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October 31, 2020
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon

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Chapter 16 Air Defense

Since October 2002, 1-3 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) deployed battery-sized elements in support of Operations DESERT SPRING and INTRINSIC ACTION. Initially, C/1-3 ADA deployed in support of 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in March 2002 for a six-month deployment followed in October 2002 by a relief in place by 2nd BCT supported by B/1-3 ADA. As the turmoil with Iraq escalated during the fall and winter of 2002, the rest of the battalion deployed by section and battery elements until the entire battalion closed on Kuwait in January 2003. This phased deployment began in November 2002 with part of the air and missile defense coordination (AMDCOORD) section deploying as part of the reinforced division tactical command post (DTAC [+]) that initially supported the VICTORY WARRIOR and LUCKY WARRIOR command post exercises (CPXs). The DTAC (+) eventually remained in Kuwait until hostilities broke out. While in Kuwait, the AMDCOORD supported the DTAC (+) and the division main command post (DMAIN [-]) as they finalized the MARNE COBRA operation plan (OPLAN), conducted mounted CPXs during each BCT-level live fire exercise (LFX), coordinated the arrival of the rest of the division, and provided command and control (C 2 ) to the division as it arrived in country and conducted individual and collective training. The rest of the battalion received its deployment order in December 2002 and closed on Kuwait on 23 January 2003. The battalion then prepared and rehearsed the operation for over two months until hostilities broke out on 20 March 2003. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the battalion initially provided short-range air defense protection by defending the divisionís high value assets (HVAs) and priority of effort until the enemy air threat was defeated by offensive counter-air. Once the enemy air threat was defeated, the battalionís mission changed as it provided security to the divisionís lines of communication (LOCs), escorted corps and division HVAs, set up blocking positions to destroy enemy ground attacks, conducted screen and clearing missions, and defended Baghdad International Airport from enemy terrorist attacks. After hostilities subsided and as the division switched from high intensity conflict (HIC) to stability and support operations (SASO), the battalion compiled a number of comments and lessons learned. Those comments are presented in this chapter.

Lessons Learned

  • The existing system to receive tactical ballistic missile (TBM) early warning (EW) must be streamlined and tested so divisions conducting continuous offensive operations can receive digital early EW.
  • The divisionís air defense battalion, along with all the other separate commands, need communications equipment that can assist the commander in commanding and controlling his/her unit throughout the depth and width of the divisionís battlespace.
  • Though a step in the right direction, the Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS) and forward area air defense command, control, communication, and intelligence (FAADC 3 I) systems need further development; they are unable to communicate with the other Army tactical command and control systems (ATCCS) and are too fragile to operate during extended combat operations.
  • The air defense battalionís equipment needs to be upgraded to the most current models made available to the rest of the division.
  • The distribution of 10-ton cargo heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMMTs) needs to be re-evaluated throughout the battalion.
  • Anti-fratricide equipment issued to the BCTs needs to be fielded to the air defense battalion at the same time
  • The divisionís air defense battalion has outstanding weapon systems and radars that can be used to help command the battalion and provide limited security while it provides air defense coverage against the enemy air threat.
  • Redundancy needs to be built into the pay system as many of our soldiers have had pay problems throughout the operation
  • The air defense battalion has greater success tracking personnel accountability and casualty evacuation than if the BCTs assume that responsibility
  • Positioning a responsible soldier from the battalionís personnel administration center (PAC) in the rear detachment to act on personnel issues proved advantageous to the battalion
  • The requisitioning and shipping of FAADC 3 I peculiar parts needs to be re-evaluated since the present system does not support a unit conducting combat operations
  • Divisional air defense forces tend to not have priority of logistics support and needs to plan accordingly
  • The Army prepositioned stock (APS) draw grid is outdated and does not support units that have already gone through some force modernization; either the APS stock must be updated or units must ship all the modern equipment from home station
  • During continuous offensive operations, moving the AMDCOORD section and the air battle management operations center (ABMOC) forward can prove advantageous to the commander as he provides command and control to the battalion and shared early warning (SEW) to the division
  • The air defense battalion S-2 is a critical member of the divisionís intelligence community and is able to assist in both target acquisition and targeting
  • The ADA synchronization rock drill is an invaluable tool to synchronize the air defense concept of support in support of the divisionís scheme of maneuver.

Topic A - Force Modification and Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Changes Early Warning

Issue: Failure to receive tactical ballistic missile (TBM) early warning (EW) through LINK-16 and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network.

Discussion: When Iraq launched the first TBMs against Kuwait City and the 101st Air Assault divisionís assembly area on G-1, the division received no TBM EW via the LINK-16 and MSE network. Though we had a great tactical digital information link (TADIL)-J/Link 16 connection throughout the battle and regularly tracked well over 100 aircraft simultaneously, we were not able to receive any TBM EW digitally. In fact, the only TBM EW we received throughout the battle was by monitoring the Air Force EW tactical satellite (TACSAT) network.

There are only two ways the division can receive digital TBM EW through the Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS) system: 1) directly from an Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) and, 2) from another AMDWS that is hooked directly into an ADSI via MSE. Both have their shortfalls. First, the MSE based system required an MSE feed that was never stable and could not provide EW to AMDWS while on the move. Second, even though a TADIL-J feed can be received on the move and does not require MSE support, the relative short flight time of the missiles the enemy used and the time it took for joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) to identify and release the information through the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) network resulted in no TBM EW information to be distributed via TADIL-J.

Recommendation: The Army must invest in additional software and hardware improvements that would shorten the time it takes to process TBM EW information and release it to the units.

Issue: Building redundancy in the way the division receives SEW

Discussion: During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the division received digital SEW via TADIL-J/Link 16 communication networks. Though the system worked well, the division was at risk because it had only two J-TIDS radios, an almost one million dollar system with no available replacement. Long operational distances negated any possible redundancy the two radios could have provided. When one JTIDS radio went down for any reason, roughly half of the division went without SEW until the communications link was re-established.

There are a number of possible solutions to this problem. First, technology is available to receive the same TADIL-J/Link 16 SEW through TACSAT, a system that is more abundant and costs less to field and maintain than a JTIDS radio. In order to use TACSAT as the primary means to pass SEW, FAADC 3 I system software and hardware must also be upgraded to be able to pass the information through that medium. This would also mean that the battalion must be fielded two TACSAT radios at each download site: one to monitor communications between the joint interface control officer (JICO), area air defense coordinator and the sector air defense commander as required to enter the operations task link (OPSTASKLINK) and one to receive the SEW.

Another means to receive digital SEW is through Link-11 and 11B. To do this, the battalion would need to be fielded KG-40, KG-84, or MXP-512P systems. This would provide the battalions a second network that it can tap into to receive SEWS, thus building redundancy and dependability into this vital intelligence tool.

Regardless on how the SEW is received; redundancy must be built into the system by providing more than just two radios to monitor one network for the entire division.

Recommendation: The air defense battalion be fielded with a backup system to the two JTIDS radio it now owns to receive SEW, whether it be with additional PSC-5 TACSAT radios with the corresponding software and hardware upgrades to the FAADC 3 I system, or additional KG-40, KG-84, or MXP-512P systems to receive SEW via Link-11. Communications

Issue: Division command via TACSAT.

Discussion: From the time we destroyed the enemyís observation posts on the international border to the divisionís closure on OBJ LIONS, the battlespace was so dispersed in width and depth that FM communications between any units larger than infantry or armor battalion/task force-sized elements was unfeasible. BCTs were often more than 40 kilometers apart, forcing the division command to conduct all command and control functions via TACSAT. Though extremely effective in allowing the BCTs to communicate with each other and with the division over great distances, many of the other division assets were left in the dark because they did not have the ability to monitor the network. Though the air defense battalion commander and his tactical operations center (TOC) had one TACSAT radio each to monitor the division command network, the battalion was not able to monitor any of the other TACSAT networks, such as division operations and intelligence (O&I), fire support, etc.

The battalion also experienced the same problems the division had in trying to communicate through the depth and width of the divisionís battlespace. Though it has the same communication requirements in terms of distance and number of networks as the division, the battalion was not allocated any resources to improve its ability to communicate internally. Though the battalion has a number of PRC-213 HF radios by MTOE, these radios are supposed to be used to pass SEW information and are unreliable at best. Although the division did receive some PRC-150 Harris HF radios that proved to be more reliable, only one was given to the battalion, hardly enough to assist it in conducting command and control within the unit.

TACSAT radios proved reliable throughout the operation for the division. The same resources need to be provided to the divisionís subordinate commands that have much the same requirements.

Recommendation: TACSAT radios need to be provided to the battalion and each battery so all battalion-level networks can be established as per our doctrine. If TACSAT radios are not available, then PRC-150 Harris HF radios must be fielded to replace these same networks.

Issue: The battalion does not have a Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB 2 ) required for battle tracking.

Discussion: The division fielded FBCB 2 as the standard for blue force tracking. The ADA battalion was not included in the fielding. During combat operations, the battalion had to locate an FBCB 2 on the battlefield to get situational awareness. Even this was limited since none of the air defense assets were displayed on the FBCB 2 screen.

None only did the lack of FBCB 2 systems in the battalion hinder situational awareness, all division fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and graphics were issued over FBCB 2 , making it difficult for the battalion to track the battle and conduct simultaneous planning in support of the division.

Recommendation: At a minimum, issue one FBCB 2 terminal to each battery, the battalion TOC, and the battalion commander; also ensure that each air defense weapon and radar system is displayed on the FBCB 2 screen. FAADC 3 I and AMDWS

Issue: Software compatibility of AMDWS with the other ATCCS.

Discussion: During operational planning and execution, the battalion is required to provide the division a current air picture superimposed over the current airspace control measures (ACMs). On demand, the divisionís leadership may also request that maneuver graphics be projected so that they can see where aircraft are in relation to the ground forces. Currently, these products are manually input into AMDWS by either the Army airspace command and control (A 2 C 2 ) or air battle management operations center (ABMOC) operators, a slow and tedious process. These operators are duplicating the efforts of other operators who are entering the same graphic control measures into the Maneuver Control System (MCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the other ATCCSs.

Recommendation: Make the required software and hardware upgrades so AMDWS can communicate with the other ATCCSs so all the different graphic control measures can be uploaded via floppy disk or through the local area network (LAN).

Issue: Equipment and products for FAADC 3 I systems should be versatile and durable

Discussion: A number of the current FAADC 3 I components weigh in excess of three hundred pounds and are large and bulky, limiting the space both for transporting the parts forward and finding areas to install them. The commercial over the counter (COTS) equipment is also not reliable after being transported over rough terrain. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, several of the battalionís hard drives were damaged during the move, making them unusable when they were installed to replace damaged or non mission capable (NMC) components.

Recommendation: Convert existing hardware packages to more versatile and durable hardware systems; the existing software can run on smaller laptop-sized computer systems, thus facilitating transportation and storage requirements. Vehicle Support

Issue: Adequate armor protection for air defense battalion and battery leadership during offensive combat operations

Discussion: During OIF, the battalion was able to draw additional Bradleys from the Army pre-positioned stock (APS) draw grid and use them as command and control vehicles (C 2 V) for the battalion and battery leadership. This enabled each commander to maneuver forward and provide the necessary command and control to air defense assets in contact with the enemy. They were able to survive the numerous artillery and mortar attacks the division received as well as provide additional firepower to protect the leadership when needed. Currently this freedom to maneuver is not available to air defense commanders who ride through the diverse battlefield in soft-top highly mobile multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Air defense counterparts within the division should have the same armor platform as division and brigade commanders.

Recommendation: M2 Bradleys should be authorized for Linebacker battery commanders, the battalion S3, and the battalion commander.

Issue: Upgrade the battalion fleet of M1068A2s

Discussion: The availability of parts for the battalionís aging fleet of M1068A2s makes sustainment of combat readiness problematic. Additionally, the M1068A2 cannot effectively sustain the speeds and maneuverability necessary to maneuver with the BCTs who are outfitted with newer, more powerful equipment.

Recommendation: Upgrade the battalionís M1068A2 fleet to the A3 model, C 2 V, or similar armored command and control platform.

Issue: Use of the air defense battery ten-ton cargo HEMTT

Discussion: Presently, ten-ton cargo HEMTTs are authorized by MTOE to the divisionís air defense battalion to haul ammunition only. By MTOE, they are assigned to each batteryís ammunition section. However, the air defense leadership realized that the enemy air threat would not be substantial during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and did not draw the entire basic load of Stinger missiles. This gave the battery commanderís another asset to haul equipment forward during the divisionís attack into Iraq.

A number of the batteries found that their ammunition HEMMTs were better utilized if they were assigned to the battery maintenance sections. The batteries were able to haul their ammunition basic loads using the organic 2-Ĺ ton-hauling assets and utilized their 10-ton cargo HEMTTs to support their organic maintenance hauling requirements. This shift was necessitated by the lack of ďdrop-sidedĒ loading capability of the drawn M35A2s and the actual cargo requirements of the Class V basic loads. By shifting these assets within their organizations, batteries were able to benefit from the cargo crane on each HEMTT to lift heavy Class IX parts, haul the drawn ISU-90 or quadcon containers that held their PLL and/or tool sets, and self-recover any NMC trailers in some cases.

Recommendation: If the enemy does not have a substantial air threat, redistribute the battalionís 10-ton HEMTTs from the battery ammunition section to the battery maintenance section.

Issue: Only Linebacker batteries are authorized 10-ton cargo HEMTTs, while the missile battery and HHBs are not.

Discussion: Ten-ton cargo HEMTTs proved their value to the battalion in several ways. Due to the limited logistical support capabilities that the battalion experienced during this operation, each battery that had HEMTTs was able to carry more of the spare parts, tools, and other equipment necessary to remain self-sufficient for a longer period of time. Plus, the tremendous hauling capability of these vehicles offered more flexibility to battery commanders in their battery CSS plans in support of their operations. HHB/1-3 ADA was fortunate to draw from APS a cargo HEMTT before this operation began, though they are not authorized one by MTOE. This piece of equipment proved essential in supporting the battery commanderís tasks of supporting his battery and the battalion as a whole. D/1-3 ADA did not draw a HEMTT and, at times, suffered from the lack of necessary cargo capacity. A HEMTT would have transported their prescribed load list (PLL) container, carried more Class IX parts acquired before the movement into Iraq, and provided an internal crane asset. All of these capabilities greatly benefitted the HHB commander, as well as the commanders for A, B, and C batteries.

Recommendation: Divisional ADA battalion MTOEs should authorize a 10-ton cargo HEMTT for the missile (D) battery as well as the HHB.

Issue: The fielding of Phoenix lights, combat identification panels (CIP), and tactical identification panels (TIPs).

Discussion: As the division prepared to conduct offensive combat operation, it fielded a number of systems to help with identifying friendly ground assets and to limit the chance for fratricide. All proved to be successful during OIF. Phoenix lights, easy to see from kilometers away with NVGs, reduced friendly breaks in contact and fratricide and enhanced friendly link-up operations, passage of lines, and visibility in severe weather. One of our crews reported that fratricide incidents were avoided because they had been able to observe the length of the entire convoy ahead of them as it rounded a curve beyond where the vehicle itself could be seen. At one point, several of the supported units requested that we turn the Phoenix lights off, stating the enemy could observe them with their own NVGs.

CIPs and TIPs also assisted in identification of friendly combat units; however, the battalion was not a priority in receiving these systems. Due to the nature of how an air defense unit fights and deploys on the battlefield, it is essential that these combat systems also be fielded these ID panels

Recommendation: Continue the use of Phoenix lights against any enemy known to possess extremely limited NVG capability and standardize the issue of CIPs and TIPs to units who do not deploy on the battlefield in unit formation.

Topic B Ė Air Defense Artillery (ADA) in the Non-Air Defense Role

Issue: Use of AMDWS to assist with monitoring the divisionís A 2 C 2 effort.

Discussion: Since the Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) was never operational, the AMDWS system, with input from the divisionís Sentinels and the TADIL-J feed, served as the only way the division leadership could monitor the use of airspace within our battlespace. The division leadership was able to monitor the passage of friendly aircraft through the divisionís airspace as well as track our own aviation brigade assets as they targeted the enemy within range of our radar systems.

Recommendation: Continue to use AMDWS as a backup system to TAIS to track friendly aircraft movement when it does not compromise the Sentinels primary mission of identifying the enemy air threat forward of the divisionís immediate battlespace.

Issue: Use of ADA weapon systems to provide ground security of the divisionís high value assets (HVAs)

Discussion: The division effectively employed ADA systems in weighting the main effort prior to ensuring air supremacy/elimination of enemy air threats. Additionally, employing the ADA battalion in nonstandard roles to secure LOCs and protect HVAs was a noteworthy success in preserving maneuver combat power. However, the loss of Avenger assets to the BCTs transferred excessive risk to the BCT C 2 nodes. For most BCT TOC/TAC formations, the Avenger is the principle security asset both on the move and once positioned. Loss of these assets mandated depleting combat power within BCT formations.

Recommendation: Sustain effective employment of our superb ADA weapon systems in multiple roles. Recognize the lack of inherent security resident in our MTOE for BCT C 2 nodes and the impact of withdrawing Avenger platforms from the BCT task organization.

Topic C - Personnel and Logistic Support Personnel

Issue: Correct processing of pay and allowances

Discussion: Too many soldiers did not receive their allowances in a timely manner. To insure soldiers are receiving the correct allowances, finance needs to synchronize soldier information with manifests. Soldiers experienced delays in benefits of more than sixty days even though the S-1 marked multiple queries of the system.

Recommendation: Cross level information between airplane manifests and soldiers entered into the pay system for theater specific allowances; build redundancy into the pay system.

Issue: Conducting day-to-day personnel transactions during combat operations.

Discussion: Since all personnel automation systems are Internet driven, conducting day-to-day operations such as promotions and finance were very difficult once the battalion pushed north into Iraq.

3rd SSB was almost completely ineffective since all personnel actions requiring Internet access had to go through Doha. On important issues that required detailed coordination and possibly phone calls to other units stateside, the only way to make progress was by contacting the battalionís rear detachment.

We were able to operate the PAC without any problem with five personnel (including the adjutant). That enabled us to leave one of our personnel administration center (PAC) soldiers in the rear detachment to support the soldiers located there and also to make personnel transactions and run down issues that we could not affect from our location. The communication was sometimes an issue, but it was very beneficial for the battalion to have a PAC soldier back at Fort Stewart.

Recommendation: Be prepared to conduct day-to-day personnel transactions by communicating with S-1 personnel located with the rear detachment.

Issue: Area coverage of unit ministry teams (UMTs) throughout the divisionís battlespace.

Discussion: Current doctrine dictates that UMTs supporting the separate battalions be held in reserve with their respective headquarters until needed. During this operation, the division chaplain in coordination with the BCT chaplains repositioned the separate UMTs with units most likely to face resistance. Repositioning UMTs enabled excellent religious and pastoral coverage to units in direct contact.

Recommendations: In coordination with BCTs chaplains and commanders, the division chaplain should position separate battalion UMTs forward on the battlefield. Logistics

Issue: Inadequate FAADC 3 I contractor support and Class IX availability and delivery.

Discussion: Because many of the FAAD/STC/Sentinel parts were under contractor control through the Contractor Logistics System (CLS), our ability to sustain combat power for Linebackers, Avengers, and Sentinels was problematic. The battalion had to rely upon telephone calls to CONUS and the use of FEDEX to secure and ship parts.

Recommendation: The battalion experienced problems with the FAADC 3 I equipment and worked with civilian contractors to fix the problems. Some of the problems can and would have been fixed locally, if the necessary parts were available. Currently, the only contract support within theater is at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and they could not support the battalion once hostilities began.

Recommendation: Battalion needs to stock an authorized stockage list (ASL) from the Project Office for FAADC 3 I equipment (video cards, network cards, etc.).

Issue: Priority of logistics support during equipment fielding and train-up operations.

Discussion: Division agencies focused all of their priorities of support on the BCTs for logistics initiatives. Whether it was priority of effort for fixing APS shortages, cell phone distribution, non-tactical vehicle (NTV) allocations, or initial issue of newly fielded equipment, it all went to the BCTs first. This negatively affected 1-3 ADA. There were several supply issues that were not resolved in theater because we were never a high priority.

Recommendation: In the future, divisional air defense battalions must deploy as prepared as possible from home station because support will most likely not be available for the divisionís separate battalions.

Issue: Priority of logistics support during the operation.

Discussion: While task organized with the brigade combat teams, 1-3 ADA units received adequate service and support. Once the division returned all of the subordinate batteries under the control of 1-3 ADA, the divisionís concept of support did not meet the demands of the battalion. The concept of support was sound. Support for all classes of supply and any required direct support maintenance would come from the 703rd MSB. All necessary coordination was made in advance with main support battalion (MSB) personnel, and the battalionís internal support systems made the necessary adjustments for the concept to operate. However, from the on-set of the battalionís consolidated mission requirements, the devised plan performed poorly. The reason the plan did not function was because the units that were considered ďdivision troopsĒ were low on the divisionís support priority list. 1-3 ADA had to resort to non-standard requisition procedures in order to receive Class II, Class IIIP, Class VI, and Class IX items. If the battalionís combat service support (CSS) personnel did not meet with the different commodity managers face-to-face and resubmit a manual requisition at that time, then the few supplies that were attained would have gone to the BCTs. There seemed to be no guidance given to the commodity managers to accommodate the requisitions and requirements of the units gaining support solely from the MSB. 1-3 ADA understood and agreed that the priority had to be the units decisively engaged with the enemy, and they were also aware of the overall pain the division was experiencing on all logistical issues. There were shortages across the board and measures needed to be taken by the MSB to accommodate, however, cutting-out support to lower priority units completely was not the best solution.

Recommendation: A future plan needs to take into consideration the needs of all the main support battalionís (MSB) customers (forward support battalion [FSBs], division troops, etc.), and allocate the limited supplies accordingly. This would better support those units not gaining support from an FSB. If implementing a plan like this would be too difficult, then direct 1-3 ADA to receive support from an FSB.

Issue: Lack of unit basic load of essential batteries in combat operations.

Discussion: Mission essential batteries were not on hand after units depleted their basic loads. The mission essential batteries are BA 5590, BA 5800, BA 5567, and BA 3058. HHB deployed with a 15-day supply of all essential batteries but once HHB tried to replenish their UBL, batteries had a backorder status of at least a month. This could have adversely affected the unitís ability to sustain operations.

Recommendation: Division support command (DISCOM) should maintain a five-day supply of mission essential batteries.

Issue: Shortage of NBC Equipment

Discussion: Due to the limitations across the division, more than half of the battalion deployed with some type of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) equipment shortage such as: joint service lightweight integrated service technology (JSLIST) suits, second skins for the protective mask, and over boots. There were shortages in boots sizes greater than size 12 and JSLIST shortage in the large-long sizes. The battalion was able to cross-level to correct some of the shortages, but we were forced to go outside the battalion to several other units to gather as much as possible to fix dead-lined mask and other critical NBC items.

Recommendation: Each battery in the battalion needs to keep a ten percent overage of all critical NBC equipment at all times.

Issue: Lack of training JSLIST suits

Discussion: The battalion was only provided two training JSLIST suits for training. Our battalion consists of 538 soldiers and made JSLIST familiarization and training problematic.

Recommendation: Field additional JSLIST suits for future training. APS Draw

Issue: Lack of MTOE-authorized equipment in the APS draw.

Discussion: The current APS draw is designed to provide equipment for a BSFV/Stinger battalion instead of the current Linebacker/Avenger battalion. Because of this, the division had a difficult time in gaining permission to ship the majority of the battalionís equipment. If the battalion did not ship its home station equipment, the division would not have had the real-time SEW picture as provided by the Sentinels and the FAADC 3 I infrastructure organic to the battalion. The battalion does not have the personnel to man the old Bradley Stinger Fight Vehicle (BSFV)/Stinger battalion MTOE and would have been forced to field fewer combat systems than with the Linebacker/Avenger battalion MTOE.

Recommendation: The APS grids worldwide must be updated to reflect the MTOE of the unit most likely to draw that equipment.

Issue: Comparing capabilities of available APS draw equipment versus home station equipment.

Discussion: Pre-deployment capability analysis was done on ADA combat systems that led to the decision to deploy M6 Linebackers instead of relying on the available draw M2 BSFVs, but this was not thoroughly done on cargo assets. At Fort Stewart, batteries have light medium tactical vehicles (LMTVs) to serve as primary haulers of supplies and equipment, but in the APS fleet, our batteries had to rely on M35A2 ďDeuce-and-a-halfs.Ē Though both assets can haul approximately two-and-a-half tons of cargo, LMTVs have an increased cargo capacity because they are ďdrop-sidedĒ. This makes them much easier to load and gives them the capability to haul the APS-issued integrated sight unit (ISU)-90s for battery PLL and tool kits.

Recommendation: Thoroughly analyze and compare all types of equipment when researching the cost-benefit of draw equipment versus deploying home station equipment.

Issue: Composition of the divisional air defense battalionís advanced party (ADVON).

Discussion: The battalion faced a dilemma in early January regarding how to best manage the remainder of the deployment and how to best support ADVON requirements occurring simultaneously. To support this situation, 1-3 ADA decided to keep the S4 at Fort Stewart to manage the rest of the deployment. Batteries were given insufficient allocation within the BCTs and therefore suffered during the APS draw process. This combination left no battalion presence on the ground in Doha to coordinate the battalionís ADVON activities.

Recommendation: Ensure a dedicated three-personnel presence from the battalion S4 section and two-personnel from each of battery accompany each ADVON during all future battalion-level deployments.

Topic D - Command and Control

Issue: Moving the Air Defense Coordinator (ADCOORD) forward with the DTAC.

Discussion: During the initial DTAC CPX held December 2002, the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) (ADC [M]) validated the need for more AMDCOORD personnel to accompany him in the DTAC. His vision was that the DTAC had to be self-sufficient since the DMAIN would be located so far in the rear and might become a non-player. As a result, the ADCOORD MAJ moved forward along with one company grade officer, two NCOs, and one enlisted soldier. The section was assigned a station in the INTEL C 2 V where the section positioned an AMDWS terminal/EO box and had access to one SINCGARS radio when the vehicle was at the halt. The section also had indirect access to an MCS terminal, an AFATDS terminal, FBCB 2 , a Harris AM radio, and a TACSAT communications system.

Once the division offensive operations commenced, the DTAC assumed all responsibilities for both current operations and planning future operations. Due to the extreme distances the division traveled, the DMAIN was never able to completely take over future operations from the DTAC until after hostilities terminated. Therefore, the advantages to having the ADCOORD forward with the DTAC were numerous. First, with the battalion TOC collocated with the DMAIN, the ADCOORD section assumed duties as an extension of the battalionís TAC and assisted the battalion commander with managing the air defense fight forward. Secondly, this allowed increased situational awareness on the battlefield between the battalion TAC and TOC due to the ADCOORDís indirect access to all the ATCCS systems and FBCB 2 . Finally, since the majority of the division FRAGOs were developed in the DTAC once hostilities began, this allowed the ADCOORD to conduct mission analysis and recommend suitable courses of action to the battalion commander during the fight.

Recommendation: Given the likelihood of greater distances in the division battlespace for future conflicts, the battalion TOC is not in a position to communicate directly with the air defense elements protecting the main effort, the ADCOORD should continue to move forward with the DTAC to assist the battalion in managing the air defense fight as well as fulfill his more traditional role as the divisionís air defense planner.

Issue: Moving the ABMOC forward with the DTAC.

Discussion: During the mission analysis phase of the military decision-making process (MDMP), the battalion leadership realized that the battalion SOP of having the A 2 C 2 collocate with the DMAIN and the ABMOC collocated with the BN TOC needed to be changed, since both headquarters would be within a kilometer of each other. This would mean that no forward area air defense (FAAD) integration node would be positioned forward to help provide early warning to the maneuver brigades. Therefore, the battalion leadership made the decision to move the ABMOC forward with the DTAC so that it could facilitate the distribution of SEW to the lead brigades while the A 2 C 2

shelter would collocate with the battalion TOC and provide SEW to the divisionís assets in the rear.

Recommendation: The battalion needs to revise the battalion tactical standing operating procedures (TSOP) so the ABMOC and the A 2 C 2 shelters are not located in the same area on the battlefield.

Issue: Attendance at the division targeting meeting.

Discussion: Due to the ADA battalionís unique position as a separate combat arms battalion, the S2ís attendance at the divisional targeting meeting was extremely helpful. The air defense battalion usually sends a member of the ADCOORD section to the meeting and this needs to continue. However, an S2 representative will ensure that enemy air, surface-to surface (SSM), and airfield targets are also considered.

Recommendation: The divisional air defense battalion S2 should attend all division targeting working group meetings.

Issue: Inclusion of Sentinel radars in division collection plan.

Discussion: The division collection plan initially did not take into consideration the air defense battalionís Sentinel radars. Once these assets were added to the division collection plan, they were tasked to collect on named areas of interest (NAIs) that were beyond the capabilities of the system.

The intelligence battlefield operating system (IBOS) synchronization meeting was an attempt to fix collection issues such as this one, however the synchronization meeting needed to be shorter, better organized, and better focused in order to be effective. Also, the IBOS Synchronization Conference needs to be better organized and should occur after a working draft of the division collection plan has been published and staffed through the G2/S2 channels.

Recommendation: The divisionís collection manager should consider all BOS elements when drafting the collection plan in order to maximize the divisionís intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

Issue: The need for Patriot liaison officers (LNOs) to be attached to the battalion during operations plan (OPLAN) development.

Discussion: Patriot LNOs must be part of the development of the division plan from its conception. Patriot LNOs provide the expertise for TBM planning that is not inherent to a divisional air defense battalion. The LNOs also provide situational awareness back to the ADA brigade and corps air defense element (CADE) section on the division operations and can assist with Patriot TBM future planning.

Recommendation: Request two Patriot LNOs from the supported ADA brigade as soon as OPLAN development is approved.

Issue: ADA synchronization ďrock drill.Ē

Discussion: A synchronization ďrock drillĒ conducted with all air and missile defense (AMD) units operating within the division battlespace was essential to provide situational understanding of the overall maneuver and ADA plan. Making a large-scale terrain board that can accommodate all players was essential. Each ďplayerĒ can stand on the map or terrain board and brief his task and purpose by phase. This greatly assisted the commander and staff to visualize the battlefield and commanders' intent before combat operations.

Recommendation: Conduct ADA synchronization ďrock drillĒ using a large terrain board or full-scale map; ensure the supporting Patriot commander and LNOs attend and participate to ensure the overall plan is nested with the commanders' intent.

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