May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 11 Battle Staff Planning The battle staff developed a base plan that was executed with little change from Kuwait to Baghdad. Key to the effectiveness of the battle staff was a solid team of planners that shared a common view of the enemy�s center of gravity. Lessons Learned The incoming and outgoing battle staff should conduct a short overlap, where tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) and standing operating procedures (SOPs) are reviewed. The incoming battle staff should conduct an orders drill, walking through a complete military decision-making process (MDMP), to include briefings to the command group and the publication of an order. After the initial mission analysis is complete and several courses of actions (COAs) have been developed, bringing in subordinate units and involving them in the process facilitates an open discussion of the capabilities of friendly and enemy units, timelines, and support requirements. Develop a system patch to enable systems to talk with each other. This battle staff planning cell should contain a maneuver planner, intelligence planner, logistics planner, and fires planner. Include rehearsals of supporting actions in the close fight such as communications procedures, actions on contact, SOPs, and visual identification. Embedding special operating forces (SOF) liaison officers (LNOs) down to the lowest level is a tactic that should be sustained. Topic A - Forming the Team Issue: Developing the team that comprises the battle staff. Discussion: The rapid integration of the battle staff into a coherent team that is capable of conducting a detailed analysis of a higher plan and producing a written operations order (OPORD) is essential to the long term effectiveness of the battle staff. Within weeks of graduating from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the many members of the battle staff are thrown together and expected to perform at a high level of proficiency. The development of the team shortly after its formation in June or July each year is critical to its ability to rapidly adapt and adjust to the changing situation and to develop and facilitate the products needed to keep the command group informed during the decision-making process. Once the team is formed, the talents each battle staff member possesses will enable the leadership to maximize the capabilities of the battle staff. Recommendation: The development of the battle staff into a functioning team needs to be a priority in early summer and is critical to their success later in the year. Incoming and outgoing battle staff should overlap and review TACSOPs and SOPs. The incoming battle staff should conduct an orders drill of the MDMP to include briefings to the command group and the publication of an order. This exercise should be conducted in a time-constrained situation in order to cause the battle staff to bond quickly. This exercise could easily be taken from past �Warfighters� and recycled in order to meet the training requirements. Topic B - Parallel Planning Issue: Parallel planning Discussion: Early in July, 2002, Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) was brought into the planning circle to assist V Corps in the refinement of the 1003 operations plan (OPLAN). This was primarily done because 3ID (M) already had a BCT size force in theater due to their participation in a CONUS contingency response force (CCRF) mission in Kuwait. The division�s participation in the planning cycle continued after it was attached to 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for planning the initial phases of the war. The Army�s MDMP process does not dictate the involvement of subordinate units until the process is almost complete, but as planning progressed 3ID (M)�s participation in the process became crucial. Unlike the Army�s MDMP process, the Marine Corps� process involves subordinate units from the start of the planning, thus reducing the number of changes to the plan and requests for information (RFIs) submitted from the divisions to the corps headquarters. Early involvement of subordinate headquarters allowed significantly more staff and commanders the ability to conduct a detailed analysis of the situation, allowing for greater flexibility during the numerous iterations of the plan. The parallel planning conducted by 3ID (M) enabled the entire V Corps to completely switch their plan, from one initially relying on 5+ divisions for LD to one relying solely on the 3ID (M). After V Corps produced and issued their original VICTORY COBRA plan during VICTORY FOCUS at Grafenwoher, Germany, 3ID (M) planners quickly realized that the plan was not feasible since most units would not be available on the proposed mid-March line of departure (LD) date. They reworked the division plan. This revised plan relied on maneuver in the open desert, avoiding urban areas originally given to the division and provided less time for corps shaping operations and fewer forces for securing lines of communication (LOCs) through the desert. 3ID (M)�s ability to rapidly reshape the division and corps campaign plan was directly due to the fact that they were involved in the plan and had already performed a detailed analysis of the terrain, enemy, logistical needs, and the time and space factors that would impact on the division. Within 24 hours of the original V Corps order being issued, Lieutenant General (LTG) Wallace directed his staff to �adopt the 3ID (M) plan and resource it.� A division staff that had not been involved during the planning process probably would have failed to see how the parameters of the conflict had changed and how the plan needed to change to support them. Getting subordinate commanders within the division to buy into the plan was also an essential part of the planning process. Subordinate commanders were included early on in order to get their perspective on the potential conflict. This early involvement in the process enabled a greater degree of flexibility by the commanders during the conflict. Recommendation: Initial mission analysis must to be performed by the staff before all subordinate units are included to ensure that the scope of the problem is clearly defined. After the initial mission analysis is complete and several COAs have been developed, including subordinate units facilitates an open discussion of the capabilities of friendly and enemy units, timelines, and support requirements. Topic C - Automation Challenges in Planning Issue: Automation within the main command post (CP) Discussion: Currently 3ID (M) uses maneuver control station light (MCS-L), Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB 2 ), command and control personal computers (C 2 PC), FALCON VIEW, Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) in order to develop division graphics and a common operating picture (COP). All of these systems perform one function for the command post but are unable to talk to other systems. As of right now, V Corps and other units use C 2 PC as their common operating system but this system is currently not able to run in conjunction with our graphics plotter, causing 3ID (M) to continue its use of MCS-L to produce graphics for maps. None of these systems can download the graphics from either MCS or C 2 PC, requiring additional operators to expend large amounts of time to upload graphics in these systems in order to be used for the COP. Recommendation: Develop a system patch in order enable systems to talk with each other. Also, recommend reducing the number of systems used in the headquarters. MCS-L could be eliminated if a program or system patch was produced to enable C 2 PC to work with a graphics plotter. FBCB 2 is a great blue force tracking system but at this time graphics from other systems cannot be imported. Too much time is spent re-inputting graphics into multiple systems. Topic D - Location of the Battle Staff during the Conflict Issue: Location of the battle staff during the conflict Discussion: With the addition of the assault command post (ACP) and the commanding general fighting the entire war from that command post, the relevance of the division main command post (DMAIN) was reduced. Since the division was not conducting deep operations in conjunction with the air tasking order (ATO) cycle, there was little planning for deep operations. The planners, responsible for writing the plan and thinking through the division decision points and the conditions set for the decision points, were unable to communicate to the G3/commanding general (CG) any impacts to the plan based on conditions earlier envisioned. Having a section of planners forward that were familiar with the numerous branches and sequels that are likely to evolve from any operations order (OPORD) may provide support and information concerning decisions made by the CG/Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) (ADC-M)/G3. Recommendation: By the start of the conflict, the ACP/division tactical command post (DTAC) had already grown in size; however, having a small planning cell forward to support future operations may have been useful. The battle staff-planning cell should contain a maneuver planner, intelligence planner, logistics planner, and fires planner. During any pauses in the operation, this group would be forward to receive guidance from the G3/CG in order to plan future operations. As a result of having the entire battle staff in the DMAIN, the planners were supporting the current operations fight, unable too look at deep. Issue: Planning in the close fight. Discussion: For the continuous offensive operations of OIF, the G3 directed that one G3 planner be forward as part of the DTAC. Tasks assigned to the planner were primarily to write and distribute fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) for the G3 current operations section. The majority of planning that occurred in the ACP/DTAC was done by the G3, CG, and ADC (M). The supporting arms were not included in the limited planning that occurred to ensure that a more thoroughly resourced and synchronized plan was developed for short notice branches. Supporting arms personnel were often asked for input and status during the current fight, but not for branch/sequel planning. An example was the plan to put the division cavalry squadron on the east side of the river and isolate An Najaf. The maneuver portion of that plan was excellent, but little or no thought was given to the logistics of the plan. This was a gross oversight given the fight the cavalry and 3rd BCT had prior to that in As Samawah, the logistics challenges the division was facing, and the tenacious fighting already faced by 2nd BCT in the area. A more detail analysis should have been done to determine a solution to logistics issues such as Class III and V resupply and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). Recommendation: DTAC needs to develop an SOP or take extracts from the 3ID (M) commander�s handbook to assist in planning in a time-constrained environment. The SOP needs to include the method the DTAC wants to use to accomplish the task and who the key players will be. The following sections should include at a minimum: G3 operations (OPs) battle major, G6, G2, division engineer (DIV ENG), DIVARTY, logistics representative, and any others by necessity. In future offensive operations over the distances traveled in OIF, thought should be given to positioning a cell of the battle staff forward to facilitate planning and dissemination of any changes if briefings are necessary. Topic E - Coordination, Rehearsals and Liaison Officer (LNOs) Issue: Coordination, rehearsals, and exchanging of LNOs Discussion: During the planning phase for OIF, special operations forces (SOF) and other government agencies (OGA) regularly came to conduct coordination and share information with 3ID (M) planners. This close coordination worked very well during the planning phase and the division reaped the benefits of the coordination. Also, 3-7 CAV and 3rd BCT conducted a few link up rehearsals with special forces (SF) teams upon completion of their isolation period. A special forces liaison element (SFLE) was integrated just prior to combat operations. This integration was critical to the success of different 3ID (M) units during several battles. SOF and OGA worked closely with 3rd BCT at An Nasariyah, 3-7 CAV and 3rd BCT in As Samawah, and OGA provided good intelligence for targeting enemy forces in Karbala. Without the SFLE, fratricide could have been a major problem during those battles. However, no rehearsals or coordination was conducted that focused on how the SOF elements would assist during the close fight. No direct coordination was done with the SOF elements operating around Karbala or those that were going to work in and around Baghdad. The lack of coordination with SOF elements working in and around Baghdad prior to execution caused some unnecessary friction that hindered transitions and reduced synergy. Recommendation: Conduct coordination with all necessary SOF elements prior to execution. Include rehearsals of supporting actions in the close fight such as communications procedures, actions on contact, SOPs, and visual identification. Embedding SOF LNOs down to the lowest level is a tactic to sustain. This tactic helped to reduce the friction during direct firefights. Integrating SOF into training at home station, when possible, can improve our level of expertise in the close fight. Integrating SOF for the first time while under fire may result in unnecessary consequences. Return to Table of Contents |
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