Military History | How To Make War | Wars Around the World Rules of Use How to Behave on an Internet Forum
Fighters, Bombers and Recon Discussion Board
   Return to Topic Page
Subject: HOW WILL THE US NAVY DEFEAT THE SUNBURN MISSILES??
LJ813    7/6/2005 9:20:57 AM
read this guys.. http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3905551929fb.htm enjoy!!
 
Quote    Reply

Show Only Poster Name and Title     Newest to Oldest
Pages: PREV  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   NEXT
Nichevo    Herald backatcha   12/18/2006 3:26:21 AM



YelliChink

      12/18/2006 12:32:12 AM

Valuable, thank you.  I substantially agree.

However, never mind the carriers.  I say USN vessels are NOT the target (except for nibbling on strragglers, minesweepers, and such). 

The target is VLCCs in the Gulf ans specifically the Straits at key chokepoints.  My thesis is that 102 VLCC or superfreighter sinkings at the right locations will physically or morally close the Gulf and send oil to $300 at which point ROW shiites a brick.  How do we ensure decrease from 1-2 to zero of large civilian casualties?

Zero tolerance for damage of multiple 500+Kton ships in Gulf.  Zero tolerance for loss of any 500Kton+ ships in the Straits.  Nonzero tolerance for damage of USN vessels (or loss, outside Hormuz chokepoints).  How to accomplish?


The only way to ensure anything is to not fight. You can greatly reduce the risk but you had better have a plan b readily available...
Tut tut Darth!  If we nuked Iran or otherwise killed everyone there, risk needle would be at zero except for background noise.  ;>  Obviously we seek to be just a little more delicate.
...If the coalition decides to attack Iran, security of the strait would be paramount. Fortunately there are a lot of USAF/ USN/Coalition assets available for an attack. This is an ideal operation for a CSF/ARG supported by USAF AEF and an SSGN. Such a force could secure the area in and around the strait, secure the airspace, destroy the Iranian Navy, seize key terrain,  strike SSM units in and around the straight, clear the strait of SSK's/mines and conduct deep strike in support of strait and gulf security. A force built loosely around whats described above would be enough to secure the strait and probably very quickly. But even so, its not a guarantee that there wont be isolated successful Iranian operations designed to disrupt gulf security.




The upside is that any successes would be short lived and easily absorbed by the market.


DA

Defend/attack, anyone?  I assume the contrary.  But both of us assume.  Anything past what, 30, 90 days?  and reserves dry up, people get vereeeee unhappy.  Mass casualties due to 40% reduction in world oil supply hard to accept.

Again, on the moral tip, I agree, Lloyd's will chill as soon as the conflict is resolved.  (You and Herald say that will not be fast - six months is not fast to be rid of $300 oil)

If physically obstructed (could the Irainans sink two of their own flagships loaded with concrete in the relevant sections, or ships filled with explosive, toxic waste, or something unacceptable to the public to be detonated and spread around the environment?), takes it to a whole new level.  Then you ask how fast new 60" pipelines can be built with no limits on crew overtime, rules against slavery, etc.

hey i said i was hitting the sack - now tty tomorrow - wait it is tomorrow - later!  thx

 
Quote    Reply

DarthAmerica       12/18/2006 3:52:40 AM







YelliChink


      12/18/2006 12:32:12 AM

Valuable, thank you.  I substantially agree.

However, never mind the carriers.  I say USN vessels are NOT the target (except for nibbling on strragglers, minesweepers, and such). 

The target is VLCCs in the Gulf ans specifically the Straits at key chokepoints.  My thesis is that 102 VLCC or superfreighter sinkings at the right locations will physically or morally close the Gulf and send oil to $300 at which point ROW shiites a brick.  How do we ensure decrease from 1-2 to zero of large civilian casualties?

Zero tolerance for damage of multiple 500+Kton ships in Gulf.  Zero tolerance for loss of any 500Kton+ ships in the Straits.  Nonzero tolerance for damage of USN vessels (or loss, outside Hormuz chokepoints).  How to accomplish?



The only way to ensure anything is to not fight. You can greatly reduce the risk but you had better have a plan b readily available...

Tut tut Darth!  If we nuked Iran or otherwise killed everyone there, risk needle would be at zero except for background noise.  ;>  Obviously we seek to be just a little more delicate.

...If the coalition decides to attack Iran, security of the strait would be paramount. Fortunately there are a lot of USAF/ USN/Coalition assets available for an attack. This is an ideal operation for a CSF/ARG supported by USAF AEF and an SSGN. Such a force could secure the area in and around the strait, secure the airspace, destroy the Iranian Navy, seize key terrain,  strike SSM units in and around the straight, clear the strait of SSK's/mines and conduct deep strike in support of strait and gulf security. A force built loosely around whats described above would be enough to secure the strait and probably very quickly. But even so, its not a guarantee that there wont be isolated successful Iranian operations designed to disrupt gulf security.




The upside is that any successes would be short lived and easily absorbed by the market.


DA


Defend/attack, anyone?  I assume the contrary.  But both of us assume.  Anything past what, 30, 90 days?  and reserves dry up, people get vereeeee unhappy.  Mass casualties due to 40% reduction in world oil supply hard to accept.

Again, on the moral tip, I agree, Lloyd's will chill as soon as the conflict is resolved.  (You and Herald say that will not be fast - six months is not fast to be rid of $300 oil)

If physically obstructed (could the Irainans sink two of their own flagships loaded with concrete in the relevant sections, or ships filled with explosive, toxic waste, or something unacceptable to the public to be detonated and spread around the environment?), takes it to a whole new level.  Then you ask how fast new 60" pipelines can be built with no limits on crew overtime, rules against slavery, etc.

hey i said i was hitting the sack - now tty tomorrow - wait it is tomorrow - later!  thx


I think we are talking in circles here. Yes, the Iranians can make a big mess of the Persian Gulf. And there are about a million ways to do it. But would it represent a problem the world could not deal with? No. I'm sure the world didn't expect Saddam's scorched Earth withdrawal from Kuwait. It was a huge ecological/economic disaster. But it was not something we could not handle. You also have to remember, blocking oil from the Gulf hurts Iran as much as anyone else. They don't exactly export cars. So in addition to giving the world a temporary headache. The Iranians would be putting a gun to their own heads and pulling the trigger by removing their chief export. In that case, we might want to help them block the strait. Perhaps then some of the more fickle members of the international community would find ways to motive Iranian compliance with the NPT and other obligations as their own oil supplies dried up.

DA

 
Quote    Reply

Herald1234    In light of the above posts it would be a good idea to get ready........   12/18/2006 11:46:55 AM
................by starting and building PLAID now (which I believe is being done.).

Herald.

 
Quote    Reply

DarthAmerica    Moving the discussion back on topic...   12/18/2006 11:58:59 AM

................by starting and building PLAID now (which I believe is being done.).

Herald.

...check out the GQM-163A Coyote SSST:

"http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/Publications/Coyote_Fact.pdf"

It seems the USN is aware of and preparing itself for this type of threat.



DA
 
Quote    Reply

The Lizard King       12/18/2006 12:16:58 PM
 
Quote    Reply

Herald1234    been playing that game for quite a while actually.   12/18/2006 1:00:49 PM



................by starting and building PLAID now (which I believe is being done.).

Herald.


...check out the GQM-163A Coyote SSST:

"http://www.orbital.com/NewsInfo/Publications/Coyote_Fact.pdf"

It seems the USN is aware of and preparing itself for this type of threat.



DA
 
 
[quoting]
 __________________________________________________
 

[2.3] BEECH AQM-37 / TELEDYNE-RYAN AQM-81 FIREBOLT / OSC SSST

* In the 1959, the US Navy and US Air Force issued a joint request for a new high-speed expendable target. Beechcraft won the competition, and the result was a small delta-winged drone with wingtip fins and a liquid rocket motor, originally designated "XKD2B-1" but now known as the "AQM-37". The type first flew in May 1961, entered service with the US Navy in 1963, and remains in service.

The original version was the "AQM-37A" or "Beech Model 1019". The AQM-37A was followed by a confusing list of subvariants, some of which were new production, others which were modifications of existing AQM-37s. These variants were intended to simulate different classes of threats, such as sea-skimming antiship missiles or high-altitude naval attack missiles, or provide better performance. One high-performance variant with improved thermal protection attained a speed of Mach 4.7 and an altitude of over 34 kilometers (112,000 feet) on a ballistic trajectory. The final US Navy variant was designated "AQM-37C".

After an evaluation of the AQM-37A in the late 1960s, the US Army bought a small initial batch of "Model 1100 / 1101" AQM-37As that, unlike other variants, were recoverable, using a parachute system. Some of this batch were intended for low-altitude operation and fitted with a radar altimeter, and others were intended for high-altitude operation and had a barometric altimeter. The Army later ordered over 400 improved non-recoverable "Model 1102" variants of the AQM-37A.

The USAF evaluated the AQM-37 in the early 1970s but was slow to adopt it. Records of USAF procurement of the type are sketchy, but it does seem to be currently part of the Air Force target inventory. Small quantities of AQM-37s were also sold to Italy, Israel, and France, while Britain bought several hundred of the type. The Meteor company of Italy built a number of AQM-37s under license.

All variants are air-launched, with the US Navy traditionally using the F-4 Phantom for the job and the British using the Canberra. These aircraft are largely out of service and it is not clear how AQM-37s are launched these days.
 
http://www.barberspointaviationmuseum.com/images/MK82_and_AQM37_pictures_018.jpg" width=511 border=0> 

5,000 AQM-37s were built into 1997, with the bulk of deliveries to the US Navy. Raytheon has been working on an "AQM-37D", with the same airframe and engine as the AQM-37C but with a new electrical system and avionics, and a follow-on "Super AQM-37" as well. The AQM-37 still remains in production, though status of the AQM-37D and Super AQM-37 efforts is unclear.

   BEECH AQM-37C:
   _____________________   _________________   _______________________
 

										Quote   
										Reply

DarthAmerica    Iran: What about ISR, EW and diplomacy?   12/18/2006 1:51:36 PM
A lot of attention has been focused on hard kill methods which is just one part of the Sensor to Shooter cycle. Thats because the Shooter part is much more dramatic and exciting to talk about. The reality is though that the sensor part is equally important if not more so! In fact, its here that Iran's weaknesses will show up most IMHO.

It's important to study the origins of various weapons systems that could come into play in a potential shooting war. The topic of this thread, the SS-N-22, was developed during the Cold War(circa 1980's) using standard design strategy of typical Soviet missile systems which emphasized high speed to reduce the reaction times for increasingly effective NATO anti-ship defenses. Being a Soviet weapon system you can bet mass/saturation was a big part of the employment scheme. Simultaneous multiple axis attacks by surprise if possible. In the SS-N-22's case it was to be used by smaller ships up to Destroyer sized and fighters. Not a particularly large weapon by Soviet standards but certainly big enough to cause serious trouble IF THE FIRING PLATFORM COULD GET IN RANGE. And thats a big if in the Soviets case. As has been discussed before in other threads, finding even a CSF at sea is no easy task. But its a vital task if you intend to shoot at it. In order to facilitate this task of locating targets, the Soviets developed a wide range of ISR platforms such as modified Bear Bombers, Recon Satellites and land based radar/elint stations to get the shooters where they needed to be to fire.

Now, considering all of the above in the previous paragraph, how is Iran going to accomplish this? Specifically, how is Iran going to accomplish this in a shooting war? While I don't know specifics, I'm sure the Iranians have seeded their coast and areas near the strait with coastal radars to monitor gulf traffic. I also understand that they are using UAV's. To what extent they have integrated UAV's into their sensor to shooter cycle, I don't know. But I do know based on how limited bandwidth is and the complexity of maintaining realtime communications that the Iranians probably aren't as able to utilize data from UAV's they have like more developed nations. Also, what about manned aircraft and boats, civil and military, with RF communications? Surely the Iranians keep a network of platforms out and about to survey movement through the choke points and provide potential targeting data where necessary. Anyway to make a long story short, the Iranians will have to somehow tie all this information in to make a picture of activity off their coast in order to decide what to shoot at. I'm confident that in a less than full scale war scenario with the Iranians taking the initiative, they have more than enough means to target their weapons at just about anything coming into range. But Iran starting hostilities seems to be a less likely course of action than them reacting to punitive coalition actions. In which case, the coalition would or should be prepared.

A study of the G-Hawk, Predators and guestimates on some of the more clandestine coalition UAV's suggest that there are enough of these assets that a topless Persian sunbather anywhere along the coast would have more than just religious police to worry about! This is in addition to Submarines, Warships, SOF, Satellites and manned platforms that also have ISR responsibilities. And some of these ISR platforms can be shooters if necessary and most of them operate outside of the Iranian's ability to shoot back. Now the coalition has been aware of the potential for action here for some time. So you could bet that there exist a great deal of knowledge about what the Iranians have along the coast and where it is. And again, Iran has little ability to deny these platforms access to the region. The reverse is not true.

Nevermind a coalition, any number of even gulf states could seriously degrade Iran's ISR network. Perhaps not as effectively as a US/EU led coalition but still. And its unfathomable that the Iranian ISR network would survive an assault on the scale of what the coalition would bring. Even if political constraints limited a coalition from preemptive hard kill action against known ISR and SSM positions. EW warfare and defensive actions would still challenge the Iranians comparatively limited capabilities. A fighter sweep could clear the skies of Iranian UAV's with little political fall out as there is no martyr. ROE would probably allow fighters and SAMs to shoot these down on sight. Also, sophisticated western ELINT methods would probably help to pinpoint facilities used to coordinate SSM attacks on warships and merchant shipping. Fighters on CAP and properly positioned warships with SAMs could provide defensive cover for chokepoints. Through diplomacy, it would be possible to position Patriot and Aster batteries in positions to assist as well. With regard to the sensor to shooter cycle. The sensor, whether on board or off
 
Quote    Reply

Softwar    US Did Help Russia Improve missiles   12/18/2006 1:55:05 PM
I'm new here so I'll stick my neck out or put my foot in it...  We indeed did help Russia with its missile program - specifically the Kh-31 Krypton.
 
I did a number of FOIA requests on both the Sunburn (3M80 series) and Krypton (Kh-31) during the 1990s.  The "Ballerina" program (an effort to buy missiles and other weapons from Russia) run by the DIA brought in some interesting details from the Russians.  Seems the USN wanted to buy Russian missiles to use for live target practice and they got a line on getting some Sunburn missiles.  The FOIA documents even contain a letter from a USN Admiral Bowes requesting Russian Adm. Gromov sell some Sunburn missiles to America.
 
 
The Sunburn deal fell through due to price but a follow on effort by Boeing managed to get some Kryptons for the US Navy to test.
 
 
The FOIA documents show quite clearly that the Kh-31 was not so nearly operational as one was led to believe.  Because in 1995 Boeing worked with Zvesda to improve the Kh-31 and make sure that you could fire it from a jet fighter without killing the pilot.  Seems the launching lanyard had some problems during emergency release.  There were additional details of joint work on improving the range and some work done on developing a ground launched version. 
In the end, the full blown deal to obtain a steady supply of Kryptons fell through.  Thus, the Russians went to work with the Chinese to up the range and the Kh-31P (improved) was born.
 
 
 
Quote    Reply

DarthAmerica    Herald Reply   12/18/2006 2:02:06 PM

The USN has been practicing for quite a while actually.

Herald

Herald,

Yes they have. Even against LO stealthy targets as well. You know that topic will come up the next time some nation introduces a alleged LO AShM and then we will have to endure the doom and gloom post about how unprepared the USN is to deal with that...lol


DA


 
Quote    Reply

Herald1234    Thank you, President Clinton.   12/18/2006 2:18:52 PM

I'm new here so I'll stick my neck out or put my foot in it...  We indeed did help Russia with its missile program - specifically the Kh-31 Krypton.

 

I did a number of FOIA requests on both the Sunburn (3M80 series) and Krypton (Kh-31) during the 1990s.  The "Ballerina" program (an effort to buy missiles and other weapons from Russia) run by the DIA brought in some interesting details from the Russians.  Seems the USN wanted to buy Russian missiles to use for live target practice and they got a line on getting some Sunburn missiles.  The FOIA documents even contain a letter from a USN Admiral Bowes requesting Russian Adm. Gromov sell some Sunburn missiles to America.

 

http://www.softwar.net/3m82.html</div>;" target="_blank">link
 

The Sunburn deal fell through due to price but a follow on effort by Boeing managed to get some Kryptons for the US Navy to test.

 

http://www.softwar.net/kh31p.html</div>;" target="_blank">link
 

The FOIA documents show quite clearly that the Kh-31 was not so nearly operational as one was led to believe.  Because in 1995 Boeing worked with Zvesda to improve the Kh-31 and make sure that you could fire it from a jet fighter without killing the pilot.  Seems the launching lanyard had some problems during emergency release.  There were additional details of joint work on improving the range and some work done on developing a ground launched version. 

In the end, the full blown deal to obtain a steady supply of Kryptons fell through.  Thus, the Russians went to work with the Chinese to up the range and the Kh-31P (improved) was born.
_____________________________________________________________________                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
A politician's technological stupidity never surprises me. Neither does his inability to foresee the  easily predictable outcomes of his stupid political decisions.

Herald



 
Quote    Reply
PREV  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   NEXT



 Latest
 News
 
 Most
 Read
 
 Most
 Commented
 Hot
 Topics