May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 31 Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) The deployment to Kuwait and subsequent combat operations in Iraq were historic activities for the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]). Key SJA lessons learned included the validation of pre-deployment soldier readiness centers (SRCs); thorough rules of engagement (ROE) training for soldiers; and the usefulness of ROE cards. As a result of our efforts, most soldiers were �good to go� on legal at SRCs and 100% of the soldiers understood rules for use of force in Kuwait and as we transitioned to war. Another success was the preparation of individual SJA officers and soldiers for their wartime mission. However, several things need improvement. The most critical SJA lesson learned is the need to update the division modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) to provide more support for the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA). The division MTOE presupposes that 19 officers and 23 enlisted can operate in three different locations (the division tactical operations center [DTAC], division main command post [DMAIN], and division rear command post [DREAR]) in three vehicles currently on the MTOE. Perhaps Force Modernization personnel assumed that SJA personnel and associated equipment would be transported by other staff sections in the DMAIN or DREAR. This assumption is untrue, and a modification to increase the number of vehicles and other equipment dedicated to the SJA should be forwarded to Department of the Army (DA). Another significant issue involved processing of captured prisoners. Soldiers failed to properly record the circumstances of many captures. Later, we were unable to identify enemy soldiers who violated the law of war (LOW), and, therefore, cannot achieve a major goal set forth by President Bush: To punish those who violate the law of war. There was no separate detained civilian camp. Many of the issues identified in the SASO portion of this Chapter resulted from the lack of a plan for Phase IV operations. 3ID (M) transitioned into Phase IV SASO with no plan from higher headquarters. There was no guidance for restoring order in Baghdad, creating an interim government, hiring government and essential services employees, and ensuring the judicial system was operational. In retrospect, perhaps division planners should have been instructed to identify and address these issues earlier, given the likelihood that higher would not provide such information. Topic A - Predeployment Issue: Pre-deployment SRCs. Discussion: All division soldiers were afforded opportunities to SRC (the service was available daily for weeks prior to deployment, as well as at regularly scheduled unit SRCs). Attorneys and support staff regularly attended Family Readiness Group (FRG) meetings to further meet the pre-deployment legal needs of division soldiers. In many cases, soldiers simply bypassed the legal station at the SRC and said, �I have a will and power of attorney.� When deployment for war was imminent, the number of soldiers needing last minute wills was beyond the capability of the OSJA, even with the call-up of three reserve attorneys. Up to a two-week wait developed for wills, although by prioritizing, the OSJA ensured that every soldier had a will (other customers were inconvenienced). Recommendation: Sustain use of SRCs to ensure soldiers are prepared for deployment. Sustain level of training to individual soldiers and units. Improve utilization by stressing the importance of these documents prior to deployment and make soldiers understand that getting a will at the last minute may be difficult. Issue: Pre-deployment training. Discussion: The operational law attorney and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) briefed 100% of deploying soldiers and units on LOW, code of conduct, and ROE prior to deployment. Pocket ROE cards were provided to each soldier. Trial Counsel reinforced and/or taught the same subjects prior to deployment and during RSOI. Recommendation: Sustain use of SRCs to ensure soldiers are prepared for deployment. Sustain level of training to individual soldiers and units. Issue: Pre-deployment SJA officer and NCO training. Discussion: The OSJA developed a thorough training plan to prepare officers and soldiers for this deployment. Weekly classroom and hands on training covered virtually every individual soldier skill and some collective tasks. Additionally, we focused on ensuring SJA personnel were cross�trained in disciplines that they would encounter, especially international law and operational law. As a result of this training plan, SJA soldiers and officers performed their duty with great skill. They significantly contributed to the mission at many levels. Recommendation: Sustain. Issue: Integration of 3rd Brigade, 3ID (M), Fort Benning, into 3ID (M), Fort Stewart. Discussion: The 3rd Brigade, 3ID( M), Fort Benning SJA team is affiliated with the Fort Benning, GA, OSJA. Fort Benning�s OSJA (Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC]) controlled staffing of the brigade combat team (BCT) legal team. Most of the SJA personnel attended training with the BCT. Fort Benning and Personnel Command (PERSCOM) assigned personnel to the battalions, resulting in a very inexperienced deploying legal team. MTOE at Ft Benning was allowed to change, erroneously downgrading two infantry battalions from E5 to E4 positions. This separate (thus, unique) BCT needs to be staffed with experienced 27Ds and not soldiers fresh from Advanced Individual Training (AIT). The NCOIC position needs to be a motivated, experienced NCO. Automation requirements were not taken care of by Fort Benning (TRADOC) or the Fort Stewart (Force Command [FORSCOM]) offices. Recommendation: The 3ID (M) SJA and chief legal noncommissioned officer (CLNCO) must make temporary duty (TDY) trips to Fort Benning to ensure integration of the legal team into Fort Stewart�s OSJA. Training should mirror the 3ID (M) training schedule. The 3ID (M) chief paralegal noncommissioned officer (CPLNCO) should handle all assignments to 3rd Brigade. Inspection by the Fort Stewart OSJA on a quarterly basis is needed. Issue: MTOE inadequate to support brigade SJA assets. Discussion: MTOE equipment dedicated for SJA use is insufficient to support the legal mission conducted by brigade operational law teams (BOLTS) and the DMAIN and DREAR elements. The BOLT, the DMAIN, and DREAR SJA sections have separate missions and responsibilities. Each is expected to perform those missions in a timely manner, simultaneously, across the division area of operations (AO). Current doctrine provides that the BOLT receives support from the brigade. During this deployment and operation, the BOLTs requested a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), a radio, supplies, a Global Positioning System (GPS) device, and other support from the brigades to which they were attached. In many cases the brigades� responded that they could not support the BOLT and instructed BOLTs to request support from the division SJA office. The division SJA office is not provided sufficient assets to meet its own mission and cannot provide such support to the brigades. Had we not deployed to Kuwait where prepositioned vehicles were available, the BOLTs would not have received vehicles. The minimum equipment the BOLT needs includes a vehicle, night vision goggles (NVGs), a field phone, and a GPS device. Ideally, there would be two radios: one for the fires net and one for the brigade command net. Additionally, access to a satellite phone and the Internet by computer are vital. During this deployment, OSJA members at all levels had to beg and borrow to obtain room in vehicles to travel to perform their mission. Communications during movement was almost impossible, hampering safety and mission accomplishment. If the operational law attorney in a convoy has no communications, he cannot provide essential services such as reviewing and providing LOW input for targeting. Recommendation: Revise brigade MTOEs to provide at least one tactical vehicle with radio, one GPS device, and one digital non-secure voice telephone (DNVT). Amend FM 27-100 to reflect these requirements. The brigade lawyer cannot be expected to borrow or share this equipment. Issue: Packing lists and equipment. Discussion: The accuracy of packing lists provided by units complicated deployment preparations. Many items contained on the list served little or no purpose (e.g., black combat boots, cold weather bear suits, and training MOPP suits). Moreover, the command did not provide many items that would have facilitated deployment, including large rucksacks, joint service lightweight integrated suit technology (JSLIST) carrying cases, second set JSLISTs, and desert camouflage uniform (DCU) Gore-Tex jackets. Recommendation: Generate a refined packing list prior to deployment and secure sufficient items to equip soldiers. Issue: MTOE inadequate to support DMAIN and DREAR SJA. Discussion: The present MTOE for the SJA Office only authorizes three HMMWVs. During Operation ENDURING/IRAQI FREEDOM, the SJA office (DMAIN and DREAR) required five HMMWVs and two 2 � ton vehicles to accomplish the mission. We obtained these solely because we deployed to theater with prepositioned vehicles. Also the division MTOE provides the OSJA one crew tent and three HEX tents. These are inadequate for our needs. Ensuring that proper equipment exists for the SJA office would enable trial defense service (TDS) and/or legal assistance attorneys to provide more efficient service at the brigade level rather than moving soldiers to a TDS located in the DREAR for counseling. The division MTOE recognizes that 42 soldiers (19 officers and 23 enlisted) will deploy with the DMAIN and DREAR. The assumption behind the current MTOE is that these SJA personnel with associated equipment will be transported by three vehicles on the MTOE or by other sections in the DMAIN or DREAR. The assumption that other sections have sufficient assets to transport our personnel and equipment is untrue. Recommendation: Increase the HHC, division MTOE to reflect that SJA has five crew tents and five HEX tents. Increase the HHC MTOE to reflect that SJA has five HMMWVs and two 2-� ton vehicles. Issue: No GPS devices issued to soldiers. Discussion: On more than one occasion during this deployment and war, soldiers became lost. Once, in a sandstorm while in enemy territory, a soldier was lost for over 12 hours and nearly captured. In the most famous example, a unit missed a route turn and encountered enemy forces, resulting in significant casualties, deaths, and American POWs (which provided a significant propaganda coup and morale boost for the enemy). That tragedy might have been avoided if every soldier in that convoy had been issued and trained on the use of a GPS device (or had every tank commander (TC) had access to a GPS device). Many soldiers purchased commercial GPS devices because the Army failed to provide GPS devices. A cost benefit analysis supports this recommendation. A good GPS device sells for approximately $100.00-$150.00, an insignificant cost. Recommendation: The Army should purchase GPS devices as unit property and issue a GPS device to every soldier. Issue: Attached personnel. Discussion: Due to the unified table of distribution (TDA) and MTOE offices, OSJA personnel at Fort Stewart Hunter Air Force Base were assigned to both MTOE positions and TDA positions and worked side by side. Some personnel on the TDA were directed to deploy with the division to replace non-deployable MTOE personnel. Attachments took too long, causing difficulty getting military issue with units. Recommendation: TDA personnel need to be identified early and assigned to HHC, division as soon as possible to ease the issuing of necessary equipment and accountability for future support needs. In addition, once attached, these personnel should be treated exactly the same as assigned personnel. Issue: SJA staffing of DTAC and other headquarters HQs. Discussion: The SJA and one enlisted soldier served in the DTAC. The DMAIN was staffed with the operational law attorney, chief of military justice, operational law NCOIC and one enlisted soldier. The DREAR was staffed with the deputy staff judge advocate (DSJA), officer in charge (OIC), legal assistance and claims attorney, TDS attorney, legal administrator, chief paralegal NCO, NCOIC, and eight enlisted personnel. Each BCT was staffed with a brigade operational law team (BOLT) consisting of one attorney and three or four enlisted personnel. One attorney worked with the 3ID (M) military police (MPs) at the enemy prisoner of war (EPW) detention facility. Recommendation: Although 3ID (M) OSJA field standing operating procedures (FSOP) does not provide for a judge advocate general (JAG) at the DTAC, this is essential, given the nature of modern combat. While the SJA normally remains at the DMAIN, like other principals and commanders, he must be where he can best advise the command. In this battle, it was important for the SJA to be in the DTAC, which controlled the battle, to personally advise the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) ADC (M) and commanding general (CG). The DTAC should include two attorneys, however, to ensure 24-hour operations. Topic B - RSOI Issue: Critical equipment and life support. Discussion: HHC, 3ID (M) failed to account for judge advocate (JA) personnel when preparing load plans. Due to a communications issue, HHC did not initially include SJA personnel in their life support plan, allocation of radios, allocation of Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receivers (PLGRs), and other equipment despite our attendance at meetings and requests for support. Recommendation: HHC must include OSJA in all facets of planning to include life support and equipment. Issue: Communications. Discussion: Prior to offensive operations, the DMAIN communicated with the DREAR and the BOLTs via SIPR, NIPR, DNVT, and personal visits. The DNVT system was surprisingly down or of such poor quality, it was useless. BOLTS shared lines in the TOC and spent hours trying to place or receive calls. This made communication impossible at times when we needed to discuss or resolve significant legal issues or pass important legal information and advice to subordinates or superiors. Whenever any OSJA component was moving as part of their headquarters convoy, they typically had no communication. During hostilities, the DMAIN could not communicate with the DTAC, DREAR, or BOLTs through e-mail, DNVT, or FM for over five days. When the DMAIN was stable and the BOLTs were moving, we had the same problem. The SJA had a FM radio in his vehicle when he traveled with the DTAC, and alternatively monitored the convoy and command nets. Consequently, he and a brigade JAG traveling with the brigade fires officer were the only J AGs who could immediately advise commanders while units were on the move. Recommendation: Ensure redundant means of communication between the DMAIN, DREAR, and the BOLTS. Ensure each BOLT has communications in their vehicle. Only reliable radio communications will allow us to properly function and accomplish our mission. An Iridium satellite phone is required for OSJA use. Issue: Space utilization. Discussion: Space is limited in the DMAIN and DREAR TOCs. At the DREAR, the SJA space was a small table in the corner of the G1/SJA/G5 van. At times, we were expected to share this space with the IG. The TOC is staffed by at least two OSJA personnel at any given time. The space provided is simply not adequate for two people. Recommendation: Allow room for at least one more person in the OSJA space of the van, either re-locating the OSJA to a larger space or relocating the G5. Issue: Timely publishing of the ROE. Discussion: The final Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) ROE arrived after the division moved to tactical assembly areas (TAAs). Although a draft version of the ROE had been provided to 3ID (M) for comment several months earlier, the final ROE included new guidance on high collateral-damage targets. Late receipt of ROE caused confusion on a number of issues that were not clearly written. These matters were not resolved until hostilities began, meaning we could not train soldiers on the provisions. Recommendation: Subject to National Command Authority (NCA) approval, we should make all efforts to ensure that the ROE are published early enough so that the information can be pushed down to the soldier pulling the trigger. Topic C - Hostilities Issue: EPWs, displaced civilians (DCs), and LOW violators. Discussion: Displaced civilians were routinely sent to the EPW holding areas. This caused the holding areas to be overwhelmed and put civilians and EPWs in close proximity (although separated by concertina wire). The primary cause was the failure of civil affairs teams to operate displaced civilian collection points (DCCPs). A secondary problem was that the enemy fought in civilian clothes, causing our units to detain civilians who were on the battlefield, mistakenly thinking that they may have been engaged in hostilities. Units failed to tag EPWs properly, so the EPW collection area did not know whether the civilians were combatants wearing civilian clothes or true civilians. Finally, some civilians who read the PSYOPs leaflets misunderstood the message intended for soldiers and later these civilians �surrendered� to us. We could not readily identify LOW violators within the ranks of our EPWs, because units did not tag EPWs as directed. Recommendation: DCCPs must be established and manned. Units must tag EPWs at the first available opportunity after they are captured and note specifics of their capture (i.e., committed LOW violations) and ensure this data is passed, with the prisoners, to higher. Issue: ROE target approval authority. Discussion: The ROE for targeting structures, including traditional military facilities, was much too restrictive. Approval for targeting structures was withheld to Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC), Central Command (CENTCOM), and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) levels, even in cases of time-sensitive targets. This significantly hindered the 3ID (M) from prosecuting valid military targets in a timely manner. Recommendation: Withhold targeting approval authority for targets within the division�s AO to no higher than division commander level. Issue: ROE change requests Discussion: Several ROE change requests were submitted by BCTs throughout hostilities. The division provided responses very quickly, permitting the BCTs to implement new ROE almost on-the-spot. Recommendation: Sustain speedy responses on ROE change requests. Issue: Battlefield property acquisition books. Discussion: The CFLCC OSJA printed battlefield property acquisition books to be used by units who had to seize or requisition civilian property for military use. The books consisted of receipts with carbon copies and instructions for use. The books arrived after 3ID( M) had moved to TAAs. As a result, not all units received the books prior to line of departure (LD). The property receipts included a line for the preparer�s social security numbers. It was unwise to give SSNs to members of the Iraqi population. Recommendation: Sustain the issuance of battlefield property acquisition books. Ensure timely distribution of the books. Do not include the preparer�s SSN on the property receipt. If the SSN is necessary for tracking, ensure that is included only on the copy that is retained by the unit and is not provided to civilians. Issue: Information flow. Discussion: Poor information flow during the battle regarding the civilian combatants and other LOW violations may have subjected soldiers to harm. Individuals wearing civilian clothes engaged the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and some 3ID (M) units. Yet word of this was not immediately relayed throughout the division. Rear convoys particularly were unaware that individuals wearing civilian clothing or driving in civilian vehicles might target them. It is unclear whether any injury would have been prevented by this knowledge, but such information must be relayed to all on the battlefield to permit soldiers to be prepared to face the enemy. Recommendation: Improve information flow by consistently ensuring that appropriate lines of communication are open. Leaders must drop down from the command net and give updates on the convoy net. Issue: Embedded media. Discussion: The guidance on embedded media access to information was either misunderstood or not enforced. Also, control on the practices and discipline of the embedded media needs to be increased in the future, perhaps subjecting them to the same limitations and restriction expected from our soldiers in order to ensure good order and discipline. Recommendation: Ensure that the guidance on embedded media access to information is clear and understood by all. Look at subjecting them to restrictions on their conduct, such as the general order for the theater. Issue: Fratricide investigations. Discussion: DoDI 6055.7, Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping, requires that the combatant commander convene a legal investigation for all friendly fire incidents. Despite requesting through SJA channels that the Commander, USCENTCOM, appoint AR 15-6 investigations in 3ID (M) suspected fratricide cases, none were ever appointed. In the absence, 3ID (M) appointed AR 15-6 investigations at its level for every fratricide incident. Recommendation: Procedures for having higher headquarters appoint required investigations must be establish prior to hostilities. Topic D - Stability and Support Operations (SASO) Issue: War trophies and property damage. Discussion: We properly addressed property issues in ROE and General Order Number One Alpha training. However, soldiers destroyed, damaged, or removed property. Recommendation: Ensure the policy on war trophies is included in all training. Ensure that guidance is uniform across the division. Have commanders strenuously reinforce rules regarding property. Prevent soldiers from looting or unnecessarily damaging property. Protect all property in place until commanders decide to use the property for official purposes. Issue: Fiscal law. Discussion: Fiscal policy concerns and confusion slowed progress in the civil affairs and SASO area. The division�s use of captured money (both dinars and dollars) was unnecessarily restricted, resulting in delays in reconstruction efforts in Baghdad. An unnecessarily restrictive policy regarding the use of this money delayed SASO efforts. The division confiscated dinars and proposed to use the money to purchase water for the local population, eliminating the need for locals to transit through a checkpoint to retrieve water. This request followed a car bombing at a U.S. checkpoint that killed four soldiers. Incredibly, concerns at higher headquarters regarding policy issues related to the use of the money delayed this force protection measure. Later, the division confiscated almost 1 billion dollars from Baghdad palaces. We had the legal authority under customary and codified international law to spend the money. Higher authorities again instructed division to not use the money to fund projects fulfilling obligations as an occupying power under international law, or responding to legitimate needs within Baghdad. Our failure to act quickly with this money negatively impacted the local population�s views and support for U.S. troops. The money could have been used to hire, train, and equip the police force; clear the rubble from government buildings and city streets; hire sanitation workers and other municipal employees; clean up the courts and hire judicial personnel. These workers, along with civil affairs operations, could have reestablished power, water, sewer, police, and fire support for Baghdad as well as cleaned the streets. The decision delayed such progress. At first, the people were anxious to get started and looked to the U.S. for assistance. They soon saw us as being unable or unwilling to get anything done. Recommendation: War plans should not restrict for policy reasons the expenditure of confiscated money or other funds for critical projects. Higher officials must understand that their reticence on this issue delayed and perhaps even jeopardized successful SASO. Issue: For political reasons, leaders declared that U.S. forces were �liberating forces� rather than occupying forces. This may have caused military commanders to be reluctant to use the full power granted to occupying forces to accomplish our legitimate objectives. Discussion: As a matter of law and fact, the United States is an occupying power in Iraq, even if we characterize ourselves as liberators. Under International Law, occupation is a de facto status that occurs when an invading army takes effective control of a portion of another country. If necessary to maintain this public affairs position, our national command should have stated that while we were �liberators,� we intended to comply with International Law requirements regarding occupation. This status would have provided us authority to control almost every aspect of the Iraqi life, including the civilian population, government, resources, and facilities, making it easier for us to accomplish all SASO missions. Occupation law also imposed upon us obligations to protect the civilian population to the best of our ability. Because of the refusal to acknowledge occupier status, commanders did not initially take measures available to occupying powers, such as imposing curfews, directing civilians to return to work, and controlling the local governments and populace. The failure to act after we displaced the regime created a power vacuum, which others immediately tried to fill. Recommendation: Military leaders must use authority granted occupying forces. We could have done this consistent with our government�s stated position. Issue: No civilian authority in place prepared to serve as civilian administrator of Iraq and no Phase IV plan. Discussion: The President announced that our national goal was �regime change.� Yet there was no timely plan prepared for the obvious consequences of a regime change. As late as 15 April, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) had, at best, a working draft plan of post Saddam Iraq. Additionally, the delay in having the civilian authority on the ground (while perhaps justified by security concerns) made commanders reluctant to move too quickly regarding Phase IV SASO activities, as they were concerned that their actions might be inconsistent with ORHA efforts � which either did not exist or had not been shared with the military. Despite the virtual certainty that the military would accomplish the regime change, there was no plan for oversight and reconstruction, even after the division arrived in Baghdad. Recommendation: Resolution of this is not in division control. State, Defense, and other relevant agencies must do a better and timelier job planning occupation governance and standing up a new Iraqi government. If this is not possible, the best alternative would have been to let the military plan and execute the mission for a month or more, then turn it over to the civilian overseer. This would have avoided the power/authority vacuum created by our failure to immediately replace key government institutions. Issue: Civil affairs coordination Discussion: The civil affairs units operating in Baghdad today initially seemed to lack central coordination and effective integration with the 3ID (M). The first unit to arrive, the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion was ill equipped to handle the entire city of Baghdad. Although other CA assets were available, the CA brigade failed to recognize that Baghdad was the center of gravity for the Iraqi campaign. They decided to resolve issues as they encountered them in other cities along the road to Baghdad from Kuwait. Subject to hearing additional information about the thought process behind this approach, it seems fair at this point to say that Baghdad should have been the priority. Recommendation: We need to ensure the civil affairs is fully integrated with the division. The CA plan should match theater priorities. Issue: Baghdad police department Discussion: The Baghdad police department originally had approximately 40,000 officers. Upon completion of the war, there were approximately 2,500. This force has not yet hit the streets, even though the need was immediate and great. The JAG Office was ready to teach these officers immediately, to better enable them to serve the public. To date, this has not occurred. The rules from higher headquarters regarding the police were unclear, especially regarding soldier escorts, police arrest powers, detaining police who were suspected of misconduct, and other issues. As BCTs interpreted these rules differently, we unsuccessfully sought a change to the ROE. Recommendation: Higher headquarters needs to understand the immediate need and impact of the local police in the aftermath of war. The people wanted police and needed security. But we had no plan to accomplish this. Issue: Trial defense service. Discussion: Originally, the one TDS counsel for division was located at Camp Doha, Kuwait, approximately two hours away from any of the camps at which the BOLTs were located. It was impossible to move military justice actions forward, because the TDS counsel was not accessible by phone, and it detracted from units� missions to travel four hours to get one soldier to TDS. Later, the TDS counsel collocated with the DREAR. This BOLT arranged to have the TDS counsel come to Camp Pennsylvania one day per week. The TDS counsel did not have his own transportation or 27D, so this BOLT was forced to transport him back and forth. Once that routine was established, it was convenient for units (who brought all their soldiers on an established day of the week to TDS) and justice actions actually began moving forward. Recommendation: TDS should be located centrally in the division. TDS should have its own vehicle and 27D. Consider bringing one more TDS attorney to help with caseload and to assist with conflict cases. These things would drastically improve TDS�s ability to perform its duties and would make TDS a better combat multiplier. BOLTs should establish a regular schedule to have TDS present at the brigade to advise clients. OSJA, Criminal Law Division should create a plan for justice operations, to include TDS, before deployment and then tweak the plan as necessary. Issue: Location of BOLT during movement Discussion: To properly advise commanders on ROE issues and other matters, the BOLT must remain collocated with the XO and FSO and/or commander. Recommendation: Commanders should collocate with their legal officers. Issue: Law of war violators Discussion: We encountered many combatants who fought in civilian clothes and civilian vehicles, thereby violating the Hague Conventions. However, we could not readily identify those violators within the ranks of our EPWs, because units did not tag EPWs as directed in the BCT operations order (OPORD). Those EPWs then intermingled with the displaced civilians who were also taken to the EPW holding areas, so potential law of war violators could not be readily distinguished. Recommendation: Units must tag EPWs at the first available opportunity after they are captured and before they are turned over to someone who knows nothing about their capture. Issue: Medical treatment of EPWs Discussion: Division guidance not to use air medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for EPWs during one battle due to the threat of being shot down by enemy fire was mistakenly interpreted as a directive to not fly enemy wounded. This was corrected in a few days, as soon as division learned of the mistaken interpretation of the order. Recommendation: Train medical evacuation personnel on LOW to ensure they know their obligations Issue: ROE regarding local police Discussion: During SASO, local police started �policing� again despite the fact that the criminal justice system was defunct. All arrestees were placed in jail and held until trial with no review of the necessity for continued pretrial confinement. Because there would be no trials in the near future, arrestees would spend an indefinite amount of time in jail without a trial. U.S. forces also did not know which police officers were connected to the Hussein regime or were merely donning the uniform to conceal their status as paramilitary forces. Local police were bearing arms (specifically AK 47s) and were wearing uniforms very similar to Iraq�s Republican Guard soldiers. Higher headquarters did not produce ROE regarding these �rogue� police. BOLTs requested ROE permitting U.S. forces to detain any local police who were without a U.S. escort and were attempting to make arrests and/or were bearing military weapons. The purpose was to enhance soldier safety, to serve as an interim measure to ensure dual patrols of local police and U.S. soldiers, and to ensure all arrestees were processed through our system. Recommendation: Anticipate such issues during SASO and give clear, timely guidance regarding police activities. Issue: Automation equipment�s durability, re-supply, and tactical satellite (TACSAT) phone Discussion: Current automation fails to stand up to the field environment. Automation exists that can handle the battlefield environment. Automation was provided by the OSJA through HHC, 3ID (M), however, due to monetary limits, appropriate automation could not be purchased. Special forces and Fort Bragg have automation equipment that can survive on today�s battlefield, however, it is expensive. Due to the fluid nature of the battlefield TACSAT phone for the OSJA office is a must. Regular communications are unpredictable and access is limited to other sections phones. Recommendations: Purchase appropriate automation for deployment and issue to appropriate attorney or paralegal for use in garrison to become familiar with capabilities. Equipment needed for each BOLT: 2 laptops 2 printers 2 scanners 1 digital camera 1 fax machine 2 palm pilots Issue: Initial supplies for deployment. Discussion: Initial supplies need to be airlifted with deploying BOLTS and offices. They should include enough supplies to function for two weeks or until supply channels are established. The OSJA is not a stand-alone unit, thus HHC, 3ID (M) or HHC, DISCOM have to acquire needed supplies. Most of the OSJA�s office supplies were shipped with CONEXs and took 4 weeks to arrive. HHC, 3ID (M) did not allocate cargo space for the OSJA�s supplies. Recommendations: All units must allocate space on aircraft for OSJA DMAIN and DTAC�s supplies. Establish a fund site channel that the legal administrator and CPLNCO can utilize for purchase of supplies and equipment. Establish FSOP with DISCOM that outlines their responsibility to the OSJA DREAR (i.e. tents, vehicles, comfort items). Issue: Plan for Phase IV operations. Discussion: Higher headquarters did not provide the 3ID (M) with a plan for Phase IV. As a result, 3ID (M) transitioned into Phase IV operations in the absence of guidance. Recommendations: Division planners should have drafted detailed plans on Phase IV operations that would have allow it to operate independently outside of guidance from higher headquarters. Critical requirements should have been identified prior to LD, and a plan to execute a SASO mission for at least 30 days should have been ready to execute immediately. A liaison officer (LNO) from ORHA during planning would have greatly assisted this process. Return to Table of Contents |
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