missile gun boats

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Mark F why not? Because... 1/5/2004 2:14:29 PM

...100 years of combat experience has shown the small fast attack craft to be largely ineffecitive. They lack range and endurance and their ability to carry weapons FAR OUTSTRIPS their ability to use them. Problems with these small hulls include slamming and heavy vibration at anything above cruising speeds which can diminish sensor performance to the point of absolute uselessness. Multipath problems due to low antenna hieght over the water can be added to that for additional effect. Forecast International did a study a few years ago for an unnamed Middle Eastern navy on the effectiveness of Missile FAC's. The study compared the effectiveness of a common weapon/sensor fit on three different hull sizes; 45 meter, 57 meter and 62 meter. The 45 meter boat (a once popular export model for Lurssen yards) was almost completely ineffective for reasons outlined above. The 57 meter boat (a popular size in the 80's) could use its search radar, fire control radar or ESM individually but not all three at the same time due to interference. The 62 meter boat was regarded as the minimum size for an effective missile armed craft, but at that point you talking about a corvette, not a small missile boat - thus negating the advantages of size. In the 60's, 70's and 80's yards such as Lurssen and Vosper sold massive quantities of missile FAC's because after the Eilaat sinking it looked like the anti-ship missile finally promised to fullfil the promise of the original torpedo boats of the late 19th century. Then the users began to discover that no, the boats were not really that effective as combat weapons and, worse yet, were of almost no value in peacetime. Yet they were still fairly expensive to buy and very expensive to maintain. This is why 80-95 meter OPV's and OPC's are currently all the rage and why yards that used to rely on FAC's for thier bread-and-butter have virtually abandoned the types in favor of these larger and far more versatile craft. With 200-mile EEZ's to patrol endurance and seakeeping are critical factors and you need something of at least 80-90 meters to get that. Happily such a vessel can also assume the wartime roles of the missile FAC by packing a set of Harpoon/Exocet/Otomat etc, along with a sensor suite that can be used effectively, and maybe even some ASW capability, or better yet, aviation facilities! All in a vessel whose cost is not much different than a missile FAC. In short, big works. Small, not so much.

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KennethB RE:why not? Because... 1/31/2004 10:11:05 PM

It is true that small vessels like FACs or MTBs has largely been ineffective, but I think it is wrong to generalize and conclude that FACs has no future. Most FACs which has been involved in conflicts, has been operating in open seas, or along an open coastline. I think one important issue with small and fast vessels, is their ability to hide. To be able to hide, they need a rugged coastline, like in Scandinavia. I think it is unfair when you compare 80-90 meter hulls with a FAC size vessel. The FAC is designed to do one thing, and that is to attack surface units close to the coast - sea denial. And if you have a rugged coast where they can operate from, I belive they can do that very well. It is not true that FACs has almost no value in peacetime. The Hauk class is a very familiar sight along the Norwegian coast, and they often take part in SAR operations, and other civilian tasks. Last year 4 Hauk class vessels participated in Active Endeavour, escorting vessels in the Gibraltar straight. These are small vessels, even for FACs, but in 6 months they only had to cancel 2 missions, and that was because of technical problems. I do not know at which Sea State their sensors becomes un operational, but with data-links they should be able to get a situation awareness nevertheless. With their speed and maneuverability they are more suited for intercepting other ships, than large 100 meter ships. And at a much lower cost. NATO concluded that they was very useful and capable for the task. The study you refer to does only apply to mono hull vessels. New FAC designs use other hull designs, like the Skjold class with a SES design. In Sea State 3 a 50 meter SES ship has an average roll angle of approximately. 3 degree, which is hardly noticeable, whereas a monohull of the same lenght has a roll angle off more than 10 degree. The air cushion between the side hulls reduces wave-induced motions considerably compared to ordinary catamarans. The Skjold class are expected to have 100 % operability with a sustained speed of more than 55 knots in calm waters, and more than 25 knots in Sea State 5. So even it they are less than 50 meter, they should be able to operate far from the coast. The range is "only" 800nm, but that is enough for its use. I might add that KNM Skjold participated in a Joint Task Force Exercise with the US Navy, where it was a part of a force attacking the USS John F. Kennedy Battlegroup. KNM Skjold was undetected for 3 days, and was the last to be detected, and that was after it had simulated launch of all the missiles. With systems like Senit2000, MRR-3D-NG radar, LINK16, 76mm Otobreda gun, manpad SAMs, and NSM, and very god operability, the Skjold class will be a very dangerous opponent along the Norwegian coast. If it will work as planned, it could for example hide in a deep fjord, recive target information from a F-16, and launch a NSM against a ship 150 km from the shore. The only thing the enemy would detect, is the missile, which would be hard to detect in it self. You could probably buy a 80-90 meter steel hull vessel with the same systems, at the same cost. But why would you want to do that. It would be much more visible (and therefore more vounreble), much slower, more expencive to run, and less capable to perform tasks like law enforcement, combat SAR, special operations support, counterinsurgency, and anti-terrorist operations. The only advantage I can see with a 80-90 meter ship ( At the same cost. A ship like Visby is another matter) is endurance and range. But that is not important for a vessel like KNM Skjold. You can get 10-12 Skjold class vessels at the same cost as one Fridtjof Nansen class frigate. Or 6 sensor-platforms with 80-96 NSM and 6 76mm guns vs. 1 sensor-platform with 8 NSM and 1 76mm gun. If I was defending a coastline, I know what I would choose, if I had other platforms for ASW and AAW.

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Mark F RE:why not? Because... 2/1/2004 5:07:42 AM

But in over 100 years of operational experience the FAC has never been able to successfully accomplish its coastal sea-denail mission. At what point is is it time to say uncle? For all the ooh's and ahh's directed at Skjold, it seems quite unlikely to change that record. The other factors I indicated previously still apply. No matter how fast a FAC might be for example in calm water, in any type of sea state that performance will start to drop dramatically (think of the USS Liberty incident where Isreali torpedo boats capable of nearly 40 knots had a hard time chasing down a 17kt converted transport in reasonably good weather). The range, endurance and seakeeping of a FAC are no where near what a proper OPV (SAR, fisheries protection etc) vessel needs making them not only uneconomical in those peacetime roles but far less effective, whatever a few, select, individual cases might seem to imply. 800nm range is certianly hopelessly inadequate for patrolling a 200nm EEZ for weeks at a time - a far more important day-to-day role for the vast majority of potential customers. And with the possible exception of special operations forces support (for which a FAC may even be too big - see USN experience) a proper OPV is FAR SUPERIOR in ALL THE MISSION AREAS you mentioned which require internal volume, good seakeeping, sensor performance, and yes, lower operating cost (FAC's require very expensive - and vulnerable - support facilities ashore). Which is why the FAC market internationally has taken the big flush in the last 20 years while every shipyard around worth its salt has shelved FAC designs in favor or proper OPV's. BTW - in your scenario instead of having the F-16 datalink information down to a FAC (which might not even be in the right position to launch), why not just have the F-16 launch the ASM? Or a shore battery if all the FAC is going to do is hide in a Fjord? The FAC seems like a 3rd wheel in this scenario.

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KennethB RE:missile gun boats 2/1/2004 2:49:35 PM

It is not true that FAC has never been able to successfully accomplish its coastal sea-denial mission. The Egyptians, using a 75 ton patrol boat armed with two 2.3 ton Styx missiles sunk an Israeli destroyer in 1967. It happened again four years later during an Indo-Pakistan war. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Egyptian and Syrian boats fired 52 missiles without hitting anything. The Israelis were prepared with electronic devices that jammed the guidance systems. But this is more an issue about missile and sensor technology, than the platforms they where launched from. I think it is wrong to use 100 years of history against present and future technology. Today a small vessel can carry the same weapon and combat systems and as far larger ships. This was not the case in WW2. A SSM launched from a FAC is as lethal as if it was launched from the largest ship in the world. Especially if it is a fire and forget missile like the NSM or Penguin. You still compares an OPV with a FAC. They have two different tasks. A FAC is not designed to patrolling a 200nm EEZ for weeks at a time. It is designed to operate close to the shore. If you want an OPV, you build an OPV. If you want a ship (at approx. the same cost) to defend a rugged coast, you build a FAC. And I think it is strange that you can say that an OPV is FAR SUPERIOR in ALL THE MISSION AREAS I mentioned. I am beginning to doubt if you are serious. If I was on a ship in a hostile environment, I would like it to be as fast and stealthy as possible. The Skjold class has 90-99 percent reduction of RCS compared with a Hauk class, depending on angle. But if you want to cruise around in hostile waters with a large and slow OPV-like vessel, be my guest. When I read what you write, I get the impression that you think that it is sea state 8 all over the world all the time, since you emphasizes the sea keeping capabilities so much. In fact, the waters along the Scandinavian coast are usually sea state 3-4 or less. In Norwegian fjords it is rarely waves more than a few feet tall. I think it would be wrong to build a large vessel, and loose many of the advantages you have with a Skjold class vessel, just to be able to operate the few days a year at some parts of the coast, where a Skjold class could have difficulties with the weather. As I tried to explain in my last message, FACs are not uneconomical or ineffective in peacetime. The small Hauk-class are known as workhorses among coastal communities. They can be used for a wide variety of tasks. And FAC's do not require very expensive - and vulnerable - support facilities ashore, not more than any other ship. In fact, a small vessel like Skjold can go to any port, small or large, to get new supplies. And if it needs more missiles or ammo, it can get to a naval base, and be operational much faster than an OPV-like vessel. The Norwegian Navy will also build a support vessel for the Skjold class, so they easily can be deployed abroad, and to be a force-multiplier. A F-16 could launch an ASM, instead of sending the information to a FAC. But then the aircraft would have to carry ASM weapons on expense of other weapons. A F-16 are better used for other tasks. A shore battery can not replace a FAC. A FAC is more than just a missile launcher. And if you take a look at the Norwegian coast, you would understand that a mobile launcher on land, would not be very mobile at all. It would take a day to travel the same distance along the coast, whereas the Skjold class would use a few of hours. KNM Skjold used 16 hours and 10 minutes on a trip from Bergen to Tromsoe, a distance of 730nm, using the protected waters where Norwegian FACs usually operates. I am not trying to say that the Skjold class, or similar designs are a good solution for everyone. Most countries would probably prefer a larger design, with better endurance. But Norway has 8-9 OPVs, and together with the 5 new frigates, no more is needed. What Norway do need, is relatively low-cost vessels, which can take advantages of the rugged coast, and defend it against surface treaths, especially after the coastal fortresses has been laid down. I belive a Skjold class vessel can do that much better than any OPV-like vessels.

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Mark F RE:missile gun boats 2/1/2004 8:26:54 PM

The whole idea of the FAC, since it was invented over 100 years ago was to be a naval equalizer - a small, cheap vessel capable of offsetting the power of conventional warships by using the latest technology in compact, modern weaponry. First it was the torpedo, then it was the missile. All of these attempts result in ships not designed like conventional warships with regard to a wide spectrum of real military requirements but to defend a coast against some real (or more often imagined) foe. To date, they have yet to prove an ability to do that. The Eilaat could have been sunk just as easily by coastal artillery or conventional air attack. Incompetence and inexperience on the part of her captain are what are responsible for her loss, combined with gross obsolesence. Irregardless, the Eilaat sinking did nothing to change the naval balance in the region. It was a PR victory, nothing more. There was nothing special about this attack other than it was the first time ship-to-ship missiles had been used. The Naval battles of the 73' war between the early Israeli Saar boats and Egytian and Syrian Project 205's aren't really helpful. For one, they were FAC on FAC engagements and thus do nothing the demonstrate the ability of a FAC to defend a coast against assault by a foriegn Navy (ie: amphibious assault - ostensibly why FAC exist). Secondly, unless the lesson is that yes, the big, clumsy, high-flying P-15 really was an antique, even in 1973, and yes, it really was intended primarily to attack really big ships, its hard to see how this proves the ability of FAC as a weapon of war. It certainly does nothing to prove that FAC can prevent the operation of conventional warships from operating within their reach. It helped sales for Lurssen and CMN though. If you want some useful examples how about these: The Japanese invasion of the Phillipines The Solomon Islands campaign The battle of Suragao Straight The Normandy invasion The invasion of Italy. Any of these are examples of situations where FAC were available and used, in numbers, against convential enemy naval forces - exactly that they were designed to do - and yet the FAC had little to no significant impact on any of these campaign's. As I pointed out earlier, FAC have always had the ability to carry the offensive weapon load of much larger ships. Big whoopdee-do. That has absolutely nothing to do with their ability to use those weapons, which frankly, sucks, as 100 years of historical precedent have made glaringly evident. Notice how the Project 205's were followed by the Project 1234's, a class intended to provide superior seakeeping and defensive capabilities to the 205's - on twice the displacement. Why might that be? The problems of the FAC are inherent and explain why they consistently keep growing until they aren't FAC's anymore until someone decides to start over and the process repeats itself again. 1. The lightly-built FAC vibrate too much from their powerful yet poorly isolated high-speed engines. This causes the tracking beams of fire control radars to lose lock before a firing solution can be obtained - just what happened at Bubiyan. 2. Their small size and high-speed hull forms translate to impressive performance on mill-pond smooth water that drops dramatically in ANY kind of sea state. Not just rolling but pitching and perhaps most importantly slamming. The impact on the efficiency of crew and equipment that results over time should be obvious. 3. A low silhouette - essentially for thier role - translates to poor performance from radars, ESM etc. Coverage is reduced and the problems of multipath effects and surface ducting are amplified. 4. Small size results in electronic equipment being jammed together in close proximity, with the consequence of mutual interference reducing effectiveness. For a vivid (and expensive) demonstration of what I am talking about, look at these before-and-after pictures and see if you can identify the problem and the solution finally adopted. link link 5. Effective damage control ranges from limited to non-existant. One or two small hits are usually adequate to make a FAC combat ineffective. 6. FAC endurance is adequate only for short sorties, such as they might engage in during combat operations. Very much NOT what is required during peacetime where protecting natural resources in the EEZ is a far more pragmatic problem than defending the coastline against some imaginary naval invasion force. Endurance - not just range but the ability to house and feed people comfortably for up to several weeks IS a real peacetime requirement. Sure FAC have peacetime applications, but nothing that couldn't be done better, at lower cost by something less specialized. I'll put a "Point" class cutter against your Hauk's any day of the week for ANY peacetime mission. 7. Upkeep and maintenance that would be done at sea on a convential ship requires special shore support facilities for a FAC. They simply don't have the capacity to carry the necessary spares or technical staff on board (this is different than stopping at the fishing village for food and gas my friend). The support infrastructure for the USN Pegasus class was for example, quite massive and extensive given the limited size and capability of the force. To improve ANY of these areas you must, if I may paraphrase the movie Jaws, "get a bigger boat." Improving sensor performance drives up size. Improving seakeeping drives up size. Improving endurance drives size up. Improving damage control drives size up. To drive all this you need bigger engines and more fuel which drives size up Let's start with the modern era. The French were early to realize that guns on FAC were nearly useless, which is why they marketed the SS-12 (a modified anti-tank missile) for use on small craft. It seemed to offer the only reliable way to hit another FAC. Bigger missiles seemed to be a way for FAC to take out bigger targets. They essentially replaced torpedo's, but the same problems remained. A torpedo fired from a FAC is much less effective than one fired from say, a destroyer, and the same is true in the missile era. Missiles require highly accurate and up-to-date target data to be effective. FAC are poor at collecting that data and make poor weapons platforms due to seakeeping and vibration issues already mentioned. The Royal Navy for its part resisted during the 1960's at least 5 concerted efforts to make it procure FAC's. Why? Because the RN had already figured out the solution to the FAC problem. In WWII British MTB's and MGB's have proved hopelessly vulnerable to German fighters. The same is still true today. 40 years ago something like a Project 205 - the Soviet's latest and greatest FAC-M - was quite defenseless against even something as primitive as a Wasp helicopter with AS-12 wire-guided missiles. The ultimate solution to the FAC for the RN was the optimized Lynx, with search radar and Sea Skua missiles just big enough to attack a FAC from outside the limited radius in which she can defend herself and with a warhead just big enough to overcome the FAC's very limited capability to sustain damage. This combination proved lethal to the FAC-M in 1991, finally destroying the credibility of the FAC-M in the process. In two days in the Bubiyan channel Lynx helicopters destroyed the FAC force of the Iraqi Navy without even coming under significant threat themselves from Iraqi gunfire or SA-7/14 SAM's. Shamefully one-sided. All of which brings us back to where we began. In the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's it became fashionable for navy's large and small to purchase FAC in silly large numbers. Why not, they had lots of fancy gadgets and missiles hanging off them. They were sleek, they were fast and they were dead sexy. By the late 80's though these customers were starting to figure out that the operating costs were quite high, the performance characteristics were far in excess of peacetime requirements and indeed, worked against them. Finally, what they really figured out is that for the most part, there was no big naval threat for these boats to defend against. But what they really could use was something that could chase down all those Spanish fishing boats illegally plying their waters (nothing agains Spanish fisherman, its just a random example). FAC quite frankly are grossly overarmed and don't offer the kind of performance necessary for the types of real-world missions the VAST MAJORITY of users really require. That is why, since about 1990 or so the once flaming market for new FAC has dried up to barely a trickly while the OPV market has exploded. OPV are a more economical, more practical proposition. Nuff said. Bubiyan Channel just sealed the deal of the fate of the FAC as a military platform. And I don't know why you keep coming back to Norway. I think we can all agree that A) Norwegian requirements, terrain and weather may be somewhat unique and not reflect those of the 170-some other nations on the planet and B). just what conventional naval threat is Norway defending against anyway? C) If the Skjold is hiding in a Fjord, it is probably doing so solo, or maybe with one consort, in which case. how is so small a force going to be a significant threat to a conventional naval force of any size? Can you see the practical problem here? D) However much territory a FAC can cover, an airplane can still cover more, quicker, fire its missiles, return to base and pick up some more, come back and fire more missiles - long before the FAC ever gets there all while patrolling a larger area of sea looking for her (moving) targets. E). If a FAC is moving it is not hiding and you propose that FAC work best when hiding in Fjords so as not to be seen. There's a contradiction here. I could go on and on but... So at any rate can you just drop Norway as your only defense of the FAC please? Size BTW, has zero to do with stealthiness. Low-observability (I hate the term Stealt) is also not necessarily a desireable trait in an OPV.

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Jack Tar RE:missile gun boats 2/2/2004 8:07:11 AM

While I agree with Mark F (for once ;)hehe ) as to the limitations of FAC M's, technical developments brought up in another thread discussion makes me wonder whether at least the problems with sensors on FAC's can be countered by use of small UAV's currently under development? (E.G Seamos) Obviously use of these UAV's would be limited to the larger FACs as they are still too big for the smaller FACs, but there seems to be the potential there to use these UAV's as stable, longer range surface search platforms, and for sending targetting info back to the FAC. This doesn't address the other pertinant issues raised by Mark F, but I do like to keep an open mind, and try never to underestimate weapons platforms, no matter their size!.

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Heorot RE:missile gun boats 2/2/2004 9:01:22 AM

If the sea state is so bad that FAC's can't see their targets, (which is the main problem they have in finding and maintaining a target) then it's unlikely that the atmospheric conditions would suit a small UAV either.

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Thomas RE:missile gun boats 2/2/2004 9:29:48 AM

I feel I must support a good Norwegean! First of all: You don't operate MMB (motor missile boats) alone. You operate them in conjunction with mines, submarines, corvettes, aircraft, coastal batteries (mobile and stationary) even tanks - yes I wrote tanks. Secondly: As Peder Tordenskiold junior points out: It very much depends on the waters you operate in. It has always been the contention of the Royal Navy that the Baltic must be closed at Skagerak - The Royal Danish Navy has always contended it could be closed far more south at Fehmern Belt - if you know what You are doing - Those operations are out of the major naval powers scope. Thirdly: In Danish domestic waters the draught is shallow - and varing with winddirection. though there are no rocks to hide behind, there are a lot of small island, fjords and bays. If you can put all the sevice function of the big ships on land - resupply in a lot of yachting/fishing harbours - you can live with reduced endurance and maximise firepower, which is precisely what the Scandinavian Navies did/have done. If the russians had tried to force the Danish Belts, they would have had a nasty close range fight - indubitably sinking several of both parties ships in the very narrow shipping lane (route T) - thus constructing non-charted obstacles. After the battle, the Danish MMB (what would be left of them) would have retired to Norway to reinforce the ��kickers there. They haven't been used?!?! Precisely: The best weapon is the one you don't have to use, because they work by deterrent. Anyway the Danish navy has, as far as I know, retired these boats, but they are quickly build and armed if need arises again.

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Massive RE:missile gun boats 2/2/2004 9:48:56 AM

The best missile attack craft is a PC-3 Orion - can see the target from a long way away, carries more missiles, goes a lot faster, can handle pretty horrible weather etc etc. The alternative is the coastal submarine with aip propulsion (for more modern navies). If you want a patrol boat, build one. If you want to deliver an anti-surface missile you need a plane or a larger helicopter equipped ship that can provide over the horizon targetting.

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Jack Tar RE:missile gun boats 2/3/2004 2:04:13 AM

'If you want to deliver an anti-surface missile you need a plane or a larger helicopter equipped ship that can provide over the horizon targetting' This is what I proposed using the small UAVs for, from large FACs (MMBs in Thomas' parlance ;) ), although Heorot raised a good point regarding weather conditions. Just a thought..

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Thomas RE:missile gun boats 2/3/2004 2:26:16 AM

An anti-surface missile IS an UAV! I have never advocated MMB's alone, but they are excellent in some weather conditions - especially if you don't have waters; but damp meadows. As a defender you can't pick the weather, but if your MMB's force the enemy to attempt an invasion in bad weather, they have achieved a significant from the very outset.

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Mark F RE:missile gun boats 2/3/2004 8:40:51 AM

To operate UAV's you need a bigger boat - something along the lines of a Saar V, at which point we are not talking FAC-M's anymore. Not by a long shot. But of course then you get all of the other advantages of a bigger boat and you don't need the FAC anymore.

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Downunder RE:missile gun boats 2/3/2004 5:45:39 PM

Weren't the Israeli's operating helicopter variants with their Saar 4.5 flotillas for just this reason?

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Mark F RE:missile gun boats 2/4/2004 5:06:08 AM

At the cost of a considerable amount of armament. Flight operations in any kind of sea state must be exciting.

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wagner95696 RE:missile gun boats 3/16/2004 12:25:40 AM

The only thing FAC are good for is running down smugglers where one needs to catch them in order to board them. All FAC are EXTREMELY vulnerable to air launched missiles. I can not recall a single instance where a confrontation between an FAC and a missile armed aircraft where the FAC didn't come of third best. So, you have a ship with limited range/seakeeping characteristics that has to operate within range of hostile shore based aircraft. Unless you control the air space it is suicidal and if you do control the airspace you don't need the FAC's as aircraft as far superior weapons platforms. The only think the FAC's do better is to provide a marine platform for boarding parties.

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