The big problem for an exit strategy from Afghanistan is this: Afghanistan has been shattered by decades of war and lacks the economic base to support an army large and powerful enough to keep control of the country without massive outside support. It will take decades to rebuild Afghanistan.
The Bush strategy took this into account by have a small, sustainable presence, designed not to occupy the whole country, but establish a safe zone where an economic base could be built up over time and gradually exert control over the outlying areas.
The Obama strategy is more of a surge, cut, and run strategy. They make a big presence to establish control and send the enemy reeling, then evacuate and leave the government to its own fate. Thus we save face, but abandon an ally. Call it the Vietnam strategy.
Enter the wild card. A recent report suggested there could be almost a trillion dollars of mineral wealth in Afghanistan (and I suspect this estimate may be a low). Compare that to a GDP of $21 billion. You are talking massive wealth for one of the poorest nations on earth.
The problem is this: it takes a lot of infrastructure to get at this mineral wealth. You need engineers and money to build and maintain the mines. Roads, railroads, and ports to ship it out to consumers. And of course this all depends upon security. It is always easier to destroy infrastructure than build it. Afghanistan has almost no infrastructure. It has a population that is mostly illiterate. It has only a few hundred miles of paved roads, no ports (it is a land-locked country), and almost no railroads.
It could take decades to develop the mineral wealth of Afghanistan and big investment from outside. The hope is that the prospect of this wealth will induce warring parties to come together in their mutual best interest. I doubt this will help, because the parties are not all interested in only money.
However, it does give the outside more incentive for staying involved. Perhaps the proponents of the cut-and-run strategy will reconsider. |