May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 29 Marne Visitors Bureau (MVB) Introduction Prior to deployment the concept of a division level visitors bureau was established to handle any VIPs (grade O7 or above) that would enter the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) space during forward operations. This was a new concept, as previous visitors bureaus were in the Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) concept involving unit liaisons working at corps or theater level. Lessons Learned
Issue: Division level visitors bureau (Marne Visitors Bureau) Discussion: Prior to deployment, the concept of a division level visitors bureau was established to handle any VIPs (grade O7 or above) that would enter 3ID (M) space during forward operations. This was a new concept, as previous visitors bureaus were in the Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) concept involving unit liaisons working at corps or theater level. Recommendation: Sustain the concept of an embedded division level MVB. The MVB can look after the interests of Third Infantry Division (Mechanized), while at the same time maintain close contact with the division command group in order to ensure VIPs are getting a proper look at the division. Another reason for sustainment is that, once notified, MVB personnel can exercise tighter control over a visit, thus gaining additional time to plan for a VIP while ensuring proper coordination with division assets for a successful visit. This is essential to maintain the positive image of 3ID (M). Issue: MVB personnel requirements Discussion: During deployment to Operation LUCKY WARRIOR, (in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) and subsequent operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the issue of staffing became crucial. The MVB deployed with four personnel in conjunction with the four personnel from the Division Equal Opportunity (EO) Office. The MVB functions in a forward environment consisted mainly of supporting visitors to the division area and supporting the command group�s rare protocol related requirements. The number of personnel deployed to support MVB operations was adequate to support the necessary mission and was largely based on the model used in garrison at Fort Stewart. Recommendation: Sustain the four person section for the MVB as laid out in the MVB SOP. This was adequate to support operations in the camp setting, but as operational requirements shifted during the commencement of hostilities, this was a small number of personnel to support during the fight when resources were strained. Issue: Deployment to Kuwait on short notice with additional personnel. Discussion: Having learned that deployment was between 10 days to two weeks away and, that in accordance with MTOE, our section was not assigned a single piece of equipment, it became a difficult task to coordinate for the use and purchase of required equipment. Moreover, the staff would be blended with the division equal opportunity officer and non commissioned officer. Recommendation: Under such circumstances, daily meetings with all necessary personnel are essential. In order to utilize the right channels for acquisition of materials, those with authority to implement IMPACT card purchases should be present, as well as other essential leaders within the command group. In addition, a checklist should be developed immediately to identify the mission, its requirements, and essential equipment. This list should be updated at every daily meeting in order to ensure nothing is neglected. This was done by the newly created MVB team and was very instrumental in ensuring that much, but not all, of the equipment questions were addressed and solved. Issue: Vehicles (tactical and non-tactical) and other essential equipment Discussion: Upon receiving the mission to deploy forward to Kuwait with the division, the newly created MVB section, consisting mainly of protocol staff and EO staff, determined a need for vehicles in a tactical setting. The vehicles assigned to protocol in the garrison setting are a non-tactical 15 passenger van, a cargo van, and a sedan. Due to MTOE constraints, it became obvious we were going to be required to acquire vehicles we were not authorized to have, but realistically needed. The issue of tent space and other essential equipment also became a necessary requirement, but again, due to MTOE constraints, the staff would have to attempt to acquire equipment not organic to the section on short notice. Recommendation: The MTOE should be adjusted to provide the protocol section and the division EO section with the equipment it needs to do its job. This would ensure access to the draw grid (for vehicles if necessary) and allow the commander to have the confidence that the division has the mobility and flexibility to freely maneuver all of its assets on the battlefield. Furthermore, field equipment such as tents, power distribution boxes, light sets, digital non-secure voice telephones (DNVT), office automation, and generator support ought to be provided in accordance with MTOE adjustments, if these sections are required to deploy and sustain themselves in a forward environment. Issue: Section responsibilities in a forward environment Discussion: Upon learning of the section composition and its mission, a concerted effort was made by the MVB staff to organize responsibilities and duties in order to successfully execute the MVB mission. The plan, largely, if not entirely, centered on the Division Protocol Office model and would be used as the basis for establishing guidelines for the section�s mission. Having never been to the field with the division tactical operations center (DTAC[+]) or division main command post (DMAIN), it was difficult at first to determine where the section would set up operations and how it would gain the support of various agencies in order to become operational. This was a unique task because protocol (or a MVB) had never been a concept the division included in its plans. Recommendation: In the future, the Division Protocol Office should be able to, on occasion, deploy with the DMAIN during Warfighter exercises so the protocol/MVB concept is integrated into the division scheme. An added benefit would be the ability of soldiers to gain field experience in utilizing tactical equipment granted by the MTOE changes. Issue: Personal weapon MTOE change Discussion: After arriving in Kuwait, the MVB section found itself routinely escorting VIPs throughout high threat environments. This included picking up VIPs at Kuwait City International Airport among throngs of civilians and in vulnerable locations. During convoy operations for VIP escort missions, escort personnel were required to carry personal weapons inside the vehicles in the VIP convoy. Moreover, in accordance with policy, personnel were required to maintain a locked, but not loaded status in the event of hostile fire. The personal weapon assigned to MVB personnel was the M-16A2, which is wholly unsuited for operation in a confined space such as a moving vehicle due to its size and length. Recommendation: Protocol/MVB personnel should be required, by MTOE, to carry the M4 carbine or 9mm pistol as a personal weapon. The M4 carbine is similar to the M-16A2 in volume and rate of fire, but has a more compact size allowing for easier operation by VIP escorts under confined conditions. This recommendation is vital for ensuring the effective security of VIPs. Issue: VIP security training Discussion: Escorting VIPs is one of the job requirements of protocol/MVB personnel. As such, staff members constantly accompany VIPs or precede their arrival. On occasions where personal security details (PSDs) are required, close liaison between PSD and protocol/MVB personnel is essential. Not all VIPs, however, bring PSD. The Under Secretary of the Army is one such case in point. Although a PSD did not accompany the Undersecretary on visits to Fort Stewart or Kuwait, there were occasions, particularly in the high threat Kuwait environment, where security awareness was essential. Trained personnel are not always available, nor are they always available in sufficient numbers. This presents a vulnerability that ought not to exist. Recommendation: Protocol/MVB personnel should be afforded some personal security training in the rear or prior to deployment. This would not replace existing PSD trained personnel, but would give escorts and protocol personnel a higher state of visibility on potential threats and ways to react to those threats as a benefit to the safety of the VIP. In those instances where PSD staff is not authorized or present, this type of training would offer some level of protection for VIPs. Attendance at this type of training could be for all staff members or simply those that have more escort related responsibilities, such as officers and senior NCOs. This would make the protocol/MVB section a value added resource to the command group because of its ability to conduct VIPs safely around 3ID (M) areas of operation, in the rear, and in hostile environments. Issue: Commanding general�s (CG) official representation fund Discussion: The official representation fund is authorized by Forces Command (FORSCOM) for the CG to use when acting in ceremonial capacities. The fund is rigidly governed in accordance with AR 37-47, and all expenditures are subject to legal review. Upon deploying to Kuwait, it was determined that the fund site might need to be utilized at some point during the deployment. The ORF custodian attempted to determine how the fund could be expended in a forward environment if necessary. In doings so, advice was sought from SJA who, in turn, referred the custodian to FORSCOM due to the ambiguous language in the annual fund authorization memorandum for FY 03, which authorizes the annual expenditure of funds. Because FORSCOM has authority to issue the authorization memorandum, they had the final judgment call on the issue. They were not sure how the commanding general could spend the money overseas and after some deliberation concluded that the fund resided with the installation commander back at Fort Stewart and not with the actual commanding general. In order to secure funds, a laborious process was initiated to determine what command in the theater could issue an �ORF� fund for the CG to utilize. This process is still on-going because it is a subject that has never been broached. In addition, the process for utilizing any monies provided by a higher command appears to be so cumbersome and slow as to be ineffective in times where speed of action may be necessary. Recommendation: The ORF issue needs to be reevaluated at the FORSCOM level to determine how the Commanding General of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) or any other division commander can utilize a fund that is important to his ability to properly represent the division. Moreover, any solution should include an expedient method of conducting authorized transactions, such as a credit card as opposed to the current time consuming process of mailing the vendor a check weeks after services have been rendered. This process is not conducive to supporting the CG in an environment where time may be a consideration. Moreover, ORF should establish a supplemental wartime fund for such emergencies that the commanding general can take wherever he may be deployed. Oversight to ensure compliance with the regulations could still reside with staff judge advocate (SJA) and after a legal review of intended expenditures is provided, the custodian can act on the CG�s behalf. 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