Yimmy, modern Anti-ship missiles DO use shaped charges. The idea for that is to penetrate as many compartment as possible to scuttle a ship. by penetrating compartments, one missile hit may be the lucky shot to ignite fuel, ammunitions or anything combustable or just cut major power cord. Shaped charges used in anti-ship missiles are also HUGE. Unlike anti-tank shaped charges which weigh from 1-20kg, typical anti-ship warheads range from 100-1000kg.

Yeah, I saw that article when it came out. It was brought to my attention by a USNFSA member, which of course, immediately raised an eyebrow. Note how Gen Hagee (a enthusiastic DD(X) supporter) doesn't actually mention battleships in the quotes attributed to him? Is he being quoted in context? Did he even mention battleships? We don't know. Novak (or someone else) inserted the part about battleships. Even if we accept that he did, it does not appear Gen Hagee advocated their return to active service. There is certainly no evidence in this article that he did. The rest of the article is the exact sort of anti-battleship conspiracy/anti-DD(X) drivel that I have come to expect from a certain group of battleship enthusiasts with media access. I am in fact, totally convinced this was written by someone at said organization and submitted to Novak for publication. If he had written it, he might have checked to see that the Marines never told the GAO in 2004 that they advocated reactivation of 2 Iowa's. Note also the quote from Gen Kelly (R) about how in his combat experience battleship gunfire was the best there is. According to his bio : hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/H...ley_PX.htm 1. General Paul X. Kelley did not serve in Korea in 1950-53. 2. General Paul X. Kelley was not in Vietnam during USS New Jersey's combat tour in 1968-69. He never experienced battleship gunfire in combat, so what experience is he allegedly referring to? Let's use a source a little closer to home: "Significantly, the leadership of the Marine Corps did not make strong protests when the battleships were stricken, nor were they particularly vocal in supporting retention of the ships." Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 18th Edition, Norman Polmar.

As a long service Mairne I'll support the argument that the Marines do not cry for the BBs. We did appreciate them, and we took them seriously when we planned fire support. But there wa never any wide spread handwringing over their absence. While some of the members of this NGF organization may be nostalgic hobbyists I strongly suspect the real motivation of that organization are businessmen who would profit by the retention of these ships.

Novak took it out of context, this is what the GOA said: "To reactivate two Iowa class battleships to their decommissioned capability, the Navy estimates costs in excess of $500 million. This does not include an additional $110 million needed to replenish gunpowder for the 16-inch guns because a recent survey found that it is unsafe. In terms of schedule, the Navy’s program management office estimates that reactivation would take 20 to 40 months, given the loss of corporate memory and the shipyard industrial base. Reactivating the battleships would require a wide range of battleship modernization improvements, according to the Navy’s program management office. At a minimum, these modernization improvements include command and control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment; environmental protection (including ozonedepleting substances); a plastic-waste processor; pulper/shredder and wastewater alterations; firefighting/fire safety and women-at-sea alterations; a modernized sensor suite (air and surface search radar); and new combat and self-defense systems. Although detailed studies would be needed to identify the full extent of modernization needs and costs, the Navy has no plans to conduct these studies. The Navy’s program management office also identified other issues that would strongly discourage the Navy from reactivating and modernizing the battleships. For example, personnel needed to operate the battleships would be extensive, and the skills needed may not be available or easily reconstituted. Other issues include the age and unreliability of the battleships’ propulsion systems and the fact that the Navy no longer maintains the capability to manufacture their 16-inch gun system components and ordnance." This is what the Marine Corp said to the GOA: "Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 and supports the Navy’s modernization efforts to deliver a sufficient NSFS capability that exceeds that of the Iowa class battleships." That is the only place in the article the Marine Corp gives an opinion about the DD(X) or the BB since 2002, and even that statement is simply "Strategic Purpose." In other words, the Marine Corp wants a sufficient NSFS capability but fully supports the DD(X). The idea that the Marine Corp doesn't support the DD(X) project is intellectually dishonest of Mr. Novak, the article GOA article goes into grreat detail regarding the Marine Corp's role for the DD(X). The Marine Corp is actually assigned the task by the Navy to determine the NSFS requirements issues for the DD(X), has been since 2002, it is the first time the Marine Corp has ever had this responsiblity for a surface combatabt. The Marine Corp is very happy about the way the DD(X) is being designed, because they are in fact the designers of the weapon system requirements. The GOA document can be read here: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0539r.pdf

A quick check of globalsecurity.org/military/ reveals the following: The Exocet seems to carry a shaped charge warhead, with some sort of impact capability. The Harpoon warhead (about 500lb) is housed in a target-penetrating, load-carrying steel structure and has an impact velocity of about 237m/s. Checking http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/index_weapons.htm for VERY ROUGH comparison data: The US 10"/40 (19th cent.) APC round weighed 510lb, and is calculated to penetrate 6.78” (or 7.8”, two formulas) of armor at 11,500 yards. (500m/s; about 3 degrees from horizontal impact). Figuring that the Harpoon warhead is going at about half the speed (1/4 of the KE., but possibly smaller diameter, the rest of the missile is not well-coupled to the warhead), I guesstimate that the Harpoon will penetrate 2", possibly 3" of armor. I guesstimate similar performance for the Exocet. As per http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/moskit.htm, the Sunburn seems to do M2, M2.2 or M2.5 at low altitude. The writeup suggests that the Russian intent is to minimize reaction time for the target. The writeup also indicates that the fuel tanks are in the back, and that the warhead is a semi-AP type. Popup attacks are not mentioned, so I assume that can be selected or not by the user. It seems that the Russians intend the Sunburn to function like an APHE round, and that any fuel left over is an added bonus. The weapon is powered by a ramjet, and is likely to have used most of its fuel before a hit. If the 320kg warhead is mostly steel, this suggests performance roughly that of a 12" AP round at 10,000 yards. The warhead is listed as a semi-armor piercing type (less steel), so the design may be able to penetrate only 4-6" or so, but have a very large explosion inside. This does not appear to be a weapon easily capable of sinking an Iowa-class battleship. A check of various pictures of the USS Stark suggest that while the fire was bad, the Exocet explosion is the cause of the list seen in the early pictures. My guess is that had the warhead been plain instead of a shaped charge, the USS Stark might have been sunk. I note that the latest thread mentions that the capability to manufacture 16" ordnance is no longer maintained. I think that the ability to manufacture armor plate is also long gone.

That's exactly why I believe the article was not written by Mr Novak, but by someone at USNFSA. The frequent use of quotes totally out of context, the Battleship vs. DD(X) framing of the argument, the "our poor Marines are going to get slaughtered without battleships" rhetoric is all standard USNFSA propaganda. Go on their web site and read some of the op-ed pieces. I bet some of the language is repeated word-for-word. PS USNFSA is a small group, and no, I don't think any stand to profit from reactivation. Most are retired military officers of some sort though AFIAK none are ex-Marines or have any knowledge or experience of Fire Support issues (and it shows). They really do just buy into the battleship myth. Considering how much was spent on battleships in their day, and how little they accomplished for that investment, I never have understood this cult of the battleship myself. But it exists and has legions of fans. Look at how many books get written about battleships as opposed to say, destroyers. Yet which time has accomplished more in the last century of warfare?

That Exocet carries a shaped-charge warhead is I believe, a myth. MM.38, AM.39 and MM.40 Block I certainly do not. Block II has been rumoured to have a shaped-charge but I have seen nothing that can be verified on that. Harpoon is generally credited with the ability to penetrate 4-6" of armour (Friedman). Presumably Exocet is similar. Kormoran penetrates plate 70-90mm thick before detonating its multiple shaped-charge warheads. Stark was hit by two AM.39 Exocet, both of which dove on the target and struck in just about the same spot on the cornere where the deck meets the hull, just forward of the bridge (guess which spot on a FFG-7 has the biggest radar return?). The first weapon did not explode. It penetrated the deck, a couple of more decks below, a bulkhead (IIRC) and out the bottom of the ship. That's probably at least 4 or 5 plates of at least 0.5-inch each. No explosion, big fires from the missile motor. The second missile exploded almost instantly after impact in the first compartment it penetrated. The list you see was caused by the inability to shed firefighting water from the upper decks on the already top-heavy FFG-7. The same problem afflicted HMS Sheffield in the Falkland's and contributed to the top-heavy instability which caused her to founder and sink in a storm a week after she was hit. PS Exocet/Harpoon class weapons are not really designed to sink ships - of any size. Sinking a ship requires letting water in. These weapons don't do that. They burn the ships out. Shellfire was not a good way to sink ships either. It was usually followed up (back in the "good-ol'-days) by a torpedo attack for the coup-de-grace. A torpedo lets water in.

I suppose that we will have to agree to disagree on Friedman's figures. Based on my guesstimate (an analogy statedly based on ...), and your example ("... probably at least 4 or 5 plates of at least 0.5-inch each ..." for 2" to 2.5" penetration), I still do not see the Harpoon having sufficient KE to achieve to Friedman's figures. The information that I find on the warhead type for various AShMs consistently points to high explosive; sometimes "shaped charge" is mentioned, sometimes not. It may be that the type varies from model to model, or is even subject to buyer preference. I will observe two things though. First, properly designed shaped-charges focus about 50% of their energy into the penetration mechanism. Therefore, they make an excellent choice for attacking a ship from the outside, but seem less effective, than an equivalent amount of non-shaped-charge, if they detonate inside. Second, the warheads specified are always some sort of high explosive designed to explode inside the ship, not some flammable liquid. All of the descriptions and accompanying drawings so indicate. I expect that covering the bridge of a modern destroyer or frigate with 200 gallons of burning napalm would be quite effective, but this is not the kill mechanism of the various AshMs. Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Stark_(FFG-31)) says the first Exocet hit, penetrated and detonated, and the second one hit the superstructure. http://www.usswaddell.com/History/stark/uss_stark.htm and several other sites implicitly agree, in that they do not contradict the sequence or location, although they do not explicitly mention explosions. Pictures at another site (http://www.navsource.org/archives/07/images/073105.jpg and http://www.navsource.org/archives/07/images/073104.jpg) of the Stark listing show it low in the water and listing. This looks to be caused by very many tons of water in the ship, and very low in the hull. That there was a bad fire is undoubted; that fighting it added this much water seems unlikely. The Sheffield had a bad fire, but the warhead did not explode. There are many early pictures of the Sheffield initially burning, but neither listing nor sinking. The pictures cause me to have the opinion that the explosion, and not the fire, allowed water to enter the Stark, causing the list. If, on the other hand, the list of the already top-heavy Stark was due to water on the upper decks from fighting the fire, why did the Stark not roll? As for gunfire not being a good way to sink ships, Coronel (Nov 1914), The Falklands (Dec 1914) and particularly the Battle Cruiser action (May 1916) prior to the main fleet engagement at Jutland, suggest otherwise. This is a very limited sample size, which implies that the commanders of the time saw the effectiveness of gunfire and value of their ships. The Scharnhorst, Bismark, Kirishima, Yamashiro and Fuso were first wrecked by naval gunfire, and at the time seemed to be going down anyway. It is probably true that torpedoes are a more efficient kill mechanism than gunfire, but torpedoes are relatively short-ranged weapons and require special tactics (subs, aircraft). Japanese naval tactics in the South Pacific in 1942 were quite effective. However, Sheer's torpedo boats, covering his first battle turn-away at Jutland, scored zero hits.

"It is probably true that torpedoes are a more efficient kill mechanism than gunfire, but torpedoes are relatively short-ranged weapons and require special tactics (subs, aircraft). Japanese naval tactics in the South Pacific in 1942 were quite effective. However, Sheer's torpedo boats, covering his first battle turn-away at Jutland, scored zero hits." the issue is yield on terminal impact. ie look at the max range of a conventional torpedo and then (eg) a japanese "long lance" as compared to the similar range of a main gun. thus any torpedo that outranges a main gun is going to brig benefit if it contacts. ie it's a "corruption" of assessment based on salvo range. if you look at current soviet/russian cruise missiles then their effectiveness is a combination of things: eh comparative yield compared to a torpex equiv kinetic energy collateral or assisted kill due to LOX spillage or similar propellant providing a secondary accelerant. I'd argue that a Mk48 ADCAP will provide greater destructive power than a russian "shipwreck" or equiv - and it's harder to avoid the ADCAP than the "shipwreck".

I have no idea if this will work...

Specifications

Note: Data given by several sources show slight variations. Figures given below may therefore be inaccurate!

Data for AGM-84D/E/F/H/K, RGM/UGM-84D (incl. booster):

	AGM-84D	RGM/UGM-84D	AGM-84E	AGM-84F	AGM-84H/K
Length	3.85 m (12 ft 7.5 in)	4.63 m (15 ft 2.2 in)	4.50 m (14 ft 9 in)	4.44 m (14 ft 6.9 in)	4.37 m (14 ft 4 in)
Wingspan	91.4 cm (36 in)				2.43 m (96 in)
Diameter	34.3 cm (13.5 in)
Weight	540 kg (1200 lb)	690 kg (1520 lb)	627 kg (1385 lb)	635 kg (1400 lb)	725 kg (1600 lb)
Speed	Mach 0.85
Range	220 km (120 nm)	140 km (75 nm)	93 km (50 nm)	315 km (170 nm)	280 km (150 nm)
Propulsion	Sustainer: Teledyne/CAE J402-CA-400 turbojet; 3.0 kN (680 lb) Booster (RGM/UGM-84 only): A/B44G-2 or -3 solid-fueled rocket; 53 kN (12000 lb) for 2.9 sec
Warhead	221 kg (488 lb) WDU-18/B penetrating blast-fragmentation				360 kg (800 lb) WDU-40/B penetrating BF

Main Sources

[1] Norman Friedman: "US Naval Weapons", Conway Maritime Press, 1983
[2] Norman Friedman: "World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997/98", Naval Institute Press, 1997
[3] Christopher Chant: "World Encyclopaedia of Modern Air Weapons", Patrick Stephens Ltd., 1988
[4] Hajime Ozu: "Missile 2000 - Reference Guide to World Missile Systems", Shinkigensha, 2000
[5] Bernard Blake (ed.): "Jane's Weapon Systems 1987-88", Jane's, 1988

If that looks like a mess, try here: http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-84.html