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Subject: Courtesy of Slylark, What if? The Six Day War Revisited
Maratabc    4/18/2013 1:00:54 PM
Replace French aircraft with Swedish aircraft in the Israeli air force? ------------------------------------ Hmmm... What if Israel developed their jet technology through Sweden instead of France and had the Draken instead of Mirage III in the 6-Day War...? Might make an interesting "Hot-topics" debate on this site. Courtesy of Skylark, whose idea this was. Israeli air order of battle: Data from ACIG. Totals as of 0715hrs of 5 June 1967: - 67 Mirage IIICJ/BJ/CJ(R) - 1 MiG-21F-13 (ex Iraqi) - 35 Super Mystère B.2 - 19 Vautour IIA/N/BR(18 serviceable) - 35 Mystère IVA (33 serviceable) - 51 Ouragan (48 serviceable) - some 15 Meteor F.Mk.8, FR.Mk.9, and T.Mk.7/8 Non-French (Swedish) replacement -70 SAAB J-35 B, C, and D Draken -1 MiG 21F-13 To replace all the Mystere, Super Mystere, and Ouragan aircraft in Israeli service, there are two Swedish aircraft, -70 Saab J 29F Tunnan -70 Saab 32 B, and C Lansen Or more ideally -100 SAAB J-35 B, C, and D Draken -100 SAAB J-32 B, C, and D Lansen -There is nothing that can replace the Vautour. ===================================>
 
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Maratabc       4/23/2013 11:56:48 AM


Had Israel had the Egyptian Inventory and Egypt had either
the extant Israeli inventory or the proposed Swedish Inventory, the outcome
would not have been much different. Probably greater losses on the part of the Israeli Air Forces, but beyond that not much in actual outcome.


From pretty much Top (Nasser) to bottom (Pilots on the flight line); the Egyptians were simply INCAPABLE of professional and constructive action or planning.  Nasser “winged” the whole Six Day War Crisis.  He pushed the Egyptian Military into hurried and unrehearsed actions and deployments.  


The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was not well-led, and had fallen into predictable patterns of operation. It apparently did not contemplate that war was/is a DYNAMIC interaction
of opponents, and so never seemed to understand that the Israelis would be trying to understand and defeat IT. Instead they seemed to focus on planning, such as it was, on attacking Israel.  


The Egyptians did not seem to understand the Israeli focus on quick turn-around and servicing.  If you look at it, with approximately equal aircraft inventories Tzahal could generate what ~1,200 sorties per day, for a limited period of time.  The Egyptians could generate, at most 450 sorties.  Which FUNCTIONALLY, gave the Israelis an air force almost THREE TIMES the size of the Egyptian Air Force!  Apparently the EAF, just did not bother to study, much  less understand, it’s Israeli opponent! Had they understood the implications of just the focus on turn-around, the Egyptians would have been much more cautious and/or focused and more capable of dealing with Tzahal.  Instead, they seemed completely surprised by the tactics and the numbers of sorties
their opponents generated.


Lastly, Egyptian pilots were sub-standard.  The EAF had fewer qualified pilots than it had aircraft.  And even the term “qualified” is suspect.  Their pilots could start the engines, taxi, take off, perform flight operations and land, that was “qualified.”  But they were not particularly skilled nor well-trained in tactics and weapon delivery. 
In fact, IIRC, the EAF realized that it was never going to produce enough qualified pilots for its force structure given the educational/economic demographics of the Egyptian population! During the attack, Egyptian pilots showed no desire to respond
effectively to the Israelis.  Without superior guidance, they were reluctant to move aircraft from targeted areas or to take off and attempt any combat.  No orders, no actions….and for several hours the Egyptian Military and Air Force were paralyzed as its commanders were airborne, incommunicado, and could not find an airfield to land at to provide any direction.  Not that these commanders were particularly adept, but without them, the Egyptian Military simply would not act!


Bottom-Line: no matter the hardware, the Israelis would have beaten the Egyptian Air Force.  It was “software” dominance and personnel that made all the difference.  Had the EAF had F-4 Phantom II’s or Drakens, the only difference would have been the shape and cost of the wreckage on their airfields.


 


 





Their air staff  was terrible, but their pilots were well trained and combat experienced
 
Equipment dictates how you fight. If your air force has few or very poor close air support aircraft such a Egypt did, then the close air support effort will be intermittent and poor in result. The Beagle made sense in Yemen, but the Badger? The lack of a good close air support aircraft in quantity such as the IL-10 and Yak 9B hurt the Egyptians. Remember that war in Yemen was a counter insurgency war and Yemen is a HUGE country with terrain worse than the moon.
 
All of your criticisms I covered in detail. (see above the basic preparation deficiencies I list.)   
 
One last note, Turnaround time for a Mystere is about an hour. For the Mig 21, it is TEN MINUTES. 
 
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JFKY    No,    4/23/2013 1:09:12 PM
Dropping bombs in Yemen is NOT combat-tested...yes, technically combat-experienced, but it's combat only in the technical sense, that live weapons were used against a live enemy, not training...but the Yemeni's had no air force, no air defenses, and even then the EAF had problems coordinating and achieving anything useful.
 
And the average turn-around for the Israelis was 7.5 minutes, per Wiki....now that isn't aircraft specific.
 
Anyway, my point is that it was NOT aircraft that made the victory possible....the EAF was hapless lot, facing a very well-trained air force, with a plan, a very good plan.
 
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Maratabc       4/23/2013 2:45:39 PM





Dropping bombs in Yemen is NOT combat-tested...yes, technically combat-experienced, but it's combat only in the technical sense, that live weapons were used against a live enemy, not training...but the Yemeni's had no air force, no air defenses, and even then the EAF had problems coordinating and achieving anything useful.


I never said anything about combat-tested. You said the Egyptians didn't have enough pilots and trained air crew. I knew that the Egyptians had flown air combat missions in Yemen for five years, prior to the 1967 war, that they had used between one hundred fifty and two hundred twenty aircraft of all types from what the west would call; strategic bombers to small attack helicopters. I knew that almost six hundred Egyptian pilots flew in that campaign, that they learned how to navigate to drop parachute troops, to resupply isolated garrisons by air, to land attacking infantry by air, to bomb in response to radioed calls for help, to city bomb, to deliver poison gas attacks, etc.


They fought a war. And in that very technical sense, the mid-grade Egyptian air force officers learned how to fight. That the Israelis were better is not disputed, but Operation Focus was two years in the planning and after its execution, the Israeli Air Force did not do much to support its army on the ground. Mainly it was because they had to hold back for air defense against Syria and Jordan and mainly it was because they did not know how .


The IAF had trained hard to attack airfields and to engage in air defense. Their close air support skills were minimal.


And the average turn-around for the Israelis was 7.5 minutes, per Wiki....now that isn't aircraft specific.


 Do not use wiki.


Arabs at War, 1948-1991, Kenneth M. Pollack. Pp345 on sortie rates the Jordanians generated against the Syrians during Black September Syrian invasion of 1970. Jordanian air sortie rates averaged 4-8 planes every sixteen hours which rivaled the start rates the Israelis managed at the start of the Six Day War. My math may not be good, but that is an Israeli turnaround time of two hours to bomb and fuel Vautours, Mysteres, and Mirages, which is consistent with Armee' del'Aire sortie rates for the type of the time.


Anyway, my point is that it was NOT aircraft that made the victory possible....the EAF was hapless lot, facing a very well-trained air force, with a plan, a very good plan.

After Operation Focus (with the Egyptian Air Force caught by surprise on the ground.) the IAF was more or less at loose ends. They fought a rather haphazard air war thereafter.


In the war of attrition the IAF did not do as well.


http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4163.html


From 1967 to 1972 the Israeli air force lost sixty precious Mirage III and Mystere aircraft, forcing them to begin importation of the Phantom II and the development of the Nesher and the Kfir to domestically produce replacement aircraft to replace the lost Mysteres and Mirages based on the best aircraft they had the Mirage IIIC.

 
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JFKY       4/23/2013 2:58:01 PM
And I believe it was Pollack that said the Egyptians didn't have enough qualified air crew...flying, intermittently, allows you to stretch your available resources.
 
And I believe the turn-around times were far less than 1 hour per Israeli aircraft....Mystere may have been an outlier...as they generated 6-8 sorties per day in the first day, at least...counting flight time, they sent a wave out every 4 minutes, IIRC.
 
Dood I don't see why you have this discussion...it was, OBVIOUSLY, not aircraft that decided the 6 Day War...it was the Israeli competence, versus Egyptian/Jordanian/Syrian incompetence.....
 
You could have given all three Arab air forces F-4's, BAC Lightnings, and Buccaneers, and the outcome would have been the same.  The Arabs, Egypt first, did a TERRIBLE job of preparing for war...poor pilots, poor planning, poor overall leadership at the National/Military/Service level....
 
And the point you make is essentially, that NO Israel didn't need Swedish Aircraft, any way....because the French aircraft fit into their war-fighting scheme better any way.
 
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Maratabc       4/23/2013 3:44:03 PM


He did not the Air War College resources to check, did he? 

And I believe the turn-around times were far less than 1 hour per Israeli aircraft....Mystere may have been an outlier...as they generated 6-8 sorties per day in the first day, at least...counting flight time, they sent a wave out every 4 minutes, IIRC.

I trust that source I gave you. It discusses the Arab war machines in great detail.

Dood I don't see why you have this discussion...it was, OBVIOUSLY, not aircraft that decided the 6 Day War...it was the Israeli competence, versus Egyptian/Jordanian/Syrian incompetence.....
 
If your radar does not work, if your missiles do not work, you will use gunsights and the gun. This is what the Israelis did, not the Egyptians, the Israelis.What your plane can do dictates how you fight in the air. The Egyptians were caught on the ground in precisely the way the Americans were at Pearl Harbor. Does that mean the Egyptian air force could not fight after?
 
The War of Attrition...
 
 
From ACIG 
 
17 Mirage IIIC  shot down
 
Then 29 Mirage IIIC, Nesher, and Phantom II aircraft lost.  This does not include the many Israeli aircraft shot down due to the IDFs arrogant underestimate of the Egyptian SAM defense belts.  

You could have given all three Arab air forces F-4's, BAC Lightnings, and Buccaneers, and the outcome would have been the same.  The Arabs, Egypt first, did a TERRIBLE job of preparing for war...poor pilots, poor planning, poor overall leadership at the National/Military/Service level....

The correct equipment must come with the correct training. The classic example is the American in Vietnam. They used their air force equipment poorly. 

And the point you make is essentially, that NO Israel didn't need Swedish Aircraft, any way....because the French aircraft fit into their war-fighting scheme better any way.
That is essentially correct. The point being, that the French military who receive much vitriol, at least at that time and in their air force knew exactly what they were doing. Something that the British, the Americans, and the Russians all seemed to have trouble with, since they and their clients at that time proved in the air to be miserable failures using wrong methods and wrong types of aircraft to conduct their air operations.  
There is a reason that as late as the Falklands War, the French air methods were more efficient than the British. The French thought their methods through and chose their equipment to match their desired results.  
 
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JFKY    I don't care about the War of Attrition.   4/24/2013 11:17:00 AM
This is the Six Day War.
 
And again, the Israelis sent a four-plane wave out every 10 minutes...now mayhap Mysteres had a 1 hour turnaround, but the rest did not.  And again I don't care  about your source...I've read multiple times about rapid turn-around and the 4-plane 10 minute or so wave.... 
 
This is a pointless thread, if we all agree that the French Aircraft were the better of the options....
 
 
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Maratabc       4/24/2013 12:35:47 PM
1. Wrong popular sources that quote each other and the original wrong source are not relevant. Launch intervals of ten minutes; after all aircraft are fueled and armed is not the turnaround time, the arming and fueling of the four plane strike is.
 
2. The War of Attrition was a direct continuation of the Six Day War as neither Egypt nor Israel honored the UN ceasefire at all.
 
3. Your point that the Egyptian air force could not fight meshes with point 2.
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Maratabc       4/24/2013 5:06:25 PM

Pollacks comments on Egyptian pilot shortages were with reference to the 1956 Suez Crisis by the way (same book).

 ========================================

The original question of this thread was could Swedish aircraft have substituted for French aircraft? 

 

I conclude that for the airbase attack mission, no, because the wrong munitions are at hand to be employed from the Lansen. On the other hand, there is good reason to suggest that the close air support mission in the Sinai could have been better handled by the J-29 Tunnan than by the Ouragons and Mysteres. The Swedish air to ground anti-armor rockets were specifically designed to kill tanks.    

 

As I determined from the likely bomber that Sweden could have supplied, (the Lansen) is probably the one the Israelis could have used to replace the Mysteres and the Vautour to attack the Egyptian airbases in the Sinai, but then the planes could not have reached the airfields in the delta and beyond that the Mysteres and Mirages did. The aircraft had no provision for air to air refueling. To make its long range runs it needed a 600 liter drop tank (conformal to center hang-point)

The Lansen could bomb with
12 x 120 kg bombs HE/frag
4 x 250 kg bombs HE/frag
4 x 500 kg bombs HE/frag
4 x 600 kg bombs HE/frag

This makes for progressively shorter ranges as the loads increase from 1000 km/combat radius to about 500 km/combat radius.

Most likely if the IDF planned long range missions, they would need to procure another 'strategic bomber' type.

That would be the Vautour.  

 


 
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