May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 7 Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)/Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Draw The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) deployed nearly 20,000 personnel and thousands of pieces of equipment in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and Army prepositioned stocks (APS) equipment draw comprised the initial stages of contingency operations in theater. During this initial deployment and operations process, the division encountered numerous challenges and obstacles. Issues such as theater responsibility, training/experience, automation, and sufficient equipment severely affected the RSOI/APS timeline and ultimately the initial stages of forward operations. This narrative addresses the key issues and lessons learned from RSOI/APS in support of OIF. Topic A - RSOI 3ID (M) began a main body force flow with two BCTs and the division troops on 1 Jan 03. The last main body flight closed on 30 Jan 03. This force flow consisted of 50 passenger flights and nine cargo flights. Army central command (ARCENT)-Kuwait Directorate of Logistics (DOL)/International Travel Office (ITOs) manning and transportation resources were barely adequate to support a BCT in support of a continental United States contingency response force (CCRF) rotation. Therefore ITO and, later, 377th TSC lacked adequate resources (personnel, transportation, buses, security escorts, and cargo baggage trucks) to meet the volume of 3ID (M) soldiers flowing into Kuwait. 3ID (M) placed an liaison officer (LNO) team at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) to track inbound flights, schedule buses, segregate soldiers� baggage, and move cargo to multiple destinations to assist in the RSOI process. It also placed an LNO team (resourced by the division support command (DISCOM),division transportation officer (DTO), and 3rd rear operations center (ROC) at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) (port of Shuiabah) to facilitate the divisions' RSO of equipment off strategic sealift. In contingency operations, RSOI is a theater-level responsibility. Doctrinally a movements control team (MCT) and a movements control battalion (MCB) locate at the APOD to track and control inbound personnel and cargo. Until these elements arrived 3ID (M) assumed responsibility for tracking flights using the Single Mobility System (SMS) and Global Transportation Network (GTN), greeting 3ID (M) personnel and cargo flights, segregating soldiers and their baggage in accordance with APS equipment draw locations, and coordinating adequate buses to move soldiers from the APOD in an expeditious manner. Movement priorities were established daily by Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and this degraded the ability of the coordinating units to plan support operations. Priority of support for APOD RSO consistently competed with movement of ammunition, SPOD vessel downloads, other service units, and daily sustainment logistics pushes to the camps. 3ID (M) soldiers were needed at the MCB to maintain visibility of incoming personnel and cargo. Major subordinate commands need to organize and deploy self-supporting advanced echelon (ADVON) APOD control teams to serve as LNOs to the MCB to monitor unit�s flow into theater and onward movement to assembly areas. CFLCC C4 should publish standing operating procedures (SOP) for APOD operations tailored to the theater of operations (TOO). Lessons Learned
Topic B: APS Equipment Draw Although the ADVON arrived in theater two weeks prior to the first unit, they were not allowed to review the equipment availability list until 12 hours prior to units closing at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The equipment scheduled for draw had several shortcomings and overages that were not reflected in the Automated Battlebook System (ABS), and the 12-hour difference was not enough to correct the discrepancies. Resources must be on hand to issue the amount of company sets of APS equipment required in a timely manner to facilitate building combat power and for integration of units into a contingency operation. 3ID (M) began flowing into Kuwait at a rate of one cargo and two personnel aircrafts per day for 21 days. Future equipment draws should be executed in one location with the ability for companies to draw company-pure APS unit identification codes (UICs). In addition, the timeline at the draw yard must allow for thorough inspections of draw equipment. Inadequate inspections will lead to combat forces drawing vehicles that have bald tires, Class III leaks, and dry- rotted hoses, and are missing basic issue Items. Items that require actual operation must have required resources on hand to enable the operators to inspect the equipment. A good example of this is having bulk water on hand to test the M17 SANATOR. Incomplete draw yard grids can also complicate this process. The proper number of vehicles must be in place when units close on the draw yard. If the above mentioned systems are not in place a division�s G4 section will be forced to deal with draw yard issues rather than focusing on the pending combat operation. Divisions must be very involved in the APS process, especially for units that do not fall under the scope of a BCT. ADVONs must be allowed to screen available equipment in advance and correct any discrepancies before the main body arrives. Lastly, upon arrival of the main body, authority to remove items from the hand receipt should be delegated, at a minimum, to the battalion-commander level. Other factors complicating setting equipment draw grids include the following: Manual versus Automated Property Book System: Manually accounting for APS property and the lack of an automated system for tracking maintenance returns delay a division�s ability to build combat power. Lack of transportation for onward movement of APS drawn equipment: Upon completion of the draw process, units must have heavy lift assets and security escorts available for rapid movement to staging areas or base camps. TSCs can designate an MCT dedicated to support onward movement of personnel and equipment from the APOD to the issue yard to its final destination. Force protection ammunition: Units responsible for RSO should task units to provide force protection security assets until the parent unit can process DA 581s. Unit basic loads (UBLs) for all classes of supplies: Unit basic loads of Class I, water, Class III(P), Class IV, and Class V (ABL), Class IX (prescribed load list [PLL] and authorized stockage list [ASL]) were insufficient to meet the unit sustainment requirements. The supply system at CP Doha lacked the capability to process, configure, and transport general supplies and repair parts. Though the stocks were available to meet the division�s demand for Class I and water, the theater was consistently unable to push the stocks to the division camps for weeks. The theater had consumed contingency stock packaged petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products while supporting rotational presence units and training events in Kuwait, but had not replenished the stocks. Additionally they had not adjusted stockage quantities to support a division, much less a multidivisional force. 3ID (M) units were shorted critical Class III(P) items in the UBL draw and because of the delay in transportation were forced to local purchase. Some items were flown from Europe or Fort Stewart because they were not available on the local market. The theater never made up the shortages in the warehouse; the division had no choice except to continue to local purchase the POL products and handle all requirements in this category of supply as emergency/work around issues. This, of course, consumed manpower and resources unnecessarily. The problem continued to frustrate logisticians and using units because when supplies finally arrived, they were ordinarily bulk�50 gallon drums, rather than usable quantities � quart bottles. Although multiple layers of headquarters had analyzed requirements for Class IV materials, numerous times, none had acquired the materials or arranged for delivery in the theater prior to line of departure (LD). None above the division had planned for issue by combat or mission configured loads. 3ID (M) again took on the burden, moving the supplies that existed in the theater, then breaking them down, sorting, organizing, packaging, and palletizing combat configured loads to support a number of engineer tasks identified through the division war-gaming sessions. Not even Class V got the planning and coordination emphasis that had been expected considering war was imminent. The division had requested an ammunition basic load (ABL) defined as 1.5 X combat system load. CFLCC had approved the load, stocks were available in the theater, and the ASP personnel had deemed it feasible to support the draw. On executing the draw, however, several different agencies stood in the way of progress. Every attempt to gain the ammunition assets resulted in some agency or another denying requests, short loading trucks, or turning away soldiers. Great confusion resulted as every agency including some within the division had differing definitions of the ABL and differing exceptions to their own rules. The entire situation became utter chaos. After repeated attempts to straighten out the problems and fill the unit shortages, the division ultimately cross-leveled ammunition among units to at least glean relatively fair if not adequate loads among them. The theater very quickly became overwhelmed as other units arrived for RSOI, and they were unable to assist the division, finally cutting off support completely. The division crossed LD short the ammunition it had declared necessary to commit to combat. Class IX proved to be no exception to the rule of UBL inadequacy. Army Materiel Command (AMC) had not requested and Department of the Army (DA) had not released the Class IX ASL stocks (contingency stocks related to APS) This single mistake cost the division upwards of 45 days in defeating the bureaucracy involved in the operational project stock management, and then to receive, inventory, configure, and upload repair parts in the forward support battalion (FSB) maintenance companies. SPOD: Theaters need to identify and dedicate a unit to serve as the port support authority (PSA) and the support package should include command and control (C2), life support, materials handling equipment (MHE), communications, transportation, and tasking authority for transportation and escort security assets. Life support and camp development: When units deploy to base camps or staging areas, a central point of contact must be established for life support to expedite the process. Multiple points of contact for various life support issues only further complicates this process of getting support to the soldiers preparing for combat. Field feeding program: A unitized group ration - A (UGR-A) with supplements must be available to deploying units. There should be a senior food service warrant officer position to assist with the food service program ensuring smooth transitions when organizations enter the region. This position can be used as a cell to register units that have food service sections participating in any operations. In conclusion, 3ID (M) identified many flaws in the RSOI/APS process. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM forced an in-depth analysis of theater/unit mission, responsibility, availability of automation equipment, asset visibility, maintenance programs, and other functions associated with RSOI and beyond. This operation also emphasizes the need for full involvement and cooperation from units and organizations above division. Lessons Learned
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