Larry, can you direct me towards some of Captain brown's literature, I'd like to have a look at that, I just pulled those stats from some old aircraft magazines I had lying about and some first ahnd accountswould be useful.

 

In terms of fighter doctrine, well, plenty of RAF pilots had been studying air doctrine and did not believe in the vics, some had even begun to implement the 'finger four' formation unofficially, it seems a bit unfair to say tha tthe British would never evolve a correct doctrine if their was no european war, it's probably an unknown variable that cannot be taken into account.

 

As for deflection shooting, the British did not study it because they had invented the gyroscopic relfector gun sight that 'calculated' lead to target automatically. Therefore RAF/RN gunnery was more than adequate, even if not as skilled as the USN.

 

As I said before, the RN isn't going to be venturing far out to sea to meet the Japanese, it only has to defend Malaya, therefore it can stay weithin the range of land based power if necessary, the lack of a proper RAF contingent in Malaya, as well as using mostly half trained troops and no tanks was the major contibutors to defeat in 1941, remember, the British forces were well overstretched by the time the Japanese attacked, given a concentration of trained and balanced british forces, it's difficult to see a japanese success in this area.

 

All the RN has to do is avoid getting mauled, the seafire would be more than adequate to defending the fleet, even if it was a bastard of a plane to recover successfully, the lack of a proper offensive weapon to use is my main concern, and probably, any offesnive action would have to be taken by land based airpower in 1941, Bristol Beaufighters being the ideal candidates.

 

Thus while not really in the ideal shape to take on japan in 1941, I believe britain could cobble together enough of a force to at least avoid defeat, any progression of the war will undoubtedly allow Britain to win....

in response to your questions..

 

1)  some RN ships did recieve the MK 37 FC.  British HA/LA directors were rotten.  The RN electrical system needed to be completely reworked to accept an American radar system.

 

2)  the FAA did fly many Lend-Lease aircraft including the Wildcat, Hellcat, Corsair, and Avenger.  Most were used in the Pacific later in the war.  British built FAA aircraft were horrible.  The only good aircraft was the Swordfish and even that was only good for small CVEs.  It was criminal that the Swordfish, Albacore, anf Fulmar stayed on front-line service past 1941.  The problem was, however, the US didn't have enough planes to share with the Brits. 

 

3)  the RN did introduce a 5.25 inch DP gun.  The mount was too slow, the director wasn't good enough, and the round was too big and heavy to be manually loaded quickly.  RN also had a 4.5 inch AA gun that wasn't too bad.  RN 4 inch was barely powerful enough for a good AA gun and not enough as an effective DP gun.  At least one Dido-class AA cruisers was rearmed with 5"/38 mounts.  Not sure if RN 5.25, 4.5, or 4 inch guns had VT fuses.  5"/38 was, by far, the best medium weight weapon of the war.

 

4)  RN needed every "big gun" ship possible hence the R class BBs stuck around (convoy duty, NGFS) though many were laid up by late 1944.

 

5)  KGV were the only RN BBs worth anything (other than Vanguard).  Had they stripped the R class turrets from the get go, that might have helped but would only give the KGV a broadside of 6 15 inch guns instead on 10 14 inch.  Completely unacceptable.

 

6)  Hood was scheduled for modernization but the war started.  Even modernized, Hood wouldn't have survived Bismarck.

 

7)  Repulse, some as Hood.  Lack of effective light and heavy AA weapons, directors, fighter cover, and stupid RN tactics doomed Repulse and Prince of Wales.

just to add, the Hurricane did have lower wing loading than the wildcat so it should be able to make a tighter turn, indeed in mock combats in 1943 the hurricanes were easily able to turn inside the F4F and stay there for the duration. While the 8 0.303s were not as good as 6 0.5s, the grouping of the guns gave the Hurricane a fairly cometitive penetration power, while the fact that it was fabric over frame aft of the cockpit made it very durable and rugged....

Wing loading is not the only factor in turn rate.  Wing form efficiency and in many cases, the effectiveness of combat flap usage were also factors.  The nature of the turn was also a consideration.  Turning until you stalled was different from making the best turn you could while trying to keep you speed up.  In any event, the Hurricain had to be navalized, which added to its weight.  No Sea Hurricains were built as such,  all were converted, standard Hurricains, but needed reinforcement to the airframe to handle repeated carrier landings.  There WAS a Sea Hurricain with folding wings designed, but it was never built.  Note that the F4F could turn inside a P-40, and the Germans in North Africa (who were in a position to know) considered the Curtiss to have a tighter turn than the Hurricain.

The fabric rear fuselage was an advatage against 20mm as it would often allow the shell to go right thru without exploding.  On the other hand, the Wildcat's reputation for toughness was well earned.  Against the Japanese, the armament of the F4F-3 or later FM1s and FM2s was better: 4x.50s with 420 rpg.  That gave 33 seconds of fire against 18 seconds for the F4F-4s 6x.50s with 240 rpg, or the Hurricain's 8x.303 with 334 rpg (about 17 seconds).  The four .50s were good enough against the Japanese IF you got in hits at all, and the greater ammo supply was more useful.  Penetration wasn't a big factor against Japanese a/c, but the .50 did a lot more damage when it hit the engine, or wing spar.

DUELS IN THE SKY by Capt. Eric M. Brown, RN, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland.  It combines a light history of FAA operations in WW2 with analysis and direct comparisons of various a/c. 

Remeber, the RAF doctrine was AGAINST fighter-vs-fighter combat.  That's what the Fighting Area Attack plans were all about: fighters attacking bombers as a kind of parade-ground exercise.

 

The Gyro sight didn't 'calculate lead automatically'.  In the absence of radar ranging on the target it couldn't.  It did make it much easier IF the pilot knew how to deflection shoot in the first place.  A (very) few RAF pilots (Screwball Burling) could deflection shoot, and racked up kills very effectively, but nearly all were limited to attacks from rear quadrant.  The STANDARD USN method of attacking a twin engined bomber was a full deflection attack from above in a vertical dive.  It kept you entirely out of the counter fire of a G4M, which was a GOOD thing, what with those 20mm turret guns.

 

Japanese doctrine also called for waiting for the enemy to come to them.  If both sides do that, no battle.  What makes you think that the RN would be in a position to sit on the defensive while the Japanese gobbled up Hong Kong, and most of the Dutch Indies??  Considering the scenario, I've assumed an open sea battle on even terms.  It would be as easy to assume (in view of the European -- British included -- attitude of preceived superiority over the Japanese) that the political situation would require the RN to go out and win a Nelsonian victory over the 'bloody little nips'.

 

Actually, without the war in Europe, there probably wouldn't have been any Beaufighters.  It was the German night bomber threat that forced its developement as a stop-gap.  It would have been the Beaufort, built as a land based torpedo bomber.

Would the Sea Spitfire actually have done the job?  They'd almost certainly have gotten hammered in their first fight or two.  It would take that long to be convinced that they REALLY COULDN'T turn with the Zeros.  That's what happened to the Darwin Wing.  They just couldn't break the habit of trying to turn their way to victory.  By the way, I was wrong.  It was only a 3 to 1 K/L ratio for the Zeros, and

I reckon the RN would have stayed on the defensive, it's entire value to the far east was as a fleet in being, Hong Kong was virtually indefensible and would fall quickly - as it did. However, based on the assumption that large Brtiish forces could be deployed to the Dutch East Indies, along with Dutch and French forces (no european war) then there isn't much difference in that scenario than defending Malaya, as long as the RN is happy enough to stay with in range of land based support, there is no reason to hunt down the Japanese, they after all, will come to the RN if they want to invade.

 

Of course, it gets difficult to gauge what each admiral would do, maybe Fraser would stay put, maybe Cunningham would go after them... it's difficult to tell. Maybe the first few seafires would get bounced, but the British did tend to learn quite quickly, and were certainly more adaptable than the Japanese (after all, for all we under-estimated them in 1941, they definately under-estimated us in 1944) and Germans - at least in the realms of technology -  and it's unlikely the mistake would be repeated. Also, the Spitfires were not aso delicate as sometimes supposed, even with it's in line engine, many spits did limp home after taken some really bad beatings.

 

As I said before Naval aviation is where we really screwed up, if there is no european war and the Japanese threrat is still percieved as early as the thirties, then you hope that if we ahve to fight the first battles at a disadvantage, so long as we don't get horsed, we'll come out on top at the end, So much of British industry went into rushed bodge jobs to produce 'iterim' solutions.... The illustrious carriers were able to push the 60-70 aircraft capacity eventually, a lot depends on the aircraft the RN gets through 43-44, if all war production is channelled into the far east. I still maintain that the RN, by hook or crutch would be able to avoid getting decimated in '41, had the fleet been available... in the end it wasn't, but hey ho...

 

But thanks for the book recommendation, it's much appreciated

 

 

My question is,

if there was no European war threat (Nazi Germany),

and the British saw Imperial Japan rising to a power that could challenge the British colonies in the region as early as the early 1930s,

would Britain have been smart enough to put the funds, manpower, and materiel resources into action to adequately (or at least, more than they were) shore up its overseas stations?

 

Would a large investment in Australian industry have enabled the RN to have large fleet yards around Australia?

Or even encourage an increased British commitment in India, or along the east African coast?

 

And if the Imperial Japanese saw the rising British power to counter them, is it possibly they (Japanese) could've collaborated with another European power to get aggressive towards the British, enough to draw a large percentage of British forces out of the Pacific theater?

If no Nazi Party had come to power in Germany, what other European countries might have been symaptheitc to the Japanese "plight" enough to declare hostilities at England principally to draw British forces from the Pacific region?

What European countries were in direct competition with the colonial territories for resources and riches, to the point another European country would've declared war on Britain?

 

Without going back a few decades even earlier and not having the US to spank the Spanish fleet out of the Philippines, among other places,

what other European power would've had enough influence in the Pacific region that they would've felt threatened by an increasing British military presence, to the point they would've allied with the Imperial Japanese to drive the British out, or at least cripple them enough so as not to be such a threat?

Russia had its own bad blood with Japan, and Japan was already in parts of china,..or would we choose to alter that history as well, hoping one of those countries would be supportive against British presence in the Pacific region?

 (unless the Bolshevik Revolution never took place either and the czars and landowners of Russia were never overthrown, I just don't see a post-1920s Russia siding with the Imperial Japanese...)

 

I'm just trying to extrapolate what might have needed to have occured to lead up to the British intensifying their Pacific military presence (no European threats to focus on),

just so these theoretical RN vs IJN battles would've happened...

One point that I haven't seen in this thread (if I missed  it I'm sorry) is that the RN never really planned for a Pacific naval front.  The British knew that if hte Japanese went atfter their Pacific colonies, the Japanese would also go for the Dutch and American possessions as well.  The Americans would do most of the heavy fighting.  The RN had no fleet train of any consequence to support extended Pacific fleet operations.  Even in 1944-45, an American fleet train task group supported the British Pacific Fleet.

 

RN carriers were built with armored flight decks.  That much weight, up high in the ship, caused many metacentric height and weight issues for them.  The armored flight decks were also strength decks.  Damage that an American carrier could recover from (albeit with very heavy damage, like Franklin or Bunker Hill) would cause a RN carrier to be written off.  The flight deck damage would warp the entire framework of the ship and ruin it for future use. 

 

RN ships never had any decent AA weapons for the entire war.  The pom-pom 2 pdr was awful.  They never mounted enough Bofors 40mm.  Only the RN ships repaired in the US had any decent AA weaponry.  By 1943, the Mk 51/40mm director-gun combo found on most US warships was unbeatable.  The 5"/38 was hands-down better than any RN AA/DP weapon.  The hodge-podge of 4", 4.5", 4.7", and 5.25" created a horrific strain on resupply and fleet train replenishment.

 

RN cruisers were barely adequate.  RN shipyards had little means of repairing heavily damaged ships with any form of speed.  HMS Belfast spent half the war in drydock after hitting a magnetic mine.  They should have scrappd her and moved on.  RN destroyers, with the exception of maybe the Tribals, weren't much good.  They were too lightly built, not enough endurance, mixed caliber weaponry, and inadequate fire control.

 

Earlier I went thru the set of WARTIME changes to the Illustrious design that allowed for larger air groups.  The three origninal ILLUSTRIOUS class ships never operated more than 50-55 a/c even using US made a/c that could be stored on deck.  INDOMITABLE could handle only a few more.  Only the final two, the IMPLACABLEs could get up to 70.

Those ships were built to specs written by battleship admirals as support ships for a battle line.  They were supposed to provide scouting, and enough fighters to protect against enemy scouting, so three dozen were good enough.  If threatened by serious air attack, they were expected to stow any a/c on board and depend on AAA and armor for defense.  The hanger was an armored box with the armored flight deck for its roof and was supposed to be impervious to any bomb they expected to have dropped on them.  Even the elevators were outside the armor box -- one ahead and one behind -- with sliding, armored doors for access to the hanger.  In the later ships with two level hangers, only the after elevator went down to the lower deck, which interferred badly with speed of operations.  The elevators couldn't be put inside the armored box without leaving weak points in the armor deck above the box.

 

As was mentioned above, the armored flight deck was the fore-and-aft strength deck of the ship.  The designers had no choice about that.  There was so much weight invested in that deck, they HAD to use it as the strength deck, but that meant that they had to limit holes in the deck to as few, and as small as possible.  Which is another reason there were only two a/c elevators, and the reason that they were so small.  That was good enough when the air group was 36 a/c, but with 70 or more, two small elevators with only one going to the lower hanger, slowed air ops to a crawl.

 

In any event, if the ships had all been built, as intended, to the original pattern, there would have been NO 60-70 a/c groups without massive rebuilding of the ships.  That's the real reason the last two took so long to complete -- the redesigning and rebuilding.  I have some doubts about Sea Spitfires anytime in 1941.  Unless the government of the UK was TOTALLY secure about any local threat they would have stayed a