May 2, 2024
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May 2, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Chapter 1 Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances Operating considerably beyond existing doctrine, the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) proved that a lethal, flexible, and disciplined mechanized force could conduct continuous offensive operations over extended distances for twenty-one days. At its largest point, the division owned and influenced a 16,100 square kilometer (km) battlespace (230 km deep and 70 km wide). The division�s training, utilization of command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C 4 I), consideration and implementation of its task organization, adherence to battlespace management, and logistics all provided invaluable lessons for the force. The lessons learned about offensive operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) will enable the Army to grow and further develop its existing capabilities. Topic A - Training for Combat The roots of the division�s successful attack to Baghdad are found on the training fields of Fort Stewart, Fort Irwin, and Kuwait. The division crossed the line of departure with a mature and trained group of staff officers, commanders, and soldiers. The ability of the division to stabilize company commanders and field grade officers after conducting multiple CONUS contingency response force (CCRF) and National Training Center (NTC) rotations produced a seasoned fighting force that was trained and ready to fight and win on any battlefield. A direct correlation can be drawn between the division�s training cycle prior to crossing the line of departure and the division�s successful attack into Iraq. The division conducted multiple integrated live fire maneuver operations on urban terrain and detailed command and control exercises at the task force through the division level to prepare for combat. All maneuver battalions conducted externally evaluated force-on-force and live fire training events focused on offensive operations at the company team level through the battalion task force level. Every rifle squad conducted combined arms training focused on entering and clearing a complex trench system and a multiple room structure. These training events focused every maneuver unit in the division on the exact missions soldiers would execute weeks later against the Iraqi Regular Army and Fedayeen death squads. The division artillery conducted live fire training events prior to crossing the line of departure that massed every firing system in the division at a single point and ensured every firing battery was trained and ready to mass fires anywhere on the modern day battlefield. The 4th Brigade (BDE) trained both close combat attacks in support of the ground maneuver commander and shaping operations under the brigade commander�s control while in Kuwait. This served to not only synchronize the brigade�s internal aviation assets, but to also synchronize the division�s aviation assets with the ground maneuver forces. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) established between 4th BDE and the maneuver brigades facilitated the rapid and safe employment of attack aviation in combat. The division fought to train under realistic conditions in preparation for combat. The priorities were clear and subordinate leaders executed training that produced a disciplined, lethal, and flexible force capable of accomplishing any tactical task. The requirement for tough realistic training has not changed in the past 227 years. The division lived under the �train as you fight� motto for the 12 months preceding the war. The training proficiency, lethality, and maturity of the division serve as an example for the Army to follow. Lessons Learned
Topic B - Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) The division succeeded in its tenacious attack over 600 kilometers (km) from Kuwait to Baghdad, through storms of biblical proportion and constant enemy resistance, specifically because of its bold and decisive maneuver and the ability to command and control on the move. Brigade combat team (BCT) and division command posts (CPs) separated and formed smaller more mobile command posts in preparation for the continuous attack. An example of these smaller CPs was the division's use of an assault command post (ACP). Doctrinally the ACP is created to provide a jump capability to a tactical command post (TAC). The ACP is a temporary organization that moves forward to allow for continuity in command and control while the remainder of the CP begins to move forward. The 3ID (M) did not follow this doctrine during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The division's ACP was a permanent C 2 node that provided the commanding general the flexibility to freely move on the battlefield with a separate security and communications package. The ACP enabled the Division Commander to gain a different view of the battlefield than the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) (ADC[(M]) and command the division from a vantage point of the commander�s choice. BCT and division CPs became more mobile and responsive by adapting the level to which they set up during stops. Most CPs had at least two levels of set-up in order to maximize capabilities for the duration of the halt. These smaller and more mobile CPs had several enablers that greatly enhanced the command and control of the division including: Force XXI battle command brigade and below � Blue Force tracker (FBCB2 - BFT), wide band tactical satellite (TACSAT), and Iridium phones. Maneuver units enjoyed huge success commanding and controlling on the move; however other battlefield operating systems (BOS) struggled with on-the-move capabilities, mainly centered on communications platforms. All future development in the command and control (C 2 ) arena must be focused on a mobile structure with long haul communications for voice and data. The Army must recognize the requirement for smaller and mobile CPs for future doctrine. At the division and brigade level, rapid and decisive offensive maneuver over extended distances cannot be executed without the ability to C 2 from multiple C 2 nodes on the battlefield, each of which must be capable of executing C 2 of its subordinate elements while it is on the move. To address this problem the division�s modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) must be changed to provide additional equipment and personnel to enable divisions and brigades to command and control on the move. The mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network is an antiquated system that must be replaced as quickly as possible. As the division�s primary MTOE means of communications over extended distances, its components must be stationary in order to function. With such limitations, there is no way that this type of system can provide reliable, responsive communications over the extended distances and at the extreme pace of operations seen during the offensive operations of OIF. As long as any of the subordinate elements is on the move, the echelon exercising C 2 must use on-the-move communications systems to do so. During the entire period from line of departure (LD) to the 101st relief in place (RIP) at An Najaf (21 March through 29 March) and again from continuation of offensive operations through seizure of the presidential palace in Baghdad (31 March through 7 April), the division had at least one and frequently two or three of its brigade size subordinate elements and most, if not all, of the division�s C 2 nodes completely on the move. The only way the division could exercise C 2 was by using its on-the-move communication systems. The MSE system is designed primarily to provide services to stationary CPs in a Cold War style battlefield that is in a fixed geographical area around the locations in which stationary MSE equipment is operated. The name mobile subscriber equipment came from the ability to use mobile subscriber radio telephones (MSRTs) within a 15 km radius of the locations in which stationary switching equipment is operated. This name is now a misnomer as the scale of distances has expanded ten-fold. MSE is no longer viable in support of maneuver on the modern asymmetrical operating environment. A replacement system(s) with newer technology must be demonstrated to be capable of providing voice and data communications over extended distances between C 2 nodes that are on the move and in the full variety of environments where the next major battle might be fought (desert, jungle, urban, etc.) FBCB 2 as a command and control medium was extremely useful and effective. It provided unprecedented situational understanding for all commanders and command posts. It also allowed the BCT to forward graphics, messages, and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) across distances that FM could not cover. Limitations included the lack of training received on all facets of the system, poor performance of electronic messaging, and a limited number of systems that allowed fielding to company commander and executive officer level in maneuver units only. To correct these shortfalls Blue Force Tracking (BFT) should increase its messaging capabilities and be fielded to every vehicle in the division. The communications available to all battlefield operating systems (BOS) other than maneuver were insufficient to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information dissemination across the entire battlefield. As a result digital systems such as All Source Analysis System-Remote Work Station (ASAS-RWS), All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L), Maneuver Control System( MCS), Joint Early Warning System (JWARN), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), and command and control personal computers (C 2 PC) were totally dependent on the MSE network. Combat support and combat service support elements cannot conduct their wartime mission without the ability to communicate, pull information from higher, and push information to subordinate units. This operation justifies the need for a deliberate investment in reliable on-the-move voice and data communications to support all assets in the division framework at all levels. The division�s rapid and decisive attack over extended distances caused units to quickly outrun their ability to use FM communications. The TACSAT operations and intelligence (O&I) and fires nets were the primary means of communication for these BOS elements between the division level CPs and the brigades/separate battalions. While these nets provided the range necessary to communicate over extended distances, the limited bandwidth (5 kHz) greatly inhibited the division�s capabilities. Though not intended to support all BOS elements, FBCB 2 did provide a redundant means of communication. With the exception of the maneuver BOS, the inability of the division staff to constantly monitor the command net on the move burdened the staff with multiple relays of information. Every BOS must have the capability to monitor the primary division and corps nets. The Army must procure an on-the-move, long-haul communications system that provides reliable, secure voice and data communications, including access to SIPRNET, for all staff sections. Access to NIPRNET is also a requirement at every command and every staff section within the division. The use of alternate CPs enabled the division to move 350 miles in three days while simultaneously jumping the four primary CPs. During a key forward passage of lines (FPOL), the engineer brigade�s main CP with augmentation from the division main command post (DMAIN) and division rear command post (DREAR) (G3 change of operational procedures (CHOPs) and division transportation officer [DTO]) assumed control of the division�s movement. This allowed the DMAIN, division tactical command post (DTAC) and ACP to continue movement towards Baghdad. If the DMAIN or DTAC CPs remain set while in the attack, the pace of the battle quickly causes that CP to be out of position to command or control the fight. The key to success in using alternate CPs is equipping them with the communication platforms and personnel necessary to accomplish the assigned task. This is not only true for division level CPs - brigade and task force level command and control nodes faced similar challenges. The establishment of a division intelligence support element (DISE) was critical to providing intelligence support to the DTAC and to brigades operating forward on the battlefield. Contrary to doctrine, the establishment and deployment of a DISE was not a means of prepositioning an intelligence node forward from which to pull from a sanctuary or base. Instead, it was a response to the demand for an intelligence node with stable communications and access to corps, theater, and national intelligence products to support the DTAC and forward brigades who were all on the move almost constantly for over 72 hours. A DISE should be resourced by MTOE and can be tailored to meet the unit�s mission-specific needs. Units should be prepared to deploy a DISE with an alternate CP such as the engineer brigade CP or the DIVARTY CP in the event that the DTAC and the DMAIN move simultaneously. Lessons Learned
Topic C - Task Organization The continuous attack across 600+ kilometers forced the division to fight in multiple directions and with units in contact often up to 200 kilometers apart. A key to this successful attack was the early resourcing of the maneuver elements with requisite forces to shape and destroy the enemy, as well as conduct all the other necessary functions to be successful. By executing a mission focused task organization of engineers, artillery, air defense artillery (ADA), military police (MPs), logistics assets, and others, the division attempted to give the BCTs all of the assets they would need to influence every aspect of their fight. If the division did not task organize all requisite assets to the BCTs prior to crossing the LD, these enablers would inevitably not be positioned to influence the fight when needed. During the attack, there were many divisional assets that were pushed down to as low as the company level. Task organizing divisional assets prior to LD allowed BCTs to integrate these assets during the planning, preparation, and execution of the operation. This allowed habitual teams to form at all levels prior to crossing the LD. Conversely, most echelons above division (EAD) assets came under tactical control (TACON) and operational control (OPCON) to the division days prior to the attack, resulting in a less than optimal relationship between elements sharing common battlespace. Common problems between divisional and EAD units were logistical support, communications during movement, and the lack of a common understanding of the tactical plan. Lessons Learned
Topic D - Battlespace Management Conducting continuous operations over extended distances on today�s complex battlefield is not possible without a clear definition of the BCT's and division�s battlespace. The division experienced several difficulties gaining a clear definition of its battlespace from higher headquarters during OIF. Establishing clear and concise boundaries is key to managing a battlespace that extended over a massive 16,000 square km. Delineating boundaries and maneuver commanders operating within the commander�s intent ensured success during full spectrum operations in the division. The clear delineation of battlespace allowed adjacent units to engage multiple enemy formations simultaneously in close proximity to one another with direct fires, indirect fires, and close air support (CAS) while division assets shaped the enemy beyond the BCTs� boundaries. A common understanding of battlespace at all levels prevents multiple headquarters from shaping the same terrain. When operating on a noncontiguous battlefield the possibility for fratricide is elevated when the ground commander does not have complete control over all fires in his battlespace. The fire support coordination line (FSCL) and forward boundaries are excellent control measures that are optimally based on the advance of the ground maneuver unit during rapid offensive operations. This allows internal intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets to acquire the enemy and conduct shaping operations against them prior to engagement by main body forces. During OIF, attack aviation, air interdiction (AI), CAS, and rocket fires conducted shaping operations. The movement of FSCLs and forward boundaries greatly contributed to the successful execution of shaping and decisive operations when moved in conjunction with the FLOT of the division�s maneuver. The size of the division�s battlespace, as well as the positioning of the corps engineer work line, placed extreme importance on the prioritization of engineer assets. Timely and accurate orders from all headquarters facilitate a common relevant picture of engineer priorities and task organization. Lessons Learned
Topic E - Logistics The continuous pace and extended distances of OIF taxed the division�s logistics systems to the maximum extent. In anticipation of the ambitious maneuver and expected austerity of the theater logistics environment, the Division Commander accepted risk in some classes of supply in order to accommodate the burden of independence and ensure the flexibility required to exploit success. The division directed units at all levels � from platoon to division, to carefully plan and in many cases modify the way they would typically operate. Under ordinary conditions, logistical units attempt to maximize productivity by establishing operations to function from the same place for as long as possible. Every day spent displacing the support unit is an opportunity lost to support operations. Expecting rapid and continuous offensive operations for several days, the division would not be able to set up and operate these steady-state logistics nodes. The lowest level units were therefore forced to be self-reliant for longer periods of time. Units maximized load plans, packing combat systems, as well as support equipment, with no less than a five-day supply of food and water and as much petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL); repair parts; and ammunition as they could possibly carry. Two more days of food and water were carried for the division within the support units, while other items such as redundant repair parts were left in Kuwait to be moved forward in later lifts. Rapid, extended, and decisive maneuver strained communications systems and challenged logisticians, at all levels, to prioritize loads and anticipate future requirements. Challenges in communications hindered the divisional units from submitting Orange 1 reports to the division materiel management center (DMMC) and forced the division to rely on �emergency resupply.� The significance of supply prioritization for transportation cannot be overstated. Moreover, every transportation mode and lift asset must be utilized to maximize distribution. Much effort in this operation was spent fruitlessly pursuing scarce ground transportation when rotary wing aircraft could have been used to a greater extent. Amazingly, the division enjoyed relatively high equipment combat capable rates throughout the operation. These rates deserve careful scrutiny, however, and are not indicative of either a necessarily healthy equipment fleet or a meticulous maintenance effort during operations. The rates simply illustrate the dedication of soldiers to do whatever is required to protect themselves from the enemy; accomplish their assigned tasks; and communicate straightforward, relevant information between commanders. In this regard, the division adapted a reporting process that accounted for combat capability, nothing more. For several days, units literally sprinted toward Baghdad. Conducting rigorous maintenance simply would not have been possible. Unfortunately, however, when conditions finally permitted maintenance operations, repair parts were not to be had. Most units literally spent 21 days in continuous combat operations without receiving a single repair part. A number of factors such as the inability to transmit data while on the move and lack of transportation assets fed the downward spiral and made it nearly impossible to recover. Logistics data communication was impossible while on the move because logistics data systems are designed with a reliance on the MSE network that cannot operate while on the move. Logistics data communication between BCTs and division support command (DISCOM) rely on the MSE backbone that cannot provide the required data connectivity during continuous on-the-move offensive operations. Shortages of predictably high-demand repair parts and vehicular fluids had the most lasting effect on fleet readiness. Tires for wheeled vehicles and suspension parts for tracks remained scarce in the theater well after the end of the ground offensive. The division was forced to local purchase packaged POL products while still in Kuwait and continued to rely on the local purchase source in the absence of any effective means of obtaining the necessary products through traditional military supply channels. Given the challenges associated with poor communications, over extended lines of communication, scarce transportation assets, and continuous consumption, the resupply of the division�s food, fuel, and ammunition during the period 25-31 March was accomplished with much difficulty. A valuable lesson learned during OIF was that �just in time� logistics does not work during continuous offensive operations. A greater reliance should be placed on targeted push packages during continuous offensive operations, particularly as it relates to Class IX. High priority requisitions had to be called in �off line� to maintenance managers that remained in Kuwait. Once these parts were obtained, their forward movement competed against other classes of supply for scarce transportation assets. As a result, repair parts outside the division�s alternate storage location (ASL) did not arrive during the initial 21 days of OIF. Targeted push packages traveling on dedicated transportation would have alleviated this concern. Perhaps the most notable contribution to the division�s success was the aggressive plan for initial fuel re-supply. With the unwavering support of the 24th CSG, the division committed all available fuel hauling assets to the fight. Two full POL truck companies, direct support (DS) supply company trucks, and the division�s organic assets were all embedded into the brigade maneuver formations and pushed 170 fuel trucks closer to the FLOT than ever intended by doctrine. Without these assets, the division would have been forced to stop, tethered at no more than the time/distance a truck driving team could make in a single day. Instead the division was able to cover nearly four times that distance in less than two days and still had fuel in the weapon systems to continue operations. This technique served its purpose well and is undeniably the most crucial logistical aspect contributing to the division�s success in obtaining and maintaining tactical and operational initiative. The concept met with unending resistance at the corps level however and whether it would gain final approval remained in question into the final hours prior to crossing the LD. Beyond LD, the lack of communication assets and extended distances, exacerbated by route congestion, contributed to confusion, frustration, and worry when the fuel assets were delayed returning to their parent unit. Although the division won the pre-combat struggle to gain additional ammunition for its initial maneuver, consumption rates proved much higher than anticipated when almost all units gained and maintained contact immediately upon entering Iraq. Enemy resistance pockets lined the routes, causing the cavalry squadron and lead maneuver elements to expend common ammo (25 mm and 155 mm high explosive [HE]) nearly continuously for 3 days. Although they had intended to travel ammo re-supply with the division, the corps support command (COSCOM) was unable to muster and organize the assets and have them integrated with the division prior to LD. On requesting ammunition re-supply, the division discovered that the reporting and requesting interface was ineffective and, of course, that the ammunition would compete with other division requirements for very critical transportation assets. Another challenging aspect of logistics during this operation was medical care. As with maintenance support, Level II and Level III medical treatment services require somewhat stationary, support areas and facilities, normally established in conjunction with brigade, division, and corps support areas. During the division�s extended movements, the nearest Level II care for a given unit could be as much as 50 km away. The division relied on aerial evacuation whenever possible, but faced communication and coordination difficulties. The division finally resorted to using only the command net communication resources to call for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). No other method was reliable or responsive. Lessons Learned
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