So what I am to understand is this: Total number of F-22's to be built is 187. Out of that number only 120 or so can be used in a combat scenario. Not all of which (maybe 75) would actually be available at any one time. No reserve to fall back on for combat losses, accidents, attrition. So yes, I do not get how that miniscule number along with a couple hundred creaky F-15's is supposed to bear the air superiority requirements for the United States Air Force for the next 30 years.

 

Low-rate production for another 100 to keep fresh planes in the air is hardly worth debating, it should be a "ferking" requirement.

The fact is huh?

 

...and this is based on what exactly?

 

 

"So yes, I do not get how that miniscule number along with a couple hundred creaky F-15's is supposed to bear the air superiority requirements for the United States Air Force for the next 30 years."

 

Well, ask yourself this...

 

How many dedicated air superiority fighters did we need the last 30 years?

 

Besides, we are also anticipating having hundreds of F-35s, Super Hornets, and Strike Eagles in service for a long time to come, none of which are deficient performers in air-to-air.

 

There is no threat anywhere in the world today or the foreseeable future that could not be addressed with the current number of F-22s. 

 

The scenarios that are the most challenging aren't the most challenging because of a lack of F-22s, but geography. 

 

Based on:

 

- The number of AEFs and the requirement for an air superiority squadron for each AEF

- The Air Force's analysis which even Schwartz acknowledged showing 243 F-22s is a medium risk force and 381 a low risk force

- The QDR showing we need a minimum of 5 air superiority wings going forward (and 240 F-22s doesnt even equal that)

- The fact that our F-15 fleet cannot be kept relevant for the next 20 years and is falling apart

- The fact that the F-35 is not a good fit for the mission, and won't be around in enough numbers anyway

 

The only way you can justify having less force structure than that is by constantly revising projected threats downwards.  Which, in the face of the proliferation of advanced Russian aircraft, improving Chinese aircraft, etc, is just goofy.  You don't win wars by achieving air adequacy.

You're right.  We never went to war against the Warsaw Pact, we should just have saved the money we blew on developing the 4th gen fighters and just stuck with the F-4 this whole time.  Who needs deterrence anyway?

"The only way you can justify having less force structure than that is by constantly revising projected threats downwards.  Which, in the face of the proliferation of advanced Russian aircraft, improving Chinese aircraft, etc, is just goofy.  You don't win wars by achieving air adequacy."

 

 

The only way you can justify 300+ Raptors is by constantly inventing threats that simply don't exist. 

 

It isn't that threats are being revised downward, it is that we are reevaluating the form the threats take.  Ballistic missiles for example are a huge and growing threat.  Virtually every potential adversary we might face has an active ballistic missile program... thus ballistic missile defenses are a high priority.

 

The same is not true of fighter aircraft.  NK, Iran, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, etc etc... none of them field more than a handful of passably modern fighters with no prospect for dramatic improvement and no capability to use their aircraft as part of a coherent system. 

 

There is no "proliferation" of "advanced Russian aircraft" to worry about.  Outside of India, Russia's largest aircraft customer in recent years but an an unlikely adversary, Russian fighter exports are going to the usual suspects.  Most of these states have poorly trained pilots, dysfunctional military leadership, and no realistic air warfare doctrine. 

 

Only China has any realistic prospect of developing a modern air force that could also fight a coherent systems based war against the US, but even then the largest problem is not the numbers or types of aircraft they might buy, but the geography of the likely theater of combat.  More F-22s won't give the US more bases in East Asia. 

 

"You're right.  We never went to war against the Warsaw Pact, we should just have saved the money we blew on developing the 4th gen fighters and just stuck with the F-4 this whole time.  Who needs deterrence anyway?"

 

 

Any who do we need to deter?

 

There isn't a state on earth that entertains any illusion that they could contest control of the air with the US.

 

Only China and Russia could make a realistic argument for being able to deny the US complete air superiority more than 72 hours into a conflict and that is primarily due to geography and their SAMs.  Neither is a likely adversary.

 

 

How many nuclear missiles have we been required to use in the last 30 years? Does the former U.S.S.R attempt to spread communism throughout Europe, the only deterrent being an enormous U.S. military buildup to counter it?

 

The current logic is to change the requirement based on affordability and make excuses like geography is challenging, yet the potential threats are increasing their capabitities to level the playing field.

 

It seems to me the challenge of geography would play a major role with any fighter/strike aircraft, not just the F-22. Having the most capable system in smaller numbers seems more rational to me. I would hope during a conflict in the PACRIM, more than 75 would be brought to the fight, but I'm not savy enough to make that determination.

You may not think so, Rufus, and I agree that it doesn't make any sense for China or Russia to go to war with us over anything--especially considering that all three powers involved here are nuclear-armed. 

However, how far have we ever been able to get on our enemies, or potential enemies, rationality?  I don't think I need to list how many irrational enemies we've had to fight in the US' history, but there's a lot more nutballs than sane people.  The last arguably sane individual we fought was Ho Chi Minh, and that's a big question mark.  So what seems sane and rational to us might not seem that way to the Chinese or the Russians...and in case anyone hasn't noticed, Russia's looking more and more like the Soviet Union these days.  Anyone catch the imagery at the celebration of Sochi at Vancouver's closing ceremonies?  There was more than a whiff of the bad old days.  Russia may not be our enemy, but they are most certainly not our friends.

 

George Washington once said that the best way to preserve peace was to be ready for war.  What Congress has done by cancelling the F-22 is ensuring that we're not ready for war--only "adequate" in case one should break out.  We're also making a mistake by thinking that, just because it makes no sense to us, that China would never go after Taiwan or Russia would never go after Georgia.  Oh wait...they did. 

 

It comes down to whether we want the USAF to have the best equipment available, or merely "what's adequate."  We've paid in blood for mere adequacy before, or because we misread our opponents' ability.  Why do we want to do that again?

as a benign observor of this.

 

if the threat is nominally China, NorK, and/or Russia then the biggest containment issue is not enough subs, pgm's and approp long range strike - there is still a future for manned LR bombing in a stand off role.

 

the USG has completely missed the boat on how its sub fleet is degrading, and the fact that the PACRIM red sub levels are escalating beyond a blue management ability.

 

crap subs are still a threat (eg the USN discovered that off nth west africa a few years back when they were stalked by 2 x NorK Romeos)

 

nobody is going to fight China and Russia on home ground.  the issue is containment, that means politics, the capacity to restrict trade, the capacity to their capacity to project force, and sustain that force when extended.

 

its an academic question to argue x platforms are better in y scemario but the bottom line is how those forces are contained and managed before they can get into a position where they can gird their military loins and start tipping the balance against your strengths.

 

the capacity to strangle trade, to restrict projection, to make it cost negative to sustain forces at length (extension) are the higher needs.  standoff capability, and tech  advantages such as USN nukes where the chinese/NorKs/russians are nowhere near as competitive (even the russians are struggling to get a decent new sub at sea) are the critical containment layers that are not being considered.

 

one you get down to knife fighting ranges in manned jet fighters, you've already demonstrated a hole in the long term containment planning cycles.