May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 27 Information Operations (IO) The pre-war phase of information operations was primarily focused on the decision makers in the Iraqi Army. The use of e-mail to contact the generals urging them to surrender and contacting Iraqi governmental decision makers offering them deals to leave the country was a great idea in planning, but the U.S. failed to understand the Iraqi government was based on Stalinism and the fear of reprisals was greater than they had anticipated. Also, the use of psychological operations (PSYOPs) to drop leaflets was negated when the leaflets were collected and those who read them were punished. During the actual prosecution of the war, the IO campaign took on a different tone. Physical destruction was a more effective method of controlling the enemy�s IO campaign. The coalition egregiously underestimated Hussein�s ability to use IO to his advantage. He demonstrated to the Iraqi people that he was in charge, and he would prevail no matter what the coalition could do. This was coupled with the fact that the Iraqi people were dubious of U.S. intentions. The 1991 debacle that encouraged an uprising and then abandoned the Kurds was foremost in the minds of the people. Hussein played upon this, convincing the people the U.S would only go as far as the oil fields and would never go as far as Baghdad. They had no reason not to believe him. The most effective way to counter this was to monitor the radio and TV stations that were playing anti-coalition messages and target them for physical destruction. Also, IO effectively used combat cameras (com-cams) to show that the coalition forces were not pillaging the country and were bringing humanitarian aide to the people in the southern part of the country. These images were broadcast on Commando Solo and SOMMS-B assets of PYSOPs. This could not be countered by the state run media and many citizens in Baghdad had locally made, black-market, satellite dishes, even though owning one of these meant six months in an Iraqi prison and a life-time of monitoring by Iraqi Intelligence. Com-cam effectively showed the Iraqi people that the regime was lying to them by showing the minister of information stating that the U.S. troops were no where near Baghdad contrasted by footage of U.S. troops in the city. This helped destroy the regime�s credibility. PSYOPs were used to deploy IO messages via loudspeakers in cities where coalition troops were moving, as well as to keep the lines of communications (LOCs) clear of civilians. In the post-hostility phase of the operation, IO was used to inform the locals of the coalition�s intent as to the Iraqi people. IO helped to keep peace by announcing curfew hours and instructions on how to surrender. IO was used to convey the message: �We�re in charge. Saddam may have cut off the utilities, but we�re here to help you help yourselves by working with you to restore normalcy.� IO worked closely with civil affairs (CA) and PSYOPs. IO�s greatest failures came from messages derived from Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). They did nothing to help provide messages to give to the brigades in the form of talking points. They provided several statements by General Franks and messages to the Iraqi people telling them how they would be treated. After these were distributed, V Corps would call to say do not use it. This caused great confusion among the Iraqi people. By not providing messages in a timely manner and by being indecisive about the messages they wanted delivered, corps and higher missed a great opportunity to more rapidly bring an end to the war while still ensuring coalition victory. Return to Table of Contents |
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