I like the Idea of the PLA not mobilizing but I dont think its practicle with an obstacle like the Taiwanese Strait in the way. They would need to land sufficient force to hold a beachhead for a few weeks to allow for time to get armor into Taiwan. Weeks because they are not mobilized first. Thats too much time and the US or Even Taiwan would stop them. So the only military option they have is to mass just prior to attack. Than ensures they have sufficient force to overwhelm the defense. Maybe they will say its an training excersise or something. In any event it will be obvious and during that time they be vulnerable. And a pre-emptive strike could disrupt their timeline such that an invasion would be doomed. So that doesnt work either. But maybe they are counting on the US not getting involved until after they initiate hostilities. But that would seem to be a bad assumtion with the current administration. The Chinese for all the rhetoric are extremely smart. I think they realise they are about 20 years from being able to pull off an invasion.

"When the Royal Marines stood up in 1981, the first thing the commander told his intel officer to do was "go to the public library" - before reporting to headquarters." Sounds like a good place for any beginning intel officer to have started long before he joined the service, but better late than never. Furthermore, I can believe that when starting something new, it's best to start with the basics. ------ "According to a deputy director of one of our agencies, this is quite untrue, if only because we are not properly organized. "We collect almost everything there is to know about almost everything on the planet. And we can tell you almost nothing about its significance in time enough to matter." " Wrong conclusion drawn from the right facts. Churchill said "democracy was the worst form of government, except for everything else." We are poorly positioned to process all the data we collect, unless you compare us to everyone else. We have better indications and warning overall of what's happening all across the globe than anyone else. Multiple agencies keep multiple threat level rosters of their AOR (which often is the whole world) and update them daily. If anything happens of even moderate significance in any country that we have even moderate interest in, there are messages that go to multiple watch centers within twelve, six, one hour of the event--or even within several minutes if noteworthy enough. I myself recall authorizing sending out messages on two occasions at flash override precedence (let the SIGINT-savvy reader understand) while stationed in Berlin as a Flight Commander in 1989 (somewhat embarassingly both turned out to be false alarms, but when certain critical criteria are met you send it out, period--and explain yourself to the DO later). Those are the kind of messages that go directly to situation rooms all over the place. However, I very much wish we had lots more analysts, because there are always more questions than answers. ----- "Thinking that our bureaucracy has produced a near perfect countermeasure for every enemy weapon may make for sounder sleep by fighter pilot,...." I don't know who thinks that. Certainly not me. I'm the one who suggested we don't have sufficient countermeasures for the FLAP LID, for example. And I seriously doubt that there are many pilots at all that think the freaking pogue intel puke squadron briefing dog could possibly know what he's talking about in the first place. ----- "...but it might be better to teach our pilots to think in terms of being ready for the sight of missiles boring in completely ignoring those countermeasures. What should they do in that case? There usually are things that will mitigate the threat. Being trained to think in terms of them may help one apply them in time " Ummm, and you've actually met a pilot who doesn't think this? Quick, get his autographed picture because he's either the stupidest or luckiest (if he's survived any combat) pilot in the service! Displacedjim

I was not just speaking about the 6 B-52, 8 B-1B, and 4 B-2s in Diego Garcia, But also the 12 B-1B and 12 B-52s deployed in 2003 to Guam (see link). http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/03/04/n.korea.bombers/ In addition to these aircraft, any buildup of Chinese forces would cause the forward deployment of more US aircraft into the area. I would not be surprised to find out that Guam is scheduled to receive some of those B-2 shelters. Guam is only 3 hours away from Taiwan, Diego Garcia is 6, and South Korea is 1.5 hours away. These counter attacks would be from 3 different directions and would by that fact alone cause the PLAN to split it's defensive forces. Now, as to what I was smoking... you do not need to sink every ship to defeat an invasion force. Just hi the primary air defense ships in the first wave of B-2/JDAM and B-1B/JASSM strikes. Followed up by B-1B/JDAM and Fighter/JDAM attacks on the undefended fleet. The secondary targets would be the ships carrying armored vehicles as this would leave any surviving Chicom troops without armor on the beach. You do not need to smash the entire snake, just cut off the head.

Forgot about the 18+ B-52/JDAM follow-ups..

Or even potentially mine the ingress routes all the way towards the straits. That would probably put a halt to any invasion or even taking out whatever logistical tail is in the offing. Anything of this scale is gonna be a logistical b**ch. That and MLRS deployed mines/cluster munitions (and maybe some WP rounds thrown in) would cause a lot of havoc on any beacheads.

Gix, you are missing terribly important points. 1) To start at the end, PRC is unwilling to let ROC remain ununited. In fact a deal was cut that it must be incorporated "within 20 years" - but the deal was cut in 1989. There is real fear that failure to do so creates political problems in China. CCP says democracy is not practical for Chinese people, and Taiwanese are Chinese people - so they cannot be allowed to proove CCP is wrong. There are other dimensions of this as well. It is not entirely rational either. But do not underestimate the determination involved. 2) PLA doctrine requires the ENTIRE WAR be fought in about two weeks. Any assumption otherwise is ignoring the doctrine itself. PLA has been quite clever: key units are based right on embarcation ports/jumping off points (two divisions are in sight of their objectives). All the ace units in the entire country are required to be able to move at full strength within five days. Some units are required to move much faster: the ready element of the national response special forces unit holds the record, measured in single digit minutes, to wheels up (they fly of course). Remember, the war is to be fought by "ace units" - not by the bulk of PLA. And certain loading issues can be solved ahead of time by ordering logistic movements. 3) ROCN mobilizes every time there is a PLAN exercise. No 1972 type Mideast War jump from exercise is viable. That is not going to happen, except on a tiny scale, one so small ROCN will NOT mobilize for it. Thus you might have a marine battalion combat team at sea before the op begins. 4) The first and second waves are medium units - there is only one "armored division" [the 10th] and it is pretty light for an armored division - because 2 of the regiments are amphibious swimmers - APCs and light tanks. Only one regiment has MBTs. Only the third wave is heavy, and it has more time to assemble and move. It also basically does not assault to get ashore - although it has several medium brigades in case landings are useful to flank an enemy defense line to seaward - it is these units that are on amphibs - the heavy units are on RO-RO and similar vessels. It is expected, by both sides, that just getting the third wave ashore may win the war: ROC units may start defecting (as they did historically) and civilian morale may collapse. But if not, it is supposed to fight its way to the capital.

You wrote: And I seriously doubt that there are many pilots at all that think the freaking pogue intel puke squadron briefing dog could possibly know what he's talking about in the first place. Actually, I think there are many pilots who think the intel puke might have a clue or two. This breaks down from time to time, but mainly when it becomes pretty obvious intel is about some other planet, not this one. This has not been common for a long time now. Even cynical old combat veterans who think you NEVER know EVERYTHING have great respect for the intel pukes, and shamlessly eat up every scrap they can get from them, if there is a situation. No one ever admits this to the intel pukes, of course, but everyone is glad we have them.

Actually, no, now that you mention it. I just feared I might if they listened to what I thought you said. Perhaps I got it wrong? I hope so.

PLA doctrine is that you MUST achieve strategic surprise. PLA has created a strategic deception planning unit. I see no more effective option for PLA than NOT TO PERMIT ANY significant mobilization. No large units out of place or out of barracks. No more than one or two tiny units in route to some minor exercise or training facility. Because otherwise you would be right, and there might be units sent forward. Doctrine says "fight one local power BEFORE the superpower can effectively intervene." That means move and fight without warning, however severe the penalty that imposes. When you are big enough, it does not matter that much. And something not noticed is that PLA has changed its readiness posture forcewide. The US Army needs more time to mount out than a PLA fist unit does.

Korean assets are not under ComAirWestPac. This may change though, under a revision announced this month - but it has not yet happened. Korea was a separate command - technically I think it is still a UN command - and it is not integated into Pacific Command at all. But Rumsfield seems to want to change that. However, that said, you left out Japan, and so did I. Japan has an air wing. It is the only one forward, and it is about as important as a carrier air wing. I do not think that that tiny numbers of bombers are going to dribble in very fast. There must be an NSC meeting and decision about what response is appropriate, and where, before ever those missions are planned. I do note your suggestion of raids against ships, and I think that is very wise - but it may or may not work out well. Early raids into the operational area will be complicated by the fact massive numbers of civilian ships ply these waters, by enemy units prepositioned to warn of and fight aircraft of this sort, and at least by land based fighters and SAM type assets. Even if "successful" raiders may not be able to target the right ships, and there are so many minor targets taking a few out won't matter. I think initial moves may well be more circumspect than implied by listing hours of flying time. A proper, organized response may take days to set up, by which time many more planes will be available, and some sense of how the enemy is organized may then exist. I do think USAF will strike before Kitty Hawk does, at about five days in. And I do think the land based Navy and Marine planes in the theater will probably coordinate with the USAF - or rather the other way around - as COMAIRWESTPAC is a Navy guy. Which means those strikes may be strong enough and organized enough to hurt. But there are not enough planes to stop the invasion in the first strike or two. A lot depends on what happens in the first couple of days, before we can intervene with effect and numbers? If we get lucky we might even be able to base units on Taiwan itself. And if things go badly, we may lose the first planes to enter the area, whatever they are. Most likely events will be in between these two extreams and not decisive at all. I expect, IF we fight, to obtain air control somewhere between 7 and 10 days in, and to achieve decisive offensive air power about 21 days in.