Hey I can read a map just fine!!!! Its the words that goof me up!! And the distance is more like 150 miles.....all along US 15/17.

When looking at Gettysburg; as much of an all or nothing operation that it was, do you guys think that the loss there had a lot to do with Lee's restructuring of the ANV? I have wondered if the South would have held out longer, maybe to the point of the Union advocating their stance on the war, had Lee sent forces to the west instead of gambling so much on the invasion of the North, leading to Gettysburg. The South would not have had the resources to win at that time, but by buying time, would the North have given-up the cause? Vicksburg would fall on July 4th, the day after Gettysburg, a major stroke against Southern morale. Personally, I had always felt Lee made the only decision that made sense, by conducting that operation into the North, but had always be curius about the possible outcomes had Jefferson Davis decided otherwise. Vapid

I can't imagine that, so long as Lincoln was our president, that the north would accept anything short of the complete reunification of the nation. That being said, the summer of 1863 saw curious failings on the part of southern commanders not heretofor predictable; 1.) Joe Johnston advising Pemberton to abandon the city, which Pemberton initially refused to do, IAW his orders from Jeff Davis to hold the city. He then debunks the city, in contravention of his presidential orders and leaving his meticulous fortifications, only to run into Grant's forces coming up from the south, having been ferried across the river by Porter's gunboats and fresh off their capture of the major rail junction at Jackson, Miss. The orders were clear and the defended position (Vicksburg) was strategic to the south's chances of survival... which were excellent if you consider the quality of Lee's forces in the east by late June as the marched through thoroughfare gap in Pennsylvania. Unusually absent from the overall excellence of confederate performance, however, is 2.) J.E.B. Stuart's handling of the ANV's reconnaisance and screening operations. Instead of adhering to his orders to screen the movement of the ANV, Stuart's decision to conduct a massive cavalry raid through Pennsylvania leaves Lee blind to stumble into the most massive meeting engagement of that, or perhaps any war-on unfavorable terrain. Why unfavorable terrain. The answer is two-fold. Unlike Stuart, John Buford understood and executed his mission with perfect eloquence. Buford's Cavalry screened the movements of Meade's forces, holding McPherson's ridge long enough for Reynold's corps (with the redoubtable "Iron Bde.")to hold off both Heth and Rodes' divisions, ensuring that it was Meade, not Lee that seized the dominant terrain east of town at Cemetary Ridge and Culp's Hill. Finally, the old master himself, Lee, mis-stepped. Rather than recognizing both the superiority of the terrain in possession by the Union and his lack of knowledge about the full nature of the forces in front of him (the entire AOP) he gives battle, ignoring the sage advice of his most trusted lieutenant, James Longstreet, to avoid this battlefield at all costs. What a battle! While Meade is as guilty of failing to destroy the ANV in the aftermath of Gettysburg as McClellan was at Sharpsburg, unlike McClellan, Meade recognized favorable terrain (thanks to Reynolds, Doubleday, and Han's help)and circumstances and fought when it mattered most to our nation. It is more than a bit beautifully mysterious how these two epic battles were largely resolved on the 4th of July. IIRC, the opening scenes of "The Killer Angels" described the incredible heat, thirst, and determination of the union riflemen as they marched to battle that day of July 1st, and all through the night-many not arriving until dawn of July 2, without sleep, and about to enter the hell that was the Roundtops, Peach Orchard, Culp's Hill, the Devil's den, and the wheatfield. As important as Vicksburg was to the south, all would have been made right had Lee flanked Meade, placing the ANV between AOP and Washington D.C. or, won the race to Gettysburg and seized the key terrain, or turned the Union's flank at the roundtops. So many small moments in time that led, culmulatively, to the defense of our nation. Gettysburg, for three days, is the defining event in American history.

In the aftermath of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville perhaps Lee and Stuart were affected by hubris. Perhaps the past successes of the ANV had lead to carelessness, impatience and an unwillingness to be circumspect. Perhaps the ANV was siezed with an obsession with bringing about a quick end to the war. Who can say that McClellan would not have won the 1864 election had Lee maintained the defensive and especially if he had supplied support for Vicksburg instead of taking the war to the North. I have read that a seige is the least economical of all military operations. Tying up a disproportionately large Federal force must have favored the South holding on to Vicksburg as a matter of pure military strategy.

One thing I have wondered about - given the high stakes implied in invading the North, why did not Lee just march north away from Meade? Why didn't he maintain a safe distance and watch for an opportunity strike the AOP when he had all the advantages on his side? Was Lee unable to cut loose from his supply lines and capture and gather from the land? Did the absence of Stuart render this impossible?

A couple of rebuttals to your thoughts. Just because the south believes Vicksburg to be critically important to their ultimate survival doesn't mean that they possessed either the means to defend. If it was important to the south, then too, it's importance was clearly recognized by the north. It may be suggested that the reason behind Meade's temporary promotion to CinC, AOP lay in the realization that the two best Union commanders were on the correct side of the country (for the time being). It may be that Lincoln trusted Grant to complete this most difficult and important of tasks more than any other. Too, were that true, then it should be assumed that the north was prepared to meet any increase in the south's defensive posture about Vicksburg, to include reinforcements, and even raise the ante. I don't, in short, believe that Lincoln would allow inadequate union forces in the west to be the reason for the failure to capture Vicksburg. Neither did Joe Johnston, who suggested that Pemberton abscond from Vicksburg. Johnston realized that no amount of confederate forces could reinforce the city such that it's survival could be assured. If these conditions were so, then it goes far to explain the importance of Lee in Pennsylvania. No other reason beside this being the Confederacy's "Kursk" (if you follow my analogy to another early July battle), could explain his presence in Pennsylvania. I have no doubt that it was Lee's intention to give battle to the AOP on favorable terrain, and destroy it-thus rendering Washington D.C. helpless, and ending the war. Why? Because holding Vicksburg for six months in a siege, only to lose it (inefficient siege methods notwithstanding)wouldn't matter a whit to a confederacy that had no legs left by mid 1863. It had become all or nothing, and this was Lee's "Hail Mary". Without a cataclysmic change to the political landscape, to include a supportive England, there would be no final victory for the south. As for Gettysburg itself, Pennsylvania was quite adequate to sustain Lee's forces for the near term, though he was personally hesitant to encourage aggressive foraging parties in the Pennsylvania countryside. Still, it happened, with, IIRC, much of the ANV being reshodded courtesy of the Dutch shoemakers in the area. Also, IIRC, there was some hesitancy to evoke images of the Union army in the Shenandoah valley. Still, supplies weren't a central issue. His crossing sites on the Rappahonock (used for his retreat later)were only 40 miles away, close enough that the bulk of his defeated forces were over the river within two days of his order for a general retreat. Two points of failure for Lee were Stuart, and faith. Certainly, Stuart's gross negligence placed his entire fledgling nation at the chopping block, and remains forever unforgivable. It was one thing for Meade to meet Lee at Gettysburg. It was altogether worse to do so as a "meeting engagement" on unfamiliar terrain in a hostile nation facing the full weight of the largest army in the world at that point. Worse again, was the absence of Stuart holding Cemetary Hill (and ridge), or terrain even further east, blinding Buford, and screening Lee from Reynold's approach-exactly what Buford did that Stuart couldn't. To this day it remains inexplicable what Stuart must have been thinking. Amazingly, though, the ANV still had opportunities to reverse Stuart's failings. The failure to secure Culp's Hill on the first day, and the inability of Hood and Law to turn the 21st Maine at the Little Roundtop and roll up the Union lines along Cemetary Ridge on day two stand out in my mind. Funny enough that this attack came out of Longstreet's corps, when it had been him who counseled Lee to forego the battle and look to flank the AOP, coming between it and Washington D.C. on terrain of the south's choosing. I believe that Lee seriously considered breaking off the fight. I believe that he chose to carry through the battle 1.)not arrogance, but a decisive sense of faith in his men to carry the day, and 2.) his inability to explain to those men why he had chosen NOT to give battle when the enemy was before them. I believe that Lee felt he would lose the confidence of his men were he not to display that same confidence in them now. Like virtually every German soldier at Kursk, Johnny Reb knew this was their last, best shot; and pychologically, it had to happen at Gettysburg. Without criticizing Lee, I sense a type of angst to confront this notion of a confederacy full bore, once and for all, and bring matters to their conclusion. Almost as though the absence of information from Stuart only served to reinforce Lee with the idea that the spiritual hand of God intended for him to fight at Gettysburg under the conditions as they existed. One epic throw of the dice.

Oh jeez, I see that my questions were in no way simple. My points to how I feel about Lee taking it to the North, S2 covered very well. However, CJH, I appreciate the other input as well. But, S2, if I recall my history...the citizenry of the North were about fed-up. Protests, riots, and so-on. I do not think it would have mattered so much of Lincoln's resolve to carry the war forward, but I question the resolve of the citizens themselves. I speak about the NY City draft riots(of course Detroit was pretty bloody as well), the $300 draft exemption fee, the idea that it was a "poormans war", or as often heard (no offense, just a quote)the "nigger war". Walt Whitman called the riots, "the Devil's Own Work." As to Stuart, I have often read that much of that blame lay with the restructuring of the ANV. Though I have read the restructuring caused miscommunication between Lee and Stuart, I have never heard exactly how. That many of the southern officers were now responsible for forces much greater in size than they had experinced, leading to some slow movement on their part. A.P. Hills Corp was a bit slow to get going, and if I recall so was Early's? But yes I agree, Stuart did fail to do his part, and would also agree that Lee comitted to an aggressive role, when he probably could have gone defensive, or outflanked (though I am not much of a Longstreet fan). Meade was deffinately eager to engage Lee, something that would/could have been adventageous to Lee, given Meade's temperment. But Meade didn't even arrive until the second day. Was Lee aware Meade had taken over? But I would agree that 20/20 hindsight and is another matter; as to what Lee was thinking or considering on that first day and into the second...would have loved to be a fly on a wall, or horses arse. =) Vapid

Oh jeez, I see that my questions were in no way simple. My points to how I feel about Lee taking it to the North, S2 covered very well. However, CJH, I appreciate the other input as well. But, S2, if I recall my history...the citizenry of the North were about fed-up. Protests, riots, and so-on. I do not think it would have mattered so much of Lincoln's resolve to carry the war forward, but I question the resolve of the citizens themselves. I speak about the NY City draft riots(of course Detroit was pretty bloody as well), the $300 draft exemption fee, the idea that it was a "poormans war", or as often heard (no offense, just a quote)the "nigger war". Walt Whitman called the riots, "the Devil's Own Work." As to Stuart, I have often read that much of that blame lay with the restructuring of the ANV. Though I have read the restructuring caused miscommunication between Lee and Stuart, I have never heard exactly how. That many of the southern officers were now responsible for forces much greater in size than they had experinced, leading to some slow movement on their part. A.P. Hills Corp was a bit slow to get going, and if I recall so was Early's? But yes I agree, Stuart did fail to do his part, and would also agree that Lee comitted to an aggressive role, when he probably could have gone defensive, or outflanked (though I am not much of a Longstreet fan). Meade was deffinately eager to engage Lee, something that would/could have been adventageous to Lee, given Meade's temperment. But Meade didn't even arrive until the second day. Was Lee aware Meade had taken over? But I would agree that 20/20 hindsight and is another matter; as to what Lee was thinking or considering on that first day and into the second...would have loved to be a fly on a wall, or horses arse. =) Vapid

Richard Ewell was particularly slow on the evening of the first day, when Culp's Hill could have been had. I believe that there was some confusion among Lee's staff as to who was in command of the AOP. Understandable, as Lincoln had appointed Meade on the 28th of June. What was Lee thinking...yeah, to know his mind during those two days, to actually hear his counsel from others and to be within the mix of contradictory thoughts that must have been racing through him. Imagine, so little time. The AOP right in front of him. His forces gathered. The momentum towards battle evidently won the decision, but it's something that I'll probably never fully comprehend. It's all part of the alchemy of command at that level. In this case, Lee's wizardry failed him miserably.

Vicksburg gets my vote (of course it was a chapter of my thesis!!) The ANV could not have taken Culp's Hill.....tomuch artillery was in place and Howard did leave on full division in place when his XI Corps moved north through Gettysburg....with other Union troops following closely.