After years of profligate spending, Greece is becoming overwhelmed. Barring some sort of large-scale bailout program, a Greek debt default at this point is highly likely. At this moment, European Centr... are probably the only thing holding back such a default. But these are a stopgap measure that can hold only until more important economies manage to find their feet. And Europe?s problems extend beyond Greece. Fundamentals are so poor... across the board that any number of eurozone states quickly could follow Greece down.

 

And so the rest of the eurozone is watching and waiting nervously while casting occasional glances in the direction of Berlin in hopes the eurozone?s leader and economy-in-chief will do something to make it all go away. To truly understand the depth of the crisis the Eu..., one must first understand Germany, the only country that can solve it.

 

Germany?s Trap

The heart of Germany?s problem is that it is insecure and indefensible given its location in the middle of the North European Plain. No natural barriers separate Germany from the neighbors to its east and west, no mountains, deserts, oceans. Germany thus lacks strategic depth. The North European Plain is the Continent?s highway for commerce and conquest. Germany?s position in the center of the plain gives it plenty of commercial opportunities but also forces it to participate vigorously in conflict as both an instigator and victim.

Germany?s exposure and vulnerability thus make it an extremely active power. It is always under the gun, and so its policies reflect a certain desperate hyperactivity. In times of peace, Germany is competing with everyone economically, while in times of war it is fighting everyone. Its only hope for survival lies in brutal efficiencies, which it achieves in industry and warfare.

Pre-1945, Germany?s national goals were simple: Use diplomacy and economic heft to prevent multifront wars, and when those wars seem unavoidable, initiate them at a time and place of Berlin?s choosing.

?Success? for Germany proved hard to come by, because challenges to Germany?s security do not ?simply? end with the conquest of both France and Poland. An overstretched Germany must then occupy countries with populations in excess of its own while searching for a way to deal with Russia on land and the United Kingdom on the sea. A secure position has always proved impossible, and no matter how efficient, Germany always has fallen ultimately.

During the early Cold War years, Germany?s neighbors tried a new approach. In part, the European Union and NATO are attempts by Germany?s neighbors to grant Germany security on the theory that if everyone in the immediate neighborhood is part of the same club, Germany won?t need a Wehrmacht.

There are catches, of course — most notably that even a demilitarized Germany still is Germany. Even after its disastrous defeats in the first half of the 20th century, Germany remains Europe?s largest state in terms of population and economic size; the frantic mindset that drove the Germans so hard before 1948 didn?t simply disappear. Instead of German energies being split between growth and defense, a demilitarized Germany could — indeed, it had to — focus all its power on economi.... The result was modern Germany — one of the richest, most technologically and industrially advanced states in human history.

Germany and Modern Europe

That gives Germany an entirely different sort of power from the kind it enjoyed via a potent Wehrmacht, and this was not a power that went unnoticed or unused.

France under Charles de Gaulle realized it could not play at the Great Power table with the United States and Soviet Union. Even without the damage from the war and occupation, France simply lacked the population, economy and geographic placement to compete. But a divided Germany offered France an opportunity. Much of the economic dynamism of France?s rival remained, but under postwar arrangements, Germany essentially saw itself stripped of any opinion on matters of foreign policy. So de Gaulle?s plan was a simple one: