellite communications (voice and data) for each BCT, including an on the move system supporting interoperable IBOS requirements at the BCT level INMARSAT Long range satellite communications to provide reliable digital intelligence net over extended range A division must have a UAV at the division and brigade level. The technology exists and commanders demand it for near real time imagery and targeting. The maneuver brigades were able to benefit from the corps� emphasis on division priorities and from the mini-UAV that the special forces employed in their sectors, but the asset was never totally dedicated to division or brigade priorities. A division needs a tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) system that is capable of collecting and jamming threat signals across the spectrum and that is responsive to the division commander�s PIR. The division�s military intelligence (MI) battalion had the most recently available system, PROPHET, and it performed adequately during OIF, based on the signal environment that actually existed. The MI battalion received the PROPHET system and some technical insertions shortly before the division�s attack. With this system, it was able to collect and conduct direction finding of key Republican Guard communications. It did not receive other technical insertions that would enable it to collect on other potential signals of interest or to acquire key threats likely associated with the division�s transition to SASO until mid-May. The signal environment in current and future battlefields runs the gamut from tactical FM radios, to HF radios, to mobile secure cell phones, to fiber optics. The conventional Army conducting full spectrum operations on a complex battlefield requires an on-the-move collection and jamming system that can keep up with the maneuver forces and can adapt to any of these signal environments. The division, therefore, needs an organic system no less capable than those available to the special operations and theater intelligence communities. It needs to be mobile, hardened, and quickly operational. It must also have a communications package that can cover the depth and width of the battlefield to ensure reliable communications between systems and command posts. While the MI battalion brought a solid HUMINT capability to the division with the THTs assigned to each of the three direct support companies, it did not have sufficient capability to man an enemy prisoner of war (EPW) cage, to surge collection or conduct general support operations, or to provide experienced and comprehensive analysis and guidance to operational teams. Recognizing this, the 103rd MI Battalion commander requested augmentation in the event of war; he received only partial augmentation shortly before beginning hostilities. Once the main effort became SASO, the MI battalion increased the division�s HUMINT collection by parking several of its legacy SIGINT systems and using the twenty-four 98G Arabic speakers to support THT operations. This increased the number of collection teams from six to fifteen and also provided twenty-four hour coverage of a key EPW holding area. About a year ago, the division G2 recognized that in any future conflict, the complex battlefield and potentially rapid transition to SASO would require several key CI and HUMINT positions, that were not resourced. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM validated these requirements. The division needs a G2X as a permanent part of a division G2 staff. The G2X coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes all HUMINT and CI operations in the division across all collection agencies. It is currently a position that is part of joint doctrine and emerging Army doctrine, having proved essential in SASO in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Also necessary is a chief of CI operations (CI Ops), a staff position requiring the technical skills to guide operational management teams (OMT) and THTs on the battlefield and to support the local headquarters with operational guidance based on accepted TTP and capabilities. CI Ops also checks reporting, coordinates with the G2X, and ensures that teams are reporting to standard on stated requirements. The next unresourced position is the operational management team (OMT), an operator�s position needed for situational awareness, all source intelligence target folder preparation, and technical guidance for THTs for certain areas of operation. Finally, the division needs an analytical element able to identify and clarify specific orders and requests (SOR) and specific information requirements (SIR) for collection and to provide analysis of all collected HUMINT information. During OIF, the G2 and the 103rd MI Battalion established each of these positions or sections out of hide. There are several other demands on the division-level intelligence BOS that come with a transition to SASO. The G2 and MI battalion commander had anticipated most of them and requested support prior to the conflict. Some resources, such as a sufficient number of linguists, were very late in getting to the fight. Commanders at all levels, THT, CA, and PSYOP need linguists. The division needs to establish a screening cell to conduct background checks for local hires and provide a force protection function; it is a full time job we cannot resource with organic assets. The analysis and control element (ACE) typically needs to reorganize its analysis and collection efforts to address the particular functions of a SASO mission. In the case of Baghdad, the details of infrastructure (water, power, sewage, cultural centers, mosques) were as important as emerging leaders, remaining paramilitary threat, and reestablishment of military forces. The 3ID (M) was able to adapt several tools from its previous SASO experiences to this particular operation. Recommendations:
Issue: Common ground station (CGS) operations Discussion: Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) had two common ground stations (CGSs) organic to its military intelligence battalion prior to June 2002. As the division conducted training rotations to Kuwait and hostilities with Iraq loomed, the division requested and received early fielding of the CGS Version 2. The MI battalion fielded and trained on the remaining four systems in November 2002. Three of the six teams had experience conducting operations with a BCT at the National Training Center or during a continental United States crisis response force rotation in Kuwait. The remaining teams conducted training at home station and in Kuwait once the division deployed as a whole. The system proved very useful in combat operations once S2s and other supervisors recognized its strength as a cueing asset and established tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to verify targets. Collaboration with other CGS crews supporting the ACE and the brigades and with the air liaison officer (ALO) and fire support elements (FSE) assisted in the target verification process. The brigade that tracked targets for three to five minutes prior to reporting also minimized inaccurate reporting and reporting on friendly units. Recommendation: Sustain the employment of the CGS within the division, building on TTP and crew proficiency with creative training opportunities to maximize the collaborative use of the system. Issue: Division electronic warfare capabilities (also addressed under Topic E) Discussion: Divisional MI electronic support (ES) assets, the legacy systems AN/TRQ-32 and AN/TSQ-138 (not used in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) and the newly acquired PROPHET system are limited in their ability to identify, collect, and locate enemy electronic emitters. Divisional electronic attack (EA) platforms are limited to the AN/TLQ-17 that can only jam in the upper HF, lower VHF spectrum. Technological advances and increased availability of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) packages available to threat forces have created a gap in the electronic warfare spectrum that division assets may not be able to adequately cover. There is, therefore, a requirement for early integration of technical insertion (TI) packages for the PROPHET to better train and fully install prior to hostilities. Recommendation: Conduct an in-depth analysis of enemy EW systems early in any contingency or conflict and match friendly EW assets against them. Provide TI packages early enough to train prior to hostilities. Issue: Timely movement of enemy prisoners of war (EPW) was a problem. Discussion: Throughout the fight, several units had difficulty correctly tagging, moving, and securing EPW. At times, the EPW were also able to erase or modify the numbers inked on their necks. The challenges were largely a training issue and not a resource issue. Recommendation: Develop training scenarios that involve large numbers of EPW instead of just a few to force units to think through all of the requirements for tagging, moving, and securing EPWs to standard. Issue: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for the transition to stability and support operations (SASO) and in support of civil-military operations (CMO). Discussion: The transition from warfighting to SASO is a huge shift in priorities and focus for the entire division from the soldier in the street up to the division commander. The IPB for this transition needs to begin much earlier than the change itself. IPB for SASO needs to be concurrent with the IPB for warfighting. The IPB for warfighting focuses on the enemy � his disposition, strength, and probable courses of action. IPB for SASO focuses on the civilian population and the supporting infrastructure of the area of operations (AO). The IPB for Baghdad began months before LD; in fact, it was often the main effort at the expense of IPB focus on the fight to get there. Corps and higher focused this effort while our parallel IPB efforts focused on the road to Baghdad. While much of the IPB work done by higher was and remains useful, it is still not at the resolution required for division and below operations. Division and below staffs have to be involved to focus the effort. CMO planning is part and parcel of warfighting in the 21st century. Practical and political considerations require planning to consider and minimize the effects of combat on the civilian population. Good IPB focused on CMO is required to plan combat operations while minimizing the impact of combat on the civilian population and supporting infrastructure. The IPB must include the ethnic makeup of regions, cities, down to neighborhoods. Restricted targets such as schools, religious sites, hospitals, and historic sites must be identified. Infrastructure is critical information for SASO. The location of water plants, sewage plants, electrical plants, and transformer stations and supporting systems are critical for SASO. The ethnic, religious, and cultural make up of the civilian population is important in predicting the actions of population at the beginning of hostilities and when they come into contact with U.S. forces. Cultural concerns such as the religious/secular festivals and celebrations in the AO must be considered because the events may have a large number of civilians moving in the AO, including visitors from other nations. The tensions between different religious/ethnic groups and their relationship to the current government will determine how the populace greets U.S. soldiers. Cultural concerns must be identified to reduce friction between U.S. forces and the civilian population. Religious or cultural restrictions may impact the type of aid that is provided, how the aid is distributed, and who provides the aid. The Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention require U.S. forces to protect specific targets such as hospitals, schools, population centers, and religious sites. Accurate IPB is important to identify these sites and adequately protect them. Information about the infrastructure of the AO is critical for planning and prioritizing SASO. Restoring any lost services after the cessation of hostilities is critical to establishing and legitimizing coalition control. Knowing the electrical, gas, water, and sewage distribution systems and how they are interconnected is essential to getting them functioning. Often, the facilities are intact, but not operating; knowing what facilities to restart is over half the battle. The IPB must also identify the key locations for restoring a functioning society that will need protection such as banks, government buildings, public records, fire stations, police stations, court houses, jails/prisons and any other location that will have a significant impact on restoring the functions of a city/society. This identification enables commanders to determine risk and to allocate resources. Recommendation: Establish civilian targets and critical infrastructure as information requirements (IR) early in the planning process. The battle staff, with support from the analysis and control element (ACE), can track and prioritize collected information and determine the relative importance of identified infrastructure and administrative sites. Issue: UAV imagery support to the division Discussion: The 3ID (M) did not have an attached or dedicated UAV to support its operations during OIF. When the division requirements were the corps� priority, the corps collection management team was very responsive. The 3ID (M) coordinated 24-48 hours in advance of missions to request UAV collection focus. As the missions were flown, utilizing Global Broadcast System (GBS) and two laptops equipped with MIRC Chat, all available imagery analysts in 3ID (M), V Corps, and Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) were able to monitor the mission and provide detailed support to targeting operations. UAV missions also assisted with situation development and battle damage assessment (BDA) tracking. The challenge with the UAV was in getting the critical intelligence to the units on the ground. Although the corps and the division ACE emailed post-mission reports to all units, many of those units did not have SIPRNET available to receive those reports when they were most critical. The remote video terminal (RVT), that was supposed to allow units to view the UAV missions, also required a unit to be stationary and within forty kilometers of the aircraft. This was not feasible given the pace of division operations. Furthermore, during several months of training with the RVT, only one unit was able to acquire a signal to watch a UAV mission for approximately thirty minutes. The most common means of providing intelligence from the UAV to units was to send it over FBCB 2 , FM radio, or SC TACSAT. The lessons the division learned about focusing UAV collection, processing reports, and disseminating the intelligence in combat are an invaluable contribution to divisional intelligence operations. Recommendation: A division must have a UAV at the division and the brigade level. The technology exists and commanders demand it for near real time imagery and targeting. Issue: Divisional access to national imagery Discussion: The national imagery asset Quick Reaction System (QRS) that 3ID (M) obtained for OIF was a critical resource for the division�s imagery team. Without the expertise, separate communications packages, and immediate integration into the ACE, many intelligence gaps would have remained. The DMAIN was operational from a 5-ton expando van with an eleven-piece, four million dollar system. The system was habitually operational within forty-five minutes in order to begin producing imagery in support of the division commander and brigade commanders. It sustained no damage or loss in eight tactical jumps. Recommendation: Provide the QRS or similar capability, including NIMA expertise and separate reliable communications, to divisions for future combat and contingency operations. While probably impractical to permanently obtain such capability for the tactical level, its support to this echelon is essential. Topic B - Electronic Enablers Introduction The primary electronic enabler* for the intelligence battlefield operating system (IBOS) is the All Source Analysis System (ASAS) series. At the division analysis and control element (ACE), the ASAS comprises the all source enclave (ASE) and the single source enclave (SSE). At the G2 operations, brigade, and some battalion levels, the systems include the ASAS-Remote Workstation (ASAS-RWS) or ASAS-Light (ASAS-L). In accordance with the concept of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS), the ASAS should be able to exchange information with each of the other ATCCS boxes to provide commanders with a common operating picture (COP) of friendly and enemy activity. During OIF, 3ID (M) relied on the Maneuver Control System-Light (MCS-L), command and control personal computers (C 2 PC),Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2), and Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) to provide a COP at various levels. ASAS could provide an enemy picture to all but FBCB 2 , but not without some initial challenges. For much of OIF, however, the inability of the RWS and the ASAS-L to effectively operate on the move was a limitation that reduced their value to and use by divisional units. Each of the ATCCS boxes has its merits for its respective BOS. What is not yet seamless is their ability to exchange information with other BOS systems and with other services. It has proven cumbersome and of marginal utility, suggesting the need to go to a single, integrated, joint system that relies on a long haul on the move communications system. See Topic C: Communications, for further explanation of this issue. *An automated system designed to increase the capability of units on the modern battlefield Issue: ADOCS and counterfire integration into the ASAS Discussion: ADOCS was an invaluable tool for situational awareness and quick analysis of counterfire acquisitions. ADOCS was also linked in to the ASAS and could receive the ASAS common relevant enemy picture. ADOCS enabled the DIVARTY S2 to quickly analyze a counterfire acquisition, apply it on the screen to the enemy situation either through the ASAS correlated database feed or through a templated overlay on the ADOCS itself, make an assessment of what systems or unit was at that location, and quickly provide the relevant analysis to both the DIVARTY commander and the division G-2. We were not able to completely work through the ADOCS connectivity with ASAS prior to LD in order to provide the counterfire common operational picture (COP) through ASAS to all of the major subordinate commands (MSC) S-2s. Given more time following this operation and redeployment, we can continue to work the connectivity between the ASAS and the ADOCS. Recommendation: Retain ADOCS at the DIVARTY TOC and as a central element of the counterfire fight. Continue to work the connectivity between the ADOCS and the ASAS in order to easily disseminate the counterfire common operational picture (COP) to all of the major subordinate commands (MSCs)/BCTs. Integrate this capability into a single, joint system that provides a COP across all BOS. Issue: Units did not use ASAS-RWS or ASAS-L Discussion: As a result of the division�s fast-paced operations during the first several days of the war, the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network was not often established for the DTAC and the maneuver brigades. Because ASAS and other ATCCS boxes depend on MSE for data transmission, few MSCs chose to use the ASAS-RWS or the ASAS-L. This was partly a function of the system itself and largely a function of the supporting communications. The ASAS-RWS takes a long time to set up and establish operations. In a fast-paced operation such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM where the DTAC and the maneuver brigade TOCs initially did not typically stop for much longer than four hours, an MSC TOC would not often take the time (approximately 45 minutes to an hour) to set up and boot the ASAS-RWS. Additionally, the data on the RWS, became an inaccurate portrayal of the enemy situation. When the communications permitted, exchanging overlays proved to be more effective. To satisfy all the different combat and combat support units, the overlay included the entire correlated database. An overlay cannot be manipulated in the same way as an external database coordinate (EDC) that can filter out or query for specific types of units and show the commander only the information that he wants to see. Recommendation: Refine the ASAS-RWS and ASAS-L to incorporate the most effective features of ADOCS. Integrate the capabilities of ASAS into a single, joint system that provides a COP across all BOS. Issue: Army weather support Discussion: The Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS) is an Army developed and maintained system that is part of the ATCCS series. For the first time in the system�s over ten year history, the IMETS actually worked. It was successfully integrated with SIPRNET and TROJAN SPIRIT, as well as with an Air Force satellite receiver, and the web page was effective. The IMETS also proved invaluable as a rolling platform for all weather systems. Having most of our equipment rack-mounted in a ready state was critical. At all times during our convoys we had the ability to stop the vehicle and rapidly set up to receive data within five minutes, and occasionally we had to do precisely that. Within the IMETS itself, software packages such as the Integrated Weather Effects Decision Aid (IWEDA) was very useful and the chemical downwind message (CDM) capability was equally powerful. The IMETS program is in serious jeopardy of being reduced or cancelled. This is particularly frustrating since the system has now finally proven its worth in war. Not only should this system be maintained, its capability should be expanded to serve as a base for all tactical weather equipment. Possible additions to the IMETS are a satellite dish mount for the tactical very small aperture terminal and a mount for the Tactical Meteorology Observing System. With these systems fully integrated both physically and from a software standpoint, the IMETS would be the backbone of Army weather support. Recommendation: Retain and expand the capabilities of the IMETS to serve as the backbone of Army weather support. Topic C - Communications Issue: The communications available to the IBOS during OIF were insufficient to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence dissemination across the entire battlefield. Discussion: �The intelligence BOS cannot effectively or efficiently provide IEW support without adequate communications equipment, capacity, and connectivity.� (FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, p. 1-14.) Put more simply, if you aren�t talking, you�re just camping. Intelligence operations, in particular, are irrelevant without the ability to communicate, to pull information from higher, and to push information to subordinate units. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM highlighted the need for a deliberate investment in reliable voice and data communications to support the IBOS at all levels. The division�s continuous offensive operations over extended distances meant that units quickly outran the ability to use FM for the division operations and operations and intelligence (O&I) net and for any exchange of digital information. The division had some single channel tactical satellite (SC TACSAT) systems with a 5 kHz bandwidth to establish key division nets, and after redistribution within the division, the G2 established a TACSAT O&I net. Initially the look angle allocated to the O&I net made reliable communications nearly impossible. It was extremely difficult to acquire and maintain the signal while the DTAC was static; it did not work at all on the move. Just before the division�s attack, we received different data for the command net, and the O&I net was able to use the previous command net data. Some of the DTAC noncommissioned officers figured out how to rig the antenna to allow on-the-move voice communications, and we were able to exchange voice intelligence reports between the DTAC, DISE, G2 operations, brigades, and the MI battalion. We had to adjust the antenna often, and we had to use very slow and deliberate speech to communicate, a limitation and challenge of the 5 kHz bandwidth. We were not able to pass any data over this means, making our digital intelligence systems�the ASAS-RWS and ASAS-L�dependent on SIPRNET communications, that were only available when the command posts operated from the halt for an extended period of time. The TACSAT O&I net, though challenging to operate and to maintain, was the primary means of communication between the DTAC, DISE, brigades, MI battalion, and G2 operations. Despite this fact, all three maneuver brigades, the aviation brigade, and the corps G2 lost their O&I TACSAT systems when a system supporting the command net went down. This forced us to rely on multiple FM relays or on FBCB 2 to exchange intelligence, proving unreliable or inefficient. Though not intended to support intelligence operations, FBCB 2 -BFT did provide a redundant means of communicating key intelligence. The DTAC established an address group for free text messages that included commanders, XOs, and S3s in order to disseminate intelligence reports and weather reports. Because the primary communications method was not always available to all S2s, the DTAC established the TTP of sending intelligence reports over the TACSAT O&I, the FM O&I, and over FBCB 2 . It usually took about three short messages to send a single INTREP, based on the amount of data the system could handle. It was not a perfect dissemination method. Some messages never got through. Two of the separate battalions, the MI battalion and the air defense battalion, did not have a single FBCB 2 system to receive INTREPs; other units, such as the engineer brigade, had only a single system in a commander�s vehicle. FBCB 2 did, however, provide a means of reaching most of those without TACSAT or FM communications. In addition to the need for TACSAT or similar long-range communications, OIF highlighted the need for battalion and brigade S2s to have additional radio systems. Each brigade established a series of command posts that dispersed the S2 sections more than had previously been typical. The configurations included a tactical command post (TAC) and a red, amber, and green tactical operations center (TOC) or a TAC, TOC A, and TOC B configuration. There was usually an S2 representative at each post. What became very clear was that to maintain complete situational awareness and conduct all expected reporting, the S2 needed access in all cases to the brigade command net, the brigade O&I net, and the division O&I net. The same held true for the DTAC. Much of the reporting of intelligence value from the brigades came over the division command net. The command and control vehicle (C 2 V) in which representatives from the G2, division chemical, engineer, and air defense brigades rode did not have a TACSAT system for the command net. While we were able to monitor some events when the inter-C 2 V intercom system was working, it was absolutely insufficient, and it affected four battlefield operating systems (BOS). The lesson here is that every unit, every BOS must have the system to monitor the primary division command net. Based on the amount of information that was also exchanged over the corps command net, every BOS must also have the system to monitor the primary corps command net. Whether the command post operates in a tent, building, or other shelter or operates from a vehicle like the C 2 V that puts several BOS together, there is an economy or an efficiency that justifies the cost of obtaining these systems. Several BOSs can monitor and benefit from the one system. The inability to rely on the MSE backbone during continuous offensive operations also hindered the use of digital systems like RWS, ASAS-L, MCS-L, and ADOCS that currently depend on MSE. Also, maneuver battalions do not have MSE, so S2s at that level do not have a means of connectivity for ASAS-L. We should be able to pass data over FM to support the ASAS-L, but during field-testing through December and January, it proved unacceptable in terms of range and rate of exchange. Furthermore, battalion S2s do not generally have the extra radio to support data exchange; using one radio for voice and data did not work. Consequently, the intelligence system designed to provide an automated capability to a battalion S2, was of little value to him. Recommendations:
Issue: The division�s establishment of a deployable intelligence support element (DISE) was critical to providing intelligence support to the DTAC and to brigades forward on the battlefield. Discussion: FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations discusses the concept of a DISE in support of force projection operations, which was the course of the Army following the Cold War. This current doctrine refers to the DISE as a means of conducting split-based operations, as the bridge between a forward-deployed force and an intelligence support base located outside of the deployed AO. It requires communications, automated intelligence fusion, and broadcast dissemination. Several units have employed a DISE to support contingency operations in Haiti, Bosnia, or Africa. None have yet employed a DISE in combat operations. The division�s establishment and deployment of a DISE was not a means of prepositioning an intelligence node forward from which to pull from a sanctuary or base. Instead, it was a response to the demand for an intelligence node with stable communications and access to corps, theater, and national intelligence products to support the DTAC and forward brigades who were all on the move almost constantly for over 72 hours. The DISE, collocated with 224th MI Battalion at Camp Udairi, maintained SIPRNET access to external intelligence products and TACSAT O&I communications with brigades and the DTAC. Recommendations:
Issue: Weather effects on communications Discussion: Air Force research labs and the Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS) program office have developed a prototype system for forecasting space weather impacts on communications systems such as high frequency (HF) radio and UHF satellite communications (SATCOM) and also for forecasting the accuracy of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. The tactical version of this system, called TacSEND (Tactical Space Environment Network Display), was deployed for the first time with 3ID (M). Applications include signal intelligence gathering, signal intelligence denial, HF radio frequency selection and management, forecasting friendly/enemy HF radio jamming effectiveness, forecasting the error experienced by GPS receivers, and warning users of losses in SATCOM due to environmental causes. TacSEND products proved very useful, especially in the area of troubleshooting HF radio communication problems. The next step for this prototype is full integration of the system, both hardware and software, with the IMETS. Recommendation: Sustain development of this system with the goal of full integration with IMETS and other electronic enablers. Topic D - Electronic Warfare Issue: Division electronic warfare capabilities Discussion: Divisional MI electronic support (ES) assets, the legacy systems AN/TRQ-32 and AN/TSQ-138 (not used in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), and the newly acquired PROPHET system are limited in their ability to identify, collect, and locate enemy electronic emitters. Divisional electronic attack (EA) platforms are limited to the AN/TLQ-17 that can only jam in the upper HF, lower VHF spectrum. Technological advances and increased availability of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) packages available to threat forces have created a gap in the electronic warfare spectrum that divisional assets cannot adequately cover. There is, therefore, a need to augment divisional capabilities with the purchase or coordination for COTS packages or a new fielding that is easily upgraded with technology shifts. Recommendation: Conduct an in-depth analysis of enemy EW systems early in any contingency or conflict and match friendly EW assets against them. Provide TI packages early enough to train prior to hostilities. Issue: Use of ground-based electronic attack Discussion: Electronic attack (EA) � utilizing the TLQ-17A � proved to be a true combat multiplier. EA missions were deliberately planned to complement lethal fires as part of the division�s overall fires plan for the destruction of the border guards. When executed, the jamming disrupted the enemy�s ability to react to the application of lethal fires and contributed to the destruction of the border guard forces in the opening hours of the war. As the fight progressed, EA was placed on negative control � allowing certain voice nets, such as artillery fires nets and ADA nets, to be jammed as acquired, contributing to the protection of the force. Recommendation: Retain ground-based EA capability at the division level. Integrate non-lethal fires into the division�s overall concept of fire support. Place EA targets on the antitank guided missile (ATGM) and ensure that non-lethal fires complement deliberate lethal fires at crucial points in the battle. Issue: Detailed analysis of enemy EW capabilities and systems Discussion: Prior to crossing the line of departure, there were nine dedicated months of research conducted on Iraqi EW and communications systems. National databases existed and were available, but were difficult to use and understand, and sometimes only annually updated. However, Iraqi forces continued to develop alternate means of communication and procured COTS systems like GPS jammers, INMARSAT, and Thuraya satellite phones. One product that was helpful in understanding the Iraqi Regular Army (RA) and Republican Guard (RG) communications structure was the INNET diagrams posted on the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) Iraq website. Basically, the diagram mapped out the communications structure for a �typical� RA or RG unit from corps down to platoon level for each mechanized, light, and armor unit. Specialty units, such as the surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigade, FA units, and Integrated Air Defense Systems were also mapped out. The actual format and viewer used to access this information made it difficult and cumbersome. What did help was actually stitching the diagram together from screen captures, having the topographic team print the diagram to a useable size (36� x 42�), and then conducting analysis on key nodes for each type communications band used (HF, VHF, LOS multichannel [UHF]). After the analysis, the electronic warfare officer (EWO) created a Power Point presentation for each specific type of unit, focusing on the key nodes that we could acquire and disrupt. The product was extremely useful in directing collection operations, resulting in the MI battalion sending 895 klieglights (KL), shooting 376 lines of bearing (LOB), and executing 47 successful EA missions. Recommendation: Research and develop this type of product for home station training, as well as for all deployments, to build target expertise. Topic E - Enemy Techniques for Defeating ISR Introduction One of the strengths of the U.S. Army is access to sophisticated intelligence collection systems. The Iraqi leadership did its homework, learning lessons about how the U.S. Army from DESERT STORM and from watching U.S. forces operate in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and after 11 September 2001. This chapter captures what U.S. troops observed as methods the Iraqi forces used to deceive or defeat U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts and to complicate or frustrate targeting.
Topic F � Echelon Above Division Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Support Introduction The integration of special operations force (SOF) and other government agency (OGA) elements with conventional forces during OIF was unparalleled in modern history. The mission profiles and skill sets that each element provided enhanced the operational capabilities of the others. The conventional, heavy division�s combat forces provided a mobile and secure base from which SOF and OGA could conduct direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and unconventional warfare (UW) operations in the zone of attack. SOF, and to a lesser extent OGA, provided an enhanced capability to extend the division�s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Additionally, the SOF/OGA skill sets that allow them to interact with and coopt indigenous personnel proved useful to 3ID (M) during movement and subsequent operation as TF Baghdad. Traditionally, SOF and OGA operate in the deep battlespace, usually inserting via fixed or rotary-winged means for short duration operations. During OIF, SOF and OGA teams traveled embedded within brigade formations and remained embedded even during the early stages of Phase IV in the city of Baghdad for the same reasons � security and logistical support. The SOF elements acted as a liaison between 3ID (M) and OGA, although senior members of the 3ID (M) command and staff were directly involved with OGA planners and operators well prior to G-day. Overall, the relationship was a positive one in spite of the cultural differences between SOF and conventional forces that often create friction points between these elements. SOF and OGA planners realized that the best method of infiltration for a large percentage of their elements was via a mechanized division. By building close relationships early, this partnership greatly enhanced the range, duration, and overall success of their operations. Although it can be argued effectively that the 3ID (M) provided more than what it received, overall SOF and OGA provided an enhanced capability to the division to �read� the enemy and the local populace, and their targeting and reconnaissance skills brought much to improve the division�s situational awareness during combat operations. Issue: Expectations of intelligence Discussion: There were some disappointments, perhaps the greatest of which was the mistaken perception that an Iraqi Regular Army (RA) Division would capitulate en masse near An Nasiriyah. Neither SOF nor OGA operators ever made such a claim directly; it was always presented as a possibility. The perception, based upon sensitive HUMINT operations that were unfolding as G-day loomed nearer, was that capitulation was very likely. Even with the disclaimers from the OGA, the overall perception remained that at least two brigades would capitulate. The appearance of many articles of capitulation just prior to G-day from CFLCC enhanced the perception. A catch phrase was even coined which reflected this optimistic view: �movement to parade.� The reality was that there was no coherent force that was going to formally capitulate. The RA soldiers in An Nasiriyah took the path of least resistance and avoided the stigma of being an EPW by merely deserting their positions and melting back into the populace. This left a determined yet ineffective force of Ba�athist hardliners to man the lines. Recommendation: Assuming that SOF, OGA, and conventional forces will continue to share battlespace and work towards common goals in future conflicts, integrate SOF and OGA reporting or analysts earlier into all echelons of the planning process. This would provide a clearer and more consistent line from strategic intelligence assessments to related operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Issue: Compartmentalization of information Discussion: Compartmentalization of information was a challenge throughout OIF, in no small part because of the traditional roles and associated sensitivity of SOF and OGA operations. A component of this issue is the targeting process. These organizations had targets and missions of national interest, but they were operating in a division�s battlespace. During the division�s latter planning phases, SOF and OGA representatives visited the division to discuss requirements and exchange information. Recipients of that information were usually the command group and selected staff and plans officers. At times, only the command group received critical information, denying the staff the opportunity to integrate and act on it. Special forces liaison elements (SFLE) met with the brigades in whose battlespace their teams would operate. Throughout the early days of the war, the SFLE provided some key information to units that would have been otherwise unavailable. An example was the identification of Mogadishu-style signaling of local combatants: SF teams identified a connection between lights going out in a town and residents taking up arms to fire at approaching aircraft. Much of the successful information exchange was more personality-dependent than based upon an established and common process or SOP. The location of Saddam Hussein was another example. Open source reports suggested the President of the United States was receiving continuous reporting from a source with eyes on Saddam Hussein, assuring him that he was inside a building targeted for a strike. That building was in the division�s battlespace, however. Information like this did not always reach the division staff level at a point where it could have contributed to the bigger picture intelligence assessment. Information resulting from SOF exploitation of sensitive sites during the SASO phase of OIF was not easily shared with conventional forces, though those sites were in their battlespace. Recommendations:
Issue: Collaborative operations Discussion: Even with all the HUMINT collection that the SOF, special mission units (SMU), and OGA could bring to bear against former regime targets, quite often the tip or lead that resulted in the capture of an individual on the black list came from local casual sources cultivated by 3ID (M) tactical HUMINT teams (THT) or walk-ins. This was more a reflection of the density of 3ID (M) soldiers in Baghdad than of the SOF/OGA skills in conducting HUMINT collection. Having SOF and OGA embedded from the beginning of combat operations within 3ID (M)�s formations allowed a rapid turn-around from the point of collection on a potential black list personality to conducting an operation to detain the individual. The information exchange on the ground directly between operational elements was a key factor in many of the successful detention operations. Normal reporting channels would not have met information requirements for timeliness. Recommendations:
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