"Against this, the RAF had available the total strength of Fighter Command -- over 700 a/c at the end of the BoB, and increasing steadily for the next three years. These were the forces available, and the numberical difference is pretty clear. " the hard yards were the Battle of Britain, at which point the poms were on odds of 4:1 against. When did P-38's ever have to deal with that level of competition? The Brits were fielding pilots with as low as 5 hrs of type time and against a numerically superior enemy - and an enemy who had been training pilots for war prior to the spanish civil war - as well as with exp honed during the spanish civil war. If any plane has been granted urban mythology post conflict it's the Lightning. There were numerous other planes that played at real war and against more numerous competent pilots. The Spit, Mustang, Hurricane and Tbolt made far more meaningful contributions.

To gf0012-aust Check past posts. We are talking about the offensive air peroid from early '41 on. RAF was operating the entire Fighter Command against less than three JG of German fighters on offensive ops, while early P38 ops sent less than two FGs against the German home defenses. The '5 hours' was BoB stuff, not what was going on as early as '41, let alone as late as '43. In the '42-'43 period, the Lightning was the ONLY allied a/c with range enought to fly many of the missions required for offensive operations. This is why the Torch landings in NW Africa were so dependent of them.

To AussieEngineer: Actually, the Germans often attacked the RAF missions over NW France and the low countries with inferior numbers. The escort formation used in '41 for daylight bomber raids was referred to by the RAF pilots themselves as 'the beehive'. It was a mass of a/c milling around the bombers and largly getting in each other's way when a few '109s dived through. Yes, the RAF continued to fly Hurris and early Mk Spits through most of '41 as they were still buiding up their numbers while the Germans were reducing theirs. Throught the period (at least until the MkIX came in in '42 the German a/c were superior. Their pilots were also excellent -- certainly more experienced on avaerage that those of the RAF. And the same was true of the P38 pilots going into Germany in '43. Point is that the over all contest within RAF daylight ops area was the entire Fighter Command force available against less than three JGs. In Germany it was originally two P38 FGs against about a third of the Luftwafffe.

Please try to find the RAF standards. I have given you those for the USAAF (and USN) and fail to see how it would have been practical for them to be any more stringent. I find the comment about 'a very strick method of confirmation by cine-film' odd as you have been arguing that gun cameras weren't really usful, and the use of them was virtually universal on USAAF fighters in Europe. Where the gun camera film was in conflict with the witness statements, the film won. The Yamato incident has been well hashed. Gun camneras were not yet in use in SOPAC at that time. In any event thats a fifty percent overclaim vs 12 claims against no acutal losses. In the Yamato attack, both bombers were, in fact, shot down. If it makes you feel any better, in the 23 Aug. fight, JG11 alone had confirmations on 9 Spitfire kills, but 127 Wing acutally lost three.

the gun camera was part of the original spec for spitfires and hurricanes so saying that the RAF brass discounted thier use for any reason other than praticality is pure tosh, the reason why the RAF stopped using the gun camera during 40/41 was that it was found that the film was completely useless due to the camera location, and was removed from all mk1,2 and 5, it was always the intention to reinstate the camera, the mk 3 had a revised location but never entered combat being superceeded by the mkV an aircraft that used the same wing as the Mk2, on the introduction of the mkIV the camera gun returned. you will never find footage of mk1/2 or 5s as the footage was just a grey mess, you couldnt tell if the target was a bomber fighter or brighton pier. from the mkiv onwards footage can be seen (quite often identifiyable by the cannon barrels in the picture) even so cam guns did not provide an infallible source of comabt confirmation, even as late as Vietnam camera guns were still not able to confirm all kills! As to air superiority, from 41 the RAF did have superior numbers, how ever they also had little method of forcing the Luftwaffe to engage, the only method that worked consistantly was large bomber formations, and only the USAF had bombers that could operate in daylight, and they were insisting that escorts were not required, as nearly all bomber targets were beyond spit range, the luftwaffe didnt engage the escorted bombers, they waited to the escorts turned back before slaughtering the bombers. in the fighter sweeps the RAF continueally performed over occupied europe, these raids were outside british radar coverage but right in the german coverage, so if the RAF had superior numbers the germans just avoided combat. they usually massed large numbers of fighters to jump these sweeps, often the RAF were outnumbered 5-6 to 1, you can argue that these sweeps were asking to RAF losses, and that they got them, however it did keep a sizable Luftwaffe force tied up in western europe, if ypu start on the over claiming rubbish (especially shooter unsupported claims of institutionised overclaiming) the bottom line is that in the air to air combat of the 40s kill confirmation is at best an educated guess, at worse propergander, if you make it too easy to claim you get ridiculus numbers if you make it too dificult you demoralise the pilots who are sure they have a kill yet have it dissallowed some compromised was required and was achieved, overclaiming allways exists even today it may not be possible to confirm a kill even with the amount of technology available. from information provided by a vet I understand that in the RAF from 43 onwards the same rules were applied for all allied pilots when claiming kills. however he does point out that whilst the rules were same, the interpritation of the rules is where a lot of problem lay. He was seconded to a USAAF pursit squadron, during the period of translation between spits and p47s. the thing he remembers about kills during this period was not which aircraft were being used but which intel officer was in position, the number of claims confirmed dropped by over 50% when the old Intel office was transfered to the PTO, purely how he inforced the rules.

It is the old lady's 70th birthday and she is still flying. Bless her.

"Actually, the Germans often attacked the RAF missions over NW France and the low countries with inferior numbers. The escort formation used in '41 for daylight bomber raids was referred to by the RAF pilots themselves as 'the beehive'. It was a mass of a/c milling around the bombers and largly getting in each other's way when a few '109s dived through." That isn't true, at least most of the time. The Germans were able to single out a squadron or two and attack in greater numbers(40+). They were then able to disengage before the other fighters could respond. This was partly because they had faster aircraft and partly because they had better pilots, but it was also due to the nature of the mission the RAF were flying. There might have been 300 escorts for 50-100 bombers, but break down how they operated and you can see why the Luftwaffe was able to suceed. There would be maybe a 3-5 squadrons who fly a sweep in front of the bombers, another 5 squadrons close escort and 2 or 3 squadrons top cover. Then there were the fighters who flew out to cover the return and the reserve. Thus the Germans were able to pick and choose when and where to engage and to do so in superior or at least equal numbers.

I haven't been arguing that gun cameras weren't useful. I'm arguing that USAAF claims were at least as inflated as everybody elses. The Germans at face value had a very carefully checked system. However, it produced some of the least accurate results of the war. It required, visual confirmation by someone on the ground or in the air, or alternatively gun camera film showing the aircraft explode or the pilot bail out. Also if the battle was fought over friendly territory wreakage had to be found and verified. But if you look at either a single day or a campaign it's obvious they were overclaiming by a fair margin. The BoB is a classic example, 712 Hurricane and 1243 spitfire kills were awarded, but only 470 Hurricanes and 285 Spitfires were shot down. The same level of overclaiming can be seen for the 1941 Channel front, the Western Desert, the 8th AF bombing campaign and so on. The VVS also had a very strict claim system, that required someone outside of the pilots own flight to verify that the aircraft was shot down or it had to be seen by men on the ground. Wreakage also had to be found by or if it was on the enemy sides of the lines it had to be verified by PR or partisans. Yet the VVS claims are universally agreed to be highly inflated. I find the idea that the USAAF standards, although less stringent than those of the VVS and LW, yielded considerably more accurate claims rather proposterous.

To OBNW: Okay, now we have some progress. Cameras were not used on Spits up to MkV. It would seem, however, that they weren't in any hurry to put them back in, if it took a couple of years. It was my understanding that some use of gun cameras was made during BoB that produced decent pictures, but I have no idea where the cameras were mounted. As to the referrences about 1941 RAF escort missions, my info came from the Douglas Bader and Johnnie Johnson. RAF piled multiple squadrons around the bombers. AS the Germans played hit and run, and the escorts were nearly all much to close to the bombers, they were pretty ineffective. Yes, the Germans could occassionally concentrate on a sweep, but usually, that was a similar business. A small number of a/c doing a diving attack without staying to tail chase. The RAF had bombers it could send out, but they were far less well armed that the later Forts and Libs, and the escort tactics were poor. In one way, the shortage of escort fighters acutally helped. They had to head off attackers well away from the bombers to be effective with their small numbers, which was soon seen to be much more effective anyway. So M Closterman's claim that RAF claim standards were higher than those of USAAF turns out not to be actually true. Also, Rbt. Scott's claim that lack of gun cameras in use in China reduced the chances of a claim being confirms would seem to have merit. The P38 had problems with film quality at first, but that was quickly solved by moving the camera from the nose to one of the drop tank pylons. They even had a cover for the lens that was wired to the tank, and so was pulled off when the tank was released. I am still left to wonder about the level of overclaiming if the system appearantly used by all allied services was being followed. There is a limit to how far interpretation can be stretched, particularly when camera film is available for re-inspection. Comfirmation in USAAF of claims sometimes was not made for weeks after the action while film and statements went 'up the chain'.

To AussieEngineer: So your aren't really talking about superior numbers except on a very narrow tactical level. And actually, it was 200-300 fighters for a couple of dozen bombers, and sometimes less.