May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 19 Personnel Service Support (PSS) Personnel support directly affects success in combat. The requirement to provide timely personnel readiness management, casualty operations, replacement operations management, and other essential personnel services is critical. Whether committed to a forward presence or SASO mission, personnel support must be tailored to satisfy tactical and operational requirements of the commander, either Army alone or in concert with a joint or combined force. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM has tested the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) G1 section across the spectrum of conflict. The G1�s objective of personnel support was to ensure operational success. Personnel support activities began with the initial planning of the operation through pre-deployment, deployment, war, and redeployment. Wartime personnel operations are not glamorous, but they provide vital information for the division commander and brigade commanders as they go through the decision-making processes and set priorities. Some of the challenges we faced were reconciling wartime and peacetime procedures to ensure all personnel service support (PSS) functions were covered. The G1 section performed their doctrinal tasks including strength accounting, replacement operations, unit-manning report tracking, limited personnel actions, and liaison with the theater army personnel command. In addition, the G1 performed other non peacetime related duties including plans and orders support; policy development; limited oversight of morale, welfare, and recreation; finance; and equal opportunity. Part of the division�s success and the morale of its soldiers depended on effective personnel service support planned and provided throughout the battlespace from Kuwait City (Camp Doha) to Baghdad, Iraq. Continuous combat operations over 400 miles challenged the technical and tactical skills of personnel soldiers and leaders alike. Teamwork ultimately decided the success of the battle and how the G1 shop performed during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The initial design reviews (IDRs) discussed are intended to show adjutant general (AG) leaders some critical tactics, techniques, and procedures that affected personnel service support during 21 days of continuous combat operations and the 3 months prior to crossing the LD. AG leaders should take the information contained here, update their SOPs, and teach their subordinates, peers, and supervisors what it takes to provide world-class personnel service support to the war fighter in combat. Personnel planning began immediately to develop procedures for how we would handle postal, casualty reporting, replacement, stabilization, stop movement and stop loss guidance, and many other essential functions. We developed force packages that determined the number and mix of personnel and where we would position them throughout Kuwait and the four different command nodes, in order to provide the most effective service for soldiers and commanders. The Army, as a whole, does not adequately train wartime personnel operations. Our failure to do so impacts our ability to sustain and reconstitute the force. A case in point is the personnel daily summary (PDS) used for reporting numbers and MOSs of casualties. The PDS is designed to provide the commander with a snapshot picture of the strength of his subordinate units. From this report, critical shortfalls in officer, warrant officer, or enlisted strength can be discerned, estimated casualties confirmed, and personnel replacements prioritized. Variations in the PDS format were numerous between the battalion, brigade, division, corps, and theater. The key to making the system work and providing commanders with timely and accurate strength data is practice in garrison, as well as the field. Topic A - Offensive and Defensive Planning Considerations Certain offensive and defensive personnel planning considerations are key to the G1�s success in planning for solid personnel architecture. The planning considerations listed below must be second nature to the G1 Review task organization and reporting requirements
Wartime personnel operations are not glamorous, but they provide vital information for the commander as he goes through the decision making process and sets priorities. The challenge is to reconcile wartime and peacetime procedures. Topic B - Other Issues Issue: Personnel manifests for air movement Discussion: When more than one unit arrived on one airplane there were problems with the manifesting procedures in identifying the correct unit identification code (UIC) and number of personnel per unit per airplane. During the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process, these problems impacted the coordination of transportation to the appropriate base camp and delayed baggage separation. This is unnecessary work for the division transportation officer (DTO) when the 3rd SSB could verify correct UIC before the plane leaves . Recommendation: There is a need for a correct manifest done beforehand by 3rd SSB. There should be a standard program designated to build the manifests and unit UIC should be reconciled prior to departure. Provide internet access to rear personnel that are pushing soldiers forward in order for them to email the most current and accurate manifest. This would create redundancy for units with the flight commander receiving the manifest (disk & hard copy) and the manifest being forwarded to a unit point of contact via email. Or, establish a POC UIC roster for forward deployed units and forward the manifest to the forward/receiving unit, as well as, wheels up time and estimated time of arrival. Separate units should be identified on the wheels up report so bed down and transportation requirements can be coordinated prior to the units� landing. Issue: Postal support was not slotted early in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) Discussion: Postal support was not slotted early in the TPFDD for flow into theater. Since the assets came later, the total package of technical/tactical equipment and personnel could not be readily assembled and deployed and did not cross the line of departure (LD) with the division. Recommendation: Postal requirements should be identified during contingency planning and annotated early on the TPFDD in order to support the division. Issue: Mail transportation delays Discussion: During the first 20 days of combat the division experienced numerous mail delays due to an unreliability and lack of prioritization of theater transportation assets The theater contracted mail transportation via truck from Brown and Root from Kuwait. Due to security issue for civilian drivers and their trucks, the mail was seldom pushed on time and on several occasions did not even get pushed. The V Corps AG and mail coordinator creatively found alternative means to move the mail. This solution is NOT acceptable. Recommendation: Guarantee up front in the same contract that the mail will be delivered the same day it arrives. Guarantee that the mail truck is reliable and dependable. Guarantee that theater has planned alternate capable mail transportation in case an emergency arises. Mail must move in a timely and efficient manner. Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CLFCC) postal planners should ensure a backup plan is identified and executable in case this situation ever happens again. Issue: Lack of NIPRNET computers limited Internet/worldwide e-mail access to perform G1 functions. Discussion: G1 and staff were constantly trying or waiting to get access to computers that had access to the web or worldwide email access. The G1 section had only one computer with NIPR net or worldwide email or Internet access. However, the office had an abundant need for two more NIPRNET lines. Recommendation: Ensure all NIPRNET line requirements are known ahead of time. Issue: Clear and timely guidance from HQDA on 1003 V stop loss and stop movement Discussion: There was no clear or timely guidance on the stop loss and stop movement for 3ID (M) units prior to deployment to Kuwait. Numerous unnecessary hours were spent determining guidelines for stop movement and stop loss for personnel in Kuwait. After numerous inquiries over 3 months during the pre-deployment phase of the operation, guidance was slow in coming. A number of personnel (well over 100) were deployed with 3ID (M) and subordinate units who were within 60 to 90 days of a required personnel action such as ETS, PCS, retirement, school attendance, etc. The personnel who fell into this category had to be removed from theater shortly after their arrival. This required that the vacated slots either remain vacant or a back fill brought in from CONUS. The swap out was expensive (about 2300 dollars per individual in movement costs alone) and was disruptive to the conduct of smooth and efficient operations. Bottom line, late guidance cause unnecessary deployment and redeployment of soldiers back and forth from home station Recommendation: Unless a stop loss program has been emplaced by Personnel Command (PERSCOM), soldiers who are within 120 days of a required action as outlined above should not be deployed. Without proper guidance, it is difficult to provide accurate deployment criteria to units as they plan to deploy and build, qualify, and stabilize combat crews. Higher headquarters should be stalwart in obtaining guidance on stop loss and stop movement and forwarding ASAP to operational commanders. This enables commanders to make decisions and the opportunity to have a more consistent deployment plan. Issue: The G1 organization expanded during the operation to include areas not included in FM 12-6. Discussion: During the operation, the scope of responsibilities for the G1 organization grew to cover areas not traditionally aligned under the G1 during peacetime operations. The following overarching functions were performed or coordinated by the G1: Functions brought forward from Fort Stewart: 1. Enlisted strength management and officer strength management to include assignments, research and analysis, and strength actions. 2. Personnel actions to include congressional inquiries, awards 3. Retention 4. G1 plans and operations cell Additional sections/functions that fell under the purview of the G1 once deployed included: 1. Establishing a division replacement section and liaison with the theater replacement detachment 2. Safety office 3. AAFES coordination 4. Red Cross 5. MWR 6. E-leave section 7. Show coordinator (USO) The G1 incorporated all these section in the daily and weekly staff calls in order to ensure all the organizations were working within the commander�s intent. Many of these sections deployed and needed a work area, transportation or a vehicle, phone lines, LAN access, etc. The communications/computer requirements included mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phones and access, laptops or PCs with LAN, and mail capabilities. Whenever possible the G1 shared their non-tactical vehicles (NTVs) and limited computer assets. The G1 coordinated with the G6 who was able to provide the needed telephone and LAN access even though it was not initially planned for. The safety office worked with accident reports and helped to coordinate accident investigations. Most of their time was spent being proactive and coordinating with the G3 and G4 to help anticipate safety considerations in future operations. Recommendation: Consider conducting planning conferences in the rear prior to deployment including all organizations at which requirements can be identified. Continue to include those organizations in communications once deployed. Issue: Accountability of contractors. Discussion: A challenge repeatedly encountered during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the attachment of civilians to the division and ambiguity regarding accountability for contractors in the area of operations (AO). There was no central office possessing information on all the contractors. This problem arose because there was no single office where all of the contractors must register. What remains a truism, however, is the necessity for contractors in the areas of responsibility (AORs). Contractors associated with the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Army Materiel Command (AMC) Logistics Assistance Representatives (LAR), Department of Defense (DOD), and third-country national linguists and translators were embedded in the operation. Once contractors are integrated into the unit, they were supported and visibility was maintained by means of status reports submitted through normal military personnel channels. Recommendation: Coordinate with all concerned and develop a contractor accountability system to ensure 100% accountability. Have civilians in process with the BCT S1 upon attachment. Issue: Patient tracking Discussion: The medical regulating officer (MRO), casualty liaison team (CLT) and patient administration and disposition (PAD) have difficulty tracking patients. When patients are brought into the hospital, they are not being tracked with any clarity at the division level as to where there are at any given time in the hospital or when they are released. It is unknown if the patients are in the hospital, have returned to home station or have returned to the unit. When the division medical operations center (DMOC) prepares tactical resources and combat effectiveness (TRACE) runs, they are unable to find patients. Recommendation: Factors that affect the ability to track patients include having PAD or CLT team personnel at the Level III hospital when patients arrive. The PAD must have a plan for securing sensitive items and maintaining accountability of the soldiers as they are treated and released. The PAD or CLT must be able to know where the patients are and prepare a report that can be used to keep the patients parent unit informed on their status. Issue: Casualty operations Discussion: Casualty reporting/tracking needs to be emphasized within the brigade combat team. The brigade combat team generally fails to report casualties using DA Forms 1156 (casualty feeder reports), 1155 (casualty witness statements). Soldiers could have bar coded tags added to their dog tag chains (or pre-printed on the back of custom-formatted 1156s) that medics would scan when conducting MEDEVAC, and then at each level the patient could be scanned in and out and their status updated. The database could be accessed on FBCB 2 or TACWEB in order to provide units continuous visibility on their soldiers� status and location. Casualty management begins during the military decision-making process (MDMP) with the S1 completing a casualty estimate. The estimate must answer the questions who, what, when, where, why, and how. Furthermore, soldiers do not understand the process of reporting casualties because they are not trained. The result is delayed reports, reports not submitted using the proper forms, or not being submitted at all. The brigade and the battalion S1s generally rely on the medical personnel or facilities to track casualties early in the battle and fail to set up casualty liaison personnel. The casualty liaison team was a failed attempt to address a problem of managing casualties during combat operation. Retention NCOs were not trained nor resourced properly to effectively perform this mission. Units had their own plan; therefore, retention NCOs interfered with their existing plan. CLTs did not report due to a lack of vehicles and communications. Co-locating the S1 with C-Med provided better visibility on all Level II to possible Level III casualties. Recommendation: The brigade and battalions S1s must ensure that soldiers are trained on casualty reporting procedures and forms. The S1 at each level is responsible to ensure that procedures are in place and that every soldier understands and is trained in casualty operations. The tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) must be detailed and specific in addressing casualty operations procedures. It is imperative that the S1 is involved during the planning process because the S1 is responsible for the casualty estimate. The S1 uses the estimate to anticipate future requirements. The S1 must continually assess the combat power of personnel before, during, and after operations. The S1 must be prepared to consolidate and reorganize quickly to sustain the momentum. This can only be accomplished through proper reporting and tracking. Casualty liaison teams must be established early and maintained throughout the operation to speed up the process. Casualty operations demand more manpower than a unit is resourced to provide. It is imperative that the S1s at each level have a plan to track casualties early. One way to accomplish this mission is to send a soldier with the forward logistical element (FLE) to locate at the casualty collection points (CCPs). Enhanced communications are a must to accomplish some critical personnel functions, such as personnel information management (from CONUS to theater) requiring deployment of only critical functions. Split-based operations, however, require careful consideration of the commander�s vision and intent and in reporting casualties in a theater over 300 miles from the division rear to the corps rear. The G1�s largest challenge out on the battlefield is to ensure every leader and soldier clearly understands the communications architecture to support the division/brigade scheme of maneuver. OPORD briefs and rehearsals are the means for the G1 must drive home his/her reporting/communications plan. There are several techniques, but what is important is that BDE/BN S1s leave the sand table knowing how they will communicate with their commanders and subordinates Practice! Practice! Practice! The more rehearsals conducted, the better the operation. The G1/S1 "rock drill" was conducted during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and again in preparation for combat operations. It was used when the plan calls for major task organization changes that had be well synchronized. Typically, all BDE S1s gather around a terrain board. The deputy G1 and operations/plans officer lead the rehearsal. All S1s brief how their part supports the operations plan. Cross talk and planning refinement from the division G1 to subordinate BDE S1s and separate S1s was a must throughout the operations. Without this communication, the results are an unsynchronized AG community often out of touch with the operational picture and frequently unaware of the location of other personnel resources on the battlefield. Several procedures were implemented to overcome this shortfall. G1 made every effort to conduct G1/S1 conferences to discuss standardized reporting times and all other essential personnel service support functions during wartime. Return to Table of Contents |
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