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Subject: Ideal World War Two RN
earlm    5/4/2008 3:13:32 PM
With hindsight what should the RN have done to be the best force possible for WW2? 1. Obtain better AA fire control from US. 2. Obtain US carrier based aircraft through lend lease. 3. Introduce a dual purpose 4.5-5" gun. (US 5"/38?) 4. Scrap the R class. 5. Save money on KGV and arm them with R class turrets with higher elevation. 6. Modernize Hood 7. Modernize Repulse
 
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Herald12345       5/13/2008 1:26:07 PM

Which link are you talking about?? Several of yours have gotten me only failure to connect notices.

 Figure it out.Cut the SP prefixes and suffixes  If I quote the naval records , we'll be here til hell freezes over.

Why do you insist of burning SP's capacity with long reprint posts that, for the most part contribute nothing to the question at hand?

 Why don't you read and see at what I drive? those Japanese officers interrogations for example just proved you don't even have your chronologies or numbers straight Larry?

The interrogation of the KAGA officer, interestingly, doesn't mention the bomb hit that struck the island itself and killed most of the ships senior officers.  Other than that, his account conforms to that in SHATTERED SWORD, pages 248-250.  Four bombs that went off in the upper hanger deck.  One thru the forward elevator, one just forward of the bridge, near the starboard side, one slightly aft of amidships and somewhat to port and one just at the starboard, forward corner of the aft elevator.  Since the hit to the island, and the second mentioned above were very near each other, some confusion could be expected.

Um, that is because NO BOMB hit the island. Just one of many facts gotten wrong in Shattered Sword


Herald
 
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Herald12345       5/13/2008 1:31:12 PM

Perhaps you should read your own sources, Herald.

I did.

The interrogation of the SORYU  XO supports the account that I gave, fully.  He reports three bomb hits, made by about 12 a/c all attacking at the same time, in three groups coming down on the ship from three different angles.  Very close to Leslie's group of 14, one of which (Leslie himself) didn't have a bomb to drop.  Nothing about any a/c attacking later, after Leslie's group finished with the CV.  Nobody from another group (ENTERPRISE) wandering by to attack later.

Three separate groups of aircraft rolled in on Soryu . You at least  noticed that much.  Two were from Yorktown.  Where did the third group rolling in come from, Larry? CREF Yorktown action report!  

Herald

 
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Herald12345       5/13/2008 1:49:35 PM

The interrogation of Capt. Amagi (former air officer of KAGA I find particularly interesting, as it contains several statements that are demonstrably false.  I wonder if it was his memory of a high stress incident from over three years previous, or if he was jerking his interviewers around deliberately.

I find your attempt to discount the testimony to be ridiculous.

For example, he states that no KAGA a/c were on the attack on Midway.  The flight records of all four carriers were saved, and we know exactly how many a/c were launched, when, for what purpose and what happened to each.  KAGA sent 18 Vals 1 reccon Kate and 9 Zekes on the Midway attack.  It also added two Zekes to the CAP in the same launch.  The total Midway strike was of 110 a/c in nearly equal groups from each carrier.  AKAGI and KAGA each contributed a squadron of Vals and a Kate, HIRYU and SORYU each contributed a squadron of Kates, and each of the four ships sent 9 Zekes.  

Kaga's records went down with her. What we have are RECONSTRUCTIONS like we do with Yorktown's records.

According to both persons involved in the planning of the Midway operation, and the planning documents, the northern attack was NOT a diversion, and Yamamoto didn't really want it laid on at the same time, but had to accept it to get cooperation in the Midway operation.  In this case, Amagi might well not have known and simply reacted to the way the question was framed as the USN was convinced that it had been a diversion. 

I already said it wasn't a diversion, Larry. I said it was a threat axis defensive counter move in response to the Doolittle Raid. You did read what I WRITE don't you?

Its like the radar stuff he gabbles about, The Japanese were experimenting,  but what they had on hand is hard to pin down because so many records are reconstructions after the fact.  AFTER THE FACT, Larry
. You go with the freshest and most authentic data you have.

There are always problems dealing with primary source material.  It's not too bad with technical data.  You just have to find out if the source had the opportunity and expertise to perform the tests in question, if there were likely to be any ulterior motive slanting the tests for good or bad, and check the details of the methodology used.  Fairly straightforward.

 I just demonstrated that you CAN'T make that claim didn't I? [comments about radar]  Now why don't you consider that I KNOW what I'm doing and what I'm talking about.

A personal account, like these interrogation reports, is much more difficult to assess.  It's like doing a crime investigation by questioning witnesses.  The accounts of the same incident by two different witnesses are often very different.  The witnesses are excited and their perceptions are often distorted.  There are methods of sorting that out, but the two big rules are to take the statement as soon after the incident as possible, and not to let the witnesses have contact with each other before taking the statement.  Obviously, in the interrogation accounts, both of these requirements have been lost.^1   Some statements are likely to be quite accurate, others much less so.  To assess the difference, and sort out the accurate material within a statement from the mis perceptions that always slip in requires a lot of cross checking between statements and comparison to other records.  That's why I only read stuff like this out of interest, and never trust any particular comment made.  I don't have the time to properly assess them myself, so I leave that to experts who specialize in it.

^1 How so? The USSBS was quite careful to sift the data for bias. its considered to be the template for how to assess operations after the results from enemy interrogations and post damage assessment.

BINGO!  Got it in forty tries.

Now you see why I don't see your citations and arguments as
 
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Herald12345       5/13/2008 1:56:34 PM

In an earlier post I remarked on US subs deliberately attacking escorts in preferrence to cargo ships.  You replied that they only attacked escorts in self defense or to get to the cargo ships.

????????????????????????????

Not so!

I want to read this!

In early 1944 ONI became aware of the shortage of escorts in the IJN.  The target priority list that was part of the orders given sub commanders was altered to reflect the situation.  Escort ships were given priority over cargo ships as targets.  Major warships had first priority in the order CVs, BBs, CAs and CLs, then tankers, then escort ships, with cargo ships having lower priority.

You have that completely wrong.

tankers.

Not only were US subs deliberately attacking escorts, that was the policy from ComSubPac.

Nope.
Herald

 
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perfectgeneral2    In Hindsight   5/13/2008 2:40:58 PM
I wholeheartly agree with Mr Williams (The Foresight War) that the KGV battleships should re-mount old 15" guns for higher elevation rather than try to develop 16" and 18" guns.

Take the time to modernize the Hood and Repulse. Those diplomatic port visits just weren't worth it.

Turning down the 50 old frigates from the US would put us in a better bargaining position (they were next to useless anyway). We should have ramped up escort production far sooner so we didn't need to ask.

Gear up Canadian production for Mosquitos, Merlins and Liberty ships

Get production of the Mosquito underway as soon as possible (no two years in the long grass). Commission a multi role carrier version (tailhook and fold-up wings) that can act as a long range recon, fighter, bomber and torpedo bomber.

Forget armoured decks and go for large a/c capacity carriers (50+ Mosquito) early. Since we are using hindsight, they can have angled decks.

Develop a very long range bomber to patrol the sea lanes with ASW equipment.

Break the Washington Treaty (if you must sign, one that limits to 15" guns) in order to build 4x 60,000t plus carriers and 8x 20,000t light and 16x 10,000t escort carriers.

You know, most of this advice still applies today. The UK should be keeping the sealanes secure and maintaining a strategic deterrant building and design capability. That is: 3 large carriers and 6 light carriers/LPH, a batch of six escorts every 44 months, 18+MPA, long range carrier based recon and fighter/bombers (E2d, F35c) and four nuclear subs every 88 months to a new design.

 
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larryjcr       5/13/2008 3:34:57 PM


You seem to be obsessed with twisting time to try and make a
point.


Please try and follow.





I've twisted nothing. I've commented on the history, especially
where the revisionists get it wrong..


 


Nimitz deliberately chose Fletcher as the carrier commander afloat
for the active threatre at the time, the SOPAC, not Spruance.





This is inaccurate. Nimitz didn't have much choice about the
commanders for his carriers. Fletcher was already there . Noyes was
coming over from the Atlantic. Fitch was already slotted, Halsey was
down with the crud, and Spruance was the one he tagged BY CHOICE for
a slot he could fill. Where he had a choice he made a choice.
Ghormley was yet to fail for health. Turner was expected to handle
the Guadalcanal naval landing. Seniority slotted Fletcher not
acc

 
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larryjcr       5/13/2008 3:40:59 PM




Perhaps you should read your own sources, Herald.

I did.



The interrogation of the SORYU  XO supports the account that I gave, fully.  He reports three bomb hits, made by about 12 a/c all attacking at the same time, in three groups coming down on the ship from three different angles.  Very close to Leslie's group of 14, one of which (Leslie himself) didn't have a bomb to drop.  Nothing about any a/c attacking later, after Leslie's group finished with the CV.  Nobody from another group (ENTERPRISE) wandering by to attack later.

Three separate groups of aircraft rolled in on Soryu . You at least  noticed that much.  Two were from Yorktown.  Where did the third group rolling in come from, Larry? CREF Yorktown action report!  



Herald


READ YOUR OWN SUPPOSED SOURCE!!!  He does NOT say that three different attacks were made.  He says that a single attack was made by about 12 a/c attacking in three groups from three directions.  There were 14 YORKTOWN SBDs in the attack Leslie led.  All accounted for.  Certainly NOT any kind of proof of any other force being involved in the attack!! 
 
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perfectgeneral2    In Hindsight   5/13/2008 3:46:43 PM
I wholeheartly agree with Mr Williams (The Foresight War) that the KGV battleships should re-mount old 15" guns for higher elevation rather than try to develop 16" and 18" guns.

Take the time to modernize the Hood and Repulse. Those diplomatic port visits just weren't worth it.

Turning down the 50 old frigates from the US would put us in a better bargaining position (they were next to useless anyway). We should have ramped up escort production far sooner so we didn't need to ask.

Gear up Canadian production for Mosquitos, Merlins and Liberty ships

Get production of the Mosquito underway as soon as possible (no two years in the long grass). Commission a multi role carrier version (tailhook and fold-up wings) that can act as a long range recon, fighter, bomber and torpedo bomber.

Forget armoured decks and go for large a/c capacity carriers (50+ Mosquito) early. Since we are using hindsight, they can have angled decks.

Develop a very long range bomber to patrol the sea lanes with ASW equipment.

Break the Washington Treaty (if you must sign, one that limits to 15" guns) in order to build 4x 60,000t plus carriers and 8x 20,000t light and 16x 10,000t escort carriers.

You know, most of this advice still applies today. The UK should be keeping the sealanes secure and maintaining a strategic deterrant building and design capability. That is: 3 large carriers and 6 light carriers/LPH, a batch of six escorts every 44 months, 18+MPA, long range carrier based recon and fighter/bombers (E2d, F35c) and four nuclear subs every 88 months to a new design.

 
Quote    Reply

larryjcr       5/13/2008 4:35:24 PM


You seem to be obsessed with twisting time to try and make a
point.


Please try and follow.





I've twisted nothing. I've commented on the history, especially
where the revisionists get it wrong..


 


Nimitz deliberately chose Fletcher as the carrier commander afloat
for the active threatre at the time, the SOPAC, not Spruance.





This is inaccurate. Nimitz didn't have much choice about the
commanders for his carriers. Fletcher was already there . Noyes was
coming over from the Atlantic. Fitch was already slotted, Halsey was
down with the crud, and Spruance was the one he tagged BY CHOICE for
a slot he could fill. Where he had a choice he made a choice.
Ghormley was yet to fail for health. Turner was expected to handle
the Guadalcanal naval landing. Seniority slotted Fletcher not
accomplishment into the carrier flag.
. .


 


Spurance became Chief of Staff for CinCPac, a job he was slated
for before Midway.  The Fifth Fleet command came well over a
YEAR LATER, where Spruance and Mitscher replaced Pownell, who had
failed his 'try out' for the part.  It was not anything Nimitz
had planned for him in June of 1942.  With US forces in the
Central Pacific growing and Pownell proving unsuitable, and with more
complex operations planned, Spruance was given the planning and
supervision of the fleet, and Mitscher got command of the fighting
force.  As of June, 1942, Nimitz had had very little direct
contact with Spruance and had picked him for Chief of Staff on his
reputation.  Fifteen months later, when he was looking for
someone to oversee Fifth Fleet, that had changed.


Herald:


You seem to be obsessed with twisting time to try and make a
point.


Please try and follow.





I've twisted nothing. I've commented on the history, especially
where the revisionists get it wrong..


 


Nimitz deliberately chose Fletcher as the carrier commander afloat
for the active threatre at the time, the SOPAC, not Spruance.





This is inaccurate. Nimitz didn't have much choice about the
commanders for his carriers. Fletcher was already there . Noyes was
coming over from the Atlantic. Fitch was already slotted, Halsey was
down with the crud, and Spruance was the one he tagged BY CHOICE for
a slot he could fill. Where he had a choice he made a choice.
Ghormley was yet to fail for health. Turner was expected to handle
the Guadalcanal naval landing. Seniority slotted Fletcher not
accomplishment into the carrier flag.
. .


 


Spurance became Chief of Staff for CinCPac, a job he was slated
for before Midway.  The Fifth Fleet command came well over a
YEAR LATER, where Spruance and Mitscher replaced Pownell, who had
failed his 'try out' for the part.  It was not anything Nimitz
had planned for him in June of 1942.  With US forces in the
Central Pacific growing and Pownell proving unsuitable, and with more
complex operations planned, Spruance was given the planning and
supervision of the fleet, and Mitscher got command of the fighting
force.  As of June, 1942, Nimitz had had very little direct
contact with Spruance and had picked him for Chief of Staff on his
reputation.  Fifteen months later, when he was looking for
someone to oversee Fifth Fleet, that had changed.





Pownall [spelled with an A] failed at Marcus Island as a task
group commander. What tryout? He was never intended as a fleet
commander-maybe a carrier admiral-but like Fletcher failed. Mitscher
was never a good choice, but he was next senior and at least he was
aggressive. Spruance after Midway was the golden boy.


 


Fletcher's staff from YORKTOWN transferred to ASTORIA with him. 
That was not a consideration in his decision to leave Spruance in
command rather than going aboard HORNET at the end of 4 June.





His staff was scattered and had to be transferred to him from
rescue ships. Astoria had no air operations or an admiral who keep
things straight in his own head as

 
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larryjcr       5/13/2008 4:46:33 PM




Which link are you talking about?? Several of yours have gotten me only failure to connect notices.



 Figure it out.Cut the SP prefixes and suffixes  If I quote the naval records , we'll be here til hell freezes over.



Why do you insist of burning SP's capacity with long reprint posts that, for the most part contribute nothing to the question at hand?



 Why don't you read and see at what I drive? those Japanese officers interrogations for example just proved you don't even have your chronologies or numbers straight Larry?



The interrogation of the KAGA officer, interestingly, doesn't mention the bomb hit that struck the island itself and killed most of the ships senior officers.  Other than that, his account conforms to that in SHATTERED SWORD, pages 248-250.  Four bombs that went off in the upper hanger deck.  One thru the forward elevator, one just forward of the bridge, near the starboard side, one slightly aft of amidships and somewhat to port and one just at the starboard, forward corner of the aft elevator.  Since the hit to the island, and the second mentioned above were very near each other, some confusion could be expected.

Um, that is because NO BOMB hit the island. Just one of many facts gotten wrong in Shattered Sword




Herald

If no bomb hit the KAGA's island, what exactly, killed virtually all the ships senior officers??  Not the bomb that hit just forward.  It went off in the hanger deck below.  When the attack by McClusky's force was over, the island was smashed and the Captain and virtually his entire command staff were dead.  Magic?? 
You say that there are many fact wrong in SHATTERED SWORD.  What is your proof.  The interrogation reports??
 
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