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Subject: Fan-boy list of ideal UK Forces - you have been warned
perfectgeneral    11/12/2007 12:39:52 AM
I estimate that MoD spending might increase to as much as 3% or even 3.5% of GDP if defence funding is given the priority that it warrants. For the UK: Space Programme Contribute 10% to ESA programme plus military satellites for intel, comms and navigation Defence research and Trident replacement Allocate 0.5% of GDP for defence research and nuclear deterrent on top of defence spending Air Force Personnel 45,000 Fixed Wing (48 F-22 Raptor - If congress allows) 232 Typhoon to tranche 3 standard (upgrade to 'tranche 4') 138 F-35b 96 F-35c 12 C17 Globemaster 50 A400m 24 A330 tanker/transports 12 E3d Sentry 12 Sentinel 24 Nimrod MR (A330 airframe?) 9 Nimrod R (A330 airframe?) 9 Dominie T1 75 Grob 115E Tutor 25 Firefly T67 M260 25 Beech King Air B200 50 Tucano T1 50 Hawk 128 50 Hawk T1A 132 Grob G103A Twin II Acro Viking T1 132 Grob 109B Vigilant T1 Executive transport Six BAe 125 executive jets (Series 700), two BAe 146s, two Islander BN2T CC Mk2 maintainence and training budget set to ensure maximum readiness Begin development of a carrier based F-22 style fighter with USN Navy Personnel 45,000 Ships 3 CVF STOVL 65,000t(Queen Elizabeth class) one every four years: 2014,2018,2022 COGASE power plant 30 knots peak, 20 knots cruise, 10 knots loiter.. refit to CTOL 72,000t, COGAS-E power plant 32 knots peak, 18 knots cruise, 8 knots loiter by 2038, 2042 and 2046 respectively. 3 LPH (New 40,000t class) one every three years: 2025,2028,2031 3 LPD (Albion class replacement 20,000 tons) one every two years: 2033,2035,2037 4+2 LSD (Bay class) - aux One escort every 12 months: (stable state of 24 over 24 years) 12 AAW Destroyers (Daring class) 12 ASW Frigates (Duke class replacements 12 x 6000t) One cruiser every three years: (stable state of 8 over 24 years) 8 Light Cruisers: 9000t-10000t 155mm main gun, 96 cell Sylver launcher for Aster15/30, Storm Shadow and CAMM quad packs, 2-4x CB90 patrol boats plus helo (2Merlin/3Slynx) hanger and two spot deck, 0-4 STANIFLEX modules. COGAS-E power plant 30 knots peak, 20 knots cruise, 10 knots loiter.. 2 Multi-role survey vessels (Echo class) 1 Antartic patrol ship (HMS Endurance) 1 Ocean survey vessel 20 Mission module corvettes/light frigates: (one every 15 months - replacing other vessels of these types) 3750t, 76mm/56mm/30mm CISW main gun, 0-1 + 0-2 STANIFLEX modules (Slynx deck and hanger/mine hunting/coastal survey/patrol/UUV or SuUV mothership/SF deployment). COGAS-E power plant 30 knots peak, 20 knots cruise, 10 knots loiter. MARS (6 fast oiler+supply 30knots peak, 20knots cruise, 14 others, 22knots peak, 12knots cruise?) - aux 6 Ro-ro transports - aux Submarines 7 SSN (Astute class) 0+4 SSBN (Vanguard class replacement) 0+4 SSN (Trafalgar class replacement batch 1) A nuclear submarine built every 22 months (minimum) Aircraft 36 V-22 Osprey 24 EH101Merlin/V-22Osprey - AEW 44 EH101 Merlin ASW 67 Super Lynx 24 EH101 Cormorant search and rescue 39 Squirrel HT1 Fast boats 20 Training (Archer class replacements) 4 Patrol (Sabre class replacements) Royal Marines 3 Commando (1+3 bn + 1 of reservists) + Marine Artillery + Corps units Executive transport Four EH101 Merlin HC3 helicopters maintainence and training budget set to ensure maximum readiness 1st bn Rifles would become the core of an army 2 Commando along with the army elements of 3 Commando (these would be replaced by RM engineers, logistics and artillery to form an all RM 3 Commando). 40 commando would attach to special forces, like 1 Para. Army Personnel 120,000 2 Commando (3 bn + 1 TA) + 1 RA + Corps units 1st Parachute Regt (5 bn + 2 TA) + 2 RA + Corps units Royal Gurkha Regt (3 bn + 1 in Nepal & 1 in Brunei) + 1 RA + Corps units Guards Division (5 bn foot, 3 bn cav) + 2 RA + Corps units 6 regional regiments: Scots (5 bn + 2 TA) + 2 RA + Corps units Rifles (sw)(5 bn + 2 TA) + 2 RA + Corps units King's (n)(5 bn + 2 TA) + 2 RA + Corps units Prince of Wales (5 bn + 2 TA) + 2 RA + Corps units Queen's (se)(5 bn + 2 TA) + 2 RA + Corps units Irish (5 bn + 2 TA) + 2 RA + Corps units Brigades 101,102,103 & 104 Logistic bdes 2 & 3 Commando bdes (3 commando is RM unit) 19 & 52 Light bdes 16 & 8 Air Assault bdes 1, 4 & 12 Mechanised bdes 7 & 20 Armoured bdes Armour 350 Challenger 2 136 Sabre* 48 Striker (with Swingfire ATGW)* 320 Scimitar* 1,492 FV 432/430* 793 MCV 80 Warrior 478 Spartan* 622 Saxon* 108 Mastiff* 11 Fuchs (NBC recce vehicles) *=some or all possibly replaced by 3000 FRES variants Artillery & Mortars 146 AS 90 155mm SP Gun 63 227mm MLRS 48 FH 70 155mm towed howitzer 136 105mm Light Gun 48 155mm Light Gun (M777) 450 81mm mortar (including 110 x self-propelled) 2093 51mm Light Mortar Aircraft 6 BN-2 Islander 67 Apache Longbow (UK version) 100 EH101 Merlin HC3 36 CH-46d Chinook HC3 67 Super Lynx A
 
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flamingknives       11/12/2007 5:00:54 PM
What current atomics are up to, I neither know nor much care - less hassle to not know. (Brit. equivalent is Atomic Weapons Establishment - AWE - btw.)

What is the LCS concept, just so we all think of the same thing? I see it as a light to medium warship with exchangable mission modules.

I don't mean Super Lynx, I mean Future Lynx. I got a little confused. Current models don't seem to have sufficient hot-and-high capacity so the FL, with better engines and better rotors, should improve that. 

FRES isn't half as optomistic as FCS is. I don't doubt the capacity of the MoD to foul it up, mind, but the capability is much closer to what can be done now.

105 vs 155, how do you judge how a fire mission is rated? what are you trying to do? Destroy or suppress. Destructive fires are proven not to work as advertised. I'm sure that you've said before, but WTH is SMASH? 
Light gun vs. Mortar is a difference of several kilometers in favour of the gun.
Mixed logistics may be a problem, but are you throwing out the baby with the bathwater? From a US standpoint, probably not. From a UK standpoint, not so sure.

Buy HIMARS? No thanks, we'll take LIMAWS(R), ta very much. Very similar capability, a few tonnes (or so) lighter. 

An 81mm mortar and a light mortar are so different that you're comparing helicopters and Toblerones. Well, maybe not that different, but they are utterly different beasts. These aren't  the US-style 60mm with a base, bipod etc., but what's called a Commando mortar - the old 2" and the newer 51mm could both be carried and operated by one man, in addition to his rifle and other kit, with more bombs distributed around the platoon. Rocket launchers are nice in MOUT (or FIBUA, or FISH, as you like it) but they're less effective when you're out in Afghanistan at night and you want some light, or a bit of smoke during the day, or a bit of HE into that compound with the three-foot-thick mud walls over there. Very useful bit of kit. Lighter than most rockets, even if you count the weight of a few bombs too. You can't lug an AGL about on foot patrol. By all means have an AGL, but have it as well as a light mortar. (to reiterate, not one with a baseplate and a bipod, a proper light platoon mortar)

Comanche went TU because it didn't do anything much better than Apache Longbow. Which we already have, in a form that suits us. More AH Mk1, please, unless perhaps we could get a deal like the Turks got from Agusta.

I don't like the Lynx in any form.
Great, Lynx BAD! Why?


If the Merlin is too big for exec transport, isn't the Bell a bit small? Something midrange, like the AW139, Sikorsky S92 or NH90?



 
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Lawman       11/12/2007 6:10:03 PM
Wow, that's pretty darned detailed!
 
My personal thinking was this:
 
16th Air Assault Brigade becomes 16th Air Assault Division, with four Para battalions and four Light Infantry battalions, trained up as air-mobile infantry. They would be grouped into Brigade Combat Teams, each basically consisting of two battalions (one para, one infantry), plus artillery etc...
 
3 Commando Brigade becomes 3rd Marine Division, with four Commando battalions and four Light Infantry battalions, trained for amphibious or air-mobile ops. Again, formed into four B.C.T.s of two battalions each.
 
Two Infantry Divisions, each with eight infantry battalions, to be equipped with medium weight armoured vehicles, along the lines of the American Stryker units, i.e. still light infantry, but with armoured 'taxis'. Again, four B.C.T.s per Division, with two battalions each.
 
7th Armoured Division reformed, to provide units of armour, possibly even reformed to provide something more akin to the US Army's Heavy Cavalry units, i.e. a mix of tanks and mounted infantry. These units would be attached to each of the rapid reaction units, and provide the armoured fist when and where it is needed.
 
 
For the Navy, I would ideally look to add a third CVF, configured as CTOL carriers, with a decent complement of F-35Cs, and hopefully E-2D Hawkeyes.
 
I would also look to increase the Type 45 procurement back up to twelve units, and hopefully another twelve units as the so-called 'C-1' type, though minus the more expensive AAW kit. This lot should be sufficient to provide a decent escort force for the carriers and amphib units. I would then add another dozen each of the C-2 and C-3 ships, ideally as a form of British Littoral Combat Ship equivalent, and these ships would be used mainly for patrol duties, and light escort duties.
 
For the amphibious forces, I would ideally (yes, only ideally, I know it's impractical) look to get three of the small LHDs that Australia is buying, to replace Ocean, but with full dock facilities, and supplement this with a third and final Albion class LPD. This should be enough to allow three small amphib task forces, each with an LHD, an LPD, and a pair of Bay class LSDs, and hopefully a couple of RoRo vessels, operated by the RFA.
 
For subs, simply buy more Astute class, aiming to maintain an attack sub force of twelve boats; and renew Trident when the time comes.
 
 
For the RAF, I would aim to boost both Typhoon and JSF orders (well, technically not the JSF numbers, but rather give them all to the RAF, and then buy the same again for the Navy...).
 
For transports and tankers, I would look to bring the C-17 force up to a minimum of eight aircraft (two more), and shore up the A-330 tanker deal, so that sixteen are bought (again, two more), but properly bought, with no weird PFI deals. The C-130 force should be improved, probably with more C-130J models, possibly including some dedicated for the special ops mission (a la MC-130). The A-400M orders would then be increased, at the very least doubled, to fourty-eight aircraft, with sixteen of them intended to operate primarily as tankers, replacing the VC-10s.
 

For strategic purposes, I would aim to replicate the American 'Wideband Gapfiller Satellite' system, giving the UK a dedicated wideband comms network (more so than Skynet 5). These would likely just be off the shelf Boeing 702 satellites, with mil-spec encryption etc...
 
I would aim to give the Army its own transport helo force, with more Chinooks, lots of Merlins, and probably a fair number of the Agusta Westland AW-149, for the low end transport role. I would abandon Lynx entirely, and probably even look at bringing the number of Apaches up a bit.
 
For exec transport purposes, I would probably just get a pair of 'extra' A-330s in the tanker deal, and add a couple of Global Express bizjets, to replace the -125s. Add in a few Agusta Westland A-109 Grands and AW-139s for VIP helo purposes.
 
 
In terms of total personnel requirements, you are probably looking at needing something like 60,000 RAF, 60,000 Navy (excluding Marines entirely), and 140,000 Army (including Marines). This would be a stretch, but it should be possible, you just need to make sure that the forces are an attractive career opportunity.
 
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Herald1234       11/12/2007 8:02:16 PM

What current atomics are up to, I neither know nor much care - less hassle to not know. (Brit. equivalent is Atomic Weapons Establishment - AWE - btw.)
Thanks; my brain freeze. I couldn't remember. You shoold be worried about the new family of modularized packages.The PAL links on them are very suspect. Not that the bombs won't work, but that they will work-all too easily and all too well. 
What is the LCS concept, just so we all think of the same thing? I see it as a light to medium warship with exchangable mission modules.
 A multimission close inshore cheap warship,that operates a distributed network of UUVs, UAVs, supports raiding parties, serves as a low end general purpose escort, a close inshore patrol vessel, fight as an ASW ship, work as a mine warfare ship, all by just adding the appropiate modules and specialist crews was the dream. Well, if any of us knows the first thing about shipbuilding and seaborne electronics, it should have been obvious from the beginning that wiring such a frankenstein up todo all that was going to be a fluster cluck. This was LPD-17 fubared by two orders of magnitude. Tell me; how can you  turn a fast minesweeper into an ocean going ASW ship inside 24 hours? Hmmmmmmmmmmmmm?  

I don't mean Super Lynx, I mean Future Lynx. I got a little confused. Current models don't seem to have sufficient hot-and-high capacity so the FL, with better engines and better rotors, should improve that. 
Better solve the vibration problems through the collective.
FRES isn't half as optomistic as FCS is. I don't doubt the capacity of the MoD to foul it up, mind, but the capability is much closer to what can be done now.
Trust me; from an engineering point of view even that is very ambitious.
105 vs 155, how do you judge how a fire mission is rated? what are you trying to do? Destroy or suppress. Destructive fires are proven not to work as advertised. I'm sure that you've said before, but WTH is SMASH? 
I'm not trying to suppress a damned thing. Harass and deny ground, with area fires, hinder movement along land choke points  with interdictive fires  and destroy specific fixed targets with aimed indirect fires.  
 
Light gun vs. Mortar is a difference of several kilometers in favour of the gun.
But not relevant as to the high angle effect. The mortar will be with the infantry, yes? If the helo can lug in a 155 to fire support the troopers as they climb Afghanistan's rugged hills, then your argument for a 105 is moot. That is mortar country anayway. Anything mechanized that requires artillery support will require a 155 for SMASH.
 
By definition of terrain-a city would be either mortars, rockets or 155s, lots of concrete to SMASH.
 
SMASH definition. The total amount of measured work you do upon an object through the combined effects of kinetic and chemical energy as a result of the local event you created when you hit your object with the projectile. Commonly expressed as joules.  
Mixed logistics may be a problem, but are you throwing out the baby with the bathwater? From a US standpoint, probably not. From a UK standpoint, not so sure.
Only case where I would use the 105 is a Falklands and I'm not sure that a 120 mortar wouldn't have worked.
Buy HIMARS? No thanks, we'll take LIMAWS(R), ta very much. Very similar capability, a few tonnes (or so) lighter. 
Suit yourself. That extra tonnage has a purpose. Besides; you know I LOVE Lockmart.  
An 81mm mortar and a light mortar are so different that you're comparing helicopters and Toblerones. Well, maybe not that different, but they are utterly different beasts. These aren't  the US-style 60mm with a base, bipod etc., but what's called a Commando mortar - the old 2" and the newer 51mm could both be carried and operated by one man, in addition to his rifle and other kit, with more bombs distributed around the platoon. Rocket launchers are nice in MOUT (or FIBUA, or FISH, as you like it) but they're less effective when you're out in Afghanistan
 
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perfectgeneral       11/13/2007 7:56:29 AM
Interesting to hear peoples comments on personnel levels. I was hoping to free up space for lower ranks by cutting the leadership back to around 17% of the overall force. Although the RAF has more brass than it can polish maybe I have cut back, in the sense of not increasing to match the new 'platforms'/formations. Some of the older items on my list are existing capabilities that I haven't scrapped/replaced.

For those unfamiliar with the UK Army the regiments and brigades overlap, they aren't separate units. So I'm only considering 11 front line brigades here.

The parachute division (a small one) is possible given four spare battalions of paras, but I want to keep to brigades outside of a hot war. Having more than one brigade of each role is more about rotation and resting than forming divisions from them, but I guess divisional HQs need training too. With this scale of army independent brigades are the status quo while divisions are drawn up from them to fit circumstances.

The point about repeating the structure of RM in the army is well made, but I believe there is a practical limit to the size of RM that can be raised in peacetime without conscription.
Rivalry between the two arms of the commando could work against us, but in a culture of joint forces the shared training facilities and equipment will help bridge between the army and navy.

You can't have three CVF without at least nine Daring class, preferably twelve, as stated. The large frigates are intended for CVF escort, so I only want twelve. All patrol work would be taken up by the light independent cruisers and the large corvettes.

Thank you all for taking the time to comment. Many people feel that the UK armed forces are under strength. I feel we should explore where that strength is needed and what is required to fit the bill.

 
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Lawman       11/13/2007 8:50:45 AM
I take your point about the Division vs Brigade structure, though I would just like to say that I wasn't really talking about the Division as anything other than a general grouping. The idea is basically similar to the RAF's new Expeditionary Air Wing concept, with the Division actually being nothing more than a basing arrangement, with limited administrative duties (i.e. not a deployable force). The units of action would be the Brigades, which would each be two battalions strong, plus artillery, engineers etc... Obviously the alternative is to do the same thing, but with Brigades instead of Divisions, and just have four deployable battalions, as battlegroups. The aim with pairing the light infantry with Marines and Paras is basically just to group them together, and boost their operational strength, so that they can be deployed as a complete unit.
 
 
As for Herald's point about FRES still being ambitious, I am not sure I agree - it originally was, but it now looks like FRES is turning into pretty much a straight procurement of either Boxer, Piranha (Stryker) or VBCI. A lot of the advanced stuff seems to be being canned...
 
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perfectgeneral       11/13/2007 9:04:21 AM

I take your point about the Division vs Brigade structure, though I would just like to say that I wasn't really talking about the Division as anything other than a general grouping. The idea is basically similar to the RAF's new Expeditionary Air Wing concept, with the Division actually being nothing more than a basing arrangement, with limited administrative duties (i.e. not a deployable force).

Sounds like the large Regiment's job to me.

 
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Lawman       11/13/2007 6:06:25 PM
The problem with that is that you then would have three completely different uses of the word 'regiment' - the regiment as a recruiting area/unit, the regiment as parent for deployable battlegroups of a common type, and the regiment as a unit of action for armour. I would much rather just have regiments as regiments, and then have them provide a pool of men into the Divisions, which would then be of a single role. The regiments would probably all be nominally 'infantry', but then have individuals go into the airborne, marine or armoured units. Some units, like the various guards units would probably be primarily light armour units, but most units would remain infantry.
 
The most important thing is to ensure all the units of action actually deploy with a full complement of troops and equipment, rather than just a rough approximation of full TOE. Another big change I would like to see would be a re-doing of equipment allocations, such that every unit gets a full set of kit assigned, and then can dish it out as needed, rather than the unit having to beg, borrow and steal just to get the equipment they are meant to have. Ideally, logistics would be primarily handled through the parent Division, back in the UK, and shipped with the units when they deploy.
 
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flamingknives       11/13/2007 6:48:30 PM
Herald:

LCS - specifics or general ideas. a 24 hour requirement seems like a specific feature of the US fiasco.
The main problems I can see, from this side of the pond, with the LCS project are that the customer keeps on adding requirements at later stages in the design and the cost of building materials are increasing somewhat. IIRC 30-50% of the LM LCS cost growth was materials. No doubt the same was true with GD, but theirs is slightly behind in production terms, so the effects are felt later.

HIMARS and LIMAWS(R) are both LM products, the difference being that LIMAWS(R) has a much higher UK content. And is lighter, mainly due to removing the traversing launcher and using an inherently lighter platform.

51mm mortar illum seems to be better than 30 seconds and considering that standard UK platoon tactics (at one point, at least) was "two up and bags of smoke", the smoke capability isn't one to be discarded lightly. It's the only mortar that is likely to be with the infantry if they are patrolling or any other situation where the battlion isn't grouped together inside a 6km circle or so. Which also relates to 105s vs mortars. 105s seem to work nicely for light infantry operations (Paras and Commandos) and to draw a WW2 analogy, using 155s as a basic calibre is like using a 4.5" gun rather than 25pdrs.

105s are lighter, more mobile and have easier individual resupply (three 105 shells to one 155).

I don't like the idea that artillery can win the day for you - the basis of destructive fires - because it is repeatedly shown not to work, you have to commit infantry to take the ground. The Somme is a prime example, Vietnam another and the way things seem to be going in Afghanistan is yet another. Napoleon may have said "God fights on the side with the best artillery" but he never specified what  he expected the artillery to do.

NH90 would be nice, if you could get them.

Perfectgeneral:

With Sabre etc., those systems are out of service now. They are not part of any operational unit - they're either sold, scrapped or hiding in the back of a warehouse somewhere.

What we need is a government who will honour the spending pledges that they have made for existing projects - get the Typhoons, the Carriers, FRES - and are willing to properly support the troops. Primarily, operational expenditure is additional to any defence budget, so you don't end up cutting your capability to fight politically expedient wars.

Add to that better care for service personnel - housing in service, access to housing after, financial planning, medical care, help getting jobs in the civilian sector, insurance, support to dependents during operations or after berevement. There's a whole heap of things that ought to be made better but get squeezed but budgetry restrictions.

Sort out MoD procurement. The mind boggles at some of the things they come up with. Get them to compete things properly rather than throwing it down to their mates at QinetiQ. Stop the joint programme silliness, where one piece of work is split out to so many different people that admin takes half of the value and no-one has a scooby-doo what the heck is going on.

The points about FRES by Lawman seem spot on. FRES has gone from being an all-singing, all-dancing, force-field-protected wonder-weapon to being the state of play about seven or eight years ago with something almost entirely like Boxer (originally a programme that the UK was a major part of), before MoD procurement got swept up in the silly airportable super-lightweight, fit-in-a-C130 tin box fever that has wasted a very large amount of money, time and goodwill. I doubt that I will ever understand why a small fraction of the money available was not thrown into lifting-body airship design. With a projected 1,000 tonne capacity, you could lift a company in Warriors in one go. Kind of beats the snot out of 1 under-protected, extremely expensive computer room in a C130. So I would suggest that a UK research project be conducted, possibly buying patents off LM.



 
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Herald1234       11/13/2007 10:23:37 PM

Herald:

LCS - specifics or general ideas. a 24 hour requirement seems like a specific feature of the US fiasco.
The main problems I can see, from this side of the pond, with the LCS project are that the customer keeps on adding requirements at later stages in the design and the cost of building materials are increasing somewhat. IIRC 30-50% of the LM LCS cost growth was materials. No doubt the same was true with GD, but theirs is slightly behind in production terms, so the effects are felt later.
1. Those listed were/are specifics required.
2.  LM screwed up program management and the Navy dropped the ball. The LM architects were dishonest as were the estimators. The engineers kept telling those idiots that you couldn't multi-mission at the estimates. GD program managers to keep in the game did the same. PEO with the LPD-17/DDX fiascoes in the works lied to CBO and GAO as well as the DoD Inspector General. Somebody needs to clean that place out. 
3. Raw materials are not that significant of a % of the overruns. Like the Virginias, the cost overruns are related to redesign to fit NMRS and customer/end-user callbacks. The guys actually testing the simulations/units keep finding design faults to original specs in the two designs as submitted and built, and the changes and charges keep adding up.  At least the builds quality is good. No Avondale with people going to jail-yet.  
HIMARS and LIMAWS(R) are both LM products, the difference being that LIMAWS(R) has a much higher UK content. And is lighter, mainly due to removing the traversing launcher and using an inherently lighter platform.
There is nothing wrong with the LM engineers and shop floor, but the program managers and the business director end of modern LM is almost as evil as THALES. I hate those bastards. I wouldn't be surprised that when you get LIMAWS[R] you'll discover it costs twice as much as it should have. The pivot table in HIMARs is a launch from the march capability. maybe the UK doesn't need it, but the US does to conform to our mobility doctrine. 
51mm mortar illum seems to be better than 30 seconds and considering that standard UK platoon tactics (at one point, at least) was "two up and bags of smoke", the smoke capability isn't one to be discarded lightly. It's the only mortar that is likely to be with the infantry if they are patrolling or any other situation where the battalion isn't grouped together inside a 6km circle or so. Which also relates to 105s vs mortars. 105s seem to work nicely for light infantry operations (Paras and Commandos) and to draw a WW2 analogy, using 155s as a basic calibre is like using a 4.5" gun rather than 25pdrs.
1. Okay, you convinced me. Nice to have if you can hump it, but given US infantry tactics and mass/logistics issues I want those rocket launchers.
2.  US experience out of WWII and since is that the 105 is too light for most point targets with inadequate work delivered in the projectiles.  The 155 seems about right, while the 203 is vast overkill. As I said, if the situation is the Falklands then a [towed] 105 makes sense, but only just with a force without SP/120 mortars. The range increment is insignificant for the logistics footprint you have, the likely battlespace, and the infantry support that artillery delivers to British infantry as you describe it used in that SMASH range. There are differences here that are national doctrinal and logistic.      
105s are lighter, more mobile and have easier individual resupply (three 105 shells to one 155).
Agreed on facts but not on desired effects or the possible logistics burden to the force. 
I don't like the idea that artillery can win the day for you - the basis of destructive fires - because it is repeatedly shown not to work, you have to commit infantry to take the ground. The Somme is a prime example, Vietnam another and the way things seem to be going in Afghanistan is yet another. Napoleon may have said "God fights on the side with the best artillery" but he never specified what  he expected the artillery to do.
US experience again is that infantry takes the grounds and holds it
 
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Lawman       11/14/2007 7:21:47 AM
I disagree strongly on the 105mm issue Herald, FK is right, the 105 has consistently been proven in UK service, especially in the assault role. The 105mm rounds can land pretty close to friendly troops, and not hurt them, allowing them to surge forward immediately afterwards, as was done in the Falklands, where a 155mm wouldn't have allowed this. I do agree that the 155mm is much better for smashing enemy defences, and crumbling buildings, but I actually feel this should be a complementary capability, not a panacea.
 
When it comes to mortars vs howitzers, i.e. 105mm  vs 120mm, I think it is important to note the pretty big range difference. This difference is very significant, with the 105 capable of around double the range of the 120 - with older style versions of both, it was around 8km vs 16km, and with newer versions (tube and round), it can be as much as 16km vs 32km. Take a look at the new Denel (or whatever they're calling it this week) G7 105mm, or even the BAE/UD V2C2.
 
Please don't get me wrong, I love mortars, but I generally favour the higher rate of fire of the 81mm, at the very least for the support fires role. The 81mm can put rounds out to a good enough range, and can be more ably carried at both battalion and company level. I do like some aspects of the 120mm mortar, especially some of the newer anti-tank rounds, but I believe the ideal mix is to go for a three-tier mix of 81mm mortars, and 105 and 155mm howitzers, to provide appropriate fire support for the right people, in the right mission. The 81mm would move with the manouvre units, the 105mm guns would be deployed with the battalion, for support of dispersed units, and 155mm guns would be held at brigade level, to smash point targets. This will become more and more important when rounds like Excalibur (or rounds with the new PGK guidance kit, which I love the idea of) come online, which will allow the larger artillery to stand in for some of the close support role previously done by the Air Force.
 
As for FRES still having bells and whistles, it is certainly my understanding that most of these have been put on the back burner (very far back...). I would hope that the main fancy equipment fitted amounts to proper working radios, and hopefully a 'blue force tracker' or FBCB2 system. To this end, I sincerely wish that the UK would invest in its own version of the Wideband Gapfiller Satellite system, to allow the UK to have more than enough bandwidth, especially for support of BFT systems and UAVs.
 
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