F-104Cs served in SEA in 1965-66 and 1966-67 during two separate deployments. Over the course of these two deployments, seven F-104s were lost to enemy ground defenses; one F-104 was shot down by an enemy aircraft, and no enemy aircraft were engaged by F-104s while flying escort or CAP missions. It has been said that the F-104s "never had a mission and never made a mark" in SEA. Misconceptions, myth and misinformation about the F-104 have led to this impression. The facts tell a different story. By 1964, the USAF's only primary air superiority aircraft, the F-104C, had been forward deployed on several occasions to project US power and assure control of the air during world crises. The F-104 was widely regarded as the world's foremost daylight air-to-air platform, and the pilots of TAC's 479th TFW, the only operators of the F-104C, had proven themselves to be masters of their trade in numerous mock air-to-air encounters. It was therefore understood that the F-104Cs of the 479th's 435th, 436th or 476th TFSs would rapidly deploy to any troublespot where air superiority must be quickly established. Such a spot was SEA in 1965.

Operation Two Buck

Soon after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, TAC began deploying aircraft in Operation Two Buck, a TDY jet force buildup in SEA. At the time of the initial 1964 buildup, PACAF advocated deployment of an F-104 contingent to protect US air traffic over the Gulf of Tonkin from harassment by PRC and NVN aircraft. However, in January 1965 when TAC proposed sending F-104s to relieve TDY pressure on its overtaxed F-100 units, PACAF reversed its initial stance, citing the logistic complications of adding one more aircraft type to the SEA mix. PACAF was convinced the existing MiG threat in SEA did not warrant a unit dedicated to the air superiority role. Events in the following months would change PACAF's opinion. With the beginning of Rolling Thunder strikes in March 1965, the tempo of bombing over NVN escalated substantially. Unfortunately, the tempo and aggressiveness of NVN and PRC MiG also increased. Initially the heightened aggressiveness was felt primarily by the USN as PRC harassment of aircraft over the Gulf of Tonkin stepped up. NVN aircraft then began to dog US bombing missions over NVN. On 3 April 1965 three NVN MiG-17s attacked a USN strike on the Dong Phuong Thong bridge, damaged an F-8 Crusader, and escaped unharmed. The following day, two NVN MiG-17s attacked a flight of four F-105s that were waiting their turn to bomb the Than Hoa bridge. The MiGs approached without warning, shot down two of the F-105s, completely disrupted the strike, then evaded escorting F-100s to escape unscathed. Obviously, the existing early warning and fighter assets in SEA were insufficient to guarantee US air superiority in the region. Accordingly, an EC-121D College Eye unit was dispatched to extend radar warning coverage over NVN, and TAC was asked to deploy F-104s to escort the EC-121s over the Gulf of Tonkin and to provide a MiG screen for USAF strike aircraft over NVN. On 7 April, TAC issued the deployment order to the 479th TFW, and the first F-104Cs of the 476th TFS landed at Kung Kuan AB, Taiwan, on 11 April. Kung Kuan was to serve as the main operating base for the F-104s, with regular rotation of aircraft to the forward operating base at DaNang. Twenty-four F-104s were deployed to Kung Kuan, and of these, fourteen would be maintained at DaNang by rotation every ten days. This deployment scheme would be utilized throughout the F-104's Two Buck commitment. After a work-up period of seven days, fourteen F-104s arrived at DaNang on 19 April and flew their first escort mission the next day. EC-121 escort missions typically involved three flights of four F-104s, and two KC-135s. The escort sorties typically lasted from two to five hours and the operating area was normally between 250 and 300 miles NNW of DaNang. MiGCAP missions over NVN utilized one to three flights of four F-104s deployed at various altitudes between the strike area and the Hanoi-Haiphong area. CAP points were 225 to 275 miles NNW of DaNang and on-station times varied from forty to ninety minutes. Aerial refueling was only required for the longer duration missions. The effect of F-104 deployment upon NVN and PRC MiG operations was immediate and dramatic. NVN MiGs avoided contact with USAF strikes being covered by F-104s, and PRC MiGs gave the EC-12

Anyway - the 319th was the ONLY combat flying outfit I've ever been in where we had payday afternoon off. The availability rate was limited ONLY by parts. The airplane was extremely reliable. The radar cold be changed in 20 minutes; the engine in 2 hours. Every comm/electronic box could be changed at the end of the runway in the quick check area in matter of a few minutes - and was. Our QC crew had spare boxes in their van and saved many a sortie.

ADC had an exercise where they put up targets in a racetrack and tested the unit on how many sorties it could crank out. One afternoon we put 60 sorties up in three hours. The pilots were RTB'ing in AB and the ground crews were giving us 15 minute turnarounds!

The F-104 is the ONLY airplane I ever heard of where the squadron dog would exceed all the Flight Manual red line limits - 750KIAS, M2.0 and 100C engine inlet temp, and the SLOW light which came on at 121C in the generator cooling air duct. The bird originally had the GE J79-3B engine, and by the time I got to fly it that engine was getting worn out. The engine frames were so warped now that hot air leaks would set off the AFT OVERHEAT light if one got too slow at altitude (generally under 315 KIAS or so). Finally a fine officer and gentleman Col (now Bgen, ret) Dave Rippetoe got us the J79-19 engine. This is the same engine that is in the F104S and a variant of the F-4E engine. The replacement was simple enough so that the majority were installed in the squadron.

The -3B gave us 9600 lbs in military and 14000 in AB - when it was new, that is. The -19 gave us 12850 in military and 18900 in AB, later reduced for peacetime longevity to 11870/17500. Suffice to say the increase in performance was outstanding. The old bird would take about 4 minutes to get to mach 2 from .9, covering about 100 miles and using about all the fuel one could spare. The new bird took 1 minute 45 seconds, 27 miles, and 1000 pounds of fuel!

We normally flew 1:20 sorties clean (no ext tanks); now we could fly 1:30. The bird now cruised at 35000 at 315 KIAS at 2700PPH. Two reasons for greater efficiency, a new nozzle and a higher compression ratio in the compressor. With 2 x 165 galon tip tanks we could now go HST-Big SpringTX, BGS to Palmdale. 2 hop XC from FL to CA.

We intercepted U-2 fairly often on their training flights, usually above 60000. Of course we had to wear p-suits. Fuel was our limitation on the old bird; we couldn't afford to wait more than about 5 minutes if he was behind on his ETA. But with the new bird! I was fortunate enough to fly the first U2 mission and during prebrief the controller at MOADS and I talked it over. Of course he had nothing in his computer about the bird's new performance. I asked to be rolled out 35 miles behind the U-2 at .9 mach at 35000. He did just that. I selected full Ab and started accelerating. As the bird pass 1.4 I started a gentle climb. At something like 18 miles (on a 20 nm scope) I saw his blip on our 'spinscan' ASG14 radar. I glanced at the gauges and saw we were 1.8 M passing 58000! I don't recall what the fuel gauge read but it was nothing to worry about. Completed the intercept and peeled off for home with about 2400 pounds of fuel left! In the old bird if we had 1200 left then we were in fat city! Gs. Yeah, just about everybody could out turn a -104 in the usual subsonic dogfight area. But the only birds that gave us a hard time - with the old engine! - were the -106 and the F-8. The secret was never slowing down and using the vertical to the max. We had a good gun and sight combo and practiced (some of us) deflection shooting out to 3500-4000 feet. We got to where we could hit the dart (5x12 feet) about 85% of the time at ranges exceeding 2500 feet using the radar ranging gunsight. The plan was to force the bogey into a turn and then phase our attacks so one bird was alway threatening the bogey. This is the TAC lead wingman switch concept. We thought of it and flew it as 'fluid four' without the wingmen, co