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Subject: Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy
Braddock    5/25/2005 5:52:46 PM
Facultative Elements of War: Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy By Sgt. Terrance Jones The current base realignment/closure proposal must be analyzed and assessed from a viewpoint that is highly cognizant of threat reconcilement and civilian subscription factors in regards to U.S. military policy, as these factors will play a major role in America?s ability to neutralize many of the military engagement variables that have a high possibility of occurring in the future. Example The current base closure proposal aims to facilitate a rapid shift to a more modular configuration at home and abroad. The fact that these shifts are to occur simultaneously has the ability to cause several problems: The shift to a modular global posture suggests that this is the best way to prepare for and engage in modular warfare. This is not necessarily the case, as the stationary modular configuration/posture that is being proposed and is supposed to guarantee flexibility can be neutralized due to the theoretical decision to expand the interpretation of modular warfare to include stationary military formations during preparatory/ short/long term phases of configurative transition. My point is that modular warfare can be waged more effectively from conventional formations that are not transparent. This increases the number of strategic options and variations available to war planners. To understand what is being proposed here the following point must be clearly understood: *Modular Warfare Engagement from Conventional Formations There are many military leaders that will argue that modular warfare suggests mobile, flexible military engagements from formations and forces that require dramatically fewer soldiers than those required for conventional military engagements. Hence, to effectively neutralize asymmetrical threats in the future, a massive realignment of troops is required, as the modular concept does not have the precise continuity and concentric factors needed to form/maintain the combat effective conventional alignment of forces that have preserved the global interests of America for almost 6 decades. I disagree with this assessment. Using Europe as a model, it is easy to see how strategic mission essentials task can be assigned in varying rates and priorities to prepare for threat variances in the region. These same threat variances will decide the rate and size of future downsizing within the region as well. This allows America to maintain a high state of readiness, while guaranteeing that the tasks of support forces will be taken on be well trained veterans that have extensive experience in the region. Soldiers from this region can be cross trained for security missions and joint military offensive by strategic rotations and cycles which will facilitate a more rapid transition into a force that contains enough forces to maintain a conventional force deterrent in numerical troop strength. This will allow for a continuous yet incremental downsizing (to maintain a dual configurative deterrent in the region) of forces in the region while having the ability to neutralize asymmetrical threats in the region due to the troop experience and knowledge of the region. *Casualty Projection Analysis In a day and age when the citizens of America are unwilling to support military engagements where Americans endure minimal casualties, how will our leadership obtain civilian support of American military policies that make the likelihood of exponential increases in casualty projection estimates due to newly adopted modular warfare concept and the costs of implementing a global realignment posture? It will be extremely difficult to convince Americans to support future military engagements where there is a great risk of increased casualties in addition to the tens of thousands of Americans due to be unemployed due to the current base realignment proposal. Precedent for Casualty Projection Analysis North Korea Civilian subscription to American military policy will be difficult to obtain just based on the fact that American military forces suffered over 30,000 casualties during the Korean War. The fact that North Korea has already developed several nuclear weapons, increases the chances of flashpoint intervention by China because of the actions that will be necessary to neutralize North Korean aggression in the region. In this scenario it is clear that American are being alienated at a time when there support will be needed, as we face the possibility of war on multiple fronts. The cumulative effect of these factors present an environment where a draft/reserve call up will be necessary. This would be extremely unpopular amongst Americans if the current base realignment/closure proposal is allowed to send tens of thousands of Americans to the unemployment line. These factors would be made worse by the fact that
 
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Old Grunt    RE:Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy   5/26/2005 12:58:37 PM
I apologize for the length of this post but it was the only way to illustrate the less-than-accurate analysis of Braddock. ?The current base closure proposal aims to facilitate a rapid shift to a more modular configuration at home and abroad.? Sorry, BRAC has nothing to do with Modularity. This one point makes your entire argument specious at best. ?The fact that these shifts are to occur simultaneously has the ability to cause several problems:? Again, as these events are unrelated there is neither any benefit nor detriment to them occurring ?simultaneously?. Also, upon what are you basing your claim of simultaneous occurrence? The BRAC schedule will not be known until the BRAC committee makes it?s final recommendation to the President. Some of the listed installations may not see any attention for either closure or realignment until FY11. ?The shift to a modular global posture suggests that this is the best way to prepare for and engage in modular warfare.? Actually, the shift to a modular force suggests that we are tired of going through the hassle filled and time consuming process of cobbling together units, which frequently have never worked together, to form a Task Force organization each time we decide to engage in an operation. The shift to a global posture suggests that we have increased our ability to project force, in a literal sense, to the point that we are no longer required to select the location of our forces based on their most likely area of operation. One of the basic rules of technical writing is that if you create a term, you explain that term. It is, therefore, incumbent upon you to explain what you mean by ?Modular Warfare?. Please, don?t use your normal Everyone-Familiar-With-Military-Operations-Knows-What-It-Means type of answer. I have already queried the Current Operations, Strategic Operations, and War Plans directorates here at the Pentagon and they haven?t a clue as to what you are referring to. ?This is not necessarily the case, as the stationary modular configuration/posture that is being proposed and is supposed to guarantee flexibility can be neutralized due to the theoretical decision to expand the interpretation of modular warfare to include stationary military formations during preparatory/ short/long term phases of configurative transition. My point is that modular warfare can be waged more effectively from conventional formations that are not transparent. This increases the number of strategic options and variations available to war planners.? This whole paragraph is worthless as it means absolutely nothing without an explanation of what is meant by ?Modular War?. By the way, one of the war planners would like to know how you develop a ?transparent? formation as he feels that it would be very useful to have an invisible battalion, especially during daylight assaults and raids. ?There are many military leaders that will argue that modular warfare suggests mobile, flexible military engagements from formations and forces that require dramatically fewer soldiers than those required for conventional military engagements.? I challenge you to name one military leader who agrees with this statement. Modularity within the US Army requires an additional 30K active duty combat personnel (an additional 16K in the reserve component). How does that, in your opinion, translate to ?dramatically fewer soldiers?? ? Hence, to effectively neutralize asymmetrical threats in the future, a massive realignment of troops is required, as the modular concept does not have the precise continuity and concentric factors needed to form/maintain the combat effective conventional alignment of forces that have preserved the global interests of America for almost 6 decades. I disagree with this assessment.? So you agree that to effectively neutralize asymmetrical threats in the future, a massive realignment of troops is not required, as the modular concept does have the precise continuity and concentric factors needed to form/maintain the combat effective conventional alignment of forces that have preserved the global interests of America for almost 6 decades? ?Using Europe as a model, it is easy to see how strategic mission essentials task can be assigned in varying rates and priorities to prepare for threat variances in the region.? METL anyone? ?These same threat variances will decide the rate and size of future downsizing within the region as well.? Wait a minute; I thought you were against a reduction in force? ?This allows America to maintain a high state of readiness, while guaranteeing that the tasks of support forces will be taken on be well trained veterans that have extensive experience in the region.? Your link between this statement and the two preceding ones is extremely weak "Soldiers from this region can be cross trained for security missions and joint military offensive by strategic rotations and cycles which will
 
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Braddock    RE:Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy   5/26/2005 9:10:52 PM
Old Grunt You are about to catch a bad one(hiphop terminology for the agony of defeat). Braddock
 
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Old Grunt    RE:Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy   5/27/2005 6:56:46 AM
How is it that I'm going to "catch a bad one"? Are you threatening to actually do some research and garner a basic understanding of your subject before producing yet another massive collection of outdated ideas and personal assumptions?! That would be really scary!! Imagine a world where Braddock could produce a product that was something other than a collection of disassociated ideas spiced by the sprinkling of random adjectives and adverbs pulled from the associated words list of a cheap thesarus! A bit of advice, do your research using materials found outside of your massive collection of self written "Tomes of Knowledge".
 
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Braddock    RE:Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy   5/27/2005 8:10:46 AM
Old Grunt You are beginning to sound emotional. That's always a good sign. It's easier to act like a kid than to wait for your amateur night critique to be refuted. You are dismissed!
 
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gf0012-aust    RE:Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy   5/27/2005 8:32:51 AM
"It's easier to act like a kid than to wait for your amateur night critique to be refuted. You are dismissed!" in light of your previous: which very much comes across as juvenile if not "kid like". rather than make a feeble attempt at withdrawing from what was a very considered and structured response by OG, how about moxying up to the plate, acting like an adult and respond as an adult to refute what you disagree with. we're already swamped with a legion of alleged JO's who consider themselves tactical geniuses, so now's your opportunity to respond in a concise, surgical manner to OG's comments. If you don't seek to engage in meaningful dialogue with the audience then I'm not sure why you're posting your tomes in the first place.
 
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Braddock    RE:Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy   5/27/2005 8:48:37 AM
gf0012 Aus Now how could I refuse an offer like that. Please tell Old Grunt that I like my ARNG khakis creased with extra starch.
 
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Old Grunt    RE:Threat Reconcilement/Civilian Subscription to Military Policy   5/27/2005 9:01:57 AM
Khaki's, or more properly TW's (Tropical Weights), went out of the inventory in 1979 and were no longer authorized for wear by 1982. You really are clueless aren't you! *please do not misconstrue the dripping sarcasm of this post as "emotion" as you did with my last post. The only emotion you inspire is levity!*
 
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Braddock    My Response to Old Grunt   5/27/2005 3:47:06 PM
Old Grunt My point was that I am old school(khakis). I am sorry if I hurt your feelings. Here is my first reply to your lightweight(mental) critique: Direct Quote from Old Grunt I apologize for the length of this post but it was the only way to illustrate the less-than-accurate analysis of Braddock. ?The current base closure proposal aims to facilitate a rapid shift to a more modular configuration at home and abroad.? Sorry, BRAC has nothing to do with Modularity. This one point makes your entire argument specious at best. *My Response to Old Grunt If you close at least 85% of the military facilities(800 military facilities, 150 military bases) on the base realignment proposal(the last base closure proposal that was implemented had an acceptance rate of 85%), you will have a configurative assortment of bases that would best be utilized from modular variations in strategic placement of forces and tactical space convergence methods due to the transportation problems that will arise due to concentric factors that will put forces at risk in real world mobilizations to defend the coverage areas that will require rapid deployment of joint forces because of the base realignment proposal. Base realignment has everything to do with modularity, as the projected savings will not be realized due to the developmental assistance that will be required by all military branches and the training costs related to establishing a joint standard. The coverage tasks of the joint forces will require a significant budgetary allocation for a specific amount of joint force training evolutions to prove that America is safer with a dramatic decrease in strategic military bases and facilities. You may look at BRAC and see cost avoidance, but in all matters regarding the military, any action in policy will have a direct correlation to the success or failure of the U.S. military?s ability to accomplish its strategic goal at home and abroad. If this assessment of such a dramatic reduction of facilities and personnel does not help you understand the theoretical shift to modularity in regards to U.S. military forces and the supporting military facilities, there is not much more that I can do for you. Your critiques are pretty much toast at this point, but I will go over your talking points and post my responses tomorrow if not sooner. Please answer the following: How much will a joint standard program cost? How much will it cost to maintain a high state of readiness while a joint standard program is being developed/implemented? Are you suggesting that our leaders have been operating a wasteful entity to the effect of 150 extra military bases and 800 military facilities(you can't be that dense. Don't try to embarass those of us who have made the system work up to this point. You are a vet. That includes you. Drop the cost avoidence drivel.) ? You need to pick up a book on warfare. Preferably "On War" by Carl Von Clausewitz. There is no distinction between policy and war. I correctly projected the paradigm shift to modularity in my first book. I think I can confidently say that I am familiar with the theoretical concept. It would be pretty hard to misunderstand the BRAC premises and intentions when I watched the hearings which included detailed testimony from some our brightest soldiers and politicians. I have indulged you. Now, please answer my questions. I will still go over your critique/talking points. Please maintain a civil decorum. Braddock
 
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Braddock    RE:My Response to Old Grunt   5/27/2005 3:55:24 PM
Old Grunt My point was that I am old school(khakis). I am sorry if I hurt your feelings. Here is my first reply to your lightweight(mental) critique: Direct Quote from Old Grunt I apologize for the length of this post but it was the only way to illustrate the less-than-accurate analysis of Braddock. ?The current base closure proposal aims to facilitate a rapid shift to a more modular configuration at home and abroad.? Sorry, BRAC has nothing to do with Modularity. This one point makes your entire argument specious at best. *My Response to Old Grunt If you close at least 85% of the military facilities(800 military facilities, 150 military bases) on the base realignment proposal(the last base closure proposal that was implemented had an acceptance rate of 85%), you will have a configurative assortment of bases that would best be utilized from modular variations in strategic placement of forces and tactical space convergence methods due to the transportation problems that will arise due to concentric factors that will put forces at risk in real world mobilizations to defend the coverage areas that will require rapid deployment of joint forces because of the base realignment proposal. Base realignment has everything to do with modularity, as the projected savings will not be realized due to the developmental assistance that will be required by all military branches and the training costs related to establishing a joint standard. The coverage tasks of the joint forces will require a significant budgetary allocation for a specific amount of joint force training evolutions to prove that America is safer with a dramatic decrease in strategic military bases and facilities. You may look at BRAC and see cost avoidance, but in all matters regarding the military, any action in policy will have a direct correlation to the success or failure of the U.S. military?s ability to accomplish its strategic goal at home and abroad. If this assessment of such a dramatic reduction of facilities and personnel does not help you understand the theoretical shift to modularity in regards to U.S. military forces and the supporting military facilities, there is not much more that I can do for you. Your critiques are pretty much toast at this point, but I will go over your talking points and post my responses tomorrow if not sooner. Please answer the following: How much will a joint standard program cost? How much will it cost to maintain a high state of readiness while a joint standard program is being developed/implemented? Are you suggesting that our leaders have been operating a wasteful entity to the effect of 150 extra military bases and 800 military facilities(you can't be that dense. Don't try to embarass those of us who have made the system work up to this point. You are a vet. That includes you. Drop the cost avoidence drivel.)? You need to pick up a book on warfare. Preferably "On War" by Carl Von Clausewitz. There is no distinction between policy and war. I correctly projected the paradigm shift to modularity in my first book. I think I can confidently say that I am familiar with the theoretical concept. It would be pretty hard to misunderstand the BRAC premises and intentions when I watched the hearings which included detailed testimony from some our brightest soldiers and politicians. I have indulged you. Now, please answer my questions. I will still go over your critique/talking points. Please maintain a civil decorum. Don't mistake my youth for inexperience. Braddock
 
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Braddock    RE:My Response to Old Grunt   5/27/2005 5:09:31 PM
Old Grunt My point was that I am old school(khakis). I am sorry if I hurt your feelings. Here is my first reply to your lightweight(mental) critique: Direct Quote from Old Grunt I apologize for the length of this post but it was the only way to illustrate the less-than-accurate analysis of Braddock. ?The current base closure proposal aims to facilitate a rapid shift to a more modular configuration at home and abroad.? Sorry, BRAC has nothing to do with Modularity. This one point makes your entire argument specious at best. *My Response to Old Grunt If you close at least 85% of the military facilities(800 military facilities, 150 military bases) on the base realignment proposal(the last base closure proposal that was implemented had an acceptance rate of 85%), you will have a configurative assortment of bases that would best be utilized from modular variations in strategic placement of forces and tactical space convergence methods due to the transportation problems that will arise due to concentric factors that will put forces at risk in real world mobilizations to defend the coverage areas that will require rapid deployment of joint forces because of the base realignment proposal. The current Base realignment proposal has everything to do with modularity, as the projected savings will not be realized due to the developmental assistance that will be required by all military branches and the training costs related to establishing a joint standard. The coverage tasks of the joint forces will require a significant budgetary allocation for a specific amount of joint force training evolutions to prove that America is safer with a dramatic decrease in strategic military bases and facilities. You may look at BRAC and see cost avoidance, but in all matters regarding the military, any action in policy will have a direct correlation to the success or failure of the U.S. military?s ability to accomplish its strategic goal at home and abroad. If this assessment of such a dramatic reduction of facilities and personnel does not help you understand the theoretical shift to modularity in regards to U.S. military forces and the supporting military facilities, there is not much more that I can do for you. Your critiques are pretty much toast at this point, but I will go over your talking points and post my responses tomorrow if not sooner. Please answer the following: How much will a joint standard program cost? How much will it cost to maintain a high state of readiness while a joint standard program is being developed/implemented? Are you suggesting that our leaders have been operating a wasteful entity to the effect of 150 extra military bases and 800 military facilities(you can't be that dense. Don't try to embarass those of us who have made the system work up to this point. You are a vet. That includes you. Drop the cost avoidence drivel.)? You need to pick up a book on warfare. Preferably "On War" by Carl Von Clausewitz. There is no distinction between policy and war. I correctly projected the paradigm shift to modularity in my first book. I think I can confidently say that I am familiar with the theoretical concept. It would be pretty hard to misunderstand the BRAC premises and intentions when I watched the hearings which included detailed testimony from some our brightest soldiers and politicians. I have indulged you. Now, please answer my questions. I will still go over your critique/talking points. Please maintain a civil decorum. Don't mistake my youth for inexperience. Braddock
 
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