May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 2 Full Spectrum Operations Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) encompassed operations across the full spectrum of conflict and across various terrain. Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) fought an asymmetric enemy in the mid and low intensity arena and transitioned to stability and support operations (SASO) at the conclusion of the attack. The division maintained the initiative and pressed on with aggressive offensive action. The Iraqi military was not able to adapt their tactics and continued to attack the division�s strengths. In addition, the division operated on varied terrain throughout the operation including open desert, urban, and restrictive terrain made up of narrow dirt and improved roads. The success of the division was due to experienced and flexible leaders; superior equipment; and focused, high-resolution training conducted prior to crossing the line of departure (LD). Leaders quickly adapted to the complex environment and modified their schemes of maneuver and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) accordingly. The division was able to quickly transition from the attack to SASO upon the seizure of Baghdad. Mature leaders and disciplined soldiers were the key to this transition. Topic A - Maneuver Observation Synopsis OIF was a full spectrum operation conducted against an asymmetric threat. The deep penetration executed by the division, coupled with the unconventional enemy forces, created a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield. The diverse threat and terrain required thinking, flexible, and adaptive leaders. Simultaneous mid intensity (MIC) and low intensity (LIC) Operations All commanders faced a multifaceted threat. Throughout the operation, units fought conventional Regular Army and Republican Guard forces as well as paramilitary and terrorist threats. Iraqi forces collocated critical assets with protected sites such as schools, hospitals, mosques, and residential areas to avoid coalition targeting. This diverse threat required significant flexibility and agility. The extended battlespace created a nonlinear battlefield. All units of the division were on the �front lines.� There was no sanctuary on the battlefield. Virtually every element of the division was engaged at some point in the fight. All movements in the division zone were combat operations and many lessons were learned about movement security and the capabilities of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units to move around the battlefield. Small paramilitary teams attacked U.S. forces around the built-up areas in an attempt to draw the division into a city fight. Unit check points, assembly areas, command post areas, as well as forward elements faced the constant threat of car bombs, dismounted suicide bombers, and limited rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms attacks by 2-4 man teams. Each threat presented its own set of considerations and TTPs for the commander. All elements in the division had to provide for their own security because the division did not have sufficient maneuver assets to dedicate to force protection of the division main command post (DMAIN), division rear command post (DREAR), or aviation brigade. 3ID (M) encountered the full spectrum of enemy forces throughout offensive operations on a complex battlefield. The threat forces consisted of the 11th Infantry Division (RA), Medina Division (RG), and elements of the Hammurabi Division (RG), Adnan Division (RG), and Nebuchadnezzer Division (RG) as well as paramilitary/terrorist elements operating in the vicinity of the built-up areas. Iraqi divisions employed armor/mechanized forces at the platoon level in offensive operations and at the brigade level in defensive operations. Enemy paramilitary groups typically operated at squad and platoon level and were armed with .50 caliber machine guns and air defense artillery (ADA) guns mounted on civilian trucks, RPGs, AK-47s, and mortars. The tactics used by the paramilitary were mounted and dismounted counterattacks, RPG ambushes, mortar and small arms fire in an attempt to inflict casualties and interdict the lines of communications (LOCs). Units quickly adapted to the diverse terrain and threat, employing modified TTPs that proved effective, such as leading with tanks, setting sites to wide angle view in urban terrain, and securing convoys instead of attempting to secure the entire route. Tanks were effective against most enemy direct fire targets, however, they were overkill in many cases. The armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS)/high explosive antitank (HEAT) mix was adjusted in the ammo basic load (ABL) at the outset and was continually refined as the target array of trucks, BMPs, bunkers, and buildings became better known. Toward the end of offensive operations, ABLs consisted of about 60% HEAT and 40% APFSDS. The 25mm on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) was highly effective against armored personnel carriers (APCs), enemy tanks, and the vehicles employed by the paramilitary forces in open and urban terrain. All static positions employed a combination of conventional defensive techniques and counterterrorism force protection measures. Leadership, flexibility, lethality, and survivability were the keys to success. Institutional, home station, and in-theater training conducted prior to crossing the LD ensured the division was fully prepared for the complex environment encountered. Transition to Stability and Support Operations Upon entry into Baghdad, 3ID (M) was immediately required to start the transition to SASO. The transition occurred while the division was still fighting Republican Guard, paramilitary, and terrorist cells. This transition required a great deal of flexibility and discipline; the soldiers and the units executed their missions superbly. Soldiers who had violently attacked enemy formations with the world�s most lethal systems over the previous three weeks were now called upon to secure neighborhoods and conduct humanitarian assistance operations. As the nature of the operation changed, the need for certain types of units diminished. Field artillery, air defense, and chemical units were assigned nonstandard missions similar to the security tasks given the maneuver units and significantly improved the coverage the division was able to provide. The initial focus in the city was on establishing security for the civilians living and working in the area. Once a reasonable degree of security had been achieved, the focus transitioned through a series of priorities for security of government facilities, utility infrastructure, museums, banks, hospitals, the reestablishment of services and utilities, and in the removal of weapons caches and unexploded ordnance (UXOs). In addition to the rules of engagement (ROE) and TTP shift that occurs, the mental shift required as soldiers move from a killing focus to a stabilizing focus cannot be overstated. Soldiers and leaders rapidly adapted to the varying threat early in the fight and were just as flexible in adapting to the SASO environment. Divisional engineer and CSS elements immediately set to work on humanitarian assistance tasks and made a significant impact with limited capabilities. Units must be ready to rapidly transition to SASO during combat operations. The diplomatic, engineering, civil affairs, non-government organizations (NGOs), and humanitarian assistance plans and resources must be forward-postured for immediate employment. Lessons Learned
Topic B - Intelligence Observation Synopsis Operation IRAQI FREEDOM validated the threat premise posited in FM 3.0, Operations, dated June 2001. It also highlighted the need for flexible and responsive intelligence collection and processing capabilities, as well as several analytical models to answer the division�s intelligence requirements during full spectrum operations. The threat dimension of the operational environment of FM 3.0, Operations, describes an adversary that develops war fighting doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to counter perceived U.S. strengths and exploit perceived vulnerabilities. Although not ultimately successful against the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized), Saddam Hussein demonstrated the intent to do just that. In many of his speeches prior to the start of the war, he indicated that he did not intend to fight the United States in the open desert, tank on tank. Instead, he intended to draw our forces into the cities and win the fight there. He often talked of employing tactics to create massive casualties and erode our will to fight. Throughout the course of OIF, we saw many examples of the Iraqi effort to counter our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. To avoid air strikes and frustrate targeting efforts, the Iraqis dispersed their forces and hid them under palm trees or in urban areas, often parking artillery or armor systems right next to schools or private residences. They also set fire trenches to try to obscure targeting. The Iraqis conducted some nonlinear, simultaneous operations, coercing citizens and recruiting foreigners to conduct ambushes and suicide attacks against coalition forces. Again, these fighters wore civilian clothes and used civilian transportation to complicate friendly targeting. The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) fought on a complex battlefield from the time it crossed the berm until it stopped just south of Baghdad. Once the division reached the outskirts of Baghdad, the main effort eventually became SASO. The division�s intelligence effort had to transition, with basic intelligence requirements identified and resources prepared to shift. The division has considerable experience in SASO from both Bosnia and Kosovo. Many individuals recalled the intelligence tools used during the division�s leadership of Multinational Division (North) and worked to adapt them for SASO in Baghdad. These tools help the intelligence battle operating system (IBOS) identify the intelligence problems, track intelligence requirements, and graphically depict intelligence analysis. �The complexity of the operational environment requires sharing intelligence from the national level to the tactical level and among headquarters at each level.� (FM 3.0, Operations, p. 11-8) Our doctrine acknowledges the demands on our intelligence system in full spectrum operations. A division must be able to collect against a commander�s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) throughout the full spectrum operations, including the intelligence dimension of SASO. As an example, it must be able to quickly integrate additional human intelligence (HUMINT) assets with corresponding demands for linguist support, operational direction, and analytical support. The division, lacking the range of collectors, processors, and supporting communications systems that would make the intelligence process seamless, is not yet ideally resourced for full spectrum operations. The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) did receive some newer collection and processing systems such as the PROPHET, PPS-5D, additional Common Ground Station (CGS) and All Source Analysis System � Light (ASAS-L) just prior to the beginning of the war, but it did not receive a dedicated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or some of the other capabilities requested to effectively conduct full spectrum operations. A division must have UAVs at the division and brigade level. The technology exists and commanders demand it for near-real-time imagery and targeting. The maneuver brigades were able to benefit from the corps� emphasis on division priorities and from the mini-UAV that the special forces employed in their sectors, but the asset was never totally dedicated to division or brigade priorities. A division needs improved organic imagery processors. The division received a Quick Reaction System (QRS), an imagery system, and a team from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) that provided a T1 communications line and access to imagery only hours old and a Global Broadcast System (GBS) that allowed us to watch UAV video from Predator and Hunter. These imagery processors were invaluable to the division in obtaining current imagery for planning and targeting. The division also needs tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems that are capable of collecting and jamming threat signals across the spectrum and that are responsive to the division commander�s PIR. These systems need to be mobile, hardened, and quickly operational. The signal environment in current and future battlefields runs the gamut from tactical FM radios, to HF radios, to mobile secure cell phones, to fiber optics. The conventional Army, conducting full spectrum operations on a complex battlefield, requires a collection and jamming system that can keep up with the maneuver forces and adapt to any of these signal environments. The division, therefore, needs an organic system no less capable than those available to the special operations and theater intelligence communities. The military intelligence (MI) battalion received the PROPHET system shortly before the division�s attack, but it did not receive technical insertions that enabled it to collect on all of the threats of interest to the division or to acquire key threats associated with the division�s transition to SASO. While the MI battalion brought a solid HUMINT capability to the division with the tactical human intelligence teams (THTs) assigned to each of the three direct support companies, it did not have sufficient capability to man an enemy prisoner of war (EPW) cage, to surge collection or conduct general support operations, or to provide experienced and comprehensive analysis and guidance to operational teams. The G2 identified this problem and requested augmentation in the event of war, which the division received shortly before beginning hostilities. Once the main effort became SASO, the MI battalion increased the division�s HUMINT collection by parking several of its legacy SIGINT systems and assigning twenty-four Arabic speakers to support THT operations. This increased the number of collection teams from six to fifteen and also provided twenty-four hour coverage of a key EPW holding area. The conduct of OIF validated the requirement for a G2X, a key aspect of HUMINT operations, as a permanent part of a division G2 staff. The G2X coordinates, deconflicts, and synchronizes all HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) operations. It is currently a position that is part of joint doctrine and emerging Army doctrine, having proved essential in SASO in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. About a year ago, the division G2 recognized that in any future conflict, the complex battlefield and potentially rapid transition to SASO as the main effort demanded the division have a G2X early. However at that time, the divisional MI battalion did not have the senior, experienced leadership to provide a G2X. As war in Iraq loomed, the G2 took an officer out of hide to create a G2X. The position proved critical throughout the fight, not just as the division transitioned to SASO. The overall campaign had a number of agencies and special operations forces (SOF) working in the division�s area of operations, and the G2X served as a focal point for deconflicting and synchronizing their operations. There are several other demands on the intelligence BOS that come with a transition to SASO. The G2 and MI battalion commander had anticipated most of them and requested support prior to the conflict. Some resources, such as a sufficient number of linguists, were very late in getting to the fight. Commanders at all levels, THT, civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOPs) teams need linguists. The division needs to establish a screening cell to conduct background checks for local hires and provide a force protection function. We cannot resource this from organic assets. The analysis and control element (ACE) typically needs to reorganize its analysis and collection efforts to address the particular functions of a SASO mission. In the case of Baghdad, the details of the city�s socioeconomic status and infrastructure (water, power, sewage, cultural centers, mosques) were as important as emerging leaders, remaining paramilitary threat, and reestablishment of military forces. The 3ID (M) was able to adapt several tools from its previous SASO experiences to this particular operation. Lessons Learned
Topic C - Fire Support Transition to Stability and Support Operations (SASO) Observation Synopsis As the division moved closer to Baghdad and the need for counterfire diminished, division artillery (DIVARTY) found itself quickly transitioning to SASO. The rapid transition proved challenging for both the DIVARTY and the division as units shifted focus to rebuilding Iraq�s infrastructure and stability. Division tasked DIVARTY to become the Force Protection Headquarters for Baghdad International Airport (BIA). The DIVARTY�s task organization included 1-39 FA (MLRS), 1-3 ADA, and 59th CHEM CO(-). DIVARTY immediately identified resources needed and manpower requirements against specified tasks. DIVARTY also began to perform other non-standard field artillery missions such as securing areas identified for sensitive site exploitation (SSE). Upon transition to SASO, fire support coverage was provided by one firing platoon per direct support (DS) battalion. Counterfire radar coverage was continuously maintained. Tactical air control parties (TACPs) were stood down and the division maintained one air liaison officer (ALO) and two enlisted terminal attack controller (ETAC) teams at division level. DIVARTY also identified an overarching need to reorganize their tactical operations center (TOC) to provide the best command and control (C2) possible for the operation. Cells such as the fire coordination element (FCE) and target processing section (TPS) became less needed, while tracking civilians moving on and off post and the number of fire trucks in sector became more important. After making adjustment to TOC manning along with work areas, DIVARTY reached a level to adequately C2 their mission. Lessons Learned Topic D - Civil Military Operations Observation Synopsis As combat operations wind down, units must be prepared to transition to SASO. This requires careful planning, target identification, and establishment of security priorities. SASO involves protecting infrastructure, historic sites, administrative buildings, cultural sites, financial institutions, judicial/legal sites, and religious sites. Protecting these sites must be addressed in the planning process. The force occupying an area must plan for civil administration including curfew; interim leadership; fire and police protection; utilities; relief priorities; and authority to hire, fire, and appoint civil workers and leaders. Establishing a centralized information-clearing house is vital to restoring the city functions and keeping the civilian population informed. The civil information plan must get the commander�s message out to the civilian population early and often. 3ID (M) did not have a fully developed plan for the transition to SASO and civil military operations in Baghdad prior to entering the city. Units must be prepared for unexpected success and be prepared to transition early to stability operations. In order to accomplish SASO tasks quickly and seamlessly, early and thorough planning is required of staffs at all levels. Soldiers and leaders did an outstanding job in executing the transition from combat operations to SASO. However, at the battalion level, the systems and resources that proved effective (CA teams, local interpreters, TPT, and THT) could have been allocated more efficiently. The CA teams attached to each battalion initially were a valuable and flexible resource. Based on changing priorities and a shortage of resources, CA teams were detached from the task force and centrally managed. Other staff sections such as the fire support element filled the void at the task force level. While these substitute elements performed admirably, they lacked the institutional knowledge and subject matter expertise of a dedicated CA team. Division of the terrain into subordinate unit boundaries allowed the systematic establishment of security and identification of key infrastructure. However, multiple zone and boundary changes complicated the process and forced companies to reestablish a foothold several times. Maintaining the presence of a company in its respective zone allowed that company to better establish a useful relationship and trust with the local populace. At all levels, anticipate and plan for the transition from combat to SASO. 3ID (M) did not have a dedicated plan to transition quickly from combat operations to SASO. Early identification of the shift in operational environments will result in more detailed planning and more refined and accurate orders and guidance to maneuver companies. At brigade level, task organize CA assets (with interpreters) to battalions and maintain throughout the duration of the operation. In preparation for SASO, units should continue to train civil-military operations (CMO) as part of their full spectrum operations training. The use of CMO situational training exercises (STX) training lanes incorporating detailed scenarios supports this home station training effort. The division as a whole did not focus on CMO training prior to the beginning of combat operations, instead focusing on mid intensity operations. Given that there are situations that mandate decentralized execution by our soldiers, a requirement exists to train the soldiers on a variety of scenarios. As the division transitioned to SASO, it did not have sufficient forces or effective rules of engagement (ROE) to control civilian looting and rioting throughout the city. Looting by the local civilians was a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of order in such a heavily populated area. Units were not able to dedicate resources to stop initial looting due to ongoing combat operations. However, once the enemy situation permitted, companies were able to focus on looting and began to detain and process looting civilians as EPWs. The problem quickly diminished to a condition that a local organized �neighborhood watch� could control. Looting and rioting are one of the many competing priorities that commanders must plan for early in the transition to SASO. Employment of non-lethal munitions should be planned and resourced to allow a graduated response and minimize civilian casualties. Lessons Learned
Topic E - Engineer Observation Synopsis As the division transitioned from offensive operations to SASO, several resourcing problems in the engineer functional area became apparent. The most critical was an acute shortage of explosive ordinance detachment (EOD) personnel to clear enemy weapons caches and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In addition, the combat engineers needed for combat operations were not always the best fit for reconstruction. EOD assets and UXO removal and destruction become particularly important as combat operations cease. 3ID (M) was assigned one EOD company for this operation. Though this company was tasked almost to its maximum capability during offensive operations, it was able to sufficiently accomplish its mission. Once 3ID (M) moved into Baghdad and combat operations began to wind down, it became apparent that one EOD company would not be sufficient to support the division. Countless weapons caches, combined with areas heavily laden with UXO, proved to be a major task for combat engineers. Though not specifically trained in UXO destruction procedures, the division relied heavily on combat engineers in the removal and destruction of UXO and weapons caches. During the transition from high intensity conflict to SASO, additional EOD teams are required, especially in urban areas. Soldiers were constantly put in situations where local civilians identified UXO and weapons locations. One of the ways to gain the confidence of the populace is to be able to quickly deal with these occurrences. By being immediately responsive, we can gain their confidence and make future operations much easier. A division must have at least one EOD company for combat operations, depending on the division�s battlespace and number of populated areas. As hostilities end and units transition to SASO, they must be augmented with at least once additional EOD company per division, if that division is operating in urban areas. Facilities engineer support and higher-level engineer planners and facilitators must be in place immediately as hostilities begin winding down. Though there was no formally announced cease-fire, the Army and Marine units began the transition to SASO after they occupied Baghdad. Over the course of the war and years of neglect, numerous critical elements of key infrastructure were damaged or destroyed and would have to be rebuilt. This was immediately apparent when the division seized the city�s main airport. This airport had been an objective throughout the entire development of the plan, but no specific plan existed for the occupation of the site. Headquarters from brigade to Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) level sought to set up their command posts (CPs) in buildings, but there was no plan in place to establish the infrastructure to support this. In addition to being an issue at the airport itself, infrastructure rebuilding was of vital importance in dealing with the local population. In order to gain the confidence and trust of the locals, it was important to demonstrate that we were willing and able to help. Though they succeeded to a great extent given their capabilities, the combat engineers and combat heavy engineers assigned to the division are not capable of the level of technical work that must be performed. If the final objective of an operation includes existing buildings and facilities, there needs to be a clear plan for the occupation of the facilities as well as a plan for the re-establishment of the basic infrastructure needs. Technical engineer experts from specialized units such as prime power and facilities teams must be positioned to begin work as soon as possible. Additionally, higher level plans and teams for the rebuilding of civilian infrastructure need to be clearly established, made known to all units involved, and on the ground immediately. Lessons Learned
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