Well, I'll need somebody better versed in this battle than myself, as I'm disarmed without my Catton books. I seem to recall, though, that Catton did make a strong argument about repeated exhortations by Lee to Ewell to come on to the north end, with the natural expectation that Ewell would seize the Culp Hill heights before sunset (late, in early July), and was intensely disappointed that this had not occurred. I also thought that Union forces had retreated from the town of Gettysburg back up the heights of Cemetary Ridge in some disarray without having secured the northern sweep of Cemetary Hill east to Culp's Hill. While temporary, and made right by sunset, there was a window of opportunity that may have existed. IIRC, Ewell had taken command of Jackson's old corps, was still not recovered from his amputation?; and that, had Jackson been alive, he would have seen to the prompt occupation of Culp's Hill. Lee, too, comes in for considerable criticism, owing to his rather casual command style. Hardly "in your face", his orders were often very open to interpretation by his subordinate commanders. This was perhaps fine to somebody of Jackson's brilliance, but for Richard Ewell some have suggested that he needed noticably more detailed instruction. It would seem, also, that J.E.B. Stuart required similar close attention in retrospect.

Maybe I am off, but I am pretty sure Rhodes and Early came in from the north of Gettysburg that first day, with only part of the XI and a small portion of the XII between them and high ground (or maybe I recall incorrectly). Ewell came in from the west, did he not? Or am I mixing Early and Ewell up? And A.P. Hills Corp had already had their fill at McPherson's Farm and Seminary Ridge. All accounts I read was that Lee had seen a glimmer of hope to take Culp's Hill that first day, and even pressed A.P. Hill to Get-R-Done. Anyway, Lee deffinately had the advantage going into the first-day, when considering troop numbers and positioning...a breakdown had to have occured somewhere that day in-order for the ANV to not have taken advantage. -------- Albany, I see you lean towards saving Vicksburg. Do you feel the northern citizenry had had their fill with the war? I had often wondered weather or not it was great enough to have brought and end, especially if the North had not had a string of successes, such as Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Vapid

O.O. Howard made sure he left forces to cover Culp's Hill and Cemetary Ridge...particulalry artillery. And maybe the rememberance of what Union artillery on ahill did the previous year (to the day) at Malvern Hill slowed down the Confederates. I will look through my library and get some sources for you on this. Vicksburg was a much mor eimportant battle for 2 main reasons 1. It cut the Trans Mississippi off from the rest of the Confederacy and opened up the entire length of the river (once Grand Gulf fell 2 weeks later). 2. It caused the complete destruction of a Confederate field army. If Meade had been beaten on the 2d day, his forces were still in better shape thanb the ANV. There were still forces around Washington he could draw on and his Pipe Creek plan was still viable. Not to mention his cavalry was in better shape. Finally, Lee was not on friendly ground. That said the Northern public were stil positive about the war in July 1863. The following July would really be the nadir for the uNion after the bloodletting of the Overland Campaign and Kennesaw Mountain.

"Vicksburg was a much mor eimportant battle for 2 main reasons 1. It cut the Trans Mississippi off from the rest of the Confederacy and opened up the entire length of the river (once Grand Gulf fell 2 weeks later). 2. It caused the complete destruction of a Confederate field army." AR, I'll tell you, I'm not sure where the greater importance lies. I don't believe that Lee marched north for the hell of it. I do, instead, believe that he felt compelled to defeat (destroy?)the AOP. I believe that he sensed that time was working against the south. Surely if he knew of the precarious state in which Pemberton found himself, and the unlikeliness of Grant losing with a winning hand, then Lee would see the handwriting on the wall for the south. As you've pointed out, and which is absolutely beyond dispute, Vicksburg was the link to Arkansas, Texas, and much of Louisiana. Still, bear in mind that with the capture of Vicksburg, the south continued fighting for an additional 21 months. My allusion to Kursk in an earlier thread, therefore, may have some relevance. Like "Citadel", Gettysburg, too, would be a beacon to the world, attracting the permanent and overt support, hopefully, of England. Like the Germans at "Citadel", the confederate forces of the AVN were the pre-eminent force in the world at that time, superbly led and trained, and possessing exceptional motivation. And, as I suggested earlier, these men possessed the unconscious knowledge that this would was their last opportunity to seize the course of the war, particularly in light of what was unfolding in Vicksburg. Too, I believe that Lee took great heart in the muddled command picture of the AOP, not believing that Meade could assemble a battlestaff worthy of the fight before them. Further, I suspect that he believed that were the ANV to emerge victorious, the AOP would be plunged into yet another leadership crisis and be incapable of reconstituting itself in time to save the capitol. All to his advantage. My thoughts. I can't recall if their origins lie in something read somewhere back ("The Killer Angels" could easily have speculated in this direction). Do you know if Ewell or Lee was aware that Howard had occupied Culp's Hill in force?

Lee's attack north, in part, was an attempt to draw Union resources from West to help the situation in Mississippi. That was one of his stated reasons to Jeff Davis in his request for permission to attack north. As for Gettysburg turning into a Confederate Saratoga....that chance was lost once the Emmanciaption Proclamation had gone inot effect. No Britsh or French government could survive if they had recognized a slave owning CSA....perhaps Lincoln's second best move of the war (Grant was his best) was issuing the Emmancipation after Antietam. It checked any diplomatic moves the French or Brits could make...and those were really the only 2 countries that mattered. As for the Mississippi being open....what is often lost in the study of the Civil War is the tremendous impact the sale of American wheat to European countries had on how thsoe companies acted towards the US. Until Vicksburg, that wheat went through the Great Lakes to Buffalo, down the Erie canal to the Hudson and out through New York. With the Mississippi open, all kinds of pent up economic activity could now pass south through New Orleans and out to the world. If anything, it had a greater economic impact for the uNion...which increased its power.

For me, there's no question of the fall of Vicksburg following the confederate loss of Jackson, Miss. It was etched in stone whether Pemberton temporarily abandoned his fortifications or not. Porter's running of the river proved that the city could (and was)flanked, finally to be besieged altogether. Done deal, subject to time and nothing else. You know that Grant was like a pit bull and, latched on, wasn't going to let go. As for the ANV marching north partially out of hope to lift pressure from Vicksburg, wasn't the city largely besieged by early June when Lee crossed over from Virginia? If so, then his hope was forlorn, unless his reason was a deception for Jeff Davis' ears. Both men should have realized that Grant could do relatively little to aid the AOP by direct reinforcement in that short time, especially with Pemberton in his grasp. Moreover, both men should have realized that there was little they could do for Pemberton by their actions in Pennsylvania. Your analysis of the effect overseas of the Emancipation Proclamation probably is spot-on. Still, if that is so, doesn't the notion of a southern victory at Gettysburg lend more, not less importance to its outcome? I can't imagine a Union defeat at Vicksburg, once Jackson, Miss. fell. I can imagine a Union defeat at Gettysburg. Can you? If so, what are the consequences to the north? My suggestion about the possible disarray with the AOP's leadership, were that the outcome, might have value. Without knowing the nature of the south's victory at Gettysburg, it's difficult to tell just how Lee may have been able to exploit that success. Certainly, with Stuart back in the fold, Lee had regained some ability to press the pursuit, should the battle have unfolded in that manner. You're probably right. But I sense that, because of your excellent point about the Emancipation Proclamation, the sense of urgency for the south may have been overwhelming by Gettysburg, whether there was benefit to be had from Europe, or not. Actually, in the certainty of the absence of forthcoming help from Europe, the requirement to impose a catastrophic defeat on the AOP, quickly, may have been overwhelming. I suspect that I have no chance of convincing you of my position, and I've fired my last rounds (I think).

Yes, I had confusion (just a tad anyway), Ewell's 2nd Corp came from the North on that first-day, and yes Ewell was slow to move. A.P. Hill seems to have moved aggressively with Heth's Division. I do honestly believe Ewell could have taken Culp's that first-day. There was little between him and that strategic point. -------- S-2, I agree that Vicksburg was paramount to the survivability of the south; I only find myself questioning which was the better decision. ------ AR, you stated even if Lee had defeated the AOP in Gettysburg by the 2d-Day then he still would have been at a disadvantage. But what would have been the bigger picture? Lee would be positioned between the AOP and Washington...who would have benefited the most from such a positioning? Vapid

"S-2, I agree that Vicksburg was paramount to the survivability of the south; I only find myself questioning which was the better decision." I can't argue about the strategic importance of Vicksburg to the south's ability to sustain itself militarily or politically. Dividing a nation during war can never be underestimated, particularly when the vehicle to that division is the Mississippi River. What I can argue is the indenfensibility of Vicksburg by early June. The predictability of outcome for the south, admittedly in hindsight, appears clear with the Union capture of Vicksburg- unless there's a profound shift in the battlefield calculus near the real strategic center of gravity, Washington D.C./Richmond, Va. Again, while critical to the long term sustainability of the CSA, Vicksburg's capture did not immediately render the south incapable of continuing the war. As I stated earlier, the war continued for an additional 21 months. If Meade loses at Gettysburg, depending upon the nature of that defeat, any Union victory at Vicksburg would be rendered moot under the circumstances of space and time. Anyway, that's what I think. What do you mean by "...which was the better decision."?

What do you mean by "...which was the better decision."? Invading the North, or sending troops from the ANV to Vicksburg. It wasn't until recently, did I start reading about the feelings about the War by Northern citizens. As to Vicksburg, I am not well as read on the western theater as I am on the eastern. I think Lee was looking for divine intervention when he embarked on his Northern Campaign...whipping the AOP to the point of making it ineffective would have been just such a feat. Vapid

"I think Lee was looking for divine intervention..." Kinda like going to a Grateful Dead concert without a ticket back in the day and saying, "I need a miracle". Actually, I wonder a bit at Lee's state of mind following Jackson's death. I do believe that he was bent on seeking battle with the AOP, hoping to turn the issue one way or the other. A good Lee biographer would be helpful now. So much of this battle came down to his shoulders alone. His thoughts would be worth gold to most civil war historians.